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This research concerns the exercise of state power over non-citizens in a middle-
income developing country with foreign labour dependency. Drawing on Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of sovereign, disciplinary and governmental power, I examine how 
Malaysia regulates four categories of non-citizens: authorised migrant workers; 
migrants with irregular status; foreign spouses of Malaysian citizens; and, asylum 
seekers, refugees, and stateless persons. I examine the structure and significance of 
the different immigration control regimes, highlighting the experiences of non-
citizens. I review case law, examining how the status and rights of non-citizens have 
been adjudicated. I identify the mentalities, techniques and objectives of government, 
which bear on how these non-citizens have been conceptualised and placed in 
Malaysia. 
 
I argue that Malaysia has taken both a deliberate approach to immigration control as 
well as an accommodative one, the former applied to migrant workers (documented 
and with irregular status), the latter to foreign spouses and asylum-seeking 
populations. State authorities do not aim to ‘govern best’ as governmentality scholars 
would assume; instead, state authorities pursue the achievement of plural (and 
sometimes contradictory) objectives. This is the cause of the frequent changes in 
policies concerning foreign labour. This belies the relatively constant nature of the 
attitudes of state authorities to non-citizens and the continuity of their objectives of 
government over the past two decades. 
 
I argue that the state exercises governmental power through fostering the development 




contribution to the ‘nation’ are accorded greater rights and freedoms. Those at the 
lowest end of the hierarchy, demonised as ‘illegal immigrants’, are deemed to have 
few rights (if any) and suffer from the poor protection of these rights. The state 
creates this hierarchy by dividing non-citizens and using immigration control to 
delimit their rights and freedoms. It maintains this hierarchy through the deployment 
of sovereign and disciplinary power. It exercises sovereign power through classifying 
individuals as being ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ and punishing transgressors of the law. It 
exercises disciplinary power through surveillance, inspection, and the creation of 
relations of dependence on citizens through the sponsorship-based system of passes. I 
suggest that sovereign power delimits the field of acceptable behaviour for non-
citizens  (or the field of legal freedoms); disciplinary power regulates behaviour, 
keeping populations ‘in check’ so that they don’t breach these limits; while 
governmental power is used to produce self-regulation and willing compliance.  
 
I argue that state authorities in Malaysia rely more heavily on sovereign and 
disciplinary power than on governmental power when managing non-citizens. They 
do so because they view non-citizens as (temporary) ‘outsiders’ – separate entities 
external to the body politic who must be controlled and regulated, rather than 
‘insiders’ who must be persuaded, consulted and influenced because their thoughts, 
feelings, and votes matter. This case study suggests that governmentality scholars 
need to consider the specificities of the relationship between state authorities and 
different types of subjects – paying particular attention to differences between (state-
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CHAPTER ONE: STATE POWER, CITIZENSHIP AND POPULATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
The movement of people is a key feature in shaping societies. Movement facilitates 
the spread of ideas, the juxtaposition of diverse cultures, the exchange of goods and 
services, and the creation of new socio-political identities. Movement has the capacity 
to change the relationship between people and states – with movement across political 
borders, citizens in one country become non-citizens in another. Of the 6.8 billion 
people in the world, an estimated 214 million live outside of their country of birth, a 
number “greater than at any time in history” (Ban 2009:2). 
 
International law allows states to specify their own criteria for citizenship. In most 
cases, this is obtained by operation of law on the basis of birth in the territory of the 
state (jus soli), biological descent (jus sanguinis), by registration, or by naturalization 
after legal entry and residence. In order for individuals to enjoy full rights as citizens 
in the modern state, their legal status must be recognized administratively, through the 
issuance of identity documents such as birth certificates, passports and identity cards. 
Citizens are able to participate in law making and government (Castles and Davidson 
2000); they are entitled to state protection of their civil, political, social and economic 
rights (Marshall 1992; Turner 1990). Importantly, citizens have the right to reside 
indefinitely in the territory of the state as well as to leave and re-enter it freely.1 
 
In the state-centric model of sovereignty – the dominant politico-legal arrangement 
that undergirds state-subject relations and the foundation for international relations –
non-citizens occupy a comparatively marginalized position. Unlike citizens, non-
                                                
1 This does not hold true under some repressive regimes, such as the ruling junta in 




citizens have conditions attached to their entry and residence and can be subject to 
legitimate deportation (Brochmann 1999; Brubaker 1992). Generally, non-citizens 
have fewer rights and entitlements, and – with the exception of a few elites – have 
weaker access to structures of power that govern their lives. Some groups of non-
citizens are more vulnerable than others, depending on how their position is 
articulated in the laws, policies, and practices of states and their access to resources. 
The weakest of all are those with irregular legal status. 
 
The modern articulation of the rights of all – citizens and non-citizens alike – has its 
roots in the formation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 and in the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. All non-citizens have certain rights, 
including those with irregular legal status. They have the right to be free from 
arbitrary killing, torture, inhumane treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention, slavery, 
forced labour, and violations of humanitarian law (Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 2006). They also have the right to marry, to 
protection as minors, to equality, non-discrimination, freedom of religion and belief, 
freedom of political opinion, and the protection of their labour rights. However, in 
reality, many non-citizens do not enjoy these rights. 
 
In the effort to promote and protect the rights of non-citizens who are particularly 
vulnerable, several international governance regimes have emerged under the 
auspices of the UN. Separate regimes exist to protect refugees, migrant workers, and 
trafficked persons. These regimes intersect with other human rights regimes that 
protect the rights of people on the basis of other forms of identity – such as victims of 




define the legal obligations and duties of states, and have formal institutions to 
monitor state performance and to advocate for their compliance. 
 
All states have legal obligations as members of the UN and under international 
customary law to uphold some rights. However, states are also able to limit their own 
legal obligations to respect, ensure and protect human rights by refusing to become a 
state party to international treaties. This is particularly evident in relation to several 
states in Southeast Asia, which are amongst the members of the UN that have the 
lowest number of ratifications of the 9 core human rights treaties.2 Even when states 
do ratify or accede to these instruments, there are systematic violations of obligations. 
The charter-based and treaty-based UN bodies that supervise the fulfilment of human 
rights obligations operate through persuasion rather than force. Only when there are 
grievous violations of human rights – amounting to genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity – can the international community argue for 
coercive intervention.3 In all other matters, the international community uses tactics of 
diplomacy and pressure. As the international law expert James Hathaway observes, 
“more than half a century after inauguration of the UN system of international human 
rights law, we must concede that there are only minimal legal tools for the imposition 
of genuine and truly universal state accountability” (Hathaway 2005:6). 
 
                                                
2 Brunei Darussalam, Burma (Myanmar), and Singapore are state parties to only 2 of 
the 9 core international human rights treaties, namely the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Malaysia is a state party to these two 
instruments, as well as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2011). The ninth treaty, the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, is not yet in force. 
3 This is an international security and human rights norm called the ‘Responsibility to 




Non-citizens in Malaysia 
Malaysia hosts the largest number of non-citizens in Southeast Asia. It is a destination 
for work, tourism, education, and asylum as well as a place of transit to other regions 
in the world. Millions of non-citizens travel in and through Malaysia every year. In 
2010 alone, it received 24,577,000 tourists (See 2011).4 It also hosts around 3-4 
million migrant workers, over 100,000 asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless 
persons, an estimated 88,000 foreign spouses, 86,000 international students, and over 
370,000 permanent residents.5 It is amongst the top 15 percent of countries with the 
highest numbers of international migrants in the world.6 
 
In spite of this, Malaysia has had an enigmatic, even schizophrenic, approach to non-
citizens. Its policies and practices have changed often; they have been incoherent and 
contradictory, creating tensions amongst stakeholders and non-citizen groups. 
Malaysia also does not see itself as an immigration country. Unlike Australia, Canada 
and the United States, it does not have structured programmes to welcome 
international migrants, integrate them, and encourage them to obtain permanent 
residence and to naturalise as citizens. In fact, Malaysia’s laws, policies, and practices 
have made it almost impossible for most non-citizens to acquire citizenship in spite of 
years of residence in Malaysia. 
 
                                                
4 In 2009, 23.65 million tourists contributed RM53.4 billion (USD16.7 billion) to the 
economy. Malaysia has plans to increase its number of tourists to 36 million and its 
tourist receipts to RM168 billion (USD52.7 billion) by 2020 (Bernama 2010d). 
5 In June 2011, news reports about a possible amnesty exercise for migrants with 
irregular status suggested that there were 2 million of them in Malaysia (Allard 2011; 
Palani 2011). Figures for international students are as at April 2011 (Bernama 2011). 
6 In 2005, the UN Population Division ranked it as the 26th country with the highest 
number of migrants in the world, based on official statistics. However, if irregular 




Malaysian nationals have not responded favourably to the presence of non-citizens in 
their midst. The World Values Survey, conducted in 2006 in Malaysia by the World 
Values Survey Association, found that 57.2 percent of the 1,200 Malaysian 
respondents surveyed expressed an objection to living next to an immigrant, much 
higher than the total average of 22.7 percent across all 57 countries surveyed between 
2005-2008.7 86.1 percent of respondents agreed that employers should give priority to 
nationals over immigrants when jobs were scarce – again higher than the total average 
across all countries of 70.2 percent.  
 
The starkest results were in relation to immigration policy. 72.1 percent of Malaysian 
respondents expressed a preference for strict limits to be imposed on people coming 
from other countries to work, the highest percentage of all the countries surveyed, far 
higher than the total average across all countries of 37.7 percent. A further 18.2 
percent of Malaysian respondents wanted the government to prohibit foreigners from 
coming altogether, higher than the 10.6 average across all countries surveyed. On the 
whole, these responses suggest that Malaysians react far more strongly to the presence 
of non-citizens in their country than the average citizen in other countries. The results 
indicate strong feelings of nationalism and of a distinct divide between ‘us-citizens’ 
and ‘them-foreigners’ amongst Malaysian nationals (see also Hing 2000).  
 
These strong reactions are ironic, given the centrality and symbolic significance of 
immigration in the history of the formation of Malaysia, but they are also 
unsurprising. In negotiations over the Independence of Malaya, British colonial 
                                                
7 Of the total Malaysian sample of 1,201 respondents, only 3.2 percent had an 
immigrant mother and 3.4 percent had an immigrant father. In response to the same 
question, in Thailand, 44 percent of respondents expressed such an objection; in 




authorities insisted that communities of migrant origin present in the territory of 
Malaya, most of whom originated from China and India, be given citizenship on equal 
footing with groups considered to be indigenous to the land, the Malays and the 
aboriginal tribes of the Peninsula, the Orang Asli. This did not sit easily with Malay 
elites. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Malaya and a key figure in 
negotiating for Independence, differentiated between ‘citizenship’ and bangsa 
(race/nation), seeing the former to be the legal guarantee of specific privileges 
extended to the multi-ethnic Malayan nation, which would have the Malay bangsa at 
its core (Harper 1999). Until now, politics in Malaysia has centred on whether Malays 
should be accorded special privilege on the basis of their ‘indigeneity’ or whether all 
Malaysian nationals should be treated equally (further elaborated in Chapter 2). 
 
Malaysia’s treatment of non-citizens is a matter of global significance – its laws, 
policies, and practices concerning non-citizens have wide-reaching and multi-scalar 
impacts beyond the lives of individuals and those of their families. A clear example is 
in relation to remittances. In 2006, Malaysia was the 10th highest remittance-sending 
country in the world, with officially recorded outward remittances of more than 
US$5,560 million that year (Ratha and Xu 2008). Malaysia is the primary source of 
remittances for Indonesia; in certain provinces, remittances are greater than total local 
income (Hernández-Coss et al. 2008). As such, any policies that affect the amounts of 
remittances can have a tremendous impact on households and whole villages in the 
countries of origin of migrant workers. 
 
A second example is in relation to its treatment of irregular migrants. Over the years, 




irregular migrants in Malaysia, combining amnesty exercises with operations to 
arrest, punish and deport them. Over a three-year period from 2006, 408,979 
detainees were held in 13 immigration detention depots in Malaysia, an average of 
102,244 detainees a year (Bernama 2009c). In 2009 alone, there were 81,396 foreign 
prisoners in Malaysia’s prisons, a daily average of 13,392 individuals. There have 
been multiple reports of overcrowding, inadequate facilities, lack of access to medical 
care, breaches of basic standards of hygiene, insufficient food and water, and ill 
treatment at the depots. Between 2006 and September 2009, there were 70 reported 
deaths in these depots (Dewan Rakyat 2009b). Between 2002 and 2008, after 
amendments were made to the Immigration Act 1959/63 to include whipping for 
immigration offences, 34,923 men were whipped; 60.2% were from Indonesia, 14.1% 
from the Philippines, 13.9% from Burma (Myanmar), 3.6% from Bangladesh, 2.8% 
from Thailand, and 5.4% from other countries (Dewan Rakyat 2009a). 
 
A third example is Malaysia’s approach to refugees. In practice, Malaysia’s treatment 
of asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons falls short of its international legal 
obligations. In order to improve effective protection, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) relies heavily on resettlement as a durable solution for refugees. 
In 2007, 2008, and 2009 Malaysia was amongst the top 5 countries of UNHCR-
assisted resettlement departures, with 5,600, 5,900 and 7,500 refugees respectively 
sent to Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, New 
Zealand, Sweden and the United States of America. As such, Malaysia has become a 
key node in Asia for the dispersal of refugees to developed countries. In short, 
Malaysia’s laws, policies and administrative practices concerning non-citizens have 




world; shaping the lives and futures of individuals, families, and communities, even 
the national economies of surrounding countries. 
 
The Aims of this Research 
How does a state exercise power over non-citizens? What are its capacities, 
mechanisms, and limits? How is state power circulated, delegated, and contested at 
the national level? What factors must a state consider in deciding how it treats non-
citizens? I explore these questions through the critical examination of Malaysia’s 
contemporary approach to citizenship and migration.  
 
Malaysia provides an example of how a developing state that is foreign labour 
dependent positions non-citizens in society as it responds to political and economic 
globalisation. In this dissertation, I examine the exercise of state power over different 
groups of non-citizens, situating this analysis in relation to broader discourses, 
practices and institutions concerning non-citizens regionally and globally.  
 
Specifically, I analyze the construction, operation and impact of Malaysia’s laws, 
policies, and practices on different categories of non-citizens, which have emerged 
through socio-political discourse and practice: authorised migrant workers; migrants 
with irregular status (referred to derogatorily as ‘illegal immigrants’); foreign spouses 
of Malaysian citizens; as well as asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons.8 I 
examine how these categories of non-citizens are constructed, regulated, and placed in 
Malaysian society as Malaysia positions itself in order to attract global capital and 
                                                
8 A more comprehensive study would look at students, tourists, trafficked persons and 
other non-citizens, which cannot be undertaken here because of the word limit set for 




situates itself in relation to global governance regimes concerning the rights of non-
citizens. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s framework on power, I seek to identify the 
mentalities of government that guide and shape Malaysia’s approach to each 
population as well as the technologies of government it employs to further its aims. I 
am also concerned with how non-citizens experience their lives as subjects – how 
they conduct themselves as they are identified and ‘interpellated’ (Althusser 1971) as 
a migrant worker, an ‘illegal immigrant’, a foreign spouse, an asylum seeker or a 
refugee.9 This study seeks to contribute to an understanding of the evolving 
relationship between foreign labour dependent developing states and their populations 
in the context of political and economic globalization. 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF MALAYSIA 
Malaysia is located at the heart of Asia. It comprises two geographical territories 
separated by the South China Sea – Peninsular Malaysia, which lies below Thailand 
and above Singapore, and the states of Sabah and Sarawak, which lie on the upper 
half of the island of Borneo. It is a federation of 13 states and 3 federal territories – 
Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya. Malaysia comprises territories previously 
under British rule. The states on the Peninsula became the independent Federation of 
Malaya in 1957. In 1963, Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore joined together to 
form Malaysia; however, Singapore was expelled soon after in 1965. Sabah and 
Sarawak have greater autonomy than other states, retaining for example, their own 
immigration controls. 
 
                                                
9 Foucault proposes that we “look at how relations of subjugation can manufacture 




Malaysia is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy. The Head of 
State is the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong, elected by the Conference of Rulers comprising 
nine hereditary Rulers (Sultan) of the Malay states. The Federal Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land and sets out the separation of powers between the Executive, 
Judicial and Legislative authorities. The Prime Minister leads the Cabinet of 
Malaysia, a council of ministers collectively accountable to the Parliament of 
Malaysia, the national legislature. The bicameral Parliament comprises the House of 
Representatives (Dewan Rakyat) and the Senate (Dewan Negara). The Federal 
Government exercises most executive power, with state governments exercising 
limited power over matters concerning Islamic law and practice, land, local 
government, and local services (Ninth Schedule, List II, Federal Constitution). 
Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN), a coalition of political parties, has been in 
power since the Independence of Malaya in 1957. The major opposition parties in 
Malaysia are organised into a loose coalition, Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance, 
PR). 
 
Malaysia is a middle-income country. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2009 was 
US$193.093 billion, dropping from US$221.828 billion in 2008 (The World Bank 
2011a). The GDP growth rate in 2010 was 7.2 percent (The Star Online 2011), 
bouncing back from a low of -1.7 percent in 2009, compared with 4.7 percent in 2008. 
Figure 1 provides the percentage contribution of the main sectors of the Malaysian 
economy to overall GDP in the first quarter of 2009. It also provides projected figures 
for 2015. Under the Tenth Malaysia Plan, Malaysia intends for the services sector to 
be an important economic growth driver, with an annual growth rate of 7.2 percent 




growth rates for the other sectors over this five-year period are expected to be 5.7 
percent for manufacturing, 3.7 percent for construction, 3.3 percent for agriculture, 
and 1.1 percent for mining and quarrying.  
 
 




Sources: 2009 Quarter 1 actual figures from MITI (2009); 2015 projected figures 
from The Economic Planning Unit (2010). 
 
 
Preliminary results of the 2010 Census of Malaysia shows a population of 27,565,821 
(51.2 percent male, 48.8 percent female) (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2011b). 
The 2000 Census enumerated a total population of 23,274,690, of whom 94.1 percent 
were Malaysian citizens and 5.9 were non-citizens (Department of Statistics Malaysia 
2002). Figure 2 provides the population breakdown according to government-
recorded ethnic categories. State authorities classify the different ethnic groups into 
two broader categories according to socially constructed indigeneity – the bumiputra 
(‘sons of the soil’) comprise of the Malays, the Orang Asli and the natives of Sabah 
and Sarawak, while the non-bumiputra comprise of Chinese, Indians, and others. In 
















Sovereignty and the State 
The modern notion of a sovereign state has its roots in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, 
which recognized territorial jurisdiction, political borders, and a legitimate, central 
governing authority as the constitutive elements of a state. Mitchell Dean proposes the 
definition of a ‘state’ as, 
A sovereign body that claims a monopoly of independent territorial power and 
means of violence, that inheres in but lies behind the apparatuses or 
institutions of organized and formal political authority and that is separate 





How does a state obtain sovereign power over subjects? What gives it political right? 
Following the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke 
(1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), social contract theorists assert 
that people give up some elements of their freedom in order to obtain the protection of 
the sovereign. As citizens of the sovereign, they are entitled to the protection of their 
rights, but are also expected to fulfil obligations, for example, in the form of taxes and 
services. They are also subject to the rules, regulations and government of the 
sovereign. As Mitchell Dean’s definition above indicates, the state exists as an 
independent entity from the ruler; rulers may change, but the state remains. In 
democracies, citizens elect their own rulers, thus exercising ‘popular sovereignty’. 
Elected governments take the place of hereditary monarchs in exercising state power. 
 
From Sovereign Power to Disciplinary Power and Biopower10  
Michel Foucault argued that in the 19th century, a gradual transformation of political 
right occurred (Foucault 2003). The classical exercise of power was most evident in 
the sovereign’s right to kill or to refrain from killing; in other words, to take life or to 
let live. This was an exercise of power that was confined – limited to the ability to 
cause death, for the sovereign did not have the techniques or capacities to cause life or 
to sustain it.  
 
                                                
10 Foucault’s discussion about biopower and biopolitics serve as a background to his 
development of the idea of governmentality. He later focuses on the ‘triangle’ of 
sovereignty, discipline and governmentality as forms of power “which has the 
population as its main target and the apparatuses of security as its essential 




However, with the rise of modernity, new techniques of power emerged. As states 
increased in their ability to coordinate, centralize, and control, the right to kill became 
complemented by the right to ‘make live’ and to ‘let die’. The state began to take 
control over the biological. Foucault calls this form of power biopower, which he 
distinguishes from disciplinary power. For Foucault, disciplinary power emerged first 
and centres on individual bodies. Its aim was to instil discipline through 
individualizing and manipulating bodies. It is achieved through techniques that order 
the spatial distribution of bodies (separating, aligning, serializing, surveying), which 
creates fields of visibility and which control bodies.  
 
Biopower, which emerged later11, operates at a different level.  It centres on 
populations, and aims at regularizing through “massifying” (Foucault 2003:243) and 
controlling events that affect populations as a whole. This is achieved through 
establishing knowledge about the masses – such as birth rates, mortality rates, 
morbidity, aging, epidemics, endemics, and the effects of the environment – which 
allows the sovereign to predict events, make forecasts and estimates, and then to 
design strategies of intervention that modify or compensate for their effects.   
 
Interventions occur at the collective level – in the form of health campaigns, 
insurance schemes, savings, safety measures, and so on – in order to produce change 
in general indicators (such as lowering the mortality rate).  The aim of biopower is to 
“establish a sort of homeostasis… by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects 
the security of the whole from internal dangers” (Foucault 2003:249).  This 
                                                
11 Agamben suggests, however, that Western politics has always been biopolitics, 
stating: “the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign 




equilibrium is achieved and maintained through the deployment of regulatory and 
security mechanisms.  
 
Foucault emphasizes that biopower complements rather than excludes or replaces 
disciplinary power. He identifies these as two ‘series’ that articulate with each other – 
“body-organism-discipline-institutions” and “population-biological processes-
regulatory mechanisms-State” (p.250); the “anatomo-politics of the human body” 
became complemented by the “‘biopolitics’ of the human race” (p.243). Biopolitics is 
a politics concerned with the administration of the processes of life at the level of 
populations, drawing upon knowledge of the health of populations (Dean 2010). 
 
Government and Governmentality 
What does ‘government’ mean? For Foucault, government entails the “conduct of 
conduct” (Foucault 2007:192–3) – the guiding, shaping or directing of people into 
ideal ways of behaving, acting and being.12 Government, in this sense, can apply to 
governing others as well as governing the self. The objective of government is “the 
welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, 
longevity, health, and so on” (Foucault 1994:217). The population is both the ‘end’ 
(or objective) of government, and its object, which it acts upon. However, the 
population is not inanimate. Thus, those who govern must also concern themselves 
with the opinions of the population – that is, they need to pay attention to “what is 
going on in the minds of the governed” (Foucault 2007:272). Foucault emphasis that 
                                                
12 Foucault also recognises the existence of ‘counter-conducts’ (Foucault 2007:202, 
194–195) – other ways of conducting oneself with alternative rationalities and 




it is not just government in itself that is important, it is the art of government, the 
“reasoned way of governing best” (Foucault 2008:2, my emphasis).  
 
There are several elements that are significant in Foucault’s definition of government. 
Firstly, government is “an intensely moral activity” (Dean 2010:19). As Dean 
explains, “It is moral because policies and practices of government… presume to 
know, with varying degrees of explicitness and using specific forms of knowledge, 
what constitutes good, virtuous, appropriate, responsible conduct of individuals and 
collectivities” (p. 19). Some behaviours are affirmed are rewarded while others are 
reviled and punished. Secondly, it involves setting the parameters for self-regulation, 
so that individuals act on themselves in order to ensure that they behave 
appropriately. Thirdly, government is a plural undertaking, in which there are number 
of authorities and agencies that seek to shape behaviour by influencing the way 
individuals think. Fourthly, there is purpose or objective to government – an ‘end’ or 
‘goal’ sought – what scholars refer to as the telos of governmental practices. 
 
In introducing the notion of governmentality, Foucault links the idea of governing 
(gouverner) and modes of thought (mentalité) (Lemke 2000). For Foucault, 
governmentality emerged after the establishment of sovereignty and involves a new 
way of thinking about and exercising power in society. Governmentality only became 
significant when the numerical growth of people became understood as ‘the problem 
of population’ (going beyond the notion of people as an agglomeration of families) 
and when wealth, money, and work became understood as the ‘the economy’. 




necessary form of knowledge for the purposes of effective government, as did 
political economy, the science and technique of intervening in the economy.  
 
Foucault distinguishes between sovereignty, discipline and governmentality, 
identifying them as different forms of power. While they may draw upon the same 
techniques, rationalities and institutions and have population as their main target, 
Mitchell Dean observes the following difference: 
The object of sovereign power is the exercise of authority over the subjects of 
the state within a definite territory, e.g. the ‘deductive’ practices of levying of 
taxes, of meting out punishments. The object of disciplinary power is the 
regulation and ordering of the numbers of people within that territory, e.g. in 
practices of schooling, military training or the organisation of work. The new 
object of government, by contrast, regards these subjects, and the forces and 
capacities of living individuals, as members of a population, as resources to be 
fostered, to be used and to be optimised (Dean 2010:29). 
 
In governmentality, the power relationship is no longer presumed to be one of 
domination, in which an assymetrical relationship exists between the dominant and 
the dominated, the latter assumed to have limited liberty. If domination exists, it is but 
an effect of technologies of government (Lemke 2000). Instead, the focus of 
governmentality is on the development and use of guiding rationalities to influence 
the ways in which individuals exercise responsible freedom (Dean 2010). 





Governmentality: The Mentalities and Techniques of Government  
Rationalities of government are central to the concept of governmentality. 
Rationalities of government refer to the way that the (agents of) government think 
through, calculate and respond to problems in a relatively systematic manner. Other 
authors have suggested the use of the term mentalities of government (Miller and 
Rose 1990; Rose and Miller 1992) to refer to “the bodies of knowledge, belief and 
opinion in which we are immersed” (Dean 2010:24). Mentalities of government are 
explicit but are relatively taken-for granted, and thus may “not be readily examined 
by those who inhabit it” (p.25). They have both rational and a-rational aspects, 
drawing upon the use of imagery, mythology and symbolism.  
 
Mentalities of government draw upon available knowledge, ideas, theories and 
philosophies. As such, authorities of knowledge play a role in shaping these 
mentalities and producing ‘truth’ about the objects of government and best ways of 
governing these objects. These authorities may have professional, technological, 
religious or academic expertise, or they may hold symbolic roles in society that render 
their articulations meaningful. Those who govern are themselves governed by 
collective ideas, beliefs and opinions.  
 
Each form of power utilises different techniques. Sovereign power operates through 
laws, decrees, and regulations, which are enforced through coercive sanctions that can 
lead, ultimately, to the sovereign exercising the right to take life (Dean 2010). 
Disciplinary power operates through the regulation of individuals; its techniques 
include surveillance and normalising judgement for the purposes of domination, 




governmentality, the techniques of government focus on the methods of guidance of 
the conduct of individuals, with individuals appropriating these techniques to govern 
themselves.  
 
Governmentality operates through the production of truth discourses. As Dean 
elaborates, “we govern others and ourselves according to what we take to be true 
about who we are, what aspects of our existence should be worked upon, how, with 
what means and to what ends…. On the other hand, the ways in which we govern and 
conduct ourselves give rise to different ways of producing truth” (Dean 2010:27). 
This truth may be a direct or indirect result of the act of governing. Governmentality 
also involves “structuring and shaping the field of possible action of subjects” (Lemke 
2000:3). Emphasis is placed on the capacity of each individual for self-control.  
 
Analysing state power in a national context through a Foucauldian approach thus 
entails studying the regime of practices of state authorities in order to discover what 
kind of rationalities or mentalities they use in the exercise of power as well as to 
identify the techniques in their exercise of the power. It also involves examining the 
effects of these practices on the production of truth and on the lives of those 




In this study, I look at state power by examining laws, policies, and practices 
concerning non-citizens – three inter-related domains of governmental knowledge and 




positivist description of rules, regulations, statements and actions that have been 
enacted, recognised, articulated and/or practiced by state authorities. However, more 
is needed in order to analyse their social and political significance and to understand 
how they are expressions of state power.  
 
Firstly, setting these descriptions in their broader historical and geographical context 
allows us examine not just the evolution and emergence of the immigration regime, 
but of the ‘state’ and of the ‘nation’, recognising that these are “unfinished projects” 
(Wong 2010:302). It is also important to move beyond a national framing of 
immigration, analysing how Malaysia’s laws, policies, and practices are shaped by 
and have an impact on its bilateral relations, its negotiations in regional agreements, 
and its role in the international community.  
 
Thirdly, considering the experiences and perspectives of key stakeholders involved in 
these regimes of practices deepens our understanding of their relative significance on 
the daily lives of individuals. Finally, rather than presuming synchrony of 
governmental response and action, it is important to recognise that there are 
inconsistencies and conflicts in the application of rules and regulations and to analyse 
the ways in which these are compromised, corrupted, and subverted, including by the 
very actors charged with the responsibility of enforcing them. 
 
In this study, I focus on different categories of non-citizens, analysing the position of 
authorised migrant workers; migrants with irregular status; foreign spouses of 
Malaysian citizens; as well as asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons. This 




sovereignty over non-citizens. There are different meanings associated with each of 
these categories of non-citizens – they occupy different socio-political positions in 
Malaysian society, they have different standing in domestic and/or international law, 
and are accorded different rights and entitlements in Malaysia. They bear different 
relations to the state and to the citizens of Malaysia, as well as to their countries of 
origin and to their fellow citizens.  
 
Studies that focus only on one type of non-citizen without recognizing the presence 
and relative positionalities of other non-citizens can lead to over-generalisation (e.g. 
Soysal 1994). Studying different categories of non-citizens allows us to examine the 
‘dividing practices’ that create and sustain differences in identity and rights between 
them. It also allows us to analyse the misrecognition of identity categories and the 
blurring of boundaries, which is particularly salient when the legal and administrative 
processes to identify and categorize individuals are non-existent, inaccurate, or 
applied arbitrarily.  
 
For each category of non-citizen, I map the immigration control policies and practices 
that regulate their entry and presence in Malaysia. Over time, the Malaysian state has 
constructed complex, intersecting sub-regimes with multiple actors to authorise the 
presence and activities of non-citizens in Malaysia. These sub-regimes comprise 
detailed administrative procedures backed up with enforcement practices, the former 
setting out the parameters of required and acceptable behaviour and the latter aimed at 
ensuring compliance to these parameters. The exception in this study, however, is the 
category of asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons, for whom the Malaysian 




evolved, with UNHCR playing a key role in administering these non-citizens while 
keeping them out of the juggernaut of state operations to arrest and detain irregular 
migrants. 
 
In this study, I also examine how non-citizens fare in the Malaysian legal framework. 
I first set out the overall structure of the legal system, the laws relevant to non-
citizens, and the practical issues that non-citizens face in trying to obtain justice. This 
overall framing is then supplemented with an analysis of case law for each category 
of non-citizen. Specifically, I look at how the judiciary has interpreted laws, 
established legal rules, set precedents, and judged the grievances of different 
categories of non-citizens.  
 
Finally, for each category of non-citizen, I seek to identify government ‘objectives’ 
which have bearing on how these non-citizens are conceptualised, placed and treated 
in Malaysia. I argue that these government objectives are what ‘anchor’ the 
(frequently) changing policies and practices concerning non-citizens. Identifying 
government objectives helps us to discern patterns in the actions taken by state 
authorities, which can appear incoherent. This is a step towards analysing the limits of 
state power as well as the mentalities and techniques of government, which I 
undertake in the final chapter of this thesis. 
 
A Foucauldian Approach to Analysing Laws, Policies and Practices? 
Can scholars using a Foucauldian approach examine power through a ‘traditional’ 
analysis of laws, policies and practices? Does Foucault not reject this approach when 




fashioning capacity of subjects; and the provisional and situational nature of ‘truth’ – 
that is, the post-structural perspective on power? Are these approaches incompatible? 
 
Villadsen and Karlsen (2012) note that scholars adopting a post-structuralist 
framework for analysing power tend to confine themselves in terms of what they 
observe and critique. Specifically, they tend to avoid the analysis of structural 
conditions, preferring instead to look at subjectivities and particularistic expressions 
of power. Foucauldian scholars, in particular, avoid discussing ‘the state’ or ‘the 
economy’ for fear of being accused of reductionism (see also Rose and Miller 
(1992)). Key theorists have warned of the tendency of poststructuralist thinkers to 
‘invisibilise’ broader structural changes in society such as capitalism and the 
introduction of neoliberal practices (Taylor-Gooby 1994; Žižek 1999). 
 
Kim McKee (2009) notes a number of weaknesses in scholarship by governmentality 
scholars, in particular, the tendency to focus on discursive construction rather than 
empirical reality; the problem of conflating rationality or mentalities of rule with 
actual practice; the inattention to social difference (that is, assuming that power 
operates in the same manner of all); the insufficient attention to the role of state 
institutions in shaping the lives of people; and the inadequate account of resistance in 
his conceptualisation of power. To overcome these, she proposes a realist 
governmentality approach, developed by Kevin Stenson (2005, 2008), which involves 
complementing discursive analysis with empirical accounts of governing practices. 
Scholars adopting this approach have been able to account for how policies are 
actually implemented as well as their unexpected consequences and limits (Li 2007; 




local governments when some aspects of decision-making and control are 
decentralised while others are recentralised (McKee 2007; Newman 2001). 
Importantly, this approach brings back emphasis on the role of state institutions in the 
exercise of power. 
 
While governmentality scholars have emphasised the post-structural perspective of 
power in Foucault’s work, his account of the operation of sovereign and disciplinary 
power recognises the continued use of coercion, repression and punishment by state 
authorities. Indeed, Foucault emphasises that these three forms of power ‘dovetail’ 
and operate in tandem. Most Foucauldian scholarship on power has focused on the 
operation of governmental power in liberal societies. This research takes a different 
path, examining the exercise of power by a semi-authoritarian state. It also examines 
different forms of power, not just governmental power, and explores how these forms 
of power interact.  
 
In summary, I argue, therefore, that it is not incompatible with Foucault to approach 
the study of state power and non-citizens through a systematic analysis of laws, 
policies, and practices. These are main tools through which state authorities construct 
categories of non-citizens and delimit their rights and freedoms. By examining them, 
the state authorities who operate by and through them, as well as their impact on the 
daily lives of non-citizens, we are able to trace not only how the state discursively 





The Choice of Non-citizen Categories for Analysis 
Why were these specific categories of non-citizens chosen for analysis, and why not 
others? Firstly, any analysis of state power over non-citizens in Malaysia would not 
be complete without an analysis of the position of migrant workers, both authorised 
and with irregular status. Migrant workers constitute the largest group of non-citizens 
in Malaysia. The Malaysian state’s approach to migrant workers has become the 
dominant paradigm by which it approaches other non-citizens. Its crackdowns on 
irregular migrants have also had an impact on the lives of other non-citizens and have 
been an issue of national debate and international scrutiny. 
 
I chose to focus on asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons for two main 
reasons. Firstly, my previous research showed that they suffered from the punitive 
measures taken by the state to address irregular migration. Secondly, they are 
different from other non-citizens in terms of their standing in international law. 
Significantly, they have a proactive, international advocate for their protection, 
UNHCR, and are interpellated in the international refugee protection and statelessness 
regimes. This introduces another angle into the analysis of state power – permitting an 
examination of the role and influence of international organisations and the 
international community in shaping domestic policies and practices concerning 
vulnerable non-citizens. I treat asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons as one 
category despite their different legal status in international law, as their experiences in 
Malaysia are very much entwined. 
 
The position of foreign spouses of Malaysian citizens introduces yet another angle of 




to citizens by marriage, a unique form of social and legal connection that other non-
citizens do not have. While foreign spouses are legally non-citizens, and are thus 
subject to immigration control, they are integrated into Malaysian society through ties 
of kinship. The majority of them have long-term interests in remaining in Malaysia 
and in being an active, integrated member of Malaysian society, whether or not they 
wish to become citizens.  
 
Gaps in the Research 
There are a number of gaps in this research. Firstly, it does not cover some types of 
non-citizen categories, in particular, trafficked persons, permanent residents, tourists 
and students. Adding these to the current project would allow for a greater number of 
perspectives and a more fine-grained analysis of Malaysia’s exercise of state power 
over non-citizens. However, space and time constraints do not allow for their 
inclusion. Nevertheless, it is fruitful to sketch some recent developments concerning 
these categories of non-citizens and to place them in relation to those that are covered 
in this project.  
 
I had initially intended to include an analysis of state responses to trafficked persons 
in this project. My previous research with migrant workers and refugees had indicated 
that trafficking was extensive both amongst authorised and undocumented non-
citizens, in particular, labour trafficking (see also Ahsan Ullah 2009; Jones 2000; Lê 
2010). The period of this research project (2006-2011) was also a productive time in 
which the Malaysian government changed laws, policies, and practices in relation to 
trafficked persons. In particular, in 2007, Malaysia enacted the Anti-Trafficking in 





In 2009, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations released a high-
profile report implicating Immigration officers in the selling of Burmese deportees to 
human smugglers at the Thai-Malaysia border (United States Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations 2009).13 This report complemented the findings in the U.S. State 
Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report that year, which also downgraded 
Malaysia’s rating from Tier 2 to Tier 3, thus signalling that Malaysia was neither 
compliant with minimum standards to protect victims of trafficking nor making 
significant effort to do so. The latter triggered a response from the Malaysian 
government, which started to bring greater visibility to its anti-trafficking efforts. 
However, although public campaigns were launched with great visibility, the 
prosecution of traffickers remained low. There are also faults in the current anti-
trafficking regime – most notably, the detention of victims of trafficking against their 
will in government ‘places of refuge’ until their deportation. 
 
During this time, in response to the increase in arrivals of Afghan and Sri Lankan 
asylum seekers by boat through Southeast Asia, the Australian government started to 
exert greater influence in the region to combat people-smuggling. Australia was 
particularly interested in the immigration practices of Malaysia and Indonesia, as 
these have been nodes of transit for asylum-seeking populations. Australia 
reinvigorated the inter-governmental Bali Process for People Smuggling, Trafficking 
in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (The Bali Process), which it co-chairs 
with Indonesia, and has also engaged in a number of bilateral discussions to explore 
collaborations on immigration control.  
                                                
13 However, the Minister of Home Affairs dismissed these allegations, claiming they 





In August 2010, the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act was amended to criminalise the 
smuggling of migrants, becoming the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-
Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007 (Act 670). Australia applauded this move, but 
Malaysian civil society groups and the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia 
(Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia, SUHAKAM) raised concerns that these 
amendments would result in victims of trafficking being mistakenly identified and 
treated as smuggled migrants and thus unable to access the care and protection 
provided by the Act. They were also concerned that refugees would be charged for 
offences related to smuggling, as many enter Malaysia through irregular routes and 
some have assisted their family and friends to do the same.  
 
More controversially, in May 2011, the Australian government announced that it 
would accept 4,000 refugees from Malaysia through a resettlement programme in 
exchange for 800 asylum seekers arriving by boat to its shores, as a measure to “break 
the business model of people smugglers” (BBC News 2011). This agreement 
provoked strong condemnation from civil society groups and Australian politicians 
who have been concerned about Australia reneging on its international obligations to 
protect refugees. In July 2011, both countries signed this agreement, thus creating an 
unprecedented form of collaboration on asylum that is likely to change regional 
dynamics significantly. 
 
In spite of these key developments, which signal that Malaysia is in the process 
reforming its approach to trafficking and smuggling, access to information regarding 




remained a challenge while I was conducting research. I was neither successful in 
gaining access to government officials nor to victims of trafficking held in 
government shelters. There has also been considerable opacity around the process and 
content of bilateral and multilateral discussions concerning smuggling and trafficking 
initiated by the Australian government. As such, while I am able to identify key 
developments, I do not have sufficient data spread across time to perform an in-depth 
analysis of the mentalities and techniques of power expressed through its treatment of 
trafficked persons. The flux in policies and practices makes any conclusion tentative 
at best. 
 
The positionality of permanent residents in Malaysia also provides a valuable 
perspective in Malaysia’s approach to non-citizens. In 2008, there were 371,281 
permanent residents in Malaysia (K. S. Lim 2010).14 Similar to foreign spouses, they 
are typically non-citizens who have lived and worked in Malaysia for decades. 
Although permanent residents from Indonesia gained permanent resident status very 
easily in the 1970s and 80s (typically within 3-6 months), this practice ended in 1989, 
when state policy shifted to legalise irregular migrants (Wong 2010). Since then, 
applicants for permanent resident status have experienced long delays in obtaining 
decisions on their status, sometimes for more than a decade. Only in 2009 did state 
officials undertake to process applications more speedily, eventually accepting around 
63.9 percent of the 34,523 applications received between 2001 and 2008 (Bernama 
2009a).  
 
                                                
14 However, in April that year, the Minister stated that there were 376,245 permanent 




Existing research indicates that permanent residents face discrimination on the basis 
of being another nationality and have been frustrated by their inability to access rights 
and privileges given to citizens, such as affordable housing, subsidised public health 
services, compensation for evictions from squatter homes, the right to purchase land, 
and to sponsor their families to Malaysia (Pillai 2004). As Pillai argues, these 
exclusions have made them feel unsettled and uneasy about their future, despite 
having lived and worked for decades in Malaysia. Indonesians, in particular, have 
been treated with disdain and suspicion by local Malays (Azizah 1987; Kahn 2006). 
Although some had relatives who were incorporated as citizens at the time of 
Independence, those who arrived afterward have not been successful in applying for 
citizenship despite having been briefed on application procedures through civic 
courses (Pillai 2004). However, their children, if born in Malaysia, are able to obtain 
citizenship by operation of law. 
 
Tourists are another significant group of non-citizens. Malaysia’s emphasis on global 
tourism for revenue growth since the 1970s has resulted in large numbers of tourists 
entering Malaysia every year.15 In 2010, an estimated 24.58 million tourists generated 
RM56.49 billion in revenue (See 2011). In addition to leisure tourism, the state has 
promoted medical and health tourism since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 (Chee 
2007; Connell 2006), undertaking initiatives such as giving tax incentives to 
healthcare corporations, creating an institutional structure to uphold quality of care, 
                                                
15 The number of foreign visitors to Peninsular Malaysia grew from 25,000 in 1967 to 
more than 1.2 million in 1976 (excluding Singaporean visitors through the Johor 
Bahru causeway), partly as a result of the promotional activities of the Tourist 
Development Corporation (TDC) (Din 1982). Din provides yearly figures of visitor 
arrivals into Peninsular Malaysia from 1974 (1.08 million people) to 1980 (1.54 




and promoting medical tourism through trade missions and other marketing activities 
(Chee 2007).  
 
In 2002, the Ministry of Tourism introduced the Malaysia My Second Home (MM2H) 
initiative as a long-stay tourism programme, allowing non-citizens who fulfilled 
certain criteria to stay in Malaysia on ten-year multiple-entry Social Visit Passes.16 
Applicants must prove they have liquid assets of specified amounts (depending on 
whether they are above or below 50 years of age) and offshore income of RM10,000 a 
month. From 2002 to February 2011, there were 15,316 participants on this 
programme, the highest numbers from China (2,522), Bangladesh (1,867), United 
Kingdom (1,685), and Japan (1,269) (Malaysia My Second Home 2011). Over the 
years, restrictions on the programme have been removed, such as the limits placed on 
nationality and age. In 2009, MM2H participants aged 50 and above were also 
allowed to work on a part-time basis.17 Research indicates that this programme has 
proven to be popular amongst Japanese retirees because of the cheaper cost of living, 
ability to engage in fulfilling activities, warmer climate and better living environment 
in Malaysia (Ono 2008). 
 
Malaysia’s approach to tourism has had an impact on the immigration regulation of 
some of the non-citizens covered in this research project. In general, Malaysia has 
constructed a liberal visa regime for non-citizens intending to stay in Malaysia for 
short periods of time. It is one of the few destinations where citizens of countries in 
                                                
16 MM2H replaced the relatively unsuccessful Silver Hair Programme launched in 
1988 (Chee 2007; Ono 2008). The validity period of the Pass depends on the validity 
period of passports. There are cases where MM2M holders have overstayed in 
Malaysia accidentally and had to pay a compound free.  




Africa and the Middle East can enter and receive a Visa on Arrival (VOA) in 
Malaysian airports. This liberal approach has caused frustration amongst Immigration 
officers concerned with abuse of the system and, in particular, with the number of 
non-citizens who overstay. In order to curb abuse, visa requirements have been 
amended a number of times. In August 2010, for example, Immigration officers 
stopped issuing visas on arrival for visitors from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, 
China, India, Nepal and Pakistan, requiring them to obtain visas in their own 
countries before departing for Malaysia (The Associated Press 2010). As elaborated 
in subsequent chapters, the flexibilities in the tourist visa regime have provided 
migrant workers, asylum seekers, refugees, stateless persons and foreign spouses with 
alternative ways to enter and reside in Malaysia.18  
 
In the early 1980s, the Malaysian government embarked on a number of initiatives to 
promote Malaysia as an education hub in order to attract international students (The 
Malaysian Insider 2008). From 5,635 international students in 1997 (McBurnie and 
Ziguras 2001), numbers have risen to approximately 86,000 in 2011 (Bernama 
2011b), many of whom originate from Southeast Asia, China and the Middle East (Y. 
M. Lim, Yap, and T. H. Lee 2011; Morshidi 2008).19 The Malaysian government 
intends to increase these numbers to 150,000 by 2015 and 200,000 by 2020 (Bernama 
2011b). While only 5 percent of the total places available in public and private 
                                                
18 However, immigration operations have also had a negative impact on tourists. In 
2007, for example, two African American tourists were arrested, taken to an 
Immigration Detention Centre, and refused contact with the US embassy (Kent 2007). 
They complained of being treated inhumanely. 
19 In 2006, there were 55,912 foreign students; the top three countries of origin were 





institutions of higher education can be made available to foreign undergraduate 
students, there are no quotas set for postgraduate students. 
 
International students are regulated through a Student Pass, which grants them 
permission to study in Malaysia and to work on a part-time basis (20 hours) during 
semester breaks in certain types of jobs.20 The Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) 
has published a list of “Do’s and Don’ts for International Students in Malaysia” which 
specify acceptable conduct (Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia 2011).21 These 
rules warn students against participating in criminal activities, working in certain 
types of jobs (including ‘immoral’ ones), working longer hours without permission, 
using force or behaving in a racist or prejudiced manner, taking part in assemblies or 
meetings without permission from relevant authorities, and disregarding rules and 
regulations of their institution of learning. In short, these rules cover a spectrum of 
daily behaviours that extend beyond the criminal justice system and immigration 
restrictions on work to include the regulation of their daily conduct and the exercise 
of their rights. Significantly, unlike countries that seek to retain international students 
as highly trained workers (such as Australia), Malaysia does not have policies that 
encourage international students to remain and to work in Malaysia after the 
completion of their studies (Ziguras and Law 2006). This is likely linked to 
government concerns over the high unemployment rates amongst Malaysian 
graduates. 
 
                                                
20 Application procedures for a Student Pass can be found on Immigration 
Department Malaysia (2011). 





Secondly, this research does not cover laws, policies, and practices governing non-
citizens in Sabah and Sarawak, which have semi-autonomous immigration systems – 
a legacy of territorial control granted when these states entered into the Federation of 
Malaysia agreement with Malaya and Singapore in 1963. Sabah, in particular, has a 
large population of non-citizens. A number of controversial policies and practices – 
such as the granting of permanent resident status and identity cards to Indonesian and 
Filipino Muslim migrants to boost vote banks as well as the issuance of IMM13 
temporary passes to Filipino Muslim refugees in the 1980s (allowing them to reside 
and work in Malaysia) – have cause great dissatisfaction amongst native populations, 
some of whom are de facto stateless because of difficulties in gaining birth 
certificates, identity cards and the rights and privileges of citizenship.22 Not only do 
some Sabahans feel alienated and abandoned by the state, the social identity of being 
a ‘Sabahan’ is being contested (Sadiq 2009). There are now generations of migrant 
children whose only sense of belonging is to Sabah, the place of their birth and 
residence, even if they do not possess any identity documents that permit them legal 
claims to residing in Sabah. The politicized nature of Sabah’s treatment of non-
citizens as well as the strength of xenophobic sentiments amongst its citizens are 
worthy of deeper analysis, but extend beyond the scope of this research project.  
 
                                                
22 There is increasing recognition of the difference between de jure and de facto 
statelessness, the former referring to “a person who is not considered as a national by 
any State under the operation of its law” (Article 1, 1954 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons). The following definition has been proposed for de facto 
statelessness: “De facto stateless persons are persons outside the country of their 
nationality who are unable or, for valid reasons, are unwilling to avail themselves of 





I use a multi-method, qualitative approach for this research, supplementing the 
analysis of a wide range of written material with interviews and participant 
observation. Whenever possible, I sought primary information that was generated 
when laws, policies, and practices were introduced and amended in order to explore 
the reasons, circumstances, and reactions to those changes. In most cases, these were 
in the form of newspaper reports as well as memorandums, speeches, statements and 
guidelines produced by stakeholders as well as the government. These were often 
available on official websites, in newsletters and circulars, or in the form of written 
materials circulated at workshops and conferences. During the period of my research, 
several government agencies (in particular the Immigration Department) took steps to 
make government procedures more transparent. This aided my search for data; 
however, the information provided was often still incomplete and sometimes differed 
from actual practice, as interviews revealed. 
 
The Hansard (official report) archives of Dewan Rakyat were a valuable resource for 
government statistics, and I was also able to supplement this primary data with 
official reports and statistics generated by international organisations such as the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Bank and UN bodies as well as 
publications by national, regional and international civil society organisations. There 
have also been a number of seminars, workshops and conferences on migration in 
Malaysia, and I was able to obtain some unpublished conference papers from fellow 
scholars. For the legal analysis for this project, I referred to the text of laws, 
regulations, and orders, as well as to written court judgments concerning non-citizens. 




which was an invaluable resource for understanding the dramas of out-of-court 
settlements and the demands of taking cases to court. 
 
In order to understand the impacts of laws, policies, and practices on stakeholders and 
actors, I conducted interviews with a range of respondents, 58 in total over a two-year 
period. These comprised 12 civil society actors advocating for migrant and refugee 
rights, 15 migrant workers, 9 foreign spouses, 14 refugees, a SUHAKAM 
Commissioner and two officers, 2 diplomats, and 3 employers (one representing the 
Malaysian Employers Federation). Around half of those I interviewed were people I 
already knew through the course of my work as an independent researcher and a 
migrant and refugee rights advocate (further elaborated below). The other half were 
contacts I secured through referrals and ‘cold-calling’ (sending emails and making 
phone calls to request for interviews). I was less successful in arranging interviews 
with policy-makers (specifically officials of the UNHCR and the Ministry of Home 
Affairs). In these interviews, I sought their experiences of dealing with immigration 
laws, policies, and practices as well as their perspectives on specific aspects of the 
regulatory regimes with which they had experience. These interviews lasted an 
average of 1-1.5 hours. In some cases, I met with the respondents several times.  
 
I also reviewed material publicly available on online discussion forums and blogs to 
get a sense of what individuals struggled with in relation to immigration control. 
Participants in these forums posed and answered questions about administrative 
procedures, compared their experiences of engaging with immigration officials, and 
exchanged (sometimes heated) views about immigration and the place of non-citizens 





I also drew upon field notes from my previous independent research with migrants 
and refugees. I started working with refugees as a volunteer for a national NGO, The 
National Human Rights Society (Persatuan Kebangsaan Hak Asasi Manusia, 
HAKAM) in 2002. Through this work, I was exposed to the vulnerabilities faced by 
refugees as they sought asylum in Malaysia. This led to further participation in 
research, service provision, and advocacy for the rights of refugees and migrant 
workers with and through other NGOs. In 2006, I co-founded the Migration Working 
Group, a civil society network committed to advocacy for the rights of non-citizens. 
In 2009, I was awarded the ‘Anti-Trafficking Hero’ award by the US State 
Department for my work in advocating for policy reform.  
 
These prior experiences shaped this research in a number of ways. Firstly, I chose to 
examine immigration laws, policies and practices because I was frustrated by their 
complexity, opaque nature, and the deep impact they had on the lives of non-citizens. 
I realised that the immigration control regime comprised a number of semi-
autonomous sub-systems of rules and procedures formed on the basis of the 
immigration status of individuals. Written information about these systems were often 
unavailable, incomplete, or inaccurate. It was necessary to work through 
inconsistencies and to crosscheck information in different documents with the 
experiences of non-citizens and civil society actors. What happened in practice often 
differed from how things were represented on paper. However, there were also limits 
to the knowledge held by those I interviewed. Those familiar with immigration 
control practices for migrant workers, for example, didn’t know what to do in relation 




different types of non-citizens, and people rarely understood more than one sub-
system. 
 
My years of engagement on migration issues opened doors to some respondents and 
guided me in the selection of topics and materials for study. It was much easier to set 
up interviews with civil society actors and non-citizens with whom I had already 
developed relationships. However, my work also closed doors to some respondents. 
As an example, in 2010, officials of UNHCR in Malaysia with whom I had had 
cordial relationships for several years ignored my requests for an interview despite 
having previously agreed to meet me. I later found out that they had recently read an 
article I wrote about refugees in Malaysia (See Nah 2010a) and had taken offence at 
my comments about their role. I am not sure if there were similar reasons behind my 
difficulty in contacting government officials for interviews. My requests for 
interviews with the latter were also ignored – but perhaps in ways no different from 
those of other researchers.  
 
Finally, in this research, I have tried to set out the different rules, regulations, and 
practices that have an impact on the lives of non-citizens. I have tried to be 
comprehensive, because one of the major challenges faced by non-citizens has been 
the incomplete and fragmented nature of information available on the immigration 
control regime and on the legal infrastructure for gaining justice. This mapping of 
detail has not been an easy task because of the complexities of the different sub-
systems and paucity of information available; indeed, it has been a tedious one. I hope 




work out the details they need to know in order to engage effectively with Malaysia’s 
immigration control regime. I hope for this research to have a practical use as well. 
 
Challenges in Research 
Studying the construction, operation and impacts of Malaysia’s laws, policies, and 
practices on non-citizens has been challenging for a number of reasons. The first is 
the difficulty of grappling with the sheer volume of laws, policies, procedures and 
practices concerning different categories of non-citizens, which govern many specific 
aspects of their lives – from their entry, residence and exit from Malaysia, to the way 
they maintain legal status, gain access to health, financial and education services, 
change jobs, obtain legal redress, pay taxes, purchase property, get married and 
divorced, register births and deaths, and maintain families while residing in Malaysia. 
These policies and procedures are not codified systematically in one central location.  
 
Of the three domains of law, policy and practice, the first is constituted most formally 
and clearly. There are established institutions with different roles in relation to the 
laws of Malaysia – the Attorney General’s (AG’s) Chambers to drafts laws, the 
bicameral Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies to enact laws, the Judiciary to 
interpret laws, and the Executive to enforce laws. These are also a number of 
formalised institutions that provide alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Information on the legal framework in Malaysia as well as laws, regulations and 
orders are codified and published for public circulation. Methodologically, however, 
my analysis of case law is restricted to written judgements, which are limited in 
number; there are thousands of cases concerning non-citizens, especially at the 





In contrast to law, the domains of policy and practice in Malaysia are much more 
opaque and their boundaries blurred. The processes by which policies are determined 
are unclear as are the content, extent and validity periods of specific policies. Most 
policy papers and reports – some written by government officials, some by 
consultants – are not available to the broader public. Some are classified as ‘official 
secrets’ under the Official Secrets Act 1972, making it a criminal offence for a person 
to hold and communicate this information. Except for the state of Selangor, which 
recently passed the Selangor Freedom of Information Enactment 2010 on 1 April 
2011, there is no legislation protecting the access of citizens to information.  
 
Government policies are not publicized in a consistent manner. Often, policy changes 
are announced through the media, and then retracted or amended soon afterward in 
the face of opposition from stakeholder groups. Several Ministries have direct 
political and economic interests in the immigration system – in particular the Ministry 
of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Human Resources – and have been engaged in 
‘turf wars’ that contribute further to policy ambiguity (Pillai 2004). As a Malaysian 
civil society actor opined, “Malaysian politicians make policy statements all the time 
that don’t carry weight”.23 This makes it challenging to identify and evaluate the 
trajectory of the development of Malaysia’s laws, policies, and practices and to assess 
their impacts. 
 
Malaysia’s policies and practices concerning non-citizens also change frequently. 
Malaysia’s management of labour migration has been referred to as a “stop-go 
                                                




approach” (Scalabrini Migration Center 2011), with “on again/off again policies” that 
have “schizophrenic policy moves” (Gurowitz 2000:867). It is very common for non-
citizens – even government officials – to be confused about the most up-to-date rules 
and regulations. The data released by Ministries has also been inconsistent, partial, 
and sometimes incomparable because of the way they are presented. Commiserating 
with the difficulties I experienced in finding clarity in government policies and 
practices, an NGO case manager with years of experience helping foreign workers in 
distress stated, “I bet it’s hard; this is Malaysia... you can't get anything by reading”.24  
 
Non-citizens are regulated through a growing, changing, complex bureaucratic system 
that is open to manipulation. While there are bureaucratic procedures for most, if not 
all, of the ways in which the state regulates the lives of non-citizens, these are not 
adhered to systematically by civil servants. The opacity of the system and the 
confusion caused by rapid changes in policies and procedures allow bureaucrats a 
high level of discretion in imposing, changing, or waiving procedural requirements. 
For example, they are able to speed up or slow down the progress of applications for 
immigration passes, which can mean the difference between large financial gains or 
losses for businesses. The level of discretion allowed to and exercised by bureaucrats 
creates ripe conditions for corruption. Such unchecked autonomy becomes a source of 
power. In public discourse, these bureaucrats – whose decisions are often arbitrary 
and incontestable – have been referred to as ‘little Napoleons’. One of my 
respondents, an employer with years of experience hiring foreign workers, 
commented, “the system that works is not the system that is written down. The 
                                                




Immigration officer tells me what I need to do, and I do it”.25 In other words, it is not 
official government policies and procedures that are important and relevant in order to 
get things done, it is what is accepted in practice that counts – and this changes from 
bureaucrat to bureaucrat. 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The next chapter provides the historical and geographical context of Malaysia’s 
contemporary approaches to citizenship and migration. I first discuss the formation 
and evolution of states in Southeast Asia, reviewing the ways in which colonial 
rationalities and modern mechanisms of control were utilised to instil order and 
authority over diverse populations, territories, and economies. I also review how 
Southeast Asian states have grappled with citizenship, statelessness, migration and 
asylum, and discuss recent developments concerning human rights and regionalism 
through the regional inter-governmental organisation the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the second part of this chapter, I turn more specifically to 
citizenship and nation building practices in Malaysia. I review political developments 
and discourses concerning national identity and the position of ‘indigenous’ and 
‘immigrant’ communities in the transition from colonial to postcolonial rule. I look at 
how these have influenced the socio-political positionality of different ethnic 
communities in Malaysia. I also examine the development of the Malaysian economy, 
which has become foreign labour dependent. I review the citizenship laws of 
Malaysia, examining the different ways by which a person can become a citizen. I 
conclude with a review of key contemporary issues related to citizenship and 
migration in Malaysian society. 
                                                





Chapter 3 provides an overview of the legal context in Malaysia in relation to non-
citizens, analysing the extent to which non-citizens have been able to gain access to 
justice. In this chapter, I review the status and rights of non-citizens in the domestic 
legal framework, the different processes available for alternative dispute resolution, 
and examine the types of grievances for which they have sought legal remedies. I 
discuss issues that non-citizens face in gaining access to justice, which have had a 
direct impact on their actual enjoyment of rights in Malaysia. 
 
Chapters 4 to 7 focus on four different categories of non-citizens. In each chapter, I 
outline the structure of the relevant immigration control regime and examine its socio-
political significance. I then explore how non-citizens in these categories perceive 
these regimes.26 This is followed with a review of relevant case law, examining the 
ways in which the judiciary has decided on their grievances and ruled on their status 
and rights in Malaysia. Finally, I identify the plural objectives of the state (both 
explicit and implicit) that undergird the decisions and actions of state authorities 
towards each category of non-citizen.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned with the Malaysian government’s approach to migrant 
workers. Chapter 4 focuses on the regulation of authorised migrant workers through 
the system of immigration passes, which differentiates between ‘expatriates’, ‘foreign 
workers’ and ‘domestic workers’ while Chapter 5 focuses on irregular migrants and 
the use of amnesty exercises, public crackdowns and methods of punishment as 
                                                
26 In relation to migrant workers (Chapters 4 and 5), I also explore the perspectives of 





mechanisms of control. Chapter 6 focuses on the position of foreign spouses of 
Malaysian citizens. I review the struggles they face in staying in Malaysia, in 
obtaining the right to work, in maintaining their independence, and in gaining access 
to permanent resident status and citizenship. In Chapter 7, I examine the position of 
asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons. I argue that in the absence of a formal 
legal and administrative framework that recognises their status and position in 
Malaysia, they are regulated by the UNHCR as a means of exempting them from 
treatment as irregular migrants.  
 
In the final chapter, Chapter 8, I draw together the analysis provided in each of the 
preceding chapters to propose theoretical contributions to our contemporary 
understanding of the nature of modern state power over non-citizens using a 
Foucauldian framework. I propose ways in which state power is limited. I also 
theorise Malaysia’s mentalities of government concerning non-citizens and its 





CHAPTER 2: CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND MALAYSIA 
MODERNITY, POSTCOLONIALISM AND THE RISE OF NATION-STATES 
Malaysia’s approaches to citizenship and migration have evolved through interplays 
with broader historical, geographical, and political developments in Southeast Asia. 
The present form of Southeast Asia, comprised of 11 separate and independent 
sovereign states, is a relatively new phenomenon in the history of the world. Aside 
from Thailand, which was never officially colonized, Burma (Myanmar), Malaysia, 
Singapore and Brunei gained independence from the British Empire in 1948, 1957, 
1963 and 1984 respectively27; Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from France in 1945, 
1949, and 1953; Indonesia from the Netherlands in 1945; and the Philippines from the 
United States of America in 1946. Timor-Leste declared its independence in 1975, 
was invaded and occupied by Indonesia shortly afterward, and gained sovereignty in 
2002. These are post-war states born in the wake of decolonization. In their 
formation, the nature of sovereignty and its source of legitimacy changed – from 
direct and indirect rule by external authorities to self-rule in the name of a nascent, 
independent nation. 
 
In their quest to govern effectively, state authorities drew upon colonial rationalities 
and utilized modern mechanisms of control. This was no easy task, given the 
plurality, diversity and centuries of conflict, movement and settlement in the lands 
they now ruled. These postcolonial states were built upon the ashes of empires, 
kingdoms, and chiefdoms with complex histories of changing political allegiances and 
                                                
27 Peninsular Malaysia gained independence with the forming of the Federation of 
Malaya in 1957. In 1963, it joined with Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore to form 




geographies of power.28 Their ways of governing became increasing modern in 
approach – embedded with the belief in the inherent good of ‘progress’ and economic 
development; in planning and bureaucracy as the best means of achieving these goals; 
and the possibility of shaping populations, lands, and other factors of production in 
order to achieve state goals of prosperity, stability and longevity.  
 
State authorities remapped and resurveyed their lands, constructing and enforcing 
borders where once free movement was permitted, in some cases bisecting traditional 
travel routes. State authorities redefined the ownership of land, introducing land 
tenure systems, and focused on developing the economic productivity of land, seeking 
ways to collect taxes and maximize profitability. They authorized the clearing of 
jungles in the name of ‘development’, benefiting from logging and offering incentives 
for farming and cash cropping. They facilitated the growth of mining, manufacturing 
and industrialization. They developed and refined the infrastructure for governing the 
economy, restructuring banking systems, creating regulatory bodies, re-establishing 
stock exchanges, and utilizing statistical methods for measuring investments, income, 
debt, savings, and productivity. 
 
State authorities displaced and resettled peoples in the name of nation building and 
development. In Indonesia, they sponsored the movement of millions under 
controversial transmigrasi (transmigration) programmes, carried out at first under the 
Dutch government and then pursued under postcolonial rule “as a way of promoting a 
nationalist vision and narrative of territory and culture through deliberate community-
building in the name of development and progress” (Hoey 2003:110). In Malaya, after 
                                                
28 As James Scott notes, there are also peoples who have resisted incorporation into 




the Second World War, state authorities resettled almost half a million people, mostly 
Chinese, into ‘New Villages’ as a way of containing the threat of the spread of 
Communism (Lee 2009). They also resettled numerous Orang Asli communities in 
order to accelerate their integration (Ministry of Home Affairs 1978) with the 
numerically and politically dominant Malays as well as to secure their lands for 
development projects (Dentan et al. 1996; Nicholas 2000).  
 
State authorities extended their administrative reach, ordering, enumerating and 
documenting people for the purposes of planning, collecting and distributing 
resources. Bureaucracies utilized surveys and censuses to define, divide and 
categorize people, recording variables such as ethnicity, place of residence, level of 
education, use of language, and type of profession that helped states to regulate their 
populations (Christopher 2006; Scott 1999). State authorities refined registration 
systems – recording births, marriages, divorces and deaths – and produced individual 
identity documents. State authorities enacted laws that divided citizens from non-
citizens, formalizing the biological and residential criteria for citizenship, and 
specifying the different entitlements, rights and responsibilities of each population in 
relation to the state.  
 
The rise of modern states ushered in an era of immigration control. States developed 
legal mechanisms, surveillance techniques and policing technologies to control 
borders. They delimited the spatial-temporal conditions for travel, authorizing specific 




checks.29 Identity became central in migration control practices, the documentation of 
individual identity a core technique of regulation. Unauthorized movement became 
punishable by imprisonment, fines and deportation. 
 
However, Southeast Asian states – along with other states in the world – have never 
achieved complete control over their own territories, populations and economies. 
Nation building has been greatly contested. Attempts to define a ‘nation’ from 
disparate peoples with different ethnic identities, cultural norms, political opinions 
and religious beliefs, have resulted in dissatisfaction, discrimination, large-scale 
communal violence, ethnocide and, in some cases – such as Cambodia from 1975-
1979 and East Timor from 1975-1999 – genocide (Kiernan 2008). Contemporary 
separatist movements in the Philippines, Southern Thailand, Indonesia and Burma 
bear testimony to the resistance by ethnic and religious minorities to state-imposed 
forms of the nation, questioning the legitimacy of those who hold political power. 
Even those officially recognized as citizens have been included unevenly in the 
political arrangements of states, depending on their ethnic identity, lifestyle, 
geographical location, and their proximity to political and economic power. Those 
that suffer the greatest inequalities are the poor, the isolated, the geographically 
marginalised, those who pursue alternative (‘backward’) lifestyles, and those who do 
not share the ethnic and religious features of the powerful. 
 
Citizenship and Statelessness: Defining Those Who Belong 
Citizenship laws are exclusionary by design. In all ten members of the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), citizenship by operation of law is obtained 
                                                
29 For historical studies on the emergence of identity documents in Europe, see the 




primarily by descent (jus sanguinis) from a mother and/or father who had citizenship 
status at the time of birth of their children.30 In these states, having one parent as a 
citizen is sufficient and the country of birth does not matter, except for Malaysia, 
which has an additional jus soli (birthright) requirement if the mother is the citizen 
and the father is not.31 Naturalization is restricted, granted to a few, most often on the 
basis of marriage to a citizen and/or long-term residency with the fulfilment of 
integration requirements (typically knowledge of language and/or customs).  
 
In all ten ASEAN states, birth in the territory of the state does not automatically 
confer the right to citizenship (that is, the principle of jus soli) except for a minority of 
children in Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and Malaysia.32 As such, 
generations may be born and raised in these states without ever being given 
citizenship, becoming part of the growing global number of non-citizens whose sense 
                                                
30 Timor-Leste, which is soon to join ASEAN, is comparatively more generous, 
permitting citizenship by descent and by virtue of birth in the national territory 
(Immigration Service of Timor-Leste 2010). 
31 That is, female Malaysian citizens cannot pass on citizenship by operation of law to 
their children born overseas. However, they can make an application for citizenship 
by registration (further elaborated below). From June 2010 however, the Malaysian 
government has made it a matter of policy to issue these children with certificates of 
citizenship if their mothers register the birth of their children at Malaysian consulates 
within a year. Singaporean women were also unable to pass on citizenship by 
operation of law to their children born abroad, until the Constitution (Amendment) 
Bill came into force on 15 May 2004 permitting them to do so (Immigration and 
Checkpoints Authority 2004) 
32 As reported by the United States Office of Personnel Management (2001), in 
Indonesia, citizenship by birth is conferred on children born in the territory of 
Indonesia between 1 January 1946 and 1 August 1958 and to children born to 
unknown parents after this period. In Thailand, it is conferred on children of unwed 
mothers who had been given temporary residence or permission to stay temporarily. 
In Cambodia, it is conferred on children of non-citizen parents also born in Cambodia 
and children of unknown parents found in Cambodian territory. In Vietnam, it is 
conferred on children born in Vietnam to parents who are stateless and have 
permanent resident status as well as to abandoned children found in Vietnam. In 
Malaysia, children born without nationality and who do not acquire nationality within 




of belonging and affective ties lie in a country that refuses to accept them as its own. 
If they are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of the country of 
origin of their parents (in international law, the country of their nationality), they 
become de facto stateless. These include the children of Filipino and Indonesian 
parents in Sabah, Malaysia who do not wish to return to the country from which their 
parents originate (Olson 2007; Tenaganita 2006). 
 
Aside from Cambodia, all ASEAN states do not permit dual citizenship for adults 
(Millbank 2011). Some citizens are also at risk of losing their citizenship. Indonesians 
who have lived abroad for more than five years, for example, will lose their 
citizenship under the 2006 Citizenship Act unless they declare their wish to remain a 
citizen before the time lapses, and continue to make this declaration every two years 
(Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal 2006). This may have a serious impact on 
Indonesian migrant workers, especially those who have lived for many years abroad 
and those who have limited access to Indonesian embassies or consulates (Writenet 
2007).  
 
In some cases, whole groups of people are de jure stateless – not considered a 
national of any state, regardless of their histories in the land. In Southeast Asia, these 
include an estimated 725,000 Rohingyas in Burma who are subject to repression and 
discrimination by the Burmese military junta, including extreme restriction of 
movement, restrictions on their freedom to marry, the confiscation of land, and 
subjection to forced labour, arbitrary arrest and extortion (Garcia and Olson 2008; 
Lewa 2009; The Arakan Project 2008). Most significantly, the 1982 Citizenship Law 




Rohingyas have been on the move since, seeking sanctuary in Bangladesh, Thailand, 
Malaysia, and beyond.  
 
In Thailand, there are an estimated 3.5 million stateless persons. These include almost 
half of the estimated 1 million members of hill tribes who have been unable to register 
their citizenship or to obtain some form of legal status. Treated as ‘illegal migrants’, 
they do not have the right to move freely, work, buy land, or gain access to affordable 
healthcare services (Toyota 2007; Vital Voices Global Partnership 2007). All of these 
groups – who cannot acquire any form of citizenship, or have lost theirs without 
alternatives – are part of the growing numbers of stateless people in the world, 
estimated at 12 million in 2008 (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 2010b). 
 
However, there have also been important measures taken to reduce statelessness in the 
region. In 2008, Thailand amended its Civil Registration Act to provide for universal 
birth registration. All children born in Thailand are issued birth certificates regardless 
of the status of their parents (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 2011). In the same 
year, Thailand enacted the Nationality Act, changing the criteria for citizenship to 
include some hill tribes who were previously not eligible (US Department of State 
2008). In 2010, the Viet Nam government agreed to give citizenship to 2,400 former 
refugees from Cambodia who have lived in Viet Nam since 1975 (UN News Centre 
2010). Last year, it passed a law allowing thousands of Vietnamese women who had 






The delineation of territorial borders and the establishment of bureaucratic procedures 
to authorize movements changes the relationship between people and place. However, 
borders require intensive work in order for them to be relevant. In spite of the efforts 
made to regulate entry and exit, borders in Southeast Asia have been porous, 
weakened by the inability of states to maintain comprehensive border controls. There 
are well-developed smuggling and trafficking networks that cut through Southeast 
Asian states, often involving a chain of agents in different countries. People move 
without the bidding or permission of state authorities – crossing borders unauthorised, 
living undocumented, working untaxed. Bureaucratic processes established to 
authorize and control movements have never been fully rationalized – their 
effectiveness impeded by petty officials, corruption, faulty record keeping, overly 
complex procedures, and resource inefficiencies. In some cases, it is precisely the 
irrationalities and discontinuities of bureaucratic processes that result in the increasing 
presence of irregular migrants in a country.  
 
Crossing Borders: Migration and Asylum   
Of the 214 million international migrants in the world estimated in 2010, 6.7 million 
are in Southeast Asia (Table 1).33 Southeast Asia is a region of origin, transit and 
destination for international migrants. Of the estimated 13.5 million migrant workers 
originating from ASEAN member states, 5 million work within ASEAN (ASEAN 
2010). The World Bank identifies the two largest legal ‘migration corridors’ in the 
region as being Malaysia-Singapore, with around 1 million documented migrants, and 
Indonesia-Malaysia, with around 700,000 documented migrants (Ratha and Xu 2008). 
                                                
33 These estimates are likely to be conservative, as they are based on population 
censuses, registers, and national surveys, which tend to undercount non-citizens with 





Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand are primary recipients of international migrants in 
the region (Figure 3). The presence of migrants changes the social landscape of some 
of these countries significantly. In contrast, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam are the primary ‘sending countries’. They each 
have interventionist policies that promote labour export, expecting to receive 
remittances as a contribution to their national economies (Battistella 2003). In 2007, 
remittance inflows as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product in the Philippines was 
11.7 percent, in Vietnam it was 7.9 percent, in Cambodia 4.2 percent and in Indonesia 
1.5 percent (The World Bank 2009). In 2009, Indonesian migrant workers remitted 
100 trillion Rupiah home (Wasti 2010).  
 
 
Table 1: Estimated Number of International Migrants in the World and in 















migrants as a 








1990 155 518 065 3 060 304 0.7 48.0 
1995 165 968 778 3 551 917 0.7 48.4 
2000 178 498 563 4 838 013 0.9 49.1 
2005 195 245 404 5 623 545 1.0 49.1 
2010 213 943 812 6 714 768 1.1 49.6 
 
Note: The countries included in Southeast Asia are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Philippines, and 
Vietnam. 




Figure 3: Percentage Breakdown of Estimated Number of International 




Note: Specific figures for Timor-Leste were not available. 






Table 2: Persons of Concern to UNHCR by Country/Territory of Asylum, End-2009 
 


































Cambodia 135 - 135 135 29 - - - - - 164 
Indonesia 798 - 798 798 1,769 311 - - - - 2,878 
Lao PDR - - - - - - - - - - - 
Malaysia1 65,350 787 66,137 66,048 10,267 - - - 40,001 61,329 177,734 
Myanmar - - - - - - 67,290 - 723,571 - 790,861 
Philippines 95 - 95 11 55 - - - - 68 218 
Singapore 7 - 7 7 - - - - - - 7 
Thailand 105,297 - 105,297 105,297 10,255 - - - 3,500,000 - 3,615,552 
Timor-Leste 1 - 1 - 10 - - - - - 11 
Viet Nam 2,357 - 2,357 - - 121 - - 7,200 - 9,678 
Grand Total 174,040 787 174,827 172,296 22,385 432 67,290 - 4,270,772 61,397 4,597,103 
 
Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (2010). Note 1: According to UNHCR, and based on lists provided by refugee communities in 
Malaysia, there are 20,000 unregistered asylum-seekers in Malaysia who share the ‘same profile’ as the current population of asylum-seekers 






Southeast Asian countries have also been places of asylum for the forcibly displaced, 
most of whom originate from the region. In recent history, the largest flow has been 
the Indochinese refugees. Between 1975-1995, almost two million people from 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam left overland and on boats to seek refuge in Hong 
Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines (Robinson 1998; Suhrke 
1983). While almost half a million eventually returned home, more than 1.2 million 
were resettled34 – to the United States, Australia, Canada, France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom as part of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese 
Refugees (CPA) – as their Asian hosts did not want them to reside in their countries 
permanently. 
 
At present, only Cambodia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste are signatories to the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention) and 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol); the main 
countries that host the largest numbers of refugees – Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia – are not. Of the 4.6 million documented persons of concern to the UNHCR 
in Southeast Asia (Table 2), the majority comprises internally displaced persons 
remaining in Burma as well as refugees from Burma residing in Thailand and 
Malaysia.35  
 
In Thailand, an estimated 140,000 refugees from Burma are contained in camps while 
an additional 5,000 live outside of camps, mingling with the estimated 1 million 
                                                
34 Keynote address by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at 
the International Seminar on “The Indochinese Exodus and the International 
Response”, Tokyo, 27 October 1995. 
35 Refugees from Burma have also sought asylum in other countries such as 





migrant workers from Burma, most of whom have irregular status and some of whom 
are also likely to be refugees in need of international protection (Green, Jacobsen, and 
Pyne 2008).36 In Malaysia, the UNHCR estimates the presence of about 100,000 
asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons in Peninsular Malaysia alone, of 
whom around 90 percent originate from Burma (see Table 2 for official figures). They 
too, intermingle with thousands of migrant workers from Burma who live in 
Malaysia, some documented and some with irregular status. Aside from the Burmese, 
there are small numbers of refugees from other regions seeking asylum in Southeast 
Asia, primarily from South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. 
 
Thailand and Malaysia have been ambivalent hosts of refugees, tolerating and 
accommodating rather than welcoming their presence. These countries have been 
rated amongst the top ten ‘worst places for refugees’ in the world in 2007 and 2008, 
because of the mistreatment of refugees by law enforcement authorities (U.S. 
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2008, 2009). The refusal of these states to 
permit their long-term integration with citizens, and the inability of refugees to return 
to their country of origin, mean that the only viable ‘durable solution’ is their 
resettlement. In 2008 and 2009, Thailand and Malaysia were amongst the five 
countries in the world with the highest numbers of refugees resettled with the 
assistance of UNHCR. In 2008, 16,800 and 5,900 individuals respectively departed 
from Thailand and Malaysia, representing 25 percent and 9 percent of the global 
UNHCR resettlement caseload (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 2009). In 2009, 
a further 16,800 and 7,500 departed from Thailand and Malaysia (UN High 
                                                




Commissioner for Refugees 2010a); the rest struggle to eke out a living without 
formal legal status.  
 
As stated earlier, Malaysia and Thailand also host large numbers of irregular 
migrants, estimated at 2 million and 1 million respectively. Most of these non-citizens 
come as migrant workers, in search of economic opportunities. However, they also 
include the children of migrants; stateless people who have lived for generations in 
the territory of the state but never gained recognition as citizens; as well as refugees 
and trafficked persons without formal status. Treated as ‘illegals’, they are vulnerable 
to violence and exploitation and have limited, if any, recourse to justice when crimes 
are committed against them. Over the years, there have been multiple exercises to 
regularize and document these groups, usually coupled with large-scale immigration 
crackdowns to arrest, detain and deport these groups. However, numbers of irregular 
migrants have continued to grow. 
 
Regionalism, Human Rights and Migration Policies  
For a long time, states in Southeast Asia have not been bound by regional 
arrangements in their development of laws, policies, and practices to regulate non-
citizens, unlike states in Africa, Latin America, North America and Europe (Castles 
and Davidson 2000). However, with increasing regionalism, the level of autonomy 
they have had is changing. Groundwork is underway for ASEAN states to develop a 
more coordinated approach to human rights and migration, which is likely to have an 





In 1997, ASEAN member states adopted ASEAN Vision 2020, conceiving of the 
region as: “a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living in peace, 
stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and 
in a community of caring societies”.37 Part of Vision 2020 is the creation of an 
integrated economic region with the free flow of goods, services and investments. 
ASEAN states aim to achieve this by 2015. They are also committed to “accelerate 
the free flow of professional and other services in the region”.  
 
In November 2004, ASEAN states adopted the six-year Vientiane Action Programme 
(VAP) as a step in realizing this vision.38 Amongst the commitments made by states 
in the VAP is the promotion of human rights and obligations and the development of 
a framework to promote and protect the rights of migrant workers. In part fulfilment 
of the VAP, ASEAN states signed the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, adopted in January 2007. However, 
Malaysia, along with Singapore, played a significant role in watering down the 
provisions of the Declaration, ensuring that irregular migrants and the families of 
migrant workers were not included in its coverage (Robertson 2008). 
 
Through the VAP, ASEAN states also committed to an “(e)laboration of an ASEAN 
instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers”.39 Work 
is underway to come to an agreement on the specific provisions of this instrument. 
                                                
37 For the full text of ASEAN Vision 2020, see http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm, 
accessed 21 July 2010.  
38 The VAP acts as a successor to the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) implemented from 
1999 to 2004. 
39 See Vientiane Action Programme VAP 2004-2010, p. 31, available on 





Reflecting the ASEAN Charter, the VAP also notes the need for greater freedom of 
movement within ASEAN countries as a means of achieving a “single market in 
services” (p.13). However, this is restricted to “business persons, experts, 
professionals, skilled labour and talents” (p.13). Freedom of movement as well as 
rights of entry, residence and work within the ASEAN region have, so far, been 
envisaged for particular types of privileged citizens rather than for all who reside in 
member states.   
 
In November 2007, at the 13th ASEAN Summit, ASEAN members adopted the 
ASEAN Charter as its constitution, which was fully ratified by the end of 2008. The 
ASEAN Charter sets out the rights and obligations of ASEAN members in fulfilling 
political-security, economic, and social-cultural goals. This includes a commitment to 
“promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Article 1(7)), and to 
establish an ASEAN human rights body.40 This body, called the ASEAN Inter-
governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), was formed in October 2009. 
In the Joint Communiqué of the 43rd ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting held in Viet 
Nam from 19-20 July 201041, Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the role of AICHR as the 
“overarching institution for regional cooperation in human rights” and approved its 
2010-2011 plan, which includes migration as an area of priority for action.  
 
However, accession to international conventions is still handled unilaterally. All 
ASEAN members are parties to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 
                                                
40 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, available on 
www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf, accessed 22 July 2010. 
41 Full text available on http://asean2010.vn/asean_en/news/36/2DA8FE/Joint-





(CRC) and the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW). Only Cambodia and the Philippines are parties to the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and to the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol). The Philippines is a 
party to the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, while Indonesia and Cambodia 
remain signatories. The Philippines is the only signatory to the 1954 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.  Nevertheless, all ASEAN states are 
required to respect principles of international customary law, the most fundamental 
being non-refoulement which prohibits the deportation of anyone to areas where they 
may face persecution (Feller, Türk, and Nicholson 2003). 
 
These rapid changes at the regional level are complemented by greater efforts by the 
international community to promote constructive dialogue on international migration. 
In 2001, the UN General Assembly issued a resolution (56/203 of 21 December) 
calling on member states of the UN to strengthen cooperation in international 
migration, in order to address root causes and to maximize the benefits of 
international migration. In 2005, the Global Commission on International Migration – 
established by the UN Secretary General and several governments – concluded that 
“the international community has failed to capitalize on the opportunities and to meet 
the challenges associated with international migration” and called for greater 
cooperation between states (Global Commission on International Migration 2005:2).42  
                                                
42 The Commission noted that states and stakeholders lacked the knowledge and skills 
to formulate and implement effective migration policies. In particular, the 
Commission noted that national migration policies tended to lack coherence, because 
of competing priorities, short-term demands, and the lack of synchronization with 





As a follow-up from the UN High-level Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development held in 2006, states developed the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development, a non-binding, voluntary, inter-governmental process for discussing 
migration policies. The Forum was held in Brussels in 2007, Manila in 2008, Athens 
in 2009, and Mexico in 2010. International organisations such as the UN Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and the International Labour 
Organisation have also sponsored dialogues and reports that encourage Southeast 
Asian states to recognize the value of labour migration and the importance of 
protecting the rights of migrants (Kaur 2007). These are efforts aimed at 
strengthening governance on migration at the national, regional and international 
level. 
 
STATE FORMATION AND NATION-BUILDING IN MALAYSIA 
The essence of the nation-state is the institution of citizenship: the integration 
of all the inhabitants of a territory into the political community, and their 
political equality as citizens. Of course, relatively few nations match this 
democratic ideal (Castles and Davidson 2000:2–3). 
 
In popular imagery, Malaysia is constructed as a peaceful, multicultural nation. It is 
portrayed as a place where peoples of different backgrounds, ethnicities and religions 
live side-by-side in harmony. For most part, this imagination holds true. Compared to 
its neighbours and to other postcolonial countries with similar historical trajectories, 
there is relatively little widespread communal violence in Malaysia in spite of 




amongst its citizens, a powerful and emotive (if contested) sense of being 
‘Malaysian’.  
 
However, this veneer of multiculturalism belies the ongoing struggles by 
marginalized communities for equal recognition and treatment as citizens. Differences 
in socio-political identities in Malaysia are also the basis for exclusion, 
marginalization and discrimination. The most salient dimensions of difference are 
ethnicity and religion, which act as representative markers for separating ‘indigenous’ 
communities from those deemed to have ‘immigrant’ backgrounds, regardless of the 
actual histories of individuals and their families in the land. Until now, it is upon the 
basis of claims to indigeneity that Malay-Muslim ethnonationalist elites continue to 
argue for ‘special privileges’ as the ‘ethnic core’ of the Malaysia nation, while others 
argue for equal rights amongst citizens. 
 
Immigration Before and During British Colonial Administration 
British colonial authorities started extending their influence in the Malay Peninsula43 
from 1786 onwards with the founding of Penang. Centuries before their arrival, 
traders from China, India, Arabia, and Europe intermingled in a number of vibrant 
trading posts on the east and west coasts of the Peninsula. These early immigrants 
were free men, relatively affluent, some settling in the Peninsula, marrying locally 
and maintaining families (Khoo 2009). They brought with them new ideas, 
technology and religious teachings, interacting with Minangkabau, Bugis, Acehnese, 
Mandaling, Kerinchi and Banjarese settlers, who moved to the Peninsula from the 14th 
                                                
43 In this thesis, I use the terms ‘Malay Peninsula’ and ‘Peninsula’ to refer to present-
day Peninsular Malaysia without including Singapore, as some scholars have done 




century onwards from territories in the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia). 
Khoo argues that traders were considerably different in social standing from their 
poorer counterparts, the labourers from China, India and the Dutch East Indies, who 
came to the Peninsula in large numbers from the first half of the 19th century onwards 
to fill labour shortages that resulted from rapid economic development under British 
administration.  
 
Initially, the British had an ‘open door’ policy on immigration, and large numbers of 
immigrants came to work in the Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca, and 
Singapore, as well as in the tin mines and rubber estates of other Malay states in the 
Peninsula (Cheah 2009). Amongst them were convicts and indentured immigrants 
brought in from India by the British specifically to construct public works, as well as 
indentured immigrants from China, India and the Dutch East Indies brought in by 
recruitment agents and employers to work on agricultural estates and plantations (Saw 
1963). From 1830 to 1931, over a period of a hundred years, the population in the 
Malay Peninsula grew rapidly, increasing from 0.5 million to 3.79 million 
(Kamaruddin 1982).  
 
The rapid growth of visible minorities triggered anxieties amongst the Malay 
inhabitants of the Peninsula. Several Malay leaders were particularly concerned about 
being outnumbered by immigrants. By the 1921 Census, immigrants from China and 
Indian were more numerous than the overall Malay population.44 British colonial 
authorities had gained influence in the Malay Peninsula through persuasion and 
negotiation with Malay chiefs and sultans; their authority was based on treaties rather 
                                                
44 The 1921 Census noted the presence of 511,000 ‘Malaysians’ (referring to the 




than conquest and subjugation. They saw themselves as being the ‘protectors’ of the 
Malays, but did not see themselves as having the same duty towards the rest of the 
inhabitants of the Peninsula (Roff 1967).  
 
In response to the anxieties of the Malay communities, the British introduced various 
pieces of legislation to curb the flow of immigration – first, the Immigration 
Restriction Ordinance of 1928, which gave it the powers to control the admission of 
immigrants, and then the Alien Ordinance of 1933, which extended these powers to 
include the regulation and control of immigrants residing in Malaya.45 These resulted 
in monthly quotas for the immigration of men from 1930; however, in order to 
improve the sex ratio women and children under 12 years of age were not restricted 
until later, in 1938 (Saw 1963). While these laws had a particularly negative impact 
on Chinese communities, they did not affect immigrants from territories now known 
as Indonesia, since the British considered them to be of the ‘same stock’ as Malaysia 
(Wong 2010) as well as immigrants from India, who were considered British subjects. 
At the same time, the Indian government imposed a ban on the emigration of 
unskilled workers.  
 
The unequal treatment of the different ethnic groups was obvious in other ways. 
When the Malayan economy slowed down in the period of the Great Depression from 
1929-1932, the British didn’t extend unemployment benefits to Chinese and Indian 
labourers, offering them only free repatriation to their homelands (Cheah 2009). As 
                                                
45 The first attempt to regulate and protect Chinese immigrants was the passing of the 
Chinese Immigration Ordinance (No. 11 of 1877). This Ordinance provided for the 
establishment of a Chinese Protectorate Office, the improvement of conditions 
onboard junks and steamers, the institution of reception facilities for immigrants, and 
the licensing of recruiters (Saw 1963). The Labour Contracts Ordinance of 1914 that 




Cheah notes, the British also adopted a number of pro-Malay measures, such as 
passing legislation to protect Malay smallholders and their ownership of land (in the 
form of the Small Holders (Restriction of Sale) Bill 1931 and the Malay Reservations 
Bill 1933), supporting padi cultivation amongst Malays while refusing to alienate 
lands for the same purpose to Chinese and Indians, and increasing the number of 
Malays in the civil service while excluding non-Malays. 
 
In 1942, the Japanese mounted a successful invasion of the Peninsula, transforming 
British Malaya. For three and a half years, the Japanese exerted control through 
violent and repressive measures. They executed an estimated 40,000 Chinese 
suspected to be part of anti-Japanese organizations, took military control of the police 
and judiciary, and registered the population, monitoring their places of residence and 
their movements closely (Harper 1999). Resistance groups fought against the 
Japanese using guerilla tactics, with the support of the British. Amongst them were 
members of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) who were organized along with 
other groups as the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army.  
 
In 1945, with the surrender of the Japanese, the British returned to power, confronted 
with poverty, inflation, food shortages, forced displacement, disease, and economic 
turmoil. Post-war discontent over labour conditions and poverty led workers to 
organize themselves and to form trade unions. The British took repressive measures 
against some of the numerous demonstrations and strikes that ensued. They sent 
police to quell protests through gunfire and arrests, changing legislation such as the 
Trade Union Ordinance in 1948, thus making these organizations illegal. In June 




the British declared a state of emergency. A month later, the British banned the MCP, 
which had gained effective control of more than two-thirds of the trade unions. While 
there was inconclusive evidence that the MCP directed the violence that ensued and 
was likely more internally divided and unsure of their actions than historians have 
portrayed, over time, communism became the primary target of the Emergency 
campaign (Harper 1999). 
 
The Malayan Communist Emergency Period (1948-1960) 
In the early years of the Communist Emergency, over half a million Chinese, in 
particular those residing in rural areas, were resettled into ‘New Villages’ where food 
supplies, essential provisions and the movements of people were monitored closely in 
order to minimize possibilities of their providing material support to the MCP. They 
were also exposed to training courses to attract and build their loyalty. The British 
also required residents to hold a national identity card, as a way of keeping track of 
their movements, a compulsory administrative practice that is still in place today. 
 
In 1952, the MCP changed its tactics, retreating deeper into the jungles of Malaya, 
building bases from which they engaged in guerrilla warfare. They built relationships 
with the aboriginal tribes who lived in the jungles, seeking their help as guides, 
porters, as well as sources of intelligence, food and essential supplies. As counter-
measures, the British implemented a disastrous resettlement programme for thousands 
of aborigines that resulted in the death and illness of many, and also aerial bombed 
suspected areas of food production in the jungle (Carey 1979; Nicholas 1990). These 
did not serve to win over the aboriginal groups, and in 1953 the British changed their 




to the aboriginal groups in order to ‘win their hearts and minds’ (H. Miller 1981). It 
was in this period that the aboriginal groups were named ‘Orang Asli’, original 
people, in recognition of their place in the history of the Peninsula. 
 
In 1953, the British replaced the Aliens Ordinance with the more comprehensive 
Immigration Ordinance of 1953, as the overall demand for labour was slowing and 
the local supply from residents (including earlier immigrants and their children) was 
becoming adequate. This Ordinance allowed the British to restrict permanent entry to 
those who could contribute to the expansion of commerce and industry, who could 
provide specialist services not available locally, who were families of local residents, 
and to others on compassionate grounds (Saw 1963). In 1959, the Ordinance was 
amended to further tighten the entry of immigrants; it prohibited the entry of wives 
and children who had been living separately from their husbands for five continuous 
years after December 1954, as well as the children of citizens aged 6 years or more. 
As Saw notes, quoting a statement released by the Malayan Ministry of External 
Affairs and the Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs reported in a Straits Times article 
dated 3 November 1959, 
The principle objectives of the amendment are to safe-guard the employment 
and livelihood of Malayan citizens and “to bring about a more balanced and 
assimilated Malayan population whose ties and loyalty are to this country 






The Formation of Malaya and Malaysia 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, nationalist movements gained momentum 
across South and Southeast Asia. In the Malay Peninsula, greater political 
consciousness and a desire to defend the interests and rights of their own communities 
led political elites to create ethnic-based parties. The United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) were founded in 
1946 and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in 1949.46 Although these parties 
were organised on the basis of ethnicity, they represented peoples with diverse 
linguistic, cultural and religious practices. Intra-group differences were minimized in 
order to achieve the benefit of collective action. In 1954, these three parties formed 
the National Alliance, the precursor of the present-day National Front (Barisan 
Nasional, BN).  
 
Malay political elites formed UMNO for a specific purpose – to oppose the Malayan 
Union proposals put forward by the British in 1946 to unify different administrative 
and political structures in the Peninsula.47 They objected, in particular, to the 
extension of citizenship and equal rights to all residents in Malaya as well as to the 
                                                
46 There were also multi-ethnic parties formed, such as the Independence of Malaya 
Party (IMP) in 1951 by Dato Onn bin Jaafar who resigned as the President of UMNO 
after it refused to accept the membership of non-Malays, but they were less politically 
successful than the Alliance parties. 
47 At that time, the British exerted influence in the Peninsula through three different 
political arrangements. In the Straits Settlements (Penang, Malacca and Singapore), 
there was a Crown Colony government for which the centre of the government was in 
Singapore. In the Federated Malay States (Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, and 
Selangor), which entered into a Federation by treaty in 1895, their authority rested on 
individual agreements with the Rulers of each state through which they negotiated for 
the positions of a British Advisors and extended British protection to the subjects of 
the Rulers and to the states. The Unfederated Malay States (Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis 
and Trengganu), previously under Siam, came under British protection in 1909 and 
also had British Advisors appointed under a series of agreements. The fifth 
Unfederated Malay State, Johor, came under the care of the British by treaty in 1885 




reduction of the powers of the Malay Rulers. This was the first time that uniform 
citizenship laws were proposed for the Peninsula – before this, the Straits Settlements 
and the Federated Malay States had their own local naturalization laws, while the 
Unfederated Malay States did not have this type of legislation (Sinnadurai 1978).  
 
Their protests were successful, and after intense debate and negotiation, a federation 
was formed under the 1948 Federation of Malaya Agreement. In this Agreement, 
Malays were given special privileges with regard to Malay reservation land, quotas in 
public services, and quotas for business licenses, permits and education scholarships. 
Citizenship was given to the subjects of the Rulers and to certain groups of 
individuals born in and permanently resident in the Federation. However, federal 
citizenship was considered to be different from nationality; state nationality laws 
prevailed and were relevant for determining if a person was a British subject 
(Sinnadurai 1978). In 1952, the Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) 
Ordinance was enacted, introducing a more restrictive form of citizenship and 
specifying the three ways by which it could be acquired: by operation of law, by 
registration and by naturalization. 
 
The rejection of the 1946 Malayan Union proposals and the adoption of the 1948 
Federation of Malaya Agreement laid bare the main political issue concerning 
citizenship that has resurfaced time and again in Malaysian politics – whether Malays 
should be given special privileges or whether all citizens should be given equal rights 
and recognition, regardless of ethnic identification and claims to indigeneity. In the 
political rhetoric of the time, the question at hand was whether Malaya would be for 




1957, 75.7 percent of Chinese and 65 percent of Indians were locally born and the 
results of the Census taken that year demonstrated the intention of these communities 
to settle permanently in Malaya (Fell 1961). Equal rights as citizens were therefore of 
great importance to Chinese and Indian communities. 
 
The British set two preconditions for Independence – racial harmony and the control 
of communist terrorism (Hooker 2003). In 1955, when the Alliance parties won 51 of 
52 seats in the first general elections to the Federal Legislative Council, their leaders 
believed that this demonstrated their capacity to meet the first requirement. In 1956, 
Alliance leaders met with British representatives in London to make preparations for 
Independence. They agreed upon the date of 31 August 1957 (Merdeka Day) as the 
official date for the handover of power. Singapore was excluded from these plans. An 
independent commission, headed by Lord William Reid, was charged with the 
responsibility of recommending a Constitution for a fully self-governing Federation 
of Malaya, which included the criteria and process for federal citizenship.48 A 
Working Party comprising representatives of the Alliance, the Malay Rulers and the 
British authorities deliberated (and made changes) to the recommendations of the 
Reid Commission.  
 
The Working Party agreed that the final Constitution would include the recognition of 
the “special position of the Malays” (Article 153), first explicated in Clause 19(1)(d) 
                                                
48 The Commission consulted widely with representatives from different 
communities. Amongst the 131 memorandums they received, and to which they paid 
particular attention, was one submitted by the Alliance. The memorandum reflected 




of the Federation of Malaya Agreement.49 This ‘special position’ would be expressed 
in the reservation of quotas for appointments in public services, issuance of business 
permits and licences, and financial assistance for education, as well as the reservation 
of land for Malays. Article 160 defines a ‘Malay’ as 
a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay 
language, conforms to Malay custom and — (a) was before Merdeka Day 
born in the Federation or in Singapore or born of parents one of whom was 
born in the Federation or in Singapore, or is on that day domiciled in the 
Federation or in Singapore; or (b) is the issue of such a person… 
 
In 1963, when Sabah and Sarawak (as well as Singapore until 1965) joined Malaya to 
form Malaysia, the natives of Sabah and Sarawak were also recognised as having this 
‘special position’. However, the aboriginal communities of Peninsular Malaysia, the 
Orang Asli, are not included in the Constitution as having this status, much to their 
consternation (Nah 2006). The Constitution also declared Islam as the official religion 
of the Federation (Article 3(1)) and Malay as the national language (Article 152(1)).  
 
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF MALAY(SI)A: 1957 TO PRESENT 
As Lim observes, “Malaysia’s colonial heritage from the British at the time of 
Independence in 1957 was a dualistic economic structure characterized by low 
productivity, subsistence, peasant agriculture on the one hand and export-oriented, 
                                                
49 The Reid Commission recommended that this provision be reduced and ceased over 
time as the different communities integrated into a common nationality. They 
recommended an official review to be conducted after 15 years. However, the 
Working Party recommended the removal of this specific time limit, suggesting 






foreign-controlled rubber estates and tin mines on the other.” (L. L. Lim 1988:112). 
After independence, the government first encouraged import substitution and then 
shifted to an export-oriented industrialization policy in the 1960s, making itself 
attractive to labour-intensive industries with foreign capital on the basis that it was a 
source of cheap labour (Jomo 1988). From 1957-1970, the economy grew rapidly; 
however, unemployment also rose, reaching 7.4 percent in 1970, contributing to 
discontentment amongst those more adversely affected (Pillai 1992, 1999). 
 
After Independence, the Malay elites held political power but Chinese elites held 
greater control over the economy. Income disparities between the different ethnic 
communities rose. Ethnic tensions between the Malay and Chinese communities 
escalated into the race riots of 13 May 1969, after Chinese opposition parties gained 
greater political strength through a General Election held on 10 May. As stated 
earlier, the government proclaimed a state of emergency in response to the burning, 
looting and killing that occurred, suspending Parliament and setting curfews.   
 
In 1971, the government introduced the National Economic Policy (NEP) “to reduce 
and eventually eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and increasing employment 
opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race”, with the purpose of 
“accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic 
imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with 
economic function” (Malaysia 1971:1). As political scientist Harold Crouch observes,  
it was assumed that the disparity between the economic and social positions of 
the Malays on the one hand and the non-Malays, especially the Chinese, on 




political stability in the future. By reducing and eventually removing this 
disparity, political stability might be strengthened and the outbreak of further 
racial conflict avoided (Crouch 1996:25). 
 
Efforts were made to improve the economic position of the Malays and other 
indigenous communities through bumiputra (‘sons of the soil’) affirmative action 
policies.50 These included providing bumiputra businessmen with special preferences 
in terms of licences, concessions, contracts, and credit; requiring companies to 
include bumiputra partners and shareholders; and provided bumiputra students with 
scholarships and quotas for places in local universities. In 1971, the government also 
introduced the National Cultural Policy, which asserted that the national culture of 
Malaysia would be based on the culture and religion of the Malays, as well as the 
National Education Policy, that made Malay the medium for instruction for education.   
 
The government’s promotion of export-oriented industrialization and agricultural 
expansion created a greater demand for labour. Industrialisation, in particular, was 
seen as a way of improving foreign exchange, diversifying the economy, and creating 
jobs. In an effort to promote foreign direct investment, the government created 
export-processing free zones, allowed free import of production inputs, and provided 
financial incentives, tax exemptions and infrastructure facilities (L. L. Lim 1988).  
 
                                                
50 The term bumiputra (or bumiputera) emerged through government policy and 
practice; it is not found in the Federal Constitution, even though proponents of 
bumiputra policies use Article 153 as the legal justification for affirmative action. 
Malays, natives of Sabah and Sarawak and the Orang Asli are considered to have 
bumiputra status (although there is greater ambiguity about the status of the Orang 
Asli as they are not included in the wording of Article 153). Citizens of all other 




The development of the manufacturing industry prompted significant rural-urban 
migration in the 1970s and 80s, as the cost of living rose and Malaysians were 
attracted to better wages. This movement, in turn, created labour shortages in the rural 
plantation sector (Kanapathy 2008b), still an important contribution to GDP. Acute 
shortages were also reported in the manufacturing and construction sectors (L. L. Lim 
1988; Pillai 1999). The real earnings of workers in the plantation, manufacturing and 
construction sectors rose, especially for jobs where labour was in short supply (L. L. 
Lim 1988).  
 
Irregular migration increased, with immigrants from Indonesia and Southern Thailand 
going to Peninsular Malaysia and immigrants from Indonesia and the Philippines 
going to Sabah and Sarawak for work. The government approved of this tacitly, as it 
served to reduce the pressure on real wages and filled gaps in labour; it was only in 
the 1980s that the government took measures to regulate foreign workers (Jomo 1988; 
Jones 2000). By the 1980s, Malaysia was classified as an upper middle income 
country (Fiske 1982). 
 
Between 1965-1995, the Malaysian labour force grew at an annual rate of 3.49 
percent; it was one of the fastest growing workforces in the world at that time (Lucas 
and Verry 1999). Employment also grew over this period, but at a reduced rate, 
resulting in increasing unemployment. The unemployment rate rose from a post-
independence low of 5.7 percent in 1980 to 9.5 percent in 1987 (Jomo 1988), before 





Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad came to power in 1981, ruling for twenty-two 
years until 2003. Under his leadership in the early 1980s, aside from transforming 
Malaysia into a newly industrialized country, government’s economic policies sought 
to make Malaysia less dependent on developed countries, and to ensure that it 
remained under genuine bumiputra capitalist leadership (Jomo 1988). As Jomo notes, 
the 1980s was a decade of authoritarian anti-labour policies. At the same time, the 
growth of irregular migration and the use of contract labour depressed real wages.  
 
In 1991, Mahathir introduced Vision 2020 (Wawasan 2020), as a long-term nation-
building project aimed at making Malaysia a fully developed country. The 
government replaced the two-decade long NEP with the National Development Policy 
(1990-2000), the National Vision Policy (2001-2010) and the New Economic Model 
(2010-2020), carrying on with bumiputra affirmative action policies. Tun Abdullah 
bin Haji Ahmad Badawi served as Malaysia’s fifth Prime Minister from 2003-2009, 
and was replaced by the current Prime Minister Dato' Sri Haji Mohd Najib bin Tun 
Haji Abdul Razak in April 2009. 
 
THE CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF MALAYSIA 
The Federal Constitution set out the laws and procedures related to the acquisition of 
citizenship (Articles 14-22, Part I and II of the Second Schedule), termination of 
citizenship (Articles 23-28) and notes addition circumstances related to citizenship 
(Articles 29-31, Part III of the Second Schedule). It was first introduced as the 
Constitution of the Federation of Malaya on Merdeka Day, and reintroduced as the 
Constitution of Malaysia on Malaysia Day, 16 September 1963. Citizenship under the 




by registration, by naturalization and by incorporation of territory. In this section, I 
describe the first three ways.51 Over time, changes to the Constitution have made 
citizenship harder to acquire and easier to lose, and which enlarge the discretion of the 
executive in relation to citizenship applications (Vohrah, Koh, and Ling 2004). 
 
Citizenship by Operation of Law 
Under the present Federal Constitution, citizenship by operation of law applies 
differently depending on the time of birth of an individual, whether it occurred before, 
on or after Malaysia Day, and on his/her place of birth, whether it occurred within or 
outside of the Federation. For those born before Malaysia Day, another two dates are 
significant, Merdeka Day and September 1962, when a constitutional amendment was 
made concerning citizenship (Constitution Amendment Act 1962, Act 14).  
 
Those who were citizens before Merdeka Day remain citizens (Article 1(1a), Part I, 
Second Schedule). Similarly, anyone resident in Sabah, Sarawak or Brunei on 
Malaysia Day who was immediately before that day a citizen of the United Kingdom 
and Colonies and was either born in the territories of Sabah or Sarawak or became a 
citizen by registration or naturalization there, remains a citizen by operation of law 
(Article 2, Part I, Second Schedule). 
 
Any person born within the Federation on or after Merdeka Day and before October 
1962 is also be entitled to citizenship by operation of law. Any child born in the 
Federation after September 1962 must have at least one parent as a citizen or a 
                                                
51 Citizenship by incorporation of territory is provided for in Article 22 of the Federal 
Constitution, which gives powers to Parliament to legislate on which persons are to be 
citizens by reason of their connection to the territory and the date(s) from which the 




permanent resident of the Federation before he/she can obtain citizenship by operation 
of law, unless he/she “was not born a citizen of any other country” (Article 1(1c), Part 
I, Second Schedule).52 These requirements also apply to those born on or after 
Malaysia Day within the Federation (Article 1(a)(e), Part II, Second Schedule); those 
born in Singapore with at least one parent as a citizen are also citizens by operation of 
law (Article 1(d), Part II, Second Schedule). 
 
Those born outside of the Federation on or after Merdeka Day can only gain 
citizenship by operation of law if their father was a citizen at the time of their birth 
and was either born the Federation or was under service to the Federal or State 
government (Article 1(1d), Part I, Second Schedule). They can also gain citizenship 
by operation of law if their father was a citizen at the time of their birth, and the birth 
was registered at a consulate of the Federation within one year, unless the Federal 
government allows a longer period of time (Article 1(1e), Part I, Second Schedule; 
Article 1(b, c), Part II, Second Schedule). 
 
On the whole, there are two important points to note in relation to citizenship by 
operation of law. Firstly, these rules discriminate on the basis of gender. Mothers who 
are citizens and who give birth to children outside of the Federation after September 
1962 cannot pass on Malaysian citizenship to their children the way that fathers can. 
In such cases, the parent or guardian of the child must apply for citizenship by 
                                                
52 The Constitution of Malaya initially allowed all people born in the territory of 
Malaysia after Merdeka Day to acquire citizenship by operation of law, an application 
of the principle of jus soli agreed upon by the Working Party (Federation of Malaya 
1957). However, this provision was amended through Act 14 of 1962 to require at 
least one parent to be a citizen or permanent resident. This measure was taken to 
prevent women from entering and giving birth in the Federation merely to allow the 




registration. In such cases, the Federal Government can exercise discretion over 
his/her application (see below). Secondly, children who are born without citizenship 
(i.e. who are stateless at the time of their birth) are entitled to citizenship by operation 
of law. This applies to many children of Rohingya parents, for example, and may 
apply to other children of non-citizen parents.53 
 
Citizenship by Registration and Naturalisation 
Four groups of people are entitled to citizenship by registration, if they meet the 
requirements specified in the Federal Constitution. Firstly, wives of citizens, if their 
marriage is subsisting, if the marriage is registered in accordance to the law in force in 
the Federation; and they have satisfied the Federal Government that they have resided 
in the Federation throughout the two years before applying for registration54, intends 
to reside in the Federation permanently, and are of good character (Article 15 (1,5)). 
No mention is made of the husbands of citizens, who presumably, can only become a 
citizen by naturalisation (see below). Secondly, a child of a citizen under twenty-one 
years of age, born before October 1962 whose father is a citizen (or was so at death), 
through an application by his/her parent or guardian if the Federal Government is 
satisfied that he/she meets the criteria of being ‘ordinarily resident’ in the Federation 
and is of good character (Article 15(3)).  
                                                
53 In order to determine if this applies to other children of non-citizens, such as the 
children of Filipino and Indonesian migrants, we need to examine the citizenship laws 
where their parents hold citizenship. In April 2007, I was told that the children of 
Filipino parents born in Sabah would be entitled citizenship in the Philippines if they 
returned and applied for it (Fieldnotes, Sabah, April 2007). As such, they are de facto 
stateless rather than de jure, in that they formally possess nationality but it is 
ineffective. Nevertheless, they may still qualify for citizenship by operation of law in 
Malaysia. 
54 As elaborated in Chapter 6, residence in this Article does not include residence on 
temporary passes (Item 20(2c), Part III, Second Schedule). Thus, only residence on 






Thirdly, any person of or over eighteen years of age who was born in the Federation 
before Merdeka Day is entitled to citizenship by registration if he/she satisfies the 
government that he/she has resided in the Federation for periods amounting to at least 
five years of the seven years preceding the date of application; that he/she intends to 
do so permanently; that he/she is of good character, and has an elementary knowledge 
of the Malay language (Article 16). Fourthly, any person of or over eighteen years of 
age who was resident in Sabah and Sarawak on Malaysia Day is entitled to citizenship 
by registration if he/she satisfies the government that he/she has resided in the 
Federation for periods of at least seven years in the ten years preceding the date of 
application, including in the immediate twelve months before the application; that 
he/she intends to do so permanently; that he/she is of good character; and has an 
sufficient knowledge of the Malay or English language, or in the case of residents of 
Sarawak, of a native language currently in use (Article 16A).55  
 
The Federal Government can exercise discretion in registering two groups of children 
as citizens – firstly, children with at least one parent as a citizen (including at death) 
when his/her parent or guardian makes an application for citizenship by registration 
(Article 15(2))56 and, secondly, in the case of any person under twenty-one years of 
age (Article 15A). 
 
Citizenship by registration requires that all persons over the age of eighteen years take 
an oath (Article 18(1)) stating 
                                                
55 The language requirements are waived if the application is made before September 
1965 and the applicant is aged forty-five or over. 
56 Article 15(2) states the Federal Government may cause… (the child) to be 




I [name] of [place] hereby declare on oath that I absolutely and entirely 
renounce and abjure all loyalty to any country or State outside the Federation, 
and I do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and be a true, loyal and faithful citizen of the 
Federation (First Schedule).  
 
Citizenship by registration is not permitted for persons who have renounced or been 
deprived of citizenship, except with the approval of the Federal Government (Article 
18(2)). Citizenship by registration is effective from the day of registration (Article 
18(3)).  
 
The Federal Government can grant a certificate of naturalisation to non-citizens of or 
over twenty-one years of age if it is satisfied that the applicant has resided in the 
Federation for periods amounting to at least ten years in the twelve years preceding 
the date of application, including in the immediate twelve months before the 
application; that he/she is of good character; and has an adequate knowledge of the 
Malay language (Article 19(1)). The certificate of naturalisation can only be granted 
after the application takes the oath of allegiance in the First Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution (described above). 
 
In 2008, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced that in a period of 20 years until 
May that year, 19,511 non-citizens had been given Malaysia citizenship (K. S. Lim 
2010). In November 2009, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced that it had 
completed clearing a backlog of 32,927 applications for citizenship filed between 




accepted and rejected. From 2007 to 2009, the Ministry received 29,677 applications 
for citizenship, of which it had decided 25,677 by October 2009 (Bernama 2010c). 
The Ministry received a further 8,826 applications in 2010 and promised to resolve 
the outstanding 11,836 applications by the end of the year or, at the latest, by 2012. 
However, again, the Ministry did not clarify how many of the applications were 
accepted and rejected, or the grounds upon which these decisions were made. 
 
The Termination of Citizenship and Dual Citizenship 
There are two ways by which citizenship may be lost. The first is by renunciation by 
the citizen through a registered declaration (Article 23 and 26B), and the second is by 
deprivation by the Federal government (Articles 24-28A). There are a number of 
grounds upon which the government may deprive a person of citizenship, three of 
which relate to the acquisition or exercise of foreign citizenship. 
 
Firstly, the government may deprive a person of citizenship if it is satisfied that the 
citizen has acquired the citizenship of any other country by a voluntary and formal act 
(other than marriage) (Article 24(1)). It cal also do so if it is satisfied that the citizen 
voluntarily claimed and exercised rights in another country exclusively accorded to 
citizens of that country, such as applying for the issuance or renewal of a passport, or 
travelling on such a passport (Article 24(2, 3A)). Thirdly, it can do so if it is satisfied 
that a woman who has obtained citizenship by registration under Article 15(1) has 
acquired citizenship of another country by virtue of a marriage to another non-citizen. 





The Legacy of the Emergency for Citizenship and State Power 
The fact that Malaya became independent during a time of emergency coloured 
negotiations concerning citizenship and the extent of state power in governing it. 
Firstly, citizenship was made more restrictive in order to guarantee ‘undivided 
loyalty’. The Reid Commission recognised that the requirement of residence for 
periods amounting to at least ten years in the twelve years as a criteria for 
naturalisation was long, but felt that it was necessary in order to prove the loyalty of a 
non-citizen to the Federation. The Working Party agreed with this recommendation. 
  
In relation to the question of whether dual citizenship would be permitted, the 
Working Party wanted to ensure that the government had adequate power to ensure 
the undivided loyalty of citizens to the Federation. They proposed that the 
government retained the power to deprive any citizen of his/her citizenship to the 
Federation by order, if he/she acquired foreign citizenship or if he/she voluntarily 
claimed and exercised rights exclusive to citizens in another country. These 
provisions were broader than those recommended by the Reid Commission, who set 
more specific conditions for the deprivation of citizenship by the government. These 
conditions were that the government could only deprive a person of his/her 
citizenship if he/she had or acquired citizenship in another country; that there must be 
the element of disloyalty; that the government had to be satisfied that it was “not 
conducive to the public good” that he/she continue to be a citizen; and that the person 
must be informed of the grounds of the deprivation and be given the opportunity to 
have his/her case referred to a committee of inquiry (J. S. C. Reid et al. 1957:17). The 
Commission also recommended that dual citizenship of countries within the 




loyalty to their country of residence. However, the Working Party did not agree to 
this. 
 
Secondly, the Constitutional Monarch and the Executive were also given extensive 
powers to enable them to respond effectively to issues of national security. As it 
stands, Article 150 of the Federal Constitution provides the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
with powers to issue a Proclamation of Emergency in situations where “the security, 
or the economic life, or public order in the Federation or any part thereof is 
threatened” (Article 150). When a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, except 
when both Houses of Parliament are in session, the Agong may pass ordinances that 
have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament (Article 150(2B and 2c)). 
Furthermore, if these ordinances and any Acts of Parliament made during an 
Emergency are inconsistent with the Federal Constitution, they shall not be 
considered invalid (Article 150(6)) unlike legislation passed during non-emergency 
periods. 
 
Since 1957, there have been five Proclamations of Emergencies – the communist 
insurgency, the confrontation with Indonesia in 1964 concerning Borneo, a political 
crisis in Sarawak in 1966, the May 13 riots in 1969, and the Kelantan political crisis 
in 1977. In spite of the historical fact that these periods of emergency are over, only 
the first was officially ended. The emergency laws passed during some of these 
periods were never formally revoked. These include the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) Act 1964 under which the Essential (Ikatan Relawan Rakyat) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2005 was enacted (further elaborated in Chapter 3), the Emergency 




Cases) Regulations 1975, and the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 197957, which 
are still in force today.  
 
NEGOTIATING BELONGING: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CITIZENSHIP AND 
MIGRATION IN MALAYSIA 
Equal Rights or Bumiputra Special Position 
A key political debate amongst citizens in Malaysia is whether bumiputra 
communities should continue to enjoy ‘special rights’ on the basis of being 
‘indigenous’ or whether all ethnic groups should be given equal rights as citizens. As 
stated earlier, the Federal Constitution provides for the recognition of the ‘special 
position’ of the Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak as well as the 
recognition of Islam and the Malay language as the national religion and national 
language of Malaysia respectively. However, since the negotiation for the 
independence of Malaya, many non-Malay organisations and some political parties 
have been actively campaigning for the realisation of a multicultural, multiethnic 
conception of national identity and for the equal rights of all citizens. On the other 
hand, some Malay nationalists, particularly those in UMNO, have been concerned to 
preserve the notion of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy) and the special rights of 
the Malays.  
 
Proponents of Malay ‘special rights’ argue that the Malays were the original 
inhabitants of Malaya, and that they entered into a ‘social contract’ with the 
immigrant ethnic groups that recognised the inherent ‘special position’ of the Malays 
in an independent body politic in exchange for citizenship rights for immigrants. 
                                                




Some argue that Malays continue to require affirmative action in order to be as 
successful as members other ethnic communities, while others suggest a move away 
from ethnic-based towards class-based or pro-poor affirmative action policies (P. L. 
Ong 2009). 
 
Each Prime Minister of Malaysia has had the uneasy task of balancing two roles – 
representing and uniting different ethnic groups and – as the head of UMNO – 
defending the rights of the Malays. In 1991, when Mahathir introduced Vision 2020, 
he identified nine strategic challenges: 
The first of these is the challenge of establishing a united Malaysian nation 
with a sense of common and shared destiny. This must be a nation at peace 
with itself, territorially and ethnically integrated, living in harmony and full 
and fair partnership, made up of one Bangsa Malaysia with political loyalty 
and dedication to the nation (Mahathir 1992:1).  
 
Mahathir introduced the concept of Bangsa Malaysia as a multiethnic alternative to 
Bangsa Melayu, which emphasized the centrality of Malay identity to Malaysia’s 
national identity and the privileging of Malays above other ethnic communities.  
However, Mahathir himself was inconsistent in promoting multiethnic national 
identity. In 1999, for example, when the Democratic Action Party (DAP), a 
predominantly Chinese opposition party, adopted the slogan ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ in 
order “to establish that Malaysia is a multi-racial, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and 




integration” (New Straits Times 1999), Mahathir rejected it stating that it would cause 
communal tension rather than build patriotism (Bernama 1999).58  
 
More recently, however, the idea of Bangsa Malaysia has been appropriated by a 
group of Malaysians who have started a non-partisan popular movement called Saya 
Anak Bangsa Malaysia (I am a child of the Malaysian race/nation, SABM) in 2007 to 
promote unity amongst Malaysians and to act against communal and race-based 
politics. With the slogan of ‘One People, One Nation’, followers of the movement 
commit themselves to “Engender a National Mindset to think and act first and 
foremost as Malaysians” (Saya Anak Bangsa Malaysia 2009). In 2010, the SABM 
movement organised a series of road shows called Kita Semua Pendatang (‘we are all 
immigrants’) emphasising the complex geographical histories of each of the ethnic 
communities that constitute the Malaysian nation.  
 
Bumiputra affirmative action policies rests on three premises – firstly, that there are 
groups of citizens who are ‘indigenous’ to the territory of Malaysia and others that are 
not; secondly, that they can be identified on the basis of ethnicity/race rather than 
actual genealogies in the land; and thirdly, that they are in need of special assistance 
in order to ‘take their place’ in modern Malaysia. The casting of non-Malay 
communities as immigrants and Malay communities as indigenous to the land is a 
very sensitive matter in Malaysia. Most contemporary non-Malays were born and 
bred in Malaysia and many can trace their family histories in Malaysia for several 
generations; they have no allegiances or senses of belonging to other countries. 
                                                
58 The use of the phrase ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ was a deliberate reference to Lee Kuan 
Yew’s call for equal rights as the leader of the People’s Action Party (PAP) when 




Malays are also very diverse in terms of their linguistic, cultural and geo-historical 
backgrounds. Malay culture is as ‘assimilatory culture’ (G. Benjamin 2002), allowing 
those who marry Malays, take on Malay adat (customs) and convert to Islam to 
‘become Malay’ (masuk Melayu). As such, many present-day Malays can trace their 
ancestry to communities outside of present-day Malaysia.  
 
Although it is a sensitive matter to cast non-Malays as immigrants, this argument has 
strong political mileage amongst Malay nationalists. In August 2008, Bukit Bendera 
UMNO Chief Datuk Ahmad Ismail provoked great consternation he referred to 
Chinese Malaysians as pendatang (immigrants) during the Permatang Pauh by-
election. This comment triggered another round of heated comment over the migrant 
origins of the different ethnic groups.59 Some Malaysians pointed out that the Orang 
Asli have had longer histories in Malaysia, but did not enjoy the special privileges 
given to Malays, while others pointed to the immigrant histories of Malays. While 
Ahmad Ismail was officially suspended from UMNO for three years and removed 
from all his party posts, some Malay UMNO members supported his position. At the 
division’s delegates conference held in November that year, he was presented with 
three Malay warrior emblems – the keris (dagger), tengkolok (head dress) and 
selempang (scarf) – thus given a “warrior’s welcome” to the political gathering 
(Dielenberg 2008). 
 
When Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak came to power in April 2009, he introduced 
his own nation-building concept called ‘1Malaysia’ based on the principle of ‘People 
                                                




First, Performance Now’ (Rakyat Didahulukan, Pencapaian Diutamakan). In the 
booklet explaining this concept, the Ministry of Information stated, 
Current globalization challenges sweeping the world require the reassigning of 
strategies so as to not be excluded [sic] or isolated from the speed of 
development or become victims of oppression by certain quarters. To 
overcome this situation, Malaysians, regardless of race or religion need to 
think and act as one race, that is the Malaysian race that thinks and acts 
towards a common goal to build a world that is prosperous, progressive, 
peaceful and safe thus enabling it to compete with other communities in the 
world (Ministry of Information Malaysia 2009:7).60 
 
In introducing the 1Malaysia concept, Najib clearly distanced himself from the idea of 
‘Malaysian Malaysia’.61 However, many critics, including Mahathir, have pointed out 
that the 1Malaysia concept has been vague and inconsistent, particularly in relation to 
fundamental question of whether Najib’s government would cede Malay special 
rights to appease other ethnic groups (Shazwan 2010). Some suggest outright that it is 
merely political rhetoric to win the support of non-Malays while Najib’s government 
maintains UMNO’s neo-feudalist agenda and ensures that it stays in power and 
protects Malay rights (Mohd Azizuddin et al. 2009). 
 
 In April 2011, the assistant chief editor of the Malay newspaper Utusan Malaysia 
called for UMNO to head a ‘1Melayu, 1Bumi’ movement, ostensibly to counter the 
                                                
60 The English and Malay versions of this booklet can be downloaded from the 
1Malaysia website. 
61 The Ministry of Information’s booklet explaining 1Malaysia has a section devoted 
to explaining the difference between these two concepts. However, the arguments are 




‘unity’ amongst Chinese fostered by DAP (Teoh 2011). While, Najib ostensibly 
distanced himself from this call (Asrul Hadi 2011), these types of initiatives indicate 
that the Prime Minister and his administration continue to walk an uneasy path 
between two conflicting nation-building perspectives – whether all Malaysians are 
equal in status and rights or whether Malays should continue enjoying their ‘special 
position’. At present, there are no signs that the government will move away from 
pro-bumiputra policies, which favour the Malays more than the Orang Asli and the 
natives of Sabah and Sarawak. 
 
The Emigration of Malaysians: A Problem of Disloyalty or Brain Drain? 
The emigration of Malaysian citizens became significant from the 1970s onwards, 
when many Malaysians left for Singapore and the Middle East both through regular 
and irregular routes (Fiske 1982; L. L. Lim 1988). In the early 1990s, there were an 
estimated 20,000 Malaysians in Taiwan and 25,000 in Japan, a substantial proportion 
of whom worked without legal status (Azizah 1992). In the mid-1990s, there were an 
estimated 100,000 Malaysians working in Singapore, a quarter of whom commuted 
daily (Pillai 1992).  
 
Another pattern of movement in the 1980s and 1990s was the permanent emigration 
of skilled citizens. Between 1983-1990, more than 40,000 Malaysians migrated to 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States (Pillai 1992). The Australian 
Government’s 1991 Census, for example, shows the substantial growth of Malaysian-
born individuals living in Australia from 1986-1991, from 46,491 to 71,665 persons 
(an increase of 54.1 percent) (Bureau of Immigration and Population Research 1994). 




skills, talents, education and business backgrounds. The main emigrants from 
Malaysia during this period were non-Malays, specifically those of Chinese 
ethnicity.62 A number of scholars have linked these movements to the increasing 
alienation felt by non-Malay citizens in the wake of the 1969 race riots, the 
government’s Islamisization policies, as well as the concern about declining standards 
in education and uneven opportunities for education and employment (Gunasekaran 
and Sullivan 1990; Pillai 1992; Yung 1987).  
 
Politicians and social commentators have also linked the emigration of Malaysians to 
growing racial extremism and religious intolerance over the past decade. In 2007, 
opposition leader Lim Kit Siang, for example, pointed out in Parliament that there 
was a sharp rise of about 2,000 percent in enquiries for emigration to other countries 
in the week following the UMNO General Assembly in November 2006 (K. S. Lim 
2007), an event marked with strong racial rhetoric against non-Malay communities. In 
2007 alone, an estimated 140,000 Malaysians left Malaysia; between March 2008 and 
August 2009, around 305,000 left Malaysia (Mokhtar 2010). As Mokhtar notes, 
Malays have also chosen to leave, dismayed by corrupt practices, the rigid confines of 
state-regulated Islam and rising fundamentalism. 
 
While some (primarily non-Malay) political leaders have observed this outward 
movement with dismay, nationalistic leaders have criticised emigrants for being 
‘disloyal’ to Malaysia. Occasionally, government officials have threatened to revoke 
                                                
62 In the Australian 1991 Census of the 68.8 percent who spoke a language other than 
English at home, 55.7 percent spoke a Chinese language, while 8.6 percent spoke 
Indonesian/Malay, and 1.8 percent spoke Tamil (Bureau of Immigration and 




the citizenship of those who emigrate for long periods of time.63 Indeed, the act of 
obtaining permanent resident status in other countries has been interpreted as an 
expression of disloyalty. In 2003, for example, a controversy arose when it came to 
light that (then) Deputy Minister for Culture, Arts and Tourism Datuk Dr Ng Yen Yen 
had had permanent resident status in Australia when she was inducted as a senator in 
the Malaysian Parliament in 1993. Although she gave this status up in 1995, this 
prompted political leaders from UMNO, MCA and DAP to raise questions about her 
allegiance to Malaysia (Aniza 2003).64  
 
More recently, however, there has been greater emphasis on how Malaysian 
emigration has led to a ‘brain drain’, which the government has recognised it can ill 
afford, particularly as it seeks to sustain high GDP growth through greater private 
sector investment. For this, and for Malaysia to become a high-income nation, a 
supply of local talent is necessary. Viewing emigration in terms of a ‘brain drain’ is 
distinct change of stance, which alters the Malaysian government’s relationship with 
emigrants. Instead of casting them in negative light, as those disloyal to the nation, 
these lenses emphasize their potential as valuable human resources for the Malaysian 
economy. 
 
 In 2005, the World Bank noted that there were 1,458,944 Malaysian emigrants 
abroad, constituting 5.8 percent of Malaysian citizens, in sharp contrast to numbers in 
                                                
63 In February 1988, Deputy Home Minister Datuk Megat Junid Megat Ayob said that 
the government had the right to revoke the citizenship of Malaysians who stayed 
away for five consecutive years without reporting themselves to the government or 
providing good reasons for their absence (Vasanthi 1988). 
64 See also the media statement by DAP National Chairman Lim Kit Siang in Penang 
on Friday, 21 March 2003, calling for a national consensus on whether permanent 





1960, where there were only 9,576 Malaysians abroad (Ratha and Xu 2008).65 In a 
more recent report with revised figures released in April 2011, the World Bank 
estimated that of the 1 million Malaysians abroad, a third were skilled and constituted 
the ‘brain drain’ (The World Bank 2011b). When asked what their top three reasons 
were for emigrating, Malaysian respondents cited better career prospects overseas (66 
percent of respondents), a sense of social injustice (60 percent) and better monetary 
compensation (54 percent).66 The report noted that this loss was not compensated for 
by the immigration of skilled expatriates, as their numbers have dropped by a quarter 
since 2004.  
 
Over the years, the Malaysian government has taken a number of measures to 
encourage skilled Malaysians to return home, such as the ‘Returning Scientist 
Programme’ in 1995, which attracted 23 Malaysians (and 70 non-citizens); the 
‘Returning Expert Programme’ in 2001, which resulted in the return of 601 
applicants; and the ‘Brain Gain Malaysia’ initiative in 2006 which had 1,051 
participants as of January 2010 (Rashvinjeet and Hariati 2010). More recently, the 
Malaysian government has established the Talent Corporation Malaysia (TalentCorp) 
under the Prime Minister’s Department to build talent in Malaysia. Amongst 
TalentCorp’s programmes is a revised version of the Returning Expert Programme to 
reinvigorate the return of Malaysian skilled workers (TalentCorp 2011b). These 
programmes offer returning Malaysians tax incentives and exceptions as well as 
permanent resident status for foreign spouses and children. However, their success 
has been limited in comparison to the continuous outflow of Malaysians. They also do 
                                                
65 Their top ten destination countries were Singapore, Australia, Brunei, United 
States, United Kingdom, Canada, India, New Zealand, Japan and Germany. 
66 This part of the study involved 194 respondents over a three-week period in 




not address the social, economic and political concerns, which emigrants cite as 
reasons for leaving.   
 
The Marginalisation of (Stateless) Malaysians and Perceptions of the 
Preferential Treatment of Immigrants 
Another key area of controversy has been the marginalisation of certain ethnic 
minority citizen communities, in particular, the Indians, the natives of Sabah and 
Sarawak and the Orang Asli. These communities have expressed grievances about 
their poverty; their lack of access to basic facilities such as electricity, housing, and 
healthcare; and restrictions on their freedom of religion (see for example TG Lim, A 
Gomes, and Rahman 2009; Nicholas 2000). In spite of the fact that the natives of 
Sabah and Sarawak and the Orang Asli have bumiputra status, in reality, their access 
to bumiputra privileges is limited (Nah 2004). 
 
Some of the members of these communities are also in danger of being de facto 
statelessness, because of the difficulties they have in complying with government 
regulations for birth registration set by the National Registration Department (NRD). 
Birth registration is a necessary pre-cursor to obtaining national identity cards that 
signify citizenship status. National identity cards are necessary for access to 
government and private services, for voting during elections, and for proving the 
holder’s unrestricted right to reside and work in Malaysia. As such, those without 
national identity cards have found it difficult to exercise their civil, political, social, 
cultural and economic rights in Malaysia, and worse, are in danger of being 






Their grievances and fears about their insecure status in Malaysia have been 
exacerbated by evidence that immigrants with shorter histories in Malaysia have been 
able to obtain permanent resident status. This became a thorny political issue in the 
1980s, when large numbers of Indonesian immigrants in Peninsular Malaysia were 
given permanent resident status.67 The visible growth in the population of Indonesians 
immigrants then triggered feelings of resentment amongst working class Malays and 
concerns amongst non-Malay communities that the government was strategising to 
boost the Malay-Muslim population by incorporating Indonesians as permanent 




Malaysia’s approaches to citizenship and migration do not differ greatly from those of 
its neighbours. Southeast Asian states grant citizenship by operation of law primarily 
on the basis of jus sanguinis rather than jus soli, thus restricting access to citizenship. 
In these countries, relatively few are naturalised as citizens. Most Southeast Asian 
states also do not permit dual citizenship. At present, each state governs its own 
territorial borders according to its immigration laws; free movement within the region 
is not permitted. Individuals are only granted entry and exit if they hold valid identity 
documents issued to citizens. However, in spite of the growth of modern bureaucracy, 
                                                
67 This is still a very sensitive political issue in Sabah. Large numbers of Muslim 
Indonesian and Muslim Filipino immigrants in Sabah were given permanent resident 
status in the 1980s and 1990s. Some immigrants have also been able to obtain 
documentation as Malaysian citizens (both ‘original’ and false) because of corruption 
in government bureaucracy and fraud (Sadiq 2005, 2009). Non-Muslim Sabahans see 
this as UMNO’s way of taking political control and of exerting Malay dominance 
over Sabah. These feelings of alienation and marginalisation have manifested as deep 




states have been unable to govern their borders perfectly, and robust trafficking and 
smuggling networks cut across the Southeast Asian region. Stateless populations are 
at greater risk of marginalisation and punishment, as they neither possess the 
documents to travel legally across borders nor are they able to access the full range of 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights granted to documented citizens.  
 
Migration has been a defining feature of Malaysian society. A key area of 
contemporary political debate focuses on whether all Malaysians should be given 
equal rights, or whether Malays, who claim indigenous status, should be given special 
privileges along with other bumiputra communities. Malay nationalists cast non-
Malays as being immigrants, a matter which causes great consternation amongst non-
Malays. While the former argue that Malay identity should take primacy in national 
identity, others argue for a more inclusive and equal multicultural conception of 
Malaysian identity. Since the 1980s, there has also been substantial emigration from 
Malaysia, primarily of non-Malays, triggered in large part by feelings of alienation 
and a sense of injustice because of discrimination. While this outward movement has 
been cast an as act of ‘disloyalty’ to the Malaysian nation, it is now (also) viewed as a 
loss of valuable human resources. As such, the Malaysian government has been 
taking concrete measures to attract Malaysian emigrants to return home. Another area 
of concern amongst some citizens is ethnic-based marginalisation. Their anxieties and 
anger have been heightened when they observe preferential treatment given to recent 
immigrants. Malaysia’s economy is dependent on non-citizens – on the revenues 
generated by tourists and students and on the labour of migrant workers. It is against 
this political, social and economic backdrop that Malaysia’s laws, policies, and 




introduction to the Malaysia’s legal system, focusing in particular, on the extent to 







CHAPTER 3: NON-CITIZENS AND THE MALAYSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
Equal protection of the law is necessary in order to prevent the exploitation and 
mistreatment of individuals; without this, their human rights and labour rights are 
illusory. In the laws of Malaysia, non-citizens have some rights that are equal to those 
of Malaysian citizens. However, some of their rights and entitlements are regulated 
through the conditions set on their entry and residence. For example, certain 
immigration passes restrict the right of some non-citizens – such as foreign workers 
and foreign domestic workers – to marry and to have children, while yet others permit 
some non-citizens – such as foreign spouses and expatriates – to do so. Breaches of 
these conditions are grounds for arrest, punishment and deportation.  
 
The extent to which non-citizens obtain justice for grievances depends largely on the 
resources they are able to mobilize. The better their financial standing, their access to 
sound legal advice, their social connections to those in power, as well as the more 
time they can afford in seeing their cases through the courts, the stronger their 
likelihood of obtaining a favourable outcome through formal adjudication 
mechanisms. As a result, some groups of non-citizens are worse off than others. 
Foreign workers and foreign domestic workers, in particular, face greater challenges 
in gaining justice. The most vulnerable of all are those with irregular status in 
Malaysia; in many cases, and contrary to the principles of international law, they have 





The Access to Justice Approach 
In this chapter, I take an access to justice approach to legal scholarship, going beyond 
the formal analysis of the content of existing laws and an explication of legal 
procedures to look at the social systems through which the law is interpreted and 
applied in recognizing and protecting the rights of non-citizens. Mauro Cappelletti 
describes this approach as follows: 
In the access-to-justice approach, the principle elements are the people (with 
all their cultural, economic and social peculiarities), the institutions, the 
processes… which represent the elements from which the law originates, lives 
and evolves. Moreover, the legal system is not seen as a separate, autonomous, 
‘autopoietic’ (self-generating) system, but as an inseparable and integrative 
part of the more complex social system, a part which cannot be artificially 
isolated from economics, ethics and politics (Cappelletti 1992:25). 
 
The access to justice approach is concerned with whether “legal and judicial 
outcomes are just and equitable” with justice referring “to both fairness of process and 
fairness of outcome in addressing justiciable issues” (United Nations Development 
Programme 2004:6). Justiciable issues are “those problems for which there is a 
potential legal remedy within a civil and/or criminal justice framework” (Mason et al. 
2009:i). For effective access to justice, the status, rights and remedies of claimants 
must be recognised under existing laws; claimants must have awareness of these 




and there must be mechanisms for the effective adjudication and enforcement of these 
rights and remedies (United Nations Development Programme 2004).68  
 
Cappelletti (1992) identifies three obstacles that the access to justice movement has 
sought to address globally. The first he terms economic poverty, the difficulties that 
poor people face in getting access to legal advice out of courts and legal 
representation in courts. One of the ways this has been addressed is through the 
provision of legal aid, whether through private lawyers on a pro bono or partial-
compensation basis (through a public fund), or through publicly salaried lawyers. The 
second obstacle he identifies as organizational poverty – the difficulty of organizing 
those who experience similar grievances – so that they can claim rights as members of 
a group. Some initiatives to address this obstacle have been to conduct class action 
suits (public interest cases), to expand locus standi rules, or to establish government 
agencies or private associations that look at the specific issues that affect these 
groups. The third obstacle he identifies as procedural poverty, the absence of 
procedures other than adversarial judicial solutions that can provide effective 
resolution for disputes, such as conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. Measures to 
improve this include the introduction of institutions to provide these services, with 
safeguards to ensure procedural fairness.  
 
This chapter analyses the extent to which non-citizens can obtain effective remedy for 
grievances through adjudication mechanisms in Malaysia. In the next section, I 
                                                
68 In order to promote access to justice, UNDP suggests that each of these five actions 
may require support through five corresponding initiatives, to: strengthen legal 
protection, improve legal awareness amongst potential claimants, provide legal aid 
and counselling, develop capacities for adjudication, and develop capacities for 
enforcement. UNDP also emphasizes the importance of strengthening the role of civil 




provide an overview of the Malaysian legal system. I then review the status and rights 
of non-citizens in the Federal Constitution and in domestic law. This is followed with 
a description of two Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes used by non-
citizens: the Department of Labour and Labour Court, and the Department of 
Industrial Relations and the Industrial Court. I then describe some of the grievances 
that non-citizens face, highlighting possible actions and the relevant legislation. 
Finally, I review the practical challenges the non-citizens face when seeking redress. 
 
THE MALAYSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW 
The Malaysian legal system is a framework of laws and institutions based on the 
English judicial system. It has evolved over the past two centuries to account for the 
plurality of customs, manners and religion of local inhabitants, giving legal 
recognition to select customary practices (M. B. Hooker 1976). It is a dual system, 
recognizing secular laws and Muslim law (further elaborated below).  
 
The Federal Constitution is the supreme authority of law (Article 160B, Federal 
Constitution). However, it can be amended with the support of a two-thirds majority 
in Parliament and the agreement of the constitutional monarch, the Yang Di-Pertuan 
Agong. Indeed, over the years, many changes have been made to it, serving to extend 
the powers of the executive and to limit the powers of the judiciary (H. P. Lee 1996). 
 
Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies have the power to enact legislation, the 
former at the federal level and the latter at the state level.69 Parliament can also 
empower specific individuals and bodies to make subsidiary or delegated legislation. 
                                                
69 List 1 and List 2 of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution enumerate 




As Malaysia is based on a common law system, judicial decisions are considered 
sources of law.  
 
The Malaysian judiciary hears civil and criminal matters through a hierarchical 
system of courts, comprising subordinate courts and superior courts. In the 
subordinate courts, cases concerning non-citizens are typically heard at the 
Magistrates’ Courts and the Sessions Courts.70 The superior courts are comprised of 
two High Courts (Malaya, and Sabah and Sarawak), the Court of Appeal, and the 
Federal Court, the latter serving as the highest court in the land.  
 
Civil action can be initiated in the Magistrates’ Court, Sessions Court or High Court, 
their proceedings governed by the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 and the Rules of 
the High Court 1980. Small claims, amounting to a maximum of RM5,000 are heard 
in the Magistrates Court according to Order 54 of the Subordinate Courts Rules Act 
1980. In this procedure, the claimant represents him/herself and cannot be represented 
by a lawyer.71  
 
Criminal cases are heard through the subordinate and superior courts, depending on 
the severity of the crimes and the maximum punishment allowed by law. Immigration 
offences are considered criminal offences and are heard in subordinate courts. In 
1989, the Immigration Act 1959/1963 was amended to remove geographical limits for 
the prosecution of immigration offence. From December 2006 to March 2007, 14 
                                                
70 There are also the Penghulu Courts in Peninsular Malaysia, presided over by a 
penghulu (headman), who hears minor civil cases involving amounts of less than 
RM50 (USD16) and minor criminal cases punishable by a fine of up to RM25 
(USD8), as well as the Juvenile Courts who deal with child offenders.  





Sessions Courts were set up at immigration detention depots in order to speed up the 
processing of cases and to reduce backlog. 
 
Muslim law is recognized and administered by syariah courts. The syariah courts are 
state-level courts, and therefore can only hear matters over which states have 
jurisdiction. The main matters heard by the syariah courts concern marriage, divorce, 
and inheritance.72 In 1988, the Federal Constitution was amended to state that the 
High Courts and subordinate courts “shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any 
matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts” (1A, Article 121, Federal 
Constitution). With this amendment, civil courts no longer have the power to hear 
appeals from syariah courts. Over the years, there have been a number of cases in 
which there has been a conflict of jurisdictions between the civil and syariah courts 
(Abdul Hamid 2000).  
 
THE STATUS AND RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS IN THE LAW 
An impressive array of laws can be applied for the protection of the rights of non-
citizens. However, their application depends on the person having legal status at the 
time he/she pursues redress as well as when the grievance(s) occurred. This is 
contrary to principles of international law (jus cogens), in which the human rights and 
labour rights of all people are to be protected regardless of their legal status. The 
existence of these laws gives the illusion that the rights of migrant workers are 
protected, when in practice, their claims for remedies are easily frustrated.  
 
                                                
72 The question of the jurisdiction of syariah courts over cases concerning non-





Status and Rights of Non-Citizens as a ‘Person’, ‘Non-Citizen’ and ‘Alien’ 
Non-citizens are included in the recognition of a ‘person’ in Malaysian law. The 
Federal Constitution, for example, distinguishes between a ‘person’ and a ‘citizen’, 
guaranteeing fundamental liberties to all persons, including the right to life and 
liberty (Article 5)73, the right to freedom from slavery and forced labour (Article 6), 
the right to protection against retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials (Article 
7), the right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law (Article 8), 
the right to profess and practise his/her religion (Article 11) and the right to property 
(Article 13). Other laws that apply to all persons – such as the Penal Code (Act 574), 
which details criminal offences and associated punishments, and the Criminal 
Procedure Code (Act 593) which relates to criminal procedures – also apply to all 
non-citizens. 
 
In 1988, Article 5(4) of the Federal Constitution concerning the right to liberty was 
amended, extending the time allowed for the detention of a non-citizen arrested for 
immigration purposes before he/she has to be produced before a magistrate 
(Constitutional (Amendment) Act 1988, Act A704). While citizens have to be brought 
before a magistrate “without reasonable delay, and in any case within twenty-four 
hours (excluding the time of any necessary journey)”, non-citizens have to be brought 
“within fourteen days”.74  
 
                                                
73 However, clauses 3 and 4 of Article 5, concerning the right to be informed of the 
grounds of his/her arrest as soon as possible and to have his/her detention beyond 14 
days reviewed by a magistrate do not apply to an ‘enemy alien’ (Article 5(5), Federal 
Constitution).   
74 A year later, Section 51 of the Immigration Act 1959/63 was amended to reflect 




The Federal Constitution recognizes the specific status of ‘aliens’, stating that powers 
to legislate on aliens lie with the Federal Legislature (Section 5, Ninth Schedule, 
Federal Constitution). However, as stated in Chapter 2, the Federal Constitution also 
permits the Yang di-pertuan Agong to make a proclamation of Emergency (Article 
150) during which time, he has powers to make ordinances that have the same effect 
as Acts of Parliament. These emergency laws have a bearing on the rights and 
realities of non-citizens in Malaysia, the most notable being the Essential (Ikatan 
Relawan Rakyat) (Amendment) Regulations 2005, which amends the Essential 
(Ikatan Relawan Rakyat) Regulations 1966, under which the Malaysian Volunteer 
Corps (Ikatan Relawan Rakyat, RELA), a paramilitary civilian volunteer 
organization, was established in 1972.75  
 
The 2005 amendment empowers RELA volunteers to stop any person believed to be 
“a terrorist, undesirable person, illegal immigrant or an occupier”, to make inquiries, 
to require the production of documents deemed necessary, and to arrest without 
warrant any person who fails to cooperate (Regulation 4A). Those so arrested are to 
be handed over to a police officer, immigration officer, or a member of the security 
forces. RELA volunteers also have the authority to enter and search any premises 
without a warrant and with or without assistance (Regulation 4B(1)). 
 
The Immigration Act 1959/63 (Act 155) is the key statute relating to immigration 
control. The Immigration Department, under the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
administers it. The Act sets out the law in relation to the admission of individuals into 
                                                
75 The 2005 amendments came into operation on 1 February 2005 just before the 





and departure from Malaysia; procedures on arrival and the removal of persons from 
Malaysia; the powers and duties of immigration officers; immigration offences and 
penalties; as well as the exclusion of the right to be heard and limits to the judicial 
review of immigration decisions. The Act has been amended 21 times since it was 
introduced, extending the powers of enforcement and increasing the level of 
punishment for offences. The Act introduces the legal term “illegal immigrant”, 
defined as a non-citizen who contravenes immigration requirements for entry, 
residence and departure from Malaysia.76 
 
The Act empowers the Minister of Home Affairs to specify authorised points of entry 
and exit to and from Malaysia (Section 5(1)). The Act states that no person other than 
a citizen shall enter Malaysia without a valid Entry Permit (Section 6(1)).77 Those 
who contravene this are guilty of an offence punishable by a fine not exceeding 
RM10,000 and/or imprisonment of up to five years, and “shall also be liable to 
whipping of not more than six strokes” (Section 6(3)).78 In 1989, the Act was 
amended to place the burden of proof that a person entered Malaysia without 
contravening Section 6(1) on that person him/herself.79 The same amending Act also 
expanded the prosecution powers of immigration officers by stating that “it shall not 
                                                
76 Specifically, an “illegal immigrant” is defined as a non-citizen who contravenes 
section 5, 6, 8, 9 or 15 of the Act or regulation 39 of Immigration Regulations 1963 
(Section 55E(7)). 
77 The Passport Act 1966 (Act 150) requires that non-citizens have a valid visa along 
with their passport in order to enter Malaysia legally (Section 2). Any non-citizen 
entering Malaysia contrary to the Act is liable for removal and may be detained in 
custody while arrangements are made “for such period as may be necessary” (Section 
5(1-2)).  
78 Whipping was introduced just before the 2002 public crackdown with the 
Immigration (Amendment) Act 2002 (Act A11540). The use of the term “shall also be 
liable” (rather than “is liable”) has been used as an argument by lawyers that 
whipping is not mandatory for contravention of Section 6(1), further elaborated in 
Chapter 7.  




be necessary to specify in the charge the date, time, place or manner of the entry of 
such person into Malaysia, or the means of travel used for such entry, and such 
prosecution may be held at any place in Malaysia” (Section 6(3-4)). 
 
The Act prohibits the entry of fifteen classes of non-citizens without special 
permission (Section 8). It empowers the Director General to prohibit the entry or re-
entry of any person or class of persons as well as to cancel at any time with absolute 
discretion and with immediate effect any Pass or Permit (Section 9). The holder of a 
cancelled Permit or expired Permit has no right to remain in Malaysia, is liable for 
removal, and is prohibited from entering Malaysia afterward (Section 9(4)). Anyone 
who does so is guilty of an offence, punishable by a fine of not less than RM10,000 
and/or imprisonment of up to five years under Section (15(1,4)). 
 
The Act also states that it is an offence to employ a person other than a citizen or an 
Entry Permit holder (i.e. a permanent resident) without a valid Pass (Section 
55B(1)).80 This is punishable by a fine of at least RM10,000 but not more than 
RM50,000 and/or to imprisonment of up to twelve months for each person hired. It is 
also an offence to forge or alter immigration passes, endorsements and documents 
used as visas. This is punishable by a fine of at least RM30,000 but not more than 
RM100,000, imprisonment of at least five years but not more than ten years, and the 
offender “shall also be punished with whipping of not more than six strokes” (Section 
55D, my emphasis). Furthermore, it is an offence for an ‘occupier’ – a person in 
charge of premises – to permit an illegal immigrant to enter and remain at any 
premises. This is punishable by a fine of not less than RM5,000 and not more than 
                                                
80 The Employment (Restriction) Act 1968 clearly prohibits the employment of a 




RM30,000, and/or to imprisonment not exceeding 12 months for each illegal 
immigrant, with higher punishments for subsequent convictions (Section 55E). 
 
The Act provides extensive powers to law enforcement officers. It accords all 
immigration officers the status of a public servant within the meaning of the Penal 
Code (Section 38(2)). That is, any act that is in contempt of their lawful authority is a 
criminal offence. The Act also provides immigration officers with the authority and 
powers of a police officer in enforcing any of its provisions related to arrest, detention 
or removal (Section 39(1)). Any police officer, immigration officer, or customs 
officer “may arrest without warrant any person who he (sic) reasonably believes has 
committed an offence against this Act” (Section 51(3)). 
 
The Act provides for the removal of a prohibited immigrant to a place of embarkation 
or to the country of his/her birth or citizenship (Section 31). It also provides for the 
removal of illegal immigrants (Section 32) and persons unlawfully remaining in 
Malaysia (Section 33) without stating any specific location for their return. The Act 
provides for the detention in custody of these persons “for such period as may be 
necessary for the purpose of making arrangements for his (sic) removal” (Section 34), 
It also provides for the arrest without warrant of a person “believed to be a person 
liable to removal from Malaysia under this Act” by any immigration officer or senior 
police officer and for his/her detention for up to 30 days pending a decision (Section 
35). 
 
The Immigration Act restricts the right of a person to challenge an immigration 




Affairs or the Director General of Immigration when an order is made against him/her 
(Section 59). Furthermore, the Act has an ouster clause, stating, 
There shall be no judicial review in any court of any act done or any decision 
made by the Minister or the Director General… under this Act except in regard 
to any question relating to compliance with any procedural requirement of this 
Act or the regulations governing that act or decision” (Section 59A(1)).  
 
These include proceedings by way of an application for mandamus, prohibition and 
certiorari; an application for a declaration or injunction; any writ of habeas corpus; 
and any suit or action related to an act or decision by the Minister or Director General 
(Section 59A(2)). The Act specifies that a Sessions court or a Court of a First Class 
Magistrate will hear all offences against the Act (Section 58). 
 
Two significant subsidiary laws to the Immigration Act are the Immigration 
Regulations 1963, which specify the procedures and conditions of different 
immigration permits and passes81, and the Immigration (Administration and 
Management of Immigration Depots) Regulations 2003, which sets out the laws and 
procedures related to the operation of immigration depots. The latter prescribes what 
is acceptable conduct by detainees in immigration depots, listing very specific 
offences against discipline such as “talks, laughs loudly or sings at any time after 
having been ordered by the official-in-charge to desist”, “shows disrespect to any 
person employed in an official capacity” and “visits the latrine without the permission 
                                                
81 Immigration Regulations 1963 sets out the regulations for each of these passes, 
including the: Employment Pass (Rule 9), Dependent Pass (Rule 10), Visit Pass (Rule 
11), Student Pass (Rule 13), Special Pass (Rule 14), and the Work Pass for Sabah 





of the officer-in-charge or remains there longer than is necessary” (Section 20). It also 
specifies procedures for the admission and discharge of detainees, the treatment and 
privileges of detainees, offences and punishments, as well as the duties of officers. 
When a non-citizen is imprisoned, the Prisons Regulations 2000 states that a 
convicted alien prisoner making an appeal and an unconvicted alien prisoner shall 
have all reasonable facilities to see his/her consular representative in addition to a 
legal adviser (Section 101(4) and 105). 
 
A number of other statutes restrict the rights and freedoms of non-citizens. The 
National Land Code states that non-citizens can only acquire land with the approval 
of the relevant State Authority upon application in writing (Section 433B). This also 
applies to a foreign company as defined in Section 4 of the Companies Act 1965 and 
companies incorporated under the Companies Act 1965 with 50 percent or more of its 
voting shares held by a non-citizen (Section 433A). Furthermore, non-citizens who 
intend to invest in or own certain types of property must also apply to the Foreign 
Investment Committee (FIC) of the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister’s 
Department (Foreign Investment Committee 2011). Finally, the Societies Act 1966 
(Act 335) states that the Registrar of Societies may issue an order prohibiting non-
citizens from holding office in a society (subsection 13A(1)). Some rights are 
protected. 
 
Status and Rights as a Worker and Employee 
Malaysian legislation protecting labour rights applies to non-citizens. However, the 
definition of ‘worker’, ‘workman’ and ‘employee’ changes from statute to statute – 




labour laws in Malaysia are the Employment Act 1955 (Act 265), the Trade Union 
Act 1959 (Act 262), and the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (Act 177). Laws relevant to 
non-citizens include the Worker’s Minimum Standards of Housing and Amenities Act 
1990 (Act 446) and the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1952 (Act 273).82 Different 
departments under the Ministry of Human Resources administer these laws.83 
 
The Employment Act sets out the minimum benefits due to an employee by law as 
well as the duties of an employer. The Department of Labour, under the Ministry of 
Human Resources, administers it. The Act uses a specific and restricted definition of 
an ‘employee’, defining this as any person with a contract of service with monthly 
wages of less than RM1,500 a month, or any person engaged in manual labour or 
domestic work regardless of what they are paid (see the First Schedule for the full 
definition). The Act sets out the law with regard to contracts of service, payment of 
wages, the liability of principals and contractors, prohibitions concerning the 
employment of women, maternity protection, rest days, hours of work, holidays, 
termination, lay-offs, retirement benefits, as well as duties of employers in employing 
foreigners. The Act also sets out the mechanisms for inspection by the Department of 
Labour and complaints and inquiries through the Department of Labour and the 
                                                
82 Other statutes regulating labour and employment are the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act 1994, the Factories and Machinery Act 1967, the Employees Provident 
Fund Act 1991, the Pensions Act 1980, the Statutory and Local Authorities Pensions 
Act 1980, the Children and Young Persons (Employment) Act 1966, the Employment 
(Restriction) Act 1968, the Employment (Information) Act 1953, the Sabah Labour 
Ordinance 1949, the Sarawak Labour Ordinance 1952, the Wages Councils Act 1947, 
the Human Resource Development Act 1992 and the Workers’ Minimum Standards 
of Housing and Amenities Act 1990 (Sharifah and George 2002). 
83 The Ministry of Human Resources has the following departments: Manpower 
Department, Department of Skills Development, Labour Department (Peninsular 
Malaysia), Occupational Safety and Health Department, Labour Department (Sabah), 
Labour Department (Sarawak), Trade Union Affairs, Industrial Relations Department, 




Labour Courts, stipulating the procedures involved and offences and penalties (further 
elaborated below). The Act is only applicable in Peninsular Malaysia, not Sabah or 
Sarawak. 
 
The Act defines ‘domestic servants’ as a separate category of employees. It states that 
when contracts are terminated, 14 days’ notice is required or the payment of an 
indemnity equivalent to wages earned during this period (Section 57). This is a 
shorter period than that required for other workers (see Section 12). Some provisions 
of the Act do not apply to domestic servants, such as provisions concerning their 
termination of contract, maternity benefits, rest days, hours of work, holidays as well 
as termination, layoff and retirement benefits.84  
 
The Trade Unions Act 1959 is an Act relating to trade unions. The Department of 
Trade Union Affairs, under the Ministry of Human Resources, administers it. The Act 
sets out the law relating to the registration, rights and liabilities of trade unions; 
offences and penalties that may be committed by trade unions; as well as the 
formation of and affiliation with a federation of trade unions and with consultative 
bodies. The Act contains extensive provisions allowing the government to control 
trade unions, including powers for the Director General of Trade Union to register 
and deregister unions as well as to suspend a branch of a trade union (Anantaraman 
n.d.). According to the Act, migrant workers have the right to join a trade union and 
to participate in its activities; however, only citizens can be office bearers (Section 
28(1a)).85  
                                                
84 The other exceptions are Sections 22, 61, and 64 of the Employment Act. 
85 The right to participate in trade unions activities is further protected by the 





The aim of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (Act 177) is to: 
provide for the regulation of the relations between employers and workmen 
and their trade unions and the prevention and settlement of any differences or 
disputes arising from their relationship and generally to deal with trade 
disputes and matters arising therefrom (Preamble, Industrial Relations Act 
1967) 
 
The Act covers all workmen employed under a contract of employment in any 
industry, including professionals (Dr A Dutt v Assunta Hospital [1981] 1 MLJ 304). 
The Department of Industrial Relations, also part of the Ministry of Human 
Resources, administers it. The Act sets out the rights of workers and employers and 
their trade unions; the recognition and scope of representation of trade unions; 
procedures for collective bargaining and collective agreements; procedures for 
conciliation; representation on dismissals; the function and procedures of the 
Industrial Court; powers of investigation and inquiry into trade disputes; matters 
arising from trade disputes, strikes and lock-outs; and penalties for non-compliance 
with an award or collective agreement. 
 
The Worker’s Minimum Standards of Housing and Amenities Act 1990 sets out the 
minimum standards of housing and nurseries for workers and their dependants as well 
as requires employers to provide health, hospital, medical and social amenities for 
                                                                                                                                      
prohibits contracts of service from restricting the right of any employee to join a 
registered trade union, participate in its activities, or associate with others in order to 
organize a trade union (Section 8). The right to be part of a trade union is further 
protected under Section 4 and 5 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 which, inter alia, 
prohibits an employer from refusing to employ, discriminating against, dismissing, or 




workers. The Department of Labour administers this Act. It is applicable to all 
employees as defined in the Employment Act. The Act also sets out powers of the 
Director General of Labour and other officers to inspect, investigate and prosecute 
employers who contravene the provisions of this Act or its regulations or who fail to 
carry out an order of the Director General. Offences are punishable by a fine not 
exceeding RM2,000 and further fines of up to RM100 a day for each day the offence 
continues. 
 
The Workmen’s Compensation Act 1952 states that employers must keep themselves 
insured for any workman under their employment under an insurance scheme 
approved by the Minister of Human Resources (Section 26). Failure to do so makes 
them liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding RM20,000 and/or to 
imprisonment for up to two years (Section 26(6)). The Act defines a ‘workman’ as 
any person who has 
entered into or works under a contract of service or of apprenticeship with an 
employer, whether by way of manual labour or otherwise, whether the 
contract is expressed or implied or is oral or in writing, whether the 
remuneration is calculated by time or by work done and whether by the day, 
week, month or any longer period… (Section 2(1))  
 
The Act excludes expatriates (as non-manual workers earning more than RM500 a 
month) as well as domestic workers (Section 2(a,c)).86  
 
                                                
86 However, in proceedings for compensation, Section 2(2) allows for the 
Commissioner, Arbitrator or the Court to deal with an injured person working under 




The Workmen’s Compensation (Foreign Workers Compensation Scheme) (Insurance) 
Order 199887 requires employers to insure their foreign workers under the Foreign 
Workers Compensation Insurance Scheme (Skim Pampasan Pekerja Asing, SPPA).88 
In addition to the insurance benefits provided in the Workmen Compensation Act, 
which insures workers against injury or death by accident in the course of 
employment or an occupational disease, the SPPA provides repatriation expenses and 
personal accident coverage outside of working hours for death and permanent 
disability. The SPPA is currently fixed at a rate of RM72 per worker, out of which a 
RM5 service fee is taken for the Department of Labour. Employers are also required 
to conduct an Orientation Course for their worker, covering immigration laws, crimes, 
and Malaysian culture, verified by the Ministry of Human Resources. 
 
Employers are required to make compulsory contributions of RM5 a month for 
expatriates and foreign workers earning less than RM2,500 a month to the national 
savings scheme providing retirement benefits called the Employee Provident Fund 
(EPF) under the Employees Provident Fund Act 1951.89 Expatriates and foreign 
workers in turn are required to contribute 11 percent of their monthly wages. 
Employers are exempted from making compulsory contributions for expatriates and 
                                                
87 This Order replaces the Workmen’s Compensation (Foreign Workers 
Compensation Scheme) (Insurance) Order 1996. When the 1998 Order came into 
force on 1 March 1998, there were 9 approved insurers for the SPPA and the premium 
was fixed at RM96 (USD30) per worker per annum. The list of approved insurers is 
provided in the Schedule. As at 3 June 2010 there are 25 insurance companies, whose 
names can be found on the website of the Ministry of Human Resources (Labour 
Department Peninsular Malaysia 2008b). 
88 Malaysian workers have not been covered under this Act since 1 July 1992. 
89 This requirement was introduced with effect from 1 August 1998. Prior to this date, 
expatriates and foreign workers were required to make contributions to EPF. 
Employer contributions for citizens and permanent residents are set at a minimum of 
12 percent of the employee’s monthly wage if the employee is of 55 years of age or 




foreign workers earning more than RM2,500 a month as well as for domestic workers. 
However, these expatriates and foreign workers (but not domestic workers) can elect 
to make voluntary contributions with the consent of their employers.  
 
Employers also do not have to make compulsory contributions to two other social 
security schemes applicable to Malaysian citizens and permanent residents – the 
Employment Injury Insurance Scheme and the Invalidity Pension Scheme 
administered by Social Securities Organisation (SOCSO) in accordance with the 
Employees' Social Security Act 1969 (Act 4), which provide protection in the event of 
injuries, occupational diseases and death for workers.  
 
Status and Rights as a Trafficked Person or a Smuggled Migrant 
The Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007 (Act 670) 
identifies the offence of trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. It also 
provides for the protection and support of trafficked persons and for the establishment 
of the Council for Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants. As 
stated earlier, the Act was originally focused on anti-trafficking activities, but was 
amended by the Anti-Trafficking in Persons (Amendment) Act 2010 to including the 
smuggling of migrants. 
 
The Act defines trafficking in persons as “all actions involved in acquiring or 
maintaining the labour or services of a person through coercion, and includes the act 
of recruiting, conveying, transferring, harbouring, providing or receiving a person for 




(a) arranging, facilitating or organizing, directly or indirectly, a person’s 
unlawful entry into or through, or unlawful exit from, any country of which 
the person is not a citizen or permanent resident either knowing or having 
reason to believe that the person’s entry or exit is unlawful; and 
 
(b) recruiting, conveying, transferring, concealing, harbouring or providing 
any other assistance or service for the purpose of carrying out the acts referred 
to in paragraph (a) (Section 2) 
 
The Act also defines exploitation as “all forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, and any illegal activity or 
the removal of human organs” (Section 2). The Act extends its application of the Act 
to beyond the territorial boundaries of Malaysia, treating offences committed by any 
ship or aircraft registered in Malaysia, as well as offences committed by any citizen or 
permanent resident on the high seas and in an place outside of Malaysia as having 
been committed within Malaysia (Section 4). The Act also provides that in the event 
of any conflict or inconsistencies with other laws, the provisions of the Act shall 
prevail and other laws be superseded (Section 5). The Act sets out various offences 
and punishments related to trafficking (Sections 12-12) as well as in relation to the 
smuggling of migrants (Section 26(A-K)). Five enforcement agencies have powers 
under the Act: police, immigration, customs; the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement 






In terms of care and protection, no provision is made for a smuggled migrant unless 
the person is a trafficked person (Section 41A). For trafficked persons, the Minister 
may declare any building “a place of refuge for the care and protection of trafficked 
persons” (Section 42(1)), where they are placed under the care of a Protection Officer 
(Section 43(2)). An enforcement officer may take a person suspected to be a 
trafficked person into “temporary custody” (Section 44(10)), producing him/her 
before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours in order to obtain an Interim Protection 
Order for their placement in a place of refuge for fourteen days for the purposes of 
investigation (44(1, 2)). At the end of the investigation, a Magistrate may make a 
Protection Order allowing for the placement of the person in a place of refuge for up 
to two years if he/she is a citizen or permanent resident of Malaysia, or up to three 
months if he/she is a foreigner, after which he/she is released to an immigration 
officer “for necessary action in accordance with the provisions of the Immigration Act 
1959/63” (Section 51(3)) – that is, his/her removal from Malaysia.  
 
Any trafficked person who escapes or is removed unlawfully from a place of refuge 
may be taken into custody by any enforcement officer, and have his/her time there 
extended by the amount of time equal to when he/she was unlawfully at large (Section 
55(a, b)). There are no provisions in the Act allowing for the trafficked person to 
reside and work in Malaysia on a temporary visa or to ensure they are provided with 
support services related to treatment, rehabilitation and reintegration. Instead, 
trafficked persons are effectively detained in the government-run ‘places of refuge’ 





ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) PROCESSES 
The Department of Labour and the Labour Court 
The Department of Labour was established in 1912. The Department has powers 
under the Employment Act 1955 to inquire into and decide on disputes between 
employees and employers in respect of wages or other cash payments due to 
employees under any contract of service (Section 69(1)) up to a monthly salary of 
RM5,000 for employees (Section 69B1), as well as under the provisions of the 
Employment Act or the Wages Council Act (Section 69).90 In addition, the 
Department can inquire into and decide on claims concerning the indemnity due to an 
employer or employee when a contract of service is terminated without notice or 
expiry of the notice (Section 69C).  
 
In order to access this mechanism91, employees have to make a complaint at the 
Labour Office that is closest to their place of work (not to the official address of their 
employer, a common mistake).92 They are required to make a statement of claim on 
oath and to provide whatever documentary proof they have of their employment, such 
as a copy of the contract of service, pay slips, and punch cards. The Labour Officer 
may then contact the employer about the claim. If the employer accepts the claim and 
makes the necessary payment, then the matter is settled. However, if there is a dispute 
about the claim, the Labour Officer will fix a date to hear the case in the Labour 
Court, located in the Labour Office.  
 
                                                
90 Those who earn more than RM5,000 (USD1,570) must pursue civil action through 
the civil courts (Sharifah and George 2002). 
91 These procedures are set out in Section 70 of the Employment Act 1955. See also 
information from (Siew 2010). 
92 Often, non-citizens, in particular foreign workers, are afraid to go without the 




The Labour Court hears matters covered under the Employment Act and its subsidiary 
legislation as well as the Wages Councils Act 1947 and orders arising from it (Section 
69(1)). It can hear disputes of unlimited amounts. The President Officer, a Labour 
Officer, hears and decides the case. Both parties are required to attend the hearing and 
are formally informed of this date, the complainant by letter, and the defendant by 
summons. The complainant may represent him/herself or be represented by a trade 
union representative or a lawyer. At the end of the hearing, which usually takes 
around 3 months, the Presiding Officer makes a decision either orally or in writing. 
His/her decision can be appealed at the High Court following the procedure in a civil 
appeal (Section 77).  
 
However, the Department of Labour cannot inquire into, hear, decide or make an 
order in respect to claims that: are pending inquiry or proceedings under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1967; have been decided by the Minister under Section 20(3) of that 
Act; or that have been referred to, or are pending proceedings before the Industrial 
Court (Section 69A). Thus non-citizens cannot pursue the same matter at the same 
time through both of these mechanisms. 
 
Aside from this, Officers authorized by the Director General of Labour can enter any 
place of employment without previous notice in order to conduct an inspection or 
inquiry related to the provisions of the Act (Section 65). In the course of this 
inspection, the Officer may require the employer to produce employees, records and 
documents that are relevant (Section 67(3)).93 In addition, the Department of Labour 
                                                
93 According to the website of the Department of Labour, in 2008, 450,000 places of 




may inquire into any complaint of discrimination between a foreign and local 
employee in relation to the terms and conditions of employment (Section 60L). The 
Department may then issue directives to resolve the matter; failure to comply with 
these directives is considered an offence punishable by a fine. 
 
The Department of Labour also decides on claims made under the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act 1952. When an accident occurs, the worker involved is required to 
inform the employer within 7 days, except when it leads to death (Section 12). The 
employer is then required to give written notice to the Department of Labour within 
10 days (Section 13). Failure to report an accident makes an employer liable on 
conviction to a fine of RM5,000 (USD1,570) for the first offence and RM10,000 
(USD3,140) for any subsequent offence (Section 13(5)). The notice has to be made at 
the Department closest to the place of accident with supporting documents. The 
Department then directs the payment of compensation. The employer is responsible 
for ensuring that this amount is paid to the Department, including in the case of death 
or payments to women and minors (Section 10(1) and (2)). If the worker awarded 
half-monthly payments intends to leave Malaysia and reside in another country, 
he/she must give the Commissioner 14 days notice before departure, and may 
continue receiving payments either on a continued basis or in a lump sum (Section 
18). 
 
The Department of Industrial Relations and Industrial Relations Court 
The Department of Industrial Relations was established as a separate department from 
the Department of Labour in 1972. Its objective is: “To ensure the existence of a 
                                                                                                                                      





positive and harmonious relationship between employers and employees and between 
their respective trade unions aimed at creating a peaceful and cordial industrial 
relations climate in the country” (Department of Industrial Relations Malaysia 2010c). 
Its activities are guided by the Industrial Relations Act 1967. The Department 
provides services for resolving trade disputes and processing representations for 
reinstatement.94  
 
The Act defines a trade dispute as “any dispute between an employer and his 
workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms 
of employment or the conditions of work of any such workmen” (Section 2). If an 
employer and trade union is unable to negotiate a resolution to a trade dispute, either 
party can report it to the Department for conciliation (Section 18). In conciliation 
proceedings, an employer may represent himself or be represented by an authorized 
employee, an officer or employee of a trade union of employers, or an official of a 
registered organization of employers (Section 19B). Similarly, an officer or employee 
can represent the trade union, or an official of a registered organization of workmen 
(Section 19B). Others cannot represent these parties, such as an advocate, advisor, or 
consultant (Section 19B(2)).  
 
The Department also conciliates the settlement of representations for reinstatement 
for dismissal “without just cause” (Section 20). This process begins when a workman 
submits a written representation for reinstatement to the office of the Department 
nearest to the place of previous employment, which must be done within 60 days 
                                                
94 The other services the Department provides are: processing claims for recognition 
of trade unions, facilitating collective bargaining, providing advisory services, and 




(Section 20(1, 1A)). The workman does not need to be a member of a trade union. 
The workman can represent him/herself, or be represented by an officer or employee 
of a trade union of which he is a member, or by any official of a registered 
organization of workmen (Section 20(6b)). Again, other persons cannot represent 
these parties (Section 20(7)). If the employee fails to attend any of the conciliation 
proceedings, his case is considered withdrawn (Section 20(9)). 
 
In relation to trade disputes and representations for reinstatement, the Officer plays 
the role of a conciliator, not an adjudicator; that is, the Officer tries to persuade both 
parties to reach an amicable settlement but does not have the power to hear and decide 
the case (Malhotra cited in D'Cruz 2007).95 For both processes, legal aid by lawyers is 
not permitted; foreign workers either represent themselves or are represented by their 
trade unions. In the past, Officers have permitted NGOs to attend parts of the 
conciliation proceedings on an informal basis with the consent of employers; 
however, this is discretionary. If the Officer is unsuccessful, he/she submits a report 
to the Recognition and Trade Dispute Division or the Conciliation Division for 
Reinstatement at Headquarters, which may then proceed with another round of 
conciliation proceedings.96 If this is still unsuccessful, the case is referred to the 
Director General, who then notifies the Minister for Human Resources (under Section 
18(5) and Section 20(2) of the Act respectively).  
 
                                                
95 In Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew FGook Chuan [1996] 1 MLJ 481 the 
Court of Appeal clearly stated that the power of the Director General (and delegated 
to Officers) is conciliatory – to mediate and attempt to settle disputes early – not to 
ascertain the law or the facts of the case. The power to adjudicate in vested in the 
Industrial Court. 





The Minister may reject the case, thus closing it, or refer it to the Industrial Court for 
adjudication under Section 26(1-2) and Section 20(3) of the Act respectively.97 The 
only way to challenge the Minister’s decision is by application to the High Court for a 
writ of mandamus, seeking the High Court to order the Minister to refer the case 
(D’Cruz 2007). Some claimants have done so, and successfully managed to get their 
cases referred; however, it is an expensive process. 
 
The Industrial Court is a tribunal with quasi-judicial powers (Susila 2010b). The 
President and a member each of two panels, one representing employers and another 
representing workers, hears each case. An employer may represent himself, be 
represented by an authorized employee, or be represented by an officer or employee 
of a trade union of employers while a workman can appear personally or be 
represented by an officer or employee of a trade union of which he is a member 
(Section 27(c)). Lawyers are allowed to represent their clients.  
 
The jurisdiction of the Industrial Court is limited to Malaysia, and as such, it cannot 
summon parties or witnesses residing outside of Malaysia to appear before it (D’Cruz 
2007).98 The Industrial Court can make decisions concerning non-citizens and can 
make an award.99 In relation to dismissal, the Industrial Court has the power to order 
                                                
97 In 2008, the Minister of Human Resources stated that only 512 cases had been 
referred to the Industrial Court that year, compared to 3,200 in the previous year, as 
up to 75 percent of them had been resolved through a newly introduced arbitration 
process (The Star Online 2008c). 
98 This has a bearing on non-citizens who wish to return home before the Court 
reaches a decision. 
99 The matter of whether the Industrial Court can hear matters concerning non-citizens 




reinstatement or compensation in lieu.100 However, in 2007, the Industrial Relations 
Act was amended so that the maximum amount of backwages awarded would not 
exceed 24 months from the date of dismissal, or 12 months for a person on probation 
at the time of dismissal (Second Schedule). 
 
The award of the Industrial Court “shall be final and conclusive, and shall not be 
challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court” 
(Section 33B(2). However, the Industrial Court can refer a question of law to the High 
Court (Section 33A). The High Court hears and determines this question as if it is an 
appeal against the award, and “may consequently confirm, vary, substitute, or quash 
the award” or make an order (Section 33A(5)). The High Court’s decision is final and 
cannot be appealed (Section 33A(7)). However, in the past, the Malaysian judiciary 
has adopted an interventionist approach in judicial review (Sharifah and George 
2002). The Federal Court in R. Ramachandran v. The Industrial Court [1977] 1 MLJ 
145 decided that an Industrial Court decision could be reviewed for substance as well 
as process and that it could change the appropriate relief and award without referring 
the case back to the Industrial Court for rehearing  
 
While making representations in writing to the Department of Industrial Relations for 
reinstatement, a worker can proceed with a concurrent action for wrongful dismissal 
in the civil courts. In Fung Keong Rubber Manufacturing (M) Sdn Bhd v. Lee Eng 
Kiat & Ors [1980] 1 LNS 156, the Federal Court held that Section 20 was only an 
alternative remedy and did not restrict the plaintiff from proceeding through an 
                                                
100 The power of the Industrial Court to award monetary compensation in situations 
when reinstatement would not be an appropriate remedy was decided in A Dutt v 




alternative course of action. As such, the plaintiff could also file a civil suit against 
the defendant.101 However, in Shamsulbahri Shaffie v. Titan Petchem (M) Sdn Bhd 
[2010] 4 CLJ 242, the High Court Judge clarified that such a claim was restricted to 
damages and that the court could not order reinstatement. The Judge stated, “If the 
claim for reinstatement is allowed by this court, it would then defeat the very basic 
principle of common law that this court could not and would not grant specific 
performance of contracts of service” (p. 251). 
 
According to Industrial Court President Mrs. Susila Sithamparam, the Industrial Court 
has taken a number of measures that help to ensure access to justice for foreign 
workmen. These include giving priority to cases involving workers of different 
nationalities, assisting a foreign workman with a case pending by informing and 
updating the Immigration Department of the status of the case (so that he/she can 
avoid criminal prosecution for immigration offences), not imposing costs if the 
workman is unsuccessful in his/her claim, and allowing a workman to request for 
summonses to be served on his/her witnesses without having to pay fees (Susila 
2010b). In 2007, the Industrial Court also launched a public portal through its website 
allowing individuals to view the status of their case including postponements, the 
documents filed, as well as schedules for hearing, mention and mediation (Susila 
2010a).  
 
TYPES OF GRIEVANCES 
A grievance refers to “a gross injury or loss that constitutes a violation of a country’s 
civil or criminal law, or international human rights standards” (United Nations 
                                                
101 This principle was followed in Haji Ali Haji Othman v. Tekekom Malaysia Berhad 




Development Programme 2004:6). Table 3 lists nine main categories of grievances 
that non-citizens have faced for which they have sought remedies, as well as the 
associated mechanisms for adjudication and relevant legislation.  
 
The first nine categories highlight problems faced by non-citizens in relation to their 
work, living conditions and legal status, with the main actors responsible being their 
employers and/or agents. These are matters related to: wages, payments and earnings; 
dismissal; working conditions; living conditions; agents; the validity of immigration 
passes for work; the withholding of passports; threat of deportation; as well as 
personal injury or death. The next four categories list problems related to the 
breakdown of marriage and/or divorce; custody of children; violence; and finally, 




Table 3: Types of Grievances, Mechanisms for Action/Redress and Relevant Legislation 
 





• Unpaid wages 
• Unlawful deductions of wages (including 
those made for foreign levies and 
insurance premiums which are to be paid 
by employers) 
• Delays in payments of wages 
• Partial payment of wages  
• Non-payment for overtime work at 
overtime rates 
Department of Labour, with possible 
referral to the Labour Court, and 
subsequent appeal to the High Court, 
or 
 
The Industrial Court, where there is 
non-compliance to a collective 
agreement already given cognizance 
by the Court (see Note 1). 
 
Section 69, 69B, 69C, 77, 




Section 56(1), Industrial Relations 
Act 1967 
 
2 Dismissal • Unfair dismissal or dismissal without just 
cause (i.e. dismissal based on the reasons 
for dismissal; includes constructive 
dismissal, in which an employee walks 
out because of a fundamental breach of 
contract) 
Department of Industrial Relations, 
with possible referral to the Industrial 
Court, and/or, 
 
Civil Courts, for damages only, not 
reinstatement (see Note 2).  
 
Industrial Relations Act 1967 
 
• Wrongful dismissal (i.e. dismissal that 
breaches terms of the contract, e.g. 
dismissal without notice) 
 
Department of Labour, with possible 
referral to the Labour Court, and 
subsequent appeal to the High Court.  





Table 3 continued 
 




• Long work hours 
• Refusal to provide the full allocation of 
annual or sick leave 
• Refusal to recognize and observe all 
gazetted public holidays 
• Refusal to provide rest days 
Department of Labour, with possible 
referral to the Labour Court, and 
subsequent appeal to the High Court. 
Employment Act 1955 
 
 
• Refusal to provide safety equipment and 
protective gear for dangerous work 
Department of Occupational Safety 
and Health 








• Decrepit, dirty accommodation 
• Overcrowding 
• Insufficient food and water 
• Insufficient electricity  
• Poor sanitation 
Make an official complaint to the 
Local Council. 
 
Make an official complaint to the 
Department of Labour to trigger an 
inspection and investigation.  
 
Bylaws of the Local Council 
 
Workers Minimum Standards of 




• High fees 
• Contract substitution 
• Deception concerning working and living 
conditions 
• Use of forged documents 
• Use of violence and threats  
• Illegally sub-contracting migrant workers 
to other employers 
 
Make an official report to the Police 
and take civil action through the courts 
(see Note 3). 
 
  
Penal Code, for criminal acts 
 
Private Employment Agencies Act 





Table 3 continued 
 
No. Category  Examples of Grievances Mechanisms for Action/ Redress Relevant Legislation 
Employment-Related 




• Delays in the renewal of immigration passes 
for work (with workers having to work without 
legal status) 
• Termination of immigration passes for work 
 
Apply for a Special Pass with the 





Act 1968; Immigration 
Act 1959/63; Immigration 
Regulations 1963 
 
7 Withholding of 
passports 
• Passports withheld by agents or employers Make an official report to 
Immigration and/or Police (see Note 
3).  
  
Passports Act 1966 
8 Threat of 
deportation  
 
• Threat of forced deportation against their will 
by their agent or employer 
Make an official report to the Police.  
9 Personal injury 




• Accidents in the workplace and outside 
working hours 
• Insufficient medical attention for sicknesses or 
injuries 
• Lack of insurance (in spite of the statutory 
requirement) 
• Substandard insurance 
• Difficulties claiming compensation 
• Insufficient compensation to cover health care 
costs 
 
Department of Labour, for 
calculating the amount of 
compensation due through the 
Foreign Workers Compensation 
Scheme. 
 
Civil action through the courts, to 




(Insurance) Order 1998 
 
The Workers Minimum 
Standards of Housing and 




Table 3 continued 
 
No. Category  Examples of Grievances Mechanisms for Action/ Redress Relevant Legislation 
Others 
10 Breakdown of 
marriage 
and/or divorce 
• Spousal abandonment / desertion 
• Petitions for divorce 
• Alimony and maintenance 
• Remaining in Malaysia after the breakdown of 
marriage and/or divorce 
 
Civil action through the courts.  
 
Law Reform (Marriage 
and Divorce) Act 1976 
 




11 Custody of 
children 
• Filing for custody of children Application to the High Court. Guardianship of Infants 
Act 1961 
 
12 Violence • Robbery 
• Physical violence 
• Sexual harassment 
• Rape 
Report to the Police and civil action 











• Arbitrary arrest despite having legal status 
• Imprisonment and/or whipping despite having 
legal status or having been cheated or 
trafficked 
• Indefinite detention as witnesses in court 
proceedings against others 
• Forced deportation 
Civil action through the courts.  
 
For unlawful detention or procedural 
errors in the detention order, filing 
for habeas corpus. 
Article 5(2), Federal 
Constitution 
Note 1: See Chong Wah Plastics Sdn Bhd & Ors vs. Idris Ali & Ors [2001] 1 ILR 598, further elaborated in Chapter 4. Note 2: See Shamsulbahri Shaffie v. Titan Petchem 
(M) Sdn Bhd [2010] 4 CLJ 242, further elaborated below. Note 3: These practices may also lead to criminal prosecution by the AG’s Chambers. Note 4: No judicial review of 
an Immigration Department decision is permitted (Section 59A, Immigration Act 1959/63). For termination of immigration passes for work, in practice, there is no effective 
mechanism for redress as it is deemed the right of the employer, although this power is not provided for in labour and employment laws. 
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ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR NON-CITIZENS 
In many cases, non-citizens do not know what to do when they face problems in 
Malaysia – their awareness of their rights and remedies in the Malaysian legal system 
is weak.102 Many are not aware of the difference between justiciable and non-
justiciable issues and do not know which mechanism of adjudication to use in order to 
pursue redress. As Renuka Balasubramaniam, a lawyer who has provided pro bono 
legal aid to foreign workers and refugees states, 
Respective Acts specify the remedies that the courts can provide. Often, claimants 
don’t know what they can and cannot complain about and what remedy to seek.… 
Making the wrong claim through the wrong court can permanently defeat the 
claim if the error is not highlighted at an early stage. If officers in the respective 
departments do not assist pro-actively, or cannot assist due to language 
difficulties, claimants may have no redress.103 
 
In some cases, depending on the facts and grievances raised, there may be more than 
one possible course of action. For example, a matter concerning the terms of 
employment covered by a collective agreement can be brought before the Department 
of Labour as well as the Department of Industrial Relations. However, the 
Employment Act clearly prohibits the former from hearing matters already considered 
by the latter. Complainants need to be clear of the consequences when deciding to 
seek remedies through one avenue rather than the other.  
 
                                                
102 This is in spite of the fact that all foreign workers on immigration passes for work 
are supposed to have received training in their country of origin concerning their 
rights and obligations in Malaysia on courses jointly accredited by their own 
government and the Ministry of Human Resources in Malaysia.  
103 Balasubramaniam, Renuka. 2010. Personal communication, 21 April. 
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Another challenge that non-citizens face is gathering documentary evidence to 
support their claims. Often, they are not given copies of the contracts they sign, or 
their wage slips showing proof of wage deductions. They also need to provide 
addresses for court documents to be served when they lodge complaints, which can be 
particularly difficult if they have been made homeless or are living in temporary 
accommodation.104 Also, there may be negative consequences to their actions that 
they must be prepared to bear. As Joachim Xavier, a Case Manager based in Penang 
who has assisted numerous foreign workers in obtaining redress for grievances, 
explains, 
Sometimes the workers don’t want to pursue the case; they feel it is not worth the 
trouble. They make a complaint, and then they realize the possible repercussions, 
such as deportation. So, they just decide to continue working under the 
exploitative conditions.105 
 
In order to access the judicial system and ADR processes, non-citizens need to 
comply with the rules of procedure of the courts. However, they are not easy to 
understand, and they – as with other persons – often need help and guidance from 
lawyers in order to file a case, draw up a statement of claim or defence, file affidavits, 
understand legal terminology, and argue the case (Sharifah and George 2002). As 
such, legal advice is necessary for them to have a clear sense of their options and to 
understand the significant obstacles involved in pursuing mechanisms for redress. As 
many cannot afford to pay for legal advice, they are very dependent on legal aid. 
                                                
104 This occurs to some foreign workers who are evicted from the housing provided 
by their employers, and foreign spouses estranged from their husbands. Legal aid 
providers have allowed their addresses to be used for this purpose. Alternatively they 
can provide an address in their home country or an email address (Susila 2010b). 
105 Xavier, Joachim. 2010. Interview by author, 4 March. 
 134 
 
Sources of Legal Aid for Non-Citizens 
There are three main organisations that provide legal aid in Malaysia – the Legal Aid 
Bureau (Biro Bantuan Guaman, BBG) run by the government, the National Legal Aid 
Foundation jointly established by the government and the Bar Council, and the 
network of Legal Aid Centres (LACs) of the Bar Council spread across Peninsular 
Malaysia. Of these three, only the LACs provide legal aid to non-citizens. The LACs 
are funded by lawyers who are members of the Bar Council and do not receive 
government funding. Lawyers who take up cases through the LACs do so on a 
voluntary basis. The LACs provide legal aid on a means tested basis. Some LACs, 
such as the one in Kuala Lumpur, have dedicated clinics and programmes to assist 
foreign workers, foreign domestic workers and refugees, in partnership with NGOs 
such as Tenaganita and UNHCR.106 However, their resources are limited in the face 
of the large numbers of cases they receive. Furthermore, the lawyers who provide 
legal aid through the LACs are not paid and the LACs do not reimburse expenses 
incurred. In many cases, lawyers are only able to mitigate when a foreign worker 
pleads guilty. 
 
Non-citizens are able to seek assistance from their embassies. Depending on the 
bilateral agreements between their country and Malaysia, embassies are often 
involved in the process of recruitment. Typically, they are required to check and attest 
                                                
106 The Kuala Lumpur LAC also runs legal aid programmes at prisons, through which 
is has provided assistance to non-citizens. From January to June 2009, it provided 
assistance to 199 non-citizen clients at Sungei Buloh prison, 3 at Kajang Men’s 
Prison, and 268 through the Tenaganita clinic. From January to June 2010, it provided 
assistance to 133 non-citizen clients at Sungei Buloh prison, 106 through the 
Tenaganita clinic, and 2,696 through the UNHCR clinic (Bar Council Legal Aid 
Centre Kuala Lumpur 2010). 
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that the minimum conditions of employment set by their respective governments are 
met before approving the recruitment and placement of their nationals. These 
embassies are also repositories for contracts of employment and documents – as such, 
they are an important source of information for civil action.  
 
The requests of foreign nationals for assistance at their embassies have been met with 
different levels of responsiveness. The embassies of the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Cambodia and Nepal, amongst others, have dedicated labour attachés mandated to 
look after the welfare of their nationals. The Indonesian embassy established a 
Taskforce in 2006 to assist Indonesian foreign workers with their grievances; in its 
first year, it assisted 763 workers, but numbers continued to rise to 900-1000 cases a 
year (Kurniawati 2009; Malay Mail Online 2009).107 The Taskforce also works with 
the Malaysian police to rescue domestic workers in distress. In addition, the Embassy 
maintains a shelter for migrants in distress, most of them domestic workers. The 
shelter, built for 75, is frequently overcrowded, sometimes hosting more than 150 
women and children at a time (Malay Mail Online 2009).  
 
Trade unions are another source of legal assistance. However, there are impediments 
to joining trade unions in spite of the fact that legislation protects the rights of non-
citizen workers to do so. For example, immigration passes for work issued by the 
Immigration Department state that foreign workers are not permitted to join 
associations (persatuan), which employers have interpreted to include trade unions 
(kesatuan). The Department of Trade Union Affairs has also ruled that foreign 
                                                
107 In contrast, the Malaysian police only recorded 39 cases of abuse of foreign 
domestic workers in 2005, 45 cases in 2006, 39 cases in 2007 and 42 cases in 2008 
(Hariati 2009). 
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domestic workers are not allowed to join trade unions (Malaysian Trade Union 
Congress 2008). In July 2007, the Registrar of Societies rejected an application by the 
Malaysian Trades Union Congress for the registration of an association to aid foreign 
domestic workers. In April 2008, MTUC made a complaint against the Malaysian 
government to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association on this matter, and in 
response, the Committee recommended that the government immediately register the 
association so that these domestic workers could fully exercise their rights to freedom 
of association (International Labour Organisation 2011). However, until now, it has 
not done so. 
 
Non-citizens also receive legal advice on a pro bono basis from the LACs, civil 
society groups (such as Tenaganita and the Penang Office for Human Development), 
faith-based groups, and individual lawyers. Most of the time, non-citizens learn of 
these organisations and lawyers through informal social networks. These 
organisations and lawyers counsel them on their options, often communicating with 
them through interpreters. When providing assistance to foreign workers and foreign 
domestic workers, most try to mediate and negotiate settlements with employers first. 
For many – especially in cases involving workers with irregular status – this is the 
only stage at which some form of success is possible. In relation to disputes 
concerning wages, earnings and payments, some NGO case managers try to facilitate 
a mutually acceptable settlement between employers and workers, which may not be 
the full amount owed to the workers. 
 
However, if this is unsuccessful, they assist documented workers in accessing ADR 
processes, making police reports in order to trigger criminal investigations, or taking 
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civil action through the judicial system. However, such pursuits are often long and 
costly, sometimes lasting for years. There are often delays in cases brought through 
the civil courts and the Industrial Court, due to applications for postponement by 
employers and the backlog of cases because of the limited resources of the courts.108 
Cases can drag on for months, if not years. 
 
Access to Legal Counsel and Representation 
The right of an arrested person to legal counsel and representation is provided in 
Article 5(3) of the Federal Constitution, which states: “Where a person is arrested he 
shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed 
to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice”. Section 28A of the 
Criminal Procedure Code states that when a person is arrested, the police shall allow 
him/her to communicate with a legal practitioner of his/her choice.  
 
However, in practice, when non-citizens are arrested, in particular foreign workers 
and those suspected of having irregular status, many are not allowed to contact 
anyone during the remand period (lasting up to 14 days for non-citizens), whether 
lawyers, family members, friends, or employers. This hampers their ability to seek 
legal assistance. Those who have been able to make outside contact often do so by 
paying a ‘fee’ to use the mobile phones of police officers or immigration officers at 
police lock-ups or immigration detention depots, by paying a fee to use a smuggled 
                                                
108 In 2008, there were around 900,000 unresolved cases in the subordinate courts and 
91,000 in the High Courts (New Straits Times 2009). However, in 2009, the judiciary 
took a number of measures to reduce backlog, including avoiding frivolous litigation, 
fully utilizing court work hours, allowing judicious adjournment of cases, adopting 
alternative dispute mechanisms and ending court boycotts (Dragon 2010). In the past, 
the judiciary has also tried to clear backlog by computerising the court system and 
introducing pre-trial case management procedures (Sharifah and George 2002). 
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mobile phone of a fellow detainee in places of detention, or, with much greater 
difficulty, by concealing a mobile phone illicitly while they are under arrest. 
 
Some non-citizens who are arrested are not told when they will be brought to court to 
be charged. When they are charged, some do not understand the charges read to them 
because they do not understand the Malay language. Some have pleaded guilty, either 
accidentally or because they have been held in remand for months and see no other 
option for getting released. 
 
Economic Barriers to Justice 
Most non-citizens are unable to bear the costs of legal counsel and representation. 
Foreign workers who decide to take legal action against their employers often have 
their contract of service terminated by their employer, rendering their status in 
Malaysia irregular. Thus, they lose not only their current and future income but also 
the food and accommodation provided by their employers. As stated earlier, pursuing 
a case through official adjudication mechanisms can take months, if not years, and 
most are unable to sustain themselves for long periods without an income.  
 
If the person is unable to afford a lawyer or to obtain the services of one on a pro 
bono basis, he/she is not assigned a legal practitioner by the government. Contingency 
fee arrangements (or, ‘no win no fee’), wherein lawyers receive a percentage of the 
amount successfully recovered or awarded but do not charge legal fees, are prohibited 
in Malaysia (Section 112, Legal Profession Act 1976). Furthermore, plaintiffs seeking 
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civil action run the risk of legal costs being awarded against them. These are further 
hindrances to the access to justice for those who are poor.109 
 
The Relevance and Significance of Legal Status in Accessing Mechanisms for 
Adjudication 
The legal status of a non-citizen has direct impact on his/her access to justice in a 
number of ways. Those who are not regularised at the time their cases are brought for 
conciliation or adjudication are vulnerable to arrest, detention, punishment for 
immigration offences and deportation. There have been a number of cases where 
Immigration officers have arrested claimants when they made their appearance at the 
Industrial court or at subordinate courts.110 There have also been a number of times 
when claimants have been deported against their will, before the conclusion of their 
court cases. 
 
When non-citizens are arrested, there are three possible ways forward. The first is to 
pursue their case while detained in immigration detention centres or prisons. 
However, many cannot bear the burden of indefinite detention, the conditions of 
detention, and the loss of income, and thus, give up pursuing redress. Secondly, they 
can be released on bail if their offence is bailable or non-bailable.111 However, if they 
are perceived to be a flight risk, courts often impose additional conditions such as 
                                                
109 Around 500,000 persons every year, an estimated 94 percent of those held under 
remand, appear in court without representation (Ramachandran and Vijaindren 2008). 
110 Susila (2010) reports that this occurred in Sathiayamoorthy s/o Karunthappan v 
TG Medical Sdn Bhd [2009] 1 ILR 453. 
111 There are three types of offences: bailable, non-bailable, and unbailable offences. 
For bailable offences, bail is offered as of right. For non-bailiable offences, bail is 
offered at the discretion of the court. For unbailable offences, bail is not permitted. 
This is reserved for offences punishable with death or life imprisonment. The full list 
of Penal Code offences and their classification for bail is given in Column 5 of the 
First Schedule.  
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requiring their travel documents to be deposited and their surety to be a Malaysian 
citizen (Hector 2006). Thirdly, they may opt for voluntary deportation and then 
continue with the pursuit of their cases while they are abroad, travelling back to 
Malaysia to attend court hearings. However, if they fail to appear in court, their cases 
may be struck off (Susila 2010b). It can also be difficult for legal aid providers to 
communicate with them while they are abroad, which leads to delays in the settlement 
of their cases. 
 
The main way of reducing a claimant’s vulnerability to arrest is to apply for a Special 
Pass from the Immigration Department, which is provided for under Rule 14 of 
Immigration Regulations 1963. These Passes are typically issued for one month for a 
fee of RM100 a month and are renewable. However, there are a number of challenges 
related to the issuance of Special Passes. Firstly, the Special Passes are issued and 
renewed at the discretion of Immigration officers. In practice, Immigration officers 
have refused to issue these passes, even when proof is provided that the applicants 
have claims pending in courts or in ADR processes. In recognition of this problem, 
Human Resources Minister Datuk Dr. S. Subramaniam issued a directive that 90-day 
Special Passes should be issued when cases are pending at the Department of Labour. 
However, this directive has not been followed by the Immigration Department.112 A 
conundrum emerges when the Department of Labour refuses to file a case without 
proof that a foreign worker has legal status (e.g. with the possession of a Special Pass) 
and the Immigration Department requires proof that a case is filed before they issue a 
Special Pass.  
 
                                                
112 Xavier, Joachim. 2010. Interview by author, 4 March. 
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Secondly, in many cases, the passes are renewed only twice, allowing the holder to 
stay in Malaysia for a total of three months, a time too short to obtain remedies for 
grievances.113 Thirdly, the Special Passes cost RM100 a month per person, which is a 
high cost for someone without an income.114 Fourthly, the Special Passes do not 
confer the right to work. Thus, the holders of the Pass are unable to earn an income 
while in Malaysia and unable to provide for themselves in terms of food, shelter and 
basic necessities. Immigration officers have expressed concerns that allowing non-
citizens to work leads to abuse of the system. Quoting (then) Immigration Department 
Enforcement Director Ishak Mohammed, a newspaper reported: 
[The Immigration Department does] not allow foreign workers with special 
passes to work in the country as this would create a loophole for illegal 
entrants to work. “I cannot allow them to use the special pass to work and stay 
for as long as their case is being heard because there are hundreds of 
thousands of illegals in the country,” said Ishak. “If we allow it, everyone 
would settle for that option including refugees, because it is an easy way to get 
work. We have found a few cases filed in court just for them to obtain a 
special pass.” (Thaindian News 2008) 
 
Some Labour Officers have asserted in public forums that migrant workers with 
irregular status are not eligible for protection under the law, as their contracts are 
deemed ‘void’ (Khamis 2008) – even though this is contrary to international 
                                                
113 In some cases, however, such as in Sampath Kumar Vellingiri & 78 ors v. Chin 
Well Fasteners Co. Sdn Bhd [2003] 1 LNS 260, Special Passes were renewed for 2-3 
years while foreign workers pursued their case in court (this case is further discussed 
in Chapter 4). Xavier, Joachim. 2010. Interview by author, 5 March. 
114 In some cases, however, the Immigration Department has waived these costs. 
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customary law (jus cogens).115 As Joachim Xavier notes, cases involving the labour 
rights of irregular foreign workers are very challenging to argue. “Often, the cases get 
turned down [by the Department of Labour] because they don’t have a written 
contract. It is hard to prove a verbal contract.”116 In some cases, Labour officers have 
insisted that foreign workers produce proof of their legal status, or present their 
passports, before acting on their complaints.  
 
In practice, many law enforcement officers consider non-citizens with irregular status 
to have ‘no rights’ in Malaysia, including rights to the protection of the law. Non-
citizens are afraid to report having been cheated, exploited, or subject to forced labour 
or trafficking to law enforcement officers. Even when measures to provide redress are 
pursued, the inevitable outcome is their removal from Malaysia. Because of this, non-
citizens with irregular status prefer to put such events behind them and to move on 
with their lives in Malaysia rather than be forced to go home.  
 
Challenges in Enforcement 
There are two types of enforcement relevant to non-citizens in terms of access to 
justice. The first concerns the responsiveness of the police, immigration officers, and 
labour officers to complaints made by non-citizens. There are indications that many 
law enforcement agents pay little attention to complaints made by non-citizens. 
According to Joachim Xavier, who has helped a number of foreign workers to lodge 
police reports, “the enforcement of criminal laws is poor. There are police reports 
                                                
115 Nevertheless, there have been occasions where Labour Officers have urged 
employers to pay their undocumented workers. Xavier, Joachim. 2010. Interview by 
author, 4 March. 
116 Xavier, Joachim. 2010. Interview by author, 4 March. 
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made about violence and robbery [suffered by foreign workers] but no action is 
taken.”117 
 
A second type of enforcement relates to the execution of awards granted to non-
citizens through the judiciary and through ADR processes. For proceedings through 
the Department of Labour, the Director General can make an order of payment by or 
to the employer or employee of a sum of money deemed just.118 If there is non-
compliance to this order, the Director General may send a certified copy of the order 
to the Registrar of a Sessions Court or a Court of a First Class Magistrate having 
jurisdiction over the place where the order relates or was made.119 When the order is 
registered, it becomes enforceable as if it were a judgment of the Court.120 However, 
as Joachim Xavier notes, 
The process of claiming [compensation] is difficult and cumbersome. You 
need to make a claim through the Labour Department. The Labour 
Department makes an assessment, and then instructs the insurance company to 
pay. Sometimes, they pay the employer, not the worker…. Aside from death, 
all claims can be paid to the employer. The worker then needs to file a 
separate claim to get the money.121 
 
                                                
117 Xavier, Joachim. 2010. Interview by author, 4 March. This is not to say that no 
action is taken whatsoever. As Joachim notes, there have been cases where Labour 
Officers compel employers to pay their undocumented workers the wages they are 
due. There have also been cases where the police have worked together with refugee 
community leaders to arrest police officers who extort money from refugee 
communities. 
118 Section 69D, Employment Act 1955. 
119 Section 75, Employment Act 1955. The certificate must comply with Order 39 of 
the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980. 
120 Order 39, Rule 5, Subordinate Courts Rules 1980. 
121 Xavier, Joachim. 2010. Interview by author, 4 March. 
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When there is non-compliance with an Industrial Court award or with a collective 
agreement, a trade union or person bound by such an award or agreement may lodge a 
written complaint to the Court. The Court may then order any party to comply or to 
cease and desist doing acts that contravene with the award or collective agreement. 
The Court can also make an order allowing rectification or restitution for any 
contravention of an award or collective agreement. If there are special circumstances, 
it can also make an order to vary or set aside terms of the award or collective 
agreement (Section 56(1-2), Industrial Relations Act 1967).  
 
Any person who does not comply with such an order of the Court is guilty of an 
offence, and if convicted, is liable to a fine not exceeding RM2,000 and/or to 
imprisonment not exceeding one year. However, as Anantaraman (n.d.) points out, 
conviction requires the Police to conduct a sufficiently thorough investigation to 
gather enough evidence of non-compliance and for the Attorney General’s Chambers 
to prosecute. These make it difficult to enforce a contract where there is non-
compliance. 
 
If the Court makes an order for a person to carry out an act (such as make a payment) 
and the person fails to do it, the Registrar of the Court may send a certified copy of 
the order to the Senior Assistant Registrar of the High Court or the Registrar of the 
Sessions having jurisdiction over the place where the order relates or was made. 
When the copy is recorded, it becomes enforceable as a judgement of the High Court 
or the Sessions Court (Section 56(3)).122 There are four ways of enforcing judgment 
in the subordinate courts: through a Judgment Debtor Summons, Writ of Seizure and 
                                                
122 However, Section 56(3) states that only the High Court can order the sale of 
immovable property for the purposes of enforcement. 
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Sale, Garnishee proceedings and Committal Proceedings.123 However, as using these 
proceedings require legal assistance and take time, it is rare that non-citizens, in 
particular foreign workers, gain compensation through these methods (Nekoo 2010). 
 
Limitations in the Judiciary 
In his analysis of judicial discourse in Malaysia, Chan (2007) suggests that access to 
justice is not a fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution of Malaysia. The 
judiciary recognises ouster clauses, which limits the appeal options of individuals 
with respect to administrative decisions. Chan also points out that Malaysian courts 
have rejected the basic features doctrine that holds that certain aspects of the 
Constitution cannot be amended by Parliament, citing the Federal Court decision in 
Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v. Sugumar Balakrishnan [2002] 3 MLJ 72.  
 
Furthermore, the Federal Court is of the view that access to justice is not a 
fundamental right but a common law right that can be modified by written law. In 
Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd v. Kekatong Sdn Bhd [2004] 2 MLJ 257, the court stated 
that “access to justice shall be available only to the extent that the courts are 
empowered to administer justice” (p. 257), affirming the powers of Parliament to 
“enact a federal law pursuant to the authority conferred by article 121(1) [of the 
Federal Constitution] to remove or restrict the jurisdiction and power of the court”. 
These decisions highlight the limits of the capacity of the judiciary to check the 
powers of the executive and legislature. 
 
                                                
123 These four are provided for in the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980, in Order 37, 
rule 13-16; Order 30 rule 12 and Order 32 rule 11; Order 33; and Order 34. 
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CONCLUSION  
An array of laws exists that cover the rights of non-citizens as persons, non-citizens, 
aliens, workers, employees and trafficked persons. However, access to justice for non-
citizens depends on the resources they are able to mobilize – in particular, specialist 
legal knowledge, finances and time. For those with limited resources – such as foreign 
workers and foreign domestic workers – the practical challenges involved in seeking 
redress through the judiciary and through ADR processes make it almost impossible 
for them to gain access to justice. Those with irregular status are worse off, as they 
have limited standing before conciliators and adjudicators and are under threat of 
arrest and deportation. Pro bono legal aid has become crucial for vulnerable non-
citizens, but the provision of it remains insufficient to meet existing demand. As such, 
many vulnerable non-citizens live without access to justice. 
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CHAPTER 4: AUTHORISED MIGRANT WORKERS 
ISMAIL: WORKING FOR A BRIGHTER FUTURE 
Ismail came to Malaysia in 2008.124 It was his first time travelling abroad, and he was 
excited about ‘seeing the world’ and making his fortune before returning home. He 
paid his agent in Pakistan RM9,000 in recruitment fees for a factory job in Malaysia. 
However, when he arrived, he was shocked to find out that the job no longer existed! 
He was told that it was because of the economic downturn. He was incensed, and 
argued long and hard with his agent. The agent ignored him at first, and then 
threatened to beat him and to get him deported if he continued to complain. 
 
 “My father is an influential man in Pakistan”, he tells me. “Because of this, the agent 
agreed to make an ‘alternative arrangement’ for me”. They got him a pass to work as 
a plantation worker, so he could have some form of legal status in Malaysia. 
However, he still didn’t have a job. Depressed and unwilling to go home without any 
money, he stayed unemployed for a few weeks until a friend told him of a job running 
a food stall in another neighbourhood. He spoke to the owner of the stall, a 
Malaysian, who offered him the job.  
 
Ismail works an average of 12 hours every day. He starts work at around 4pm and 
works until about 4am. He is happy that he has a job, that he has independence in 
managing the food stall, and that his boss pays him regularly and on time. However, 
he is unhappy that his boss doesn’t give him a day off and that his wages are low. He 
has asked repeatedly to have at least one day off a week and to get an increment, but 
his boss has not agreed to it. Once, his boss had a quarrel with the owner of the coffee 
                                                
124 Ismail (name changed). 2010. Interview by author. 15 February. 
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shop where the food stall is located. The next day, the owner refused to let Ismail set 
up the stall. Afraid of the consequences, he called his boss, trying to stay out of the 
quarrel. “You never know what might happen. They might blame me for something I 
didn’t do”. Thankfully, the quarrel was resolved after a few days and Ismail could get 
back to work as usual. 
 
“You Malaysians don’t know the power you have”, he says to me. “We are foreigners 
in your country. If we make noise, we can get thrown out of your country so easily. 
We have to be very careful about what we say, what we do. You are safe.” We don’t 
talk about an obvious issue – that according to immigration regulations, he is 
committing an offence by working in a job and in a location that is not reflected in his 
pass. Over the course of our conversation, Ismail’s manner changes – his eyes 
sparkling first with excitement, and then reflecting anger, disappointment and 
resignation as he narrates his story to me. “I am growing old very quickly in 
Malaysia. See, I am losing my hair”, he jokes, as he runs his fingers over the top of 
his head. One day, he hopes to save up enough money so that he can return home. He 
wants to get married, start his own business, and settle down. Now, while he remains 




From the time since independence, Malaysia chose to adopt a pro-business 
policy stance and [to] be inclusive as a major trading and open economy. This 
has been key in facilitating rapid economic growth and in transforming 
Malaysia from [a] poor country dependent on rubber and tin, into a diversified 
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and industrialised nation. Malaysia’s openness to foreign capital and labour is 
well reflected in our policies. The Prime Minister had reinforced our stance of 
openness by announcing this year, further liberalisation of services and the 
[Foreign Investment Committee] guidelines. Our acceptance of foreign labour 
is demonstrated by the presence of more than 2 million legal migrants, making 
up almost 20% of our labour force. 
YB Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop 
Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department 
At the launching of UNDP’s 2009 Global Human Development Report 
Kuala Lumpur, 6 October 2009 
 
Contemporary policies concerning the management of international labour migration 
in Malaysia can be traced back to the 1970s, when the demand for cheap labour grew 
significantly as a result of government efforts to restructure the economy. In the 
1980s, the government began authorizing the large-scale recruitment of foreign 
workers from surrounding countries, beginning with Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. The supply of cheap labour allowed 
employers to keep wages low and thus to remain competitive. In 1981, Parliament 
enacted the Private Employment Agency Act 1981 in order to regulate agencies 
involved in the placement of workers (local and foreign) in Malaysia. On 14 July 
1982, a Cabinet decision was made to restrict and regulate inflows of foreign workers 
(Khamis 2008), setting up the Cabinet Committee for the Recruitment of Foreign 
Workers (Jawatankuasa Pengambilan Pekerja Asing). In 1984, the Ministry of 
Human Resources estimated the presence of over 500,000 foreign workers, most of 
whom were employed in the plantation and construction sectors (Pillai 1999). That 
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year, it signed the 1984 Medan Agreement with the government of Indonesia, the first 
bilateral agreement with a sending country aimed at regularizing the recruitment of 
foreign workers and reducing irregular movement.125  
 
In October 1991, Cabinet introduced the Comprehensive Policy on the Recruitment of 
Foreign Workers as a temporary measure to overcome labour shortages until the 
domestic labour force was adequate. As (then) Human Resources Minister Datuk Lim 
Ah Lek clarified, it was planned to be in force for only five years; the Policy would be 
reviewed annually and shortened if necessary (Rohaizad 1991). The Ministry of 
Human Resources expected that the domestic workforce would grow and be able to 
meet labour demands. Under the policy, the plantation, construction and 
manufacturing sectors were allowed to hire foreign workers for up to two years; the 
manufacturing sector was only allowed to hire foreign workers in the skilled, semi-
skilled, technical and professional categories. Employers would have to prove they 
were unable to hire local workers and show how they would address the shortage of 
local workers through initiatives such as job training. Wages paid to foreign workers 
would also have to be the same as those paid to local workers. Foreign workers would 
be barred from engaging in petty trading (New Sunday Times 1991). The main 
elements of this Policy are still in place, albeit with numerous modifications 
concerning the procedures involved, the choice of source countries of workers, the 
length of time allowed for passes, and the numbers of workers brought in every year. 
From 2002 onwards, however, state authorities made deliberate attempts to reduce the 
                                                
125 However, this agreement was ineffective at reducing irregular migration and was 
replaced with another bilateral agreement in 1988 (Jones 2000) (further elaborated in 
Chapter 5). 
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percentage of Indonesian foreign workers in the foreign labour market, by 
diversifying the source countries for workers (Wong 2010). 
 
Concomitant with the rise in numbers of authorized foreign workers in Malaysia has 
been the growth of migrants with irregular status (in Malay, pendatang haram, 
‘unlawful/illegal immigrant’, or pendatang tanpa izin, PATI, ‘immigrant without 
permission’). The Malaysian government was aware of this phenomenon from the 
1970s, and initially approved of it tacitly as it offset the pressure on wages and helped 
to overcome labour shortages (Jomo 1988). However, in the 1980s, it began to take 
active measures to control and regulate these populations (Jones 2000) through 
bilateral agreements, regularization programmes, and large-scale immigration 
operations to arrest and deport irregular migrants (further elaborated in Chapter 5). 
 
The earliest official statistics recorded of authorised foreign workers, according to 
(Azizah 2001), shows the presence of 532,723 foreign workers in 1993. Between 
1987-1993, Malaysia transitioned swiftly from being a net labour exporter to a 
significant net labour importer, even before it reached full employment (L. L. Lim 
1996).126 The practice of mass recruitment for temporary labour has continued until 
the present. Actual numbers of foreign workers have fluctuated significantly over the 
years, as a result of policy changes related to quotas and in response to immigration 
control measures. Table 4 contains figures for 1999, 2003 and 2008, broken down by 
the country of origin of foreign workers in Malaysia. As of 30 September 2008, there 
were 2.1 million authorised foreign workers employed in manufacturing (36 percent), 
plantations (17 percent), construction (15 percent), domestic work (14 percent), 
                                                
126 Malaysia reached full employment in 1991 (Ruppert 1999). 
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services (10 percent) and agriculture (9 percent) (Dewan Rakyat 2008). In 2009, there 
were an estimated 300,000 foreign domestic workers in Malaysia, with more than 90 




Table 4: Numbers of Authorised Foreign Workers in Malaysia by Country of 
Origin, 1999, 2003 and 2008 
 
 1999 2003 2008 No. % No. % No. % 
Indonesia 269,194 65.7 988,165 73.9 1,085,658 52.6 
Bangladesh 110,788 27.0 94,541 7.1 316,401 15.3 
Thailand 2,130 0.5 10,158 0.8 21,065 1.0 
Philippines 7,299 1.8 17,400 1.3 26,713 1.3 
Pakistan 2,605 0.6 2,141 0.2 21,278 1.0 
Others 17,644 4.3 224,575 16.8 591,481 28.7 
Total 409,660 100 1,336,980 100 2,062,596 100.0 
 
Source: The Economic Planning Unit Malaysia (2009) 
 
 
Expatriates are far fewer in number. In the 1970s, there were between 3,000-4,000 
expatriates a year in Malaysia, which rose to around 14,000 in 1982 and to 20,000 in 
1983, their countries of origin reflecting the changing pattern of foreign direct 
investment in Malaysia (L. L. Lim 1988).127 In 2000, there were around 60,000 
expatriates in Malaysia (Azizah 2001), dropping to 43,548 in 2005 and 32,609 in 
2006 (Kanapathy 2008a).128 In 2006, the top five countries of origin of expatriates 
were India (28.2 percent), Japan (14.8 percent), China (15.1 percent), the United 
Kingdom (8.6 percent) and Singapore (6.7 percent).129 With them were 14,895 family 
                                                
127 There were 12,011 professional, technical and skilled workers as at 1st January 
1988 (Pillai 1992).  
128 In 2005, there were 19,752 new applications for expatriates approved, while in 
2006, there were 19,444 approved (Kanapathy 2008a). 
129 In 1981, the largest numbers came from the following countries: Japan (19 
percent), United Kingdom (14 percent), United States (11 percent), India (10 percent), 
Singapore (8 percent), and South Korea (6 percent). 
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members on Dependent Passes and 2,497 on Social Visit Passes. In 2008, there were 
around 42,000 expatriate workers, constituting 0.4 percent of the total workforce 
(Khamis 2008), dropping to 32,583 expatriates in 2010 in West Malaysia (The World 
Bank 2011b). 
 
Periods of economic recession, such as in 1983-4, 1997-8, and 2008-9, resulted in the 
withdrawal of foreign direct investment and a reduction of orders for exports. 
Companies were forced to downsize or to cease operations altogether, which led to 
higher unemployment amongst Malaysian citizens. In response, the Malaysian 
government took a number of measures to reduce the numbers of foreign workers and 
to promote ‘Hire Locals First’ practices amongst employers. However, continued 
labour shortages in specific sectors during these periods – particularly in the 
plantation and construction sectors – suggest that Malaysians were unwilling to take 
up these jobs at the prevailing wages and work conditions despite being unemployed. 
These periods generally did not last for more than 1-2 years – the economy soon 
picked up, creating renewed demand for foreign labour. Over time, the economy has 
become increasingly foreign labour dependent (see Table 5). This has been a cause of 
alarm for the government, which has repeatedly stated its objective of reducing this 
dependency (further elaborated below).  
 
 
Table 5: Foreign Labour Dependence by Sector, 1985 and 2004 
 
Sector 1985 2004 
Agriculture 6.2 20.5 
Manufacturing 1.7 11.0 
Construction 7.6 13.0 
Services 4.8 13.3 
 




In 2010, the Malaysian government established a national-level Foreign Nationals 
Management Laboratory (also known as the Laboratory on Management of Foreign 
Citizens), comprising government officials from different ministries and stakeholder 
groups to make recommendations for improvements to the overall management of 
foreign workers. The Laboratory met from 23 March to 23 April, and came up with 
48 recommendations. A similar initiative for Sabah, the Special Laboratory on Sabah 
Foreign Citizens, was also established and met from 4-27 May 2010. Their report, 
containing 20 recommendations was tabled at the Cabinet Committee Meeting on 
Foreign Workers and Illegal Immigrants (JKKPA-PATI) in March 2011 (Bernama 
2011c). At time of writing, the government has neither made all of these 
recommendations public nor detailed all of its responses to these recommendations. 
 
IMMIGRATION CONTROL OF AUTHORISED MIGRANT WORKERS130 
The Malaysian government regulates the recruitment, entry, placement and exit of 
migrant workers through a system of passes. The government differentiates clearly 
between expatriates (pegawai dagang), professionals with temporary contracts, 
foreign workers (pekerja asing), and foreign domestic workers (pembantu rumah, 
PRA, also referred to as ‘foreign domestic helpers’ in policies and ‘domestic servants’ 
in legislation) giving each type of migrant worker different rights and privileges for 
limited periods of time. There are three types of passes: an Employment Pass, a Visit 
Pass for Professional Employment (Pas Lawatan Ikhtisas), and a Visit Pass for 
Temporary Employment (Pas Lawatan Kerja Sementara, PLKS). All of these passes 
are employer-sponsored and issued against a specific job. Migrant workers do not 
                                                
130 For the rest of this chapter, I use the term ‘migrant worker’ to encompass 
expatriates, professionals with temporary contracts, foreign workers and domestic 
workers coming from other countries to work in Malaysia. 
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apply for and hold these passes independently; they cannot change employers without 
the permission of the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
 
Expatriates are allowed to work in Malaysia for up to ten years. Foreign workers are 
allowed to work for up to five years, after which they need to pass a skills test in order 
to stay on as a skilled worker (further elaborated below). Employers must post 
security bonds for each migrant worker of between RM200-RM2000, depending on 
their country of origin. The security bond is returned only after the worker has left the 
country or has changed employers with the permission of the Immigration 
Department; it is forfeited if the employee absconds. However, employers are also 
allowed to submit an insurance guarantee or a bank guarantee in lieu of paying the 
full amount of the security bond.  
 
Expatriates and Professionals with Temporary Contracts 
Expatriates are foreigners who occupy professional, managerial, or specialist 
technical positions where there is a shortage of trained Malaysians. There are three 
types of posts that expatriates can hold: a ‘key post’, a senior management position; 
an ‘executive post’, for professional and middle management positions; and a ‘non-
executive post’ for highly skilled technical positions. The employer must be a private 
limited company or a public listed company, and must meet the minimum paid-up 
capital requirement of between RM250,000 to RM500,000 depending on whether its 
equity is locally-owned, foreign-owned, or both. Permission to hire a foreigner is 
contingent on the availability of local human resources. There are some positions 
which expatriates are not allowed to fill – primarily supervisory, operator and 
technician positions in the manufacturing and constructing industries. 
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Employers have to apply for permission to one of six authorized agencies depending 
on their core business, submitting documents that explain the company’s activities 
and providing the résumé of the proposed foreigner as the application is tied to a 
specific non-citizen individual.131 After approval for the post is obtained – which 
should take a maximum of 7 working days132 - companies must submit an application 
for either an Employment Pass or a PLKS for each expatriate, which should be 
processed within 3 days (PEMUDAH 2010f). Employment Passes are issued to 
expatriates on contracts of at least 2 years with a salary of RM5,000 a month or more, 
with automatic approvals for those earning RM8,000 or more per month.133 In 
addition, there is a RM50 processing fee for the issuance of the Employment Pass. No 
levy is charged. A PLKS is issued to expatriates with a contract of less than 24 
months or earns an income of less than RM2,500 a month (Zaid Ibrahim & Co 2008). 
Levies are charged on either a yearly or monthly basis depending on the sector. The 
amount charged is the same as that for foreign workers (see Table 6 below).  
 
                                                
131 The agencies are the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) for 
manufacturing companies; the Multimedia Development Corporation (MDec) for 
information technology companies with Multimedia Super Corridor status, the Public 
Service Department for government agencies; the Central Bank of Malaysia for 
banking, finance and insurance companies; the Securities Commission for security 
and share market companies; and the Expatriate Committee, an inter-ministerial 
committee, for other appointments. 
132 Fees of between RM200-300 (USD63-94) per year are charged for the approval 
process depending on what kind of post the person holds. 
133 Rule 9 of the Immigration Regulations 1963 states that an Employment Pass can 
be issued to a person to take up a employment under a contract for a minimum period 
of two years employment under which “such person is entitled to a salary of not less 
than twelve hundred dollars a month”. The terms for the minimum level of monthly 
salary have changed over time and different reports state different amounts, including 
RM1,200 (USD376) (Ruppert 1999) and RM2,500 (USD784) (Zaid Ibrahim & Co 
2008). According to the Immigration website, the RM5,000 (USD1,570) minimum 
monthly salary was implemented with effect from 1 January 2009.  
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There are different visa requirements for all non-citizens who enter Malaysia, 
depending on their nationality.134 Those taking up expatriate positions can either enter 
Malaysia on a ‘Visa Without Reference’, which is approved and issued by the 
Malaysian Foreign Mission or Representative Office at their country of origin in 
advance of their travel, or a ‘Visa With Reference’ (Visa Dengan Rujukan, VDR), 
which requires approval by the Immigration Department in advance of their travel. 
Those who travel on a Visa Without Reference are required to pay processing fees for 
the issuance of a Journey Performed Visa (JPV), which costs RM500 per application, 
as well as the costs for the JPV itself, which costs between RM9 and RM50 
depending on the country of origin.  
 
Expatriates on Employment Passes are allowed to bring family members into 
Malaysia on Dependent Passes and Social Visit Passes, while those on the PLKS can 
bring in family members on Long Term Social Visit Passes.135 Applications for these 
can be submitted to the Immigration Department either together with or after the 
application for the Employment Pass or the PLKS. There are four fees charged in 
relation to the Dependent Pass: the fee for the Pass itself (RM90 per year), the 
processing fee (RM50), the Journey Performed Visa fee (RM500, if relevant) and the 
                                                
134 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia (2010) for the types of visas needed to 
enter Malaysia, listed by nationality. 
135 Dependent Passes and Visit Passes are provided for under Rule 10 and Rule 11 of 
the Immigration Regulations 1963. According to the Immigration Department 
website, Expatriates on Employment Passes can apply for Dependent Passes for their 
husband/wife, children (not more than 21 years old), handicapped/disabled children, 
and legally adopted children while Social Visit Passes are issued to the parents of the 
expatriate, his common law wife (with confirmation from the Embassy), children 
below 21 years old, and step children. From 20 November 2008 onwards the 
Immigration Department issued Dependent Passes to husbands of expatriates holding 
Employment Passes in accordance with Immigration Circular No. 30/2008 
(PEMUDAH 2010e). Expatriates on PLKS can apply for Long Term Social Visit 
Passes for their husband/wife and children under 21 years of age. 
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Visa fee, depending on the country of origin. The approval of the Dependent Pass 
should take place within three days (PEMUDAH 2010f). Spouses on the Dependent 
Pass are allowed to engage in charity work as well as to work with permission from 
the Immigration Department. The Malaysian Immigration Circular No.35/2008 
confirms, “spouses of expatriates holding Dependant Passes are allowed to work 
without converting their Dependant Passes to Employment Passes” (PEMUDAH 
2010e). The same four fees are charged in relation to the Long Term Social Visit 
Passes except for the fee for the Pass itself, which costs RM50 a month for nine 
months after the first three months (which are free). Expatriates can apply for 
permission for their children to study at educational facilities in Malaysia. They are 
allowed to bring in a foreign domestic worker, with no restrictions on nationality and 
age. Expatriates are also allowed to change jobs from one company to another, after a 
“cooling off period” of six months. 
 
A third type of visa, a Visit Pass for Professional Employment (Pas Lawatan 
Ikhtisas), is issued for non-citizens with professional qualifications or specialist skills 
who work in Malaysia in their professions for short periods, not exceeding 12 months. 
These are typically experts, advisors, specialists, volunteers, consultants, artists, 
musicians and missionaries. The application is made by the professional (not the local 
sponsor) and submitted to the Immigration Department. The documents required 
include a letter from a local sponsor, a personal bond, and a copy of the professional’s 
passport. The applicant has to be outside of the country during the period of 
application. They are charged fees for their Visit Pass (RM90) and for their visa 
(either RM90 or RM500 depending on their profession). In 2006, there were 22,940 
professionals on these short-term visas (Kanapathy 2008a). In 2007, the Immigration 
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Department extended the period of the Visit Pass from 3 months to 6 months, and 




‘Foreign workers’, on the other hand, occupy ‘semi-skilled’ or ‘unskilled’ positions. 
Only those with specific nationalities are given authorization to work in specific 
sectors, namely manufacturing, plantation, agriculture, construction, and services (see 
Table 7 below for a detailed breakdown).136 They must be aged 18-45 years, with 
salaries of less than RM1,200 a month. They are not allowed to bring their family 
members, and are not allowed to marry while in Malaysia.137 Unlike expatriates, they 
are subject to medical screening for communicable and chronic diseases – and for 
women, pregnancy – before and after their arrival in Malaysia.138 
 
In order to recruit foreign workers, employers must also obtain approval in advance. 
They are required to submit their application to one of four ‘One Stop Centres’ (Pusat 
Kelulusan Setempat) where officials from relevant ministries review their 
applications.139 The One Stop Centre approach was introduced in 2005 to streamline 
                                                
136 Exceptions are made for Thai cooks and rubber tappers who work in the Northern 
and East Coast states, who do not need these approvals.  
137 Foreign workers who want to marry other foreign workers are required to return 
home to register their marriages (Sandanasamy, Florida. 2010. Interview by author, 6 
February). 
138 The medical examination includes screening for: HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, leprosy, 
Hepatitis B, psychiatric illness, epilepsy, cancer, sexually-transmitted diseases, 
malaria, hypertension, heart diseases, bronchial asthma, diabetes mellitus, peptic 
ulcer, and kidney diseases. Urine is tested for the presence of cannabis or opiates and 
women are tested for pregnancy (FOMEMA 2011). 
139 This procedure was put in place on 1 August 2005. The officers are from Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry Malaysia (MITI), Ministry of Human Resources 
(Kementerian Sumber Manusia, KSM), Ministry of Agriculture (Kementerian 
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the process of applications for passes. There are four such Centres, located in 
Putrajaya (also known as the Foreign Workers Division of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs140), Labuan, Kota Kinabalu and Kuching. Employers are only allowed to hire 
a maximum of one foreign worker for every national employed. Their application 
must include a certificate from the Ministry of Human Resources showing that they 
used the Job Clearing System to try to recruit local workers. When applications are 
approved, letters of approval are issued two days after the payment of the levy.141 The 
cost of the levy depends on the sector and type of job (see Table 6 for details). 
                                                                                                                                      
Pertanian dan Industri Asas Tani, KPIAT), Ministry of Plantation Industries and 
Commodities (Kementerian Perusahaan Perladangan dan Komoditi, KPPK) and 
Construction Industries Development Board of Malaysia (CIDB). In 2008, 301,682 
passes were approved (Rashvinjeet 2009). In earlier policy procedures, applications 
were submitted to the Committee for the Employment of Foreign Workers under the 
Ministry of Human Resources, who made decisions with the assistance of a 
Processing Committee comprised of multiple government agencies.  
140 The Foreign Workers Division was established “in line with the Government's 
intention to practice good governance and to reduce bureaucracy in order to further 
improve the quality of service delivery to the public” (Ministry of Home Affairs 
Malaysia 2010a). 
141 Employers submitting applications that did not contain the bio-data of workers will 
only be given a conditional letter of approval. To obtain full approval, employers 
must submit copies of the foreign workers passports to the One Stop Centre within 
two weeks before they arrive. 
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Table 6: Annual Levy Charges for Foreign Workers (in RM) 
 
  1992 2010 




1. Manufacturing  1,200.00 960.00 
 a) General Workers 420.00 - - 
 b) Semi-skilled Workers 540.00 - - 
 c) Skilled Workers 900.00 - - 
2. Construction 420.00 1,200.00 960.00 
3. Plantation 300.00 540.00 540.00 
4. Agriculture - 360.00 360.00 
5. Services - - - 
 a) Restaurant 420.00 1,800.00 1,440.00 
 b) Cleaning Services - 1,800.00 1,440.00 
 c) Cargo handling - 1,800.00 1,440.00 
 d) Laundry - 1,800.00 1,440.00 
 e) Caddy - 1,800.00 1,440.00 
 f) Barber - 1,800.00 1,440.00 
 g) Retailing and whole 
selling 
- 1,800.00 1,440.00 
 h) Textile Merchant - 1,800.00 1,440.00 
 i) Scrap iron - 1,800.00 1,440.00 
 j) Welfare Homes - 600.00 600.00 
 k) Resort Island - 1,200.00 960.00 
 l) Petrol Pump Attendants 420.00 - - 
 m) Hotels 420.00 - - 
6. Others (Special approval) - 1,800.00 1,440.00 
7. Domestic Helper 360.00 - - 
 - First Domestic Helper - 360.00 360.00 
 - Second Domestic Helper - 540.00 540.00 
 
Source: 1992 figures from Patrick Pillai (personal correspondence) obtained from 




Table 7: Approved Nationalities and Sectors for Non-citizens on Visit Passes 
(Temporary Employment) 
 
Approved Sectors Nationals of: 
All sectors (manufacturing, 
construction, plantation, agricultural, 
and services sectors) 
 
Southeast Asia 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, 




Nepal, Pakistan, Ceylon 
 
Central Asia 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan 
 
Services (cooks, wholesale/retail, 
goldsmith, barber, 
metal/scraps/recycle, textile); 
Construction (fixing of high voltage 





Domestic workers142 Southeast Asia 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
 
South Asia  
Sri Lanka, India 
 
 
Source: Website of the Immigration Department, accessed 4 August 2010. 
 
                                                
142 However, the Ministry of Home Affairs website states that only five source 
countries are approved for the recruitment of domestic workers: Indonesia, Thailand, 
Cambodia, Philippines and Sri Lanka. It states that applications can be made to the 
Immigration Department requesting the recruitment of domestic workers from other 
countries (Ministry of Home Affairs Malaysia 2010c). 
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Employers are expected find their own workers, a process referred to as ‘direct 
recruitment’. Employers do this by travelling abroad to find workers themselves. To 
assist them, they sometimes engage recruiting agents in the countries of origin of 
foreign workers or hire a ‘consultant’ in Malaysia to facilitate the process. Employers 
are not permitted to use agents (further elaborated below). Upon finding workers, 
employers then need to apply for a PLKS for each individual foreign worker (and a 
VDR for certain nationalities), providing documents that include a copy of the 
passport of the worker, a medical report, a Certificate of Eligibility (described below), 
a bank draft for the payment of the PLKS processing fee and the visa, as well as a 
security bond (or a bank guarantee or insurance guarantee). This process is also 
referred to as the application for a ‘Calling Visa’. While the approval process should 
take 7 days (PEMUDAH 2010a), employers have complained of delays with no 
explanation provided. Sometimes, the proposed foreign worker is rejected, for 
example if his/her details are already lodged with another company, if there is non-
compliance with the terms of the PLKS, or if he/she is subject to the ‘cooling off 
period’ in between jobs (Nik Ahmad Zahazli 2005).  
 
Before coming to Malaysia, prospective foreign workers have to pass a medical 
examination in a clinic in their own country accredited by the Ministry of Health in 
Malaysia. They must also pass an Induction Course for Foreign Workers jointly 
conducted by authorized Training Centres and approved Malaysian Training 
Providers. The governments of sending countries propose Training Centres for the 
approval of the Ministry of Human Resources while the National Vocational Training 
Council (Majlis Latihan Vokasional Kebangsaan), a department under the Ministry of 
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Human Resources, appoints Malaysian Training Providers.143 The National 
Vocational Training Council or an authorized Malaysian Training Provider assesses 
prospective foreign workers after they complete the course and then issues them a 
Certificate of Eligibility. This certificate must be included in the application of the 
Calling Visa described above. 
 
Foreign workers are only allowed to enter Malaysia after the issuance of their VDR 
and PLKS. Employers are responsible for meeting foreign workers at the airport.144 
Upon arrival, foreign workers are required to undergo and pass a second medical 
examination at a clinic or health centre registered with the Foreign Workers Medical 
Examination Monitoring Agency (Fomema Sdn Bhd) within a month. Employers are 
charged a medical fee of RM180 and RM190 for male and female foreign workers 
respectively.145 After they pass the medical examination, their employers must submit 
their passports to the Immigration Office of the State they work in or to the 
                                                
143 For full details see Ministry of Human Resources Malaysia (2005). The 
requirement for the Induction Course was implemented from 1 November 2005. The 
purpose of the induction course is to: “make the [foreign workers] familiar with, 
aware of and understand the various customs, culture and social circumstances in 
Malaysia and also the rules and regulations governing or relating to the employment 
of FWs in the country”. The National Vocational Training Council is responsible for 
the overall supervision of the induction course, including monitoring and assessing 
the performance of Traning Centres and approving Malaysian Training Providers. 
There is a fee of USD10 charged for attending the Induction Course. 
144 They can do so through Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) either on the 
VDR obtained in their country of origin or, for certain countries, by obtaining a Visa 
on Arrival if they arrive on Malaysia Airlines, Air Asia, or their own national carriers. 
Foreign workers from Indonesia and Thailand can enter Malaysia through other routes 
if they obtain a visa from the Malaysian diplomatic authority in their own country 
ahead of time. Employers are able to obtain multiple entry visas for Indian nationals 
from the Malaysian representative office in India. 
145 These fees have not changed since the policy on medical screening was introduced 
in 1997. See (FOMEMA 2011) for an elaboration on the procedures for medical 
examination. 
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Immigration Headquarters in Putrajaya in order to obtain a PLKS sticker. Those who 
fail the medical examination are sent home.  
 
The PLKS is issued for three years, and can be renewed on a yearly basis for another 
two years by application to the Foreign Workers Division three months before the 
expiry of the PLKS.146 For extensions into the second and third year, foreign workers 
must undergo another Fomema-approved medical examination. For extensions 
beyond five years, foreign workers have to pass the Malaysian Skills Certificate 
(SKM) levels 1 and 2, or the Skilled Workers Certification from the National 
Vocational Training Council of the Ministry of Human Resources, or the Skills 
Proficiency Certificate or the Skilled Foreign Workers Certification from the 
Construction Industries Development Board of Malaysia. 
 
Foreign workers who are repatriated to their home countries at the end of their PLKS 
must have a Check Out Memo issued by the Foreign Workers Division. The 
application process requires a number of documents to be produced, including a 
return ticket to their country of origin. Employers are allowed to apply for 
replacements if their workers are sent back at the end of the contract period or if their 
foreign worker passed away while working in Malaysia.147 
 
The employer is responsible for reporting a foreign worker who absconds to the 
nearest Immigration Office. In such cases, the PLKS for the foreign worker is 
                                                
146 This was introduced in 2002. Before this, the PLKS could be renewed for up to 
seven years. This change was instituted to reduce labour dependence on Indonesians 
foreign workers (Pillai 2004).  
147 Applications for replacements must be submitted to the One Stop Centre at the 
Ministry of Home Affairs. The Committee on Replacement of Foreign Workers, 
which previously oversaw these applications has been dissolved. 
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cancelled. The process is an easy one – employers need to bring a letter of 
cancellation for the PLKS, a copy of his/her identity card, a copy of the deposit (or 
bank guarantee or insurance guarantee), a completed ‘Worker Absconded Report 
Form’, and a police report. Employers forfeit their security bond to the government. If 
a foreign worker is arrested, the employer must report the arrest to the Foreign 
Workers Division, so that they can verify the authenticity of the PLKS sticker and 
arrange for the person to be released. 
 
Foreign Domestic Workers 
The Immigration Department specifies eligibility conditions for foreign domestic 
workers. They are to be females148, aged between 21-45 years, certified medically fit, 
and must enter Malaysia with a VDR (Immigration Department Malaysia 2010c). 
Only certain nationalities are permitted to work in Malaysia (see Table 7). They too 
are subject to medical tests in their country of origin and at Fomema-approved 
medical facilities within a month of arrival. They are neither allowed to bring family 
members with them nor to get married while in Malaysia. 
 
Employers are only allowed one domestic worker per household, unless they apply 
for special permission. Only employers that have dependents (children or parents who 
are ill) and who meet minimum income requirements can employ foreign domestic 
workers. Those who earn at least RM3,000 nett a month are allowed to hire foreign 
domestic workers from Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, while 
those that earn more than RM5,000 nett a month are also allowed to hire foreign 
                                                
148 Applications for male domestic workers can also be made at the Immigration 
Department if employers have a child or parent that is ill and requires intensive care 
(Ministry of Home Affairs Malaysia 2010b). 
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domestic workers from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and India. Employers have to pay a 
personal bond of between RM250 to RM1,500 depending on the country of origin of 
the foreign domestic worker.  
 
Employers can either recruit foreign domestic workers directly, or go through an 
employment agency registered with the Immigration Department. To apply for the 
approval directly, employers must submit a series of documents, which include a 
number of application forms, a personal bond form, the Employment Agreement, a 
copy of the foreign domestic worker’s passport, a medical report, formal 
acknowledgement that the foreign domestic worker is a Muslim (applicable for non-
Muslim employers only), formal acknowledgement that the application was made 
individually rather than through a registered agency, proof of regular income of 
husband and wife, copies of the identity card of the husband and wife, documents 
supporting the argument for the need of the domestic worker and, for first time 
applicants, the marriage certificate of the employers (Immigration Department 
Malaysia 2010c). 
 
When the application is approved, the foreign domestic worker is sent a visa approval 
letter, which is required for a VDR application at the Malaysian embassy in her 
country of origin. With a VDR, the foreign domestic worker can enter at any 
authorized port of entry, where her employer or employment agency is expected to 
meet her. She is issued with a 30-day Special Pass, giving her employer time to get 
her medically examined and to report her presence to the Immigration Department 
that authorized her VDR. Employers are responsible for the immediate repatriation of 
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foreign domestic workers who do not pass the medical examination. They do this by 
obtaining a Check-Out Memo from the Immigration Department. 
  
Employers are expected to submit applications for the extension of the PLKS at least 
three months before expiry. In order to obtain an extension of the PLKS or to get a 
Check Out Memo, employers are required to keep payroll records showing that 
salaries are paid no later than the last week of every month and to show them to the 
Immigration Department if requested. Foreign domestic workers are required to 
undergo medical examinations at Fomema-approved medical facilities for renewals of 
the PLKS for their second and third year of employment. Applications for renewals 
include the payment for the levy, visa fee, PLKS processing fee, as well as a number 
of documents including the passport of the worker with 12 months validity. 
Employers may apply for a change or replacement of a foreign domestic worker if she 
is found to be medically unfit or failed to arrive after the issuance of the VDR. 
 
Employer Responsibilities for Foreign Workers and Foreign Domestic Workers 
The government holds that employers are “responsible and accountable for the 
behaviour and action of the foreign workers under [their] employment” (Ministry of 
Human Resources Malaysia 2008). They are responsible for providing foreign 
workers with adequate housing, health care, food and rest; for paying their workers on 
time; and for ensuring that their passes are renewed in a timely manner. In practice, 
employers keep the passports of foreign workers and foreign domestic workers, even 
though this is contrary to the Passport Act 1966. 
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Under section 60K of the Employment Act 1955, employers are to submit information 
on foreign employees to the Director General of Labour (i.e. the Labour Department) 
within 14 days of their employment (Article 60K(1)) and are required to maintain a 
register of all employees (Article 61(1)). They are not allowed to discriminate against 
a foreign employee in relation to a local employee and vice versa in relation to the 
terms and conditions of employment. The Director General of Labour may inquire 
into any such complaint and issue directives to resolve the matter (Article 60L(1)). 
Employers are also required to ensure that their foreign workers are insured with one 
of 25 insurance companies appointed to the panel of the Foreign Workers 
Compensation Insurance Scheme (Skim Pampasan Pekerja Asing, SPPA). 
 
The Immigration Department also sets guidelines for the treatment of foreign 
domestic workers. It specifies that employers can only assign them with housework, 
which excludes car washing. Employers must provide them with basic facilities, 
nutritious food, and adequate rest, as well as respect their religious beliefs as a 
Muslim. This means that the worker must be allowed to pray five times a day, fast 
during Ramadan, and not be asked to do chores “contrary to the religion of Islam” 
(Immigration Department Malaysia 2010c) – which commonly refers to handling 
pork and taking care of dogs. Employers are also to ensure that their workers do not 
marry, do not apply for permanent residency, and do not change employers without 
the permission of the Immigration Department while they are in Malaysia. They are 
responsible for the medical treatment of the worker. The Immigration Department 
warns: “the employer is responsible for the behaviour and discipline of the foreign 




Employers are responsible for making a report to the Immigration Department if their 
foreign domestic worker dies, goes missing, or runs away. If a worker runs away, the 
employer is to submit a letter of application to cancel the PLKS, a copy of the identity 
card of the employer or his/her representative, the original passport of the worker who 
fled, the Report of a Runaway Worker (Borang Laporan Pekerja Asing Melarikan 
Diri dari Majikan) issued by the Immigration Department, and a certified copy of the 
Police Report. Foreign domestic workers who run away are blacklisted, and 
employers are required to pay the personal bond. Employers who fail to comply with 
the conditions set by the Immigration Department are blacklisted and not permitted to 
employ foreign domestic workers in the future. If an employer is found to have 
abused a foreign domestic worker, the Immigration Department has the power to 
transfer the worker to another employer on humanitarian grounds without the consent 
of the original employer. 
 
Employment Agencies for Domestic Workers 
Private employment agencies that recruit and place foreign domestic workers in 
Malaysia must be licenced under the Private Employment Agency Act 1981. They 
can only operate with the approval of the Immigration Department. On average, 
employers pay the agencies a placement fee of between RM8,000–RM9,000 for each 
foreign domestic worker, which is then divided between the Malaysian agency and 
recruitment agencies in countries of origin. The private employment agencies provide 
a range of services, including submitting applications to the Immigration Department, 
receiving foreign domestic workers at airports, arranging for substitutes if the foreign 
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domestic workers are unsuitable, and repatriating workers if they fail medical 
examinations or their contracts expire.  
 
The Malaysian Association of Foreign Maid Agencies (Persatuan Agensi Pembantu 
Rumah Asing Malaysia, PAPA) represents its members in lobbying the government 
for policy changes concerning the recruitment and placement of foreign domestic 
workers. Some of the responsibilities of private employment agencies are outlined in 
greater detail in bilateral agreements with the governments of sending countries.149 
 
Outsourcing Companies for Foreign Workers 
The Malaysian government introduced the outsourcing system in 2006 to supplement 
the direct recruitment system for foreign workers outlined above. In this system, 
outsourcing companies are authorized to recruit, manage and house foreign workers, 
and to deploy them to different employers (referred to as ‘principals’) within the same 
sector. They act as ‘middle men’, managing foreign labour. They are listed as the 
‘employer’ on the passes of foreign workers. Only those with outsourcing licences are 
allowed to engage in this work, and there are conditions attached to their licences. As 
of May 2011, there are 241 licenced outsourcing companies (Ministry of Home 
Affairs Malaysia 2011c). 
 
                                                
149 See for example the 2006 bilateral agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia 
concerning the conveyance and recruitment of Indonesian foreign domestic workers 





sG-juY9lhw&sig2=RgsDHAkouOHSM_1qDXvU1A accessed 16 May 2011. More 
recent discussions to finalise another bilateral agreement have stalled, but media 
reports indicate that it will be signed by the end of May 2011. 
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Principals requiring less than 50 foreign workers are allowed to source them from 
outsourcing companies. Principals pay between RM48-RM60 a day for each worker 
and bear the costs of the foreign levy.150 Outsourcing companies take a fee from the 
total amount received from principals, and are responsible for paying their workers as 
well as providing food and accommodation. When the principal no longer needs their 
labour, the outsourcing company moves the workers to another principal. Outsourcing 
companies and principals cannot breach the maximum limit of one foreign worker to 
every local worker employed. 
 
The outsourcing system allows employers, as principals, greater flexibility in meeting 
their labour needs. They are able to gain additional workers during short periods of 
increased production, without having to keep them on during periods of lower 
productivity. As Ms. Chan, a human resource manager at a Japanese manufacturing 
company tells me, “Recruiting directly takes a long time. It can take 3-6 months. In 
the meantime, the company can go into recession – half a year ago, you needed 
people, half a year later, the situation changes…. Outsourcing allows employers to be 
flexible”.151 Using direct recruitment, Ms. Chan estimates that it takes between 3-6 
months to have a worker in place from the time that the application is first submitted. 
 
According to Mr. Lim, running an outsourcing company is not easy. He describes the 
difficulties he faced in managing foreign workers he brought in from Bangladesh.  
The workers don’t listen to you; they listen to their ‘uncle’ [their own leader 
within the group]. Sometimes, you send them to a worksite, and then they just 
leave and go to another job. Their ‘uncle’ takes them, and they just follow. If I 
                                                
150 Ms. Chan (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 9 February. 
151 Ms. Chan (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 9 February. 
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report to Immigration that they are missing, I have to pay RM600 per worker. 
So I just make a police report to say that they ran away…. I brought them in 
legally, I didn’t break the law, but I become the victim of a scam. When 
something goes wrong, the police don’t intervene. The ‘uncle’ sees that it can 
be done [with no consequence] and repeats it.152 
 
However, there are many more reports of outsourcing companies committing abuses 
against their foreign workers. Some outsourcing companies have demanded that 
principals hire their workers for a minimum number of years, thus removing the 
flexibilities in the system. Some have made excessive profits while paying their 
workers very poor wages. Some have only paid them for the number of days they 
worked, leaving them uncompensated for the days they were not deployed to 
principals, even though it is the responsibility of the company to find them work and 
the company has an obligation to pay each worker a minimum of RM400 a month.  
 
In April 2007 Tenaganita conducted a fact-finding mission amongst Bangladeshi 
migrant workers brought in by outsourcing companies. They found them living in 
fear, jobless, without income, starving, and living in extremely poor housing 
conditions (Tenaganita 2007). The workers were afraid that if they complained, their 
outsourcing company would punish them and get them arrested and deported. They 
were also afraid that they would not be able to recoup the money they paid to 
recruitment agents for their jobs (often obtained through selling assets and taking 
loans with steep interest), which ranged from RM7,000 to RM12,000. They alleged 
that the Bangladeshi Embassy in Malaysia colluded with recruitment agents and 
                                                
152 Mr. Lim (name changed). 2010. Interview by author. 10 February. 
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outsourcing companies to continue the deployment of workers despite reports of 
abuse. There have also been many other reports of foreign workers left stranded in 
plantations and airports. Desperate to recoup their losses and to pay off debts, they 
worked illegally in Malaysia (N. Benjamin 2010).  
 
In response to reports of abuse, the government has blacklisted a number of 
outsourcing companies and forfeited their bank guarantees (amounting to RM500 per 
worker). However, employers and civil society groups alike have called for the total 
dissolution of the system. Employers object, in particular, to indiscriminate 
recruitment by outsourcing companies, creating an oversupply of workers (Mustafa 
2009). Tenaganita and other civil society groups point out that the outsourcing system 
leads to labour trafficking, as recruitment agencies in countries of origin promise a set 
of work conditions that cannot be guaranteed or fulfilled by outsourcing companies. 
In spite of vehement protests, the outsourcing system is still in place. 
 
The ‘Absence’ of Agents  
Aside from outsourcing companies (and employment agencies for domestic workers), 
the government does not permit agents to be involved in the recruitment and 
placement of foreign workers. The Immigration Department website clearly states that 
“…[using authorized agents] is an offense and is liable to legal action under the 
provisions of the Immigration Act and the regulations of Malaysia” (Immigration 
Department Malaysia 2010a). Articles written by government officials outlining 
procedures for the recruitment of foreign workers clearly state that employers must 
submit these applications themselves and that applications by middlemen or agents 
are not allowed (Nik Ahmad Zahazli 2005; Zarina 2005). 
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government doesn’t recognize agents. They see them as crooks. This is why 
employers have to do ‘direct recruitment’”.153  
 
However, in practice, many employers find it difficult to find workers and to process 
all the necessary paperwork without the help of agents. Thus, they hire them as 
‘consultants’. These ‘consultants’ are able to facilitate faster and smoother processing 
of paperwork through the cultivation of ‘special relationships’ with Immigration 
officers and the payment of bribes (see also Azizan 2008). As Mr. Lim states, 
cynically, “There are no formal agent systems. Immigration officers will ‘chase’ 
suspected agents out [of the immigration office] – except when new deals are made. 
Then they become good friends”.154 
 
Agents are also able to source for willing foreign workers, saving employers the cost 
and time involved in travelling abroad to look for workers themselves. Agents often 
work in partnership with their counterparts in the countries of origin of foreign 
workers. Foreign workers often go through a ‘chain’ of agents, starting with local 
recruiters in their villages, who pass them onto recruiters in larger towns or cities, 
who then facilitate their entry into Malaysia in partnership with Malaysian agents 
(Lindquist 2010; Spaan, Naerssen, and Kohl 2002).   
 
Because agents for foreign workers are not officially recognized, there isn’t a clear 
regulatory framework in place that specifies their roles, responsibilities and 
obligations. Joachim Xavier, a case manager who has provided legal aid to numerous 
foreign workers, highlights this problem, stating that it is compounded by cronyism.  
                                                
153 Mr. Lim (name changed). 2010. Interview by author. 10 February. 
154 Mr. Lim (name changed). 2010. Interview by author. 10 February. 
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The Malaysian government does not want to define them [legally] and 
legislate their activities. We need to accept that they provide a necessary 
service, but how can we regulate [their activities]? How do we place 
obligations on agents? There is a conflict of interest. Agents are well 
connected politically, and this allows them to ‘run free’. How do we enforce 
obligations upon them? This can only be done if you have regulations about 
agents’ obligations.155 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IMMIGRATION CONTROL REGIME 
The system of immigration passes is the main mechanism by which the Malaysian 
government operationalises its policy changes concerning foreign labour. When the 
government wants to reduce the number of migrant workers in Malaysia, it restricts 
approvals for applications for foreign workers, refuses to renew passes, and shortens 
the length of time that migrant workers can work on existing passes. Conversely, 
when there are labour shortages, the government approves more applications and 
allows migrant workers to work in Malaysia for longer periods of time.  
 
The system of immigration passes is also the main biopolitical instrument by which 
the government regulates the size and the health of the migrant worker population. 
The government pays close attention, in particular, to the health of foreign workers 
and foreign domestic workers. It introduced mandatory health screening specifically 
to “(d)etect communicable diseases among foreign workers [and to] (r)educe the 
burden on public healthcare facilities due to foreign workers with chronic conditions 
requiring prolonged and extensive treatment” (Pantai FOMEMA 2011). 
                                                
155 Xavier, Joachim. 2010. Interview by author, 4 March. 
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Thirdly, the system of immigration passes is a significant source of revenue for the 
federal government. Since it introduced the foreign levy system in 1992, the amount 
of foreign levies collected has risen steadily, from just under RM41 million in 1992 to 
RM2.13 billion in 2007 (see Table 8). Revenues from visa fees alone rose from 26.7 
million in 1995 to 109.4 million in 2003. Over an 11-month period in 2007, the 
Immigration Department collected RM7,517,101 in compound fines for immigration 
offences (Ishak 2007).  
 
 


















Note: * The figure for 1994 is up to 10 November only. 
Source: 1992-1994 figures from Patrick Pillai (personal correspondence) obtained 
from Immigration Department, Malaysia. 1995-2003 figures obtained from Ministry 
of Finance Malaysia (2004). 2007 figure obtained from Dewan Rakyat (2008).156  
 
 
Fourthly, the system of immigration passes is a mechanism for organizing and 
distributing economic resources, both formally and informally. Those who manage 
the system have access to power and resources that they can use as political and 
                                                
156 Pillai (1999) records that RM430 million (USD134.8 million) was collected in 
1996. 
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economic capital. Each official approval in the process of hiring migrant workers – 
from training certificates, to calling visas, to immigration passes, to visas for travel, to 
medical examinations – involves the payment of fees. Those who manage the system 
make decisions on which companies obtain licences and official authorization to 
conduct activities that are mandatory in the process. A clear example is the control 
over the issuance of outsourcing licences, which is decided by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. According to Mr. Lim, outsourcing licences are awarded to those with good 
connections to those in power in the Ministry.157 These companies, in turn, engage in 
rent seeking, allowing other businessmen to use their licences to bring in foreign 
workers while taking a cut of the profits.158  
 
Another example is control over the mandatory health screening of foreign workers 
and foreign domestic workers. In 1997, Fomema Sdn Bhd was given a fifteen-year 
concession to supervise and monitor this programme. One of the owners of Fomema 
Sdn Bhd, Pantai Fomema & Systems Sdn Bhd, runs this health screening system.159 
This monopoly, which will end in 2012, guarantees yearly profits and cash flow. 
Pantai Fomema charges RM25 in service fees and RM5 to issue a certificate of fitness 
                                                
157 Mr. Lim (name changed). 2010. Interview by author. 10 February. 
158 One example of a business model is Andaraya Malaysia Sdn Bhd, a licenced 
outsourcing company that trains Malaysians to work as their ‘coordinators’. These 
coordinators use Andaraya’s licence to recruit and place foreign workers with 
principals. They earn a commission for every paid day of work of a foreign worker 
(Andaraya 2011). 
159 75 percent of Fomema Sdn Bhd is owned by Pantai Fomema & Systems Sdn Bhd 
and 25 percent is owened by Koperasi Doktor Malaysia Berhad (KDMB). Pantai 
Fomema has been granted a court order to buy out KDMB, but this is under appeal. 
Pantai Fomema is owned by Pantai Holdings Bhd (PHB), which is owned by Pantai 
Irama Ventures Sdn Bhd, which is jointly owned by Khazanah Nasional Bhd (60 
percent) and Singapore’s Parkway Holdings Ltd (40 percent). Khazanah is the 
investment holding arm of the Malaysian government. At point of writing, Khazanah 
is negotiating to take over Parkway with the expected cost of RM3.5 billion (USD1.1 
billion) (Reuters 2010).  
 179 
for every foreign worker processed. Pantai Fomema conducts these medical 
examinations through a panel of clinics, laboratories and X-ray facilities. In 2007, it 
screened 1,361,781 foreign workers and in 2009, it screened 1,021,542 foreign 
workers (Ministry of Health Malaysia 2008).160 In the financial year ending 31 
December 2008, Pantai Fomema made a net profit of RM41.58 million from 
RM235.87 million in revenue (Tee 2010). However, there have been a number of 
allegations of fraud and cheating, with test results falsified and laboratories claiming 
to be underpaid (Sakran 2004). Suspicions have also been raised about how the 
clinics, laboratories and X-ray facilities are chosen to be part of the Pantai Fomema 
panel.  
 
The decision-making power held by officials, coupled with the lack of transparency in 
process, creates conditions for corruption. One of the most high profile cases in 2008 
involved the arrest of the head of the Immigration Department, Director General 
Datuk Wahid Mohd Don, together with six other officials by the Malaysian Anti-
Corruption Commission (MACC). Datuk Wahid was accused of receiving RM60,000 
of a RM1.2 million payment to expedite the approval of passes of 4,337 Bangladeshi 
workers (Borneo Post Online 2010; Lourdes 2008).161 Immigration officers have also 
been arrested and convicted for receiving bribes for a variety of reasons, including 
allowing irregular entry into Malaysia (Siti Nursuraya 2010) and extending social 
visit passes (Mageswari 2010). The Selangor branch of the MACC estimates that 
between 1,000-1,500 migrants enter Malaysia through irregular routes, with around 
35 percent of them giving bribes of between RM70-100 to avoid going through proper 
                                                
160 In 2008, Fomema found 3.05 percent of foreign workers tested to be unsuitable for 
work; in 2009, it found 2.84 percent unsuitable for work. 
161 The Session Court acquitted Datuk Wahid in October 2010; however, the MACC 
is appealing this decision (Bernama 2010a). 
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immigration procedures (Bernama 2011a). MACC arrested eleven Immigration 
officers in 2010, with RM231,608.36 in cash and saving accounts, as well as assets 
worth RM117,400.  
 
The two ministries with the greatest decision-making power over the immigration 
control system are the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is always headed by UMNO, 
and the Ministry of Human Resources, which is either headed by MCA or MIC. There 
have been a number of ‘turf wars’ between these ministries about the overall 
management of migrant workers (Pillai 2004). This was particularly evident in 2007, 
when the Ministry of Home Affairs proposed a Foreign Workers Bill that would 
extend its role from the issuance of passes and the monitoring of the payment of 
levies and insurances to the overall supervision of foreign workers, including their 
induction, training, salaries and accommodation. In the words of (then) Home 
Minister Datuk Seri Radzi Sheikh Ahmad, the Bill would “allow the ministry to 
control foreign workers from the day they entered the country until the day they 
leave” (Bernama 2007a). It was framed as an effort to “cut down on red tape” (Ritikos 
2007) and to streamline rules and regulations governing foreign workers in order to 
reduce the difficulty of enforcement by different ministries (Megan and Azura 2007).  
 
This Bill would reduce the role of the Human Resources Ministry even further. 
Protesting this initiative publicly, (then) Human Resource Minister Datuk Seri Dr 
Fong Chan Onn stated that a new Act was not necessary as there were already 
sufficient labour laws to govern local and foreign workers – 22 in total. He also 
pointed out that Cabinet had stated that his ministry would handle all workers, both 
local and foreign, as well as their work-related problems (Cruez 2007). The Home 
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Minister Radzi, in turn, responded “we are not taking away power from anyone. We 
are reducing red tape as directed by the Prime Minister”.  
 
The system of immigration passes does not protect sufficiently the legal status of 
authorized migrant workers. Employers are responsible for the renewal of passes for 
work; migrant workers are unable to do this themselves. Delays in renewal – due to 
errant employers (or their agents) or slow immigration processing – as well as the 
cancellation of passes by malicious employers when workers raise complaints, cause 
migrant workers to lose their legal status while remaining in Malaysia. Avenues for 
redress are limited and migrant workers are often left in a quandary, working without 
documents until they save up enough money to return home. 
 
There have been many ad-hoc changes in immigration policies. Some of these 
changes have jeopardised the legal status of migrant workers, in effect causing them 
to become ‘illegal’. In October 2001, for example, Parliament shortened the 
maximum length of validity of the PLKS from six years to three years, thus changing 
the status of many migrants to ‘illegal’ overnight (Liow 2003). Those who served 
more than three years were to be repatriated with three months’ notice. The unfairness 
of this decision sparked riots in two detention centres.  
 
Finally, aside for the highly skilled, the system of immigration passes is clearly 
designed for temporary labour migration with no prospects for naturalisation.162 
Naturalisation is only possible after a non-citizen obtains permanent residency status 
                                                
162 Expatriates may qualify for permanent resident status as a high net worth 
individual, an expert, a professional, a spouse of a Malaysian citizen or through the 
points-based system (Immigration Department Malaysia 2010b). 
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(that is, by holding an Entry Permit) and meets the requirements for naturalization, 
which include residency in Malaysia for ten out of twelve years preceding an 
application. Migrant workers, issued temporary passes, are expected to work in 
Malaysia for a time and then to return home. There are no integration programmes to 
assist them to stay in Malaysia for the long term, no provisions for family 
reunification and no prospects for permanent residence. Marriage and pregnancy with 
Malaysian citizens – practices indicating integration – are a breach of the conditions 
of passes for work and are grounds for immediate deportation. 
 
The Perspectives of Employers 
Contrary to popular belief, the employment of foreign workers does not necessarily 
represent cost savings for employers. According to the Employment Act, foreign 
workers cannot be discriminated against in relation to a local employee with respect 
to the terms and conditions of employment (Section 60L). In addition to the basic 
salaries of foreign workers (which can range between RM480 in the construction 
sector to RM750 in the manufacturing sector) and overtime pay, employers can incur 
around RM3,800 in recurring costs per worker per year for accommodation, transport, 
visa fees, levies, insurance and medical treatment (M.Vivekanandan 2008).163 Also, 
some employers bear the cost of airfare for foreign workers from their country of 
origin.  
 
                                                
163 The writer provides the following cost breakdown: Annual medical check at 
RM190 (USD60), accommodation including bills at RM1200 (USD376), transport at 
RM552 (USD173), PLKS at RM60 (USD19), Levy at RM1200 (USD376), multiple 
entry visa at RM15 (USD5), processing fee at RM50 (USD16), bank guarantee at 
RM250 (USD78), Foreign Worker’s Compensation Scheme at RM96 (USD30), 
medical fees at RM150 USD47) and other costs at RM50 (USD16). For the plantation 
sector, the levy is RM360 (USD113) and the processing fee RM10 (USD3), so their 
recurring costs are cheaper.  
 183 
For Ms. Chan, the human resource manager mentioned earlier, there is a significant 
advantage in hiring foreign workers – their reliability. “Locals don’t want to do the 
job”, she says, speaking from her experiences in the manufacturing industry.  
They come in one day, they don’t come in another day. They are choosy. 
Their mindset is not right. They just don’t show up. They have lots of excuses 
– such as their motorcycle broke down. When you ask them to do overtime, 
they complain. But foreign workers want to do overtime. They don’t complain  
that they are tired. They are willing to work on public holidays, on Sundays. 
You don’t need to beg and plead with them, like with locals. They want to 
work overtime to pay off their loans…. With a local workforce, on a daily 
basis, about 10 percent will not be working. They will be absent. Foreign 
workers are more stable as a workforce. They rarely don’t show up for work. 
There is less [of a] problem with absenteeism.164 
 
However, employers face several challenges in hiring foreign workers. For many, the 
numerous changes in immigration regulations are a source of discontent. According to 
Tuan Haji Shamsuddin Bardan, Executive Director of the Malaysian Employers 
Federation,  
The policies are ad hoc, depending on the situation. Things change often. As 
an employer, you get to know of them through the media. The most frustrating 
thing is their immediate effect – today you can do something, tomorrow you 
can’t. The changes shouldn’t be so frequent; we should have long-term 
policies.165 
 
                                                
164 Ms. Chan (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 9 February. 
165 Bardan, Shamsuddin. 2010. Interview by author, 8 March. 
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Tuan Haji Shamsuddin also finds the system of regulation overly complex, with too 
many government bodies struggling to protect their own interests.  
There are too many players. For manufacturing, employers have to deal with 
MITI [the Ministry of International Trade and Industry], for agriculture, you 
have the Agriculture Ministry, with timber, you have the Forestry Ministry. 
Then you have the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of 
Human Resources; all are involved. With this multi-ministry, multi-agency 
involvement, it is not really efficient. Each ministry looks into their own 
sectoral interests. The so-called ‘national policy’ is fragmented. The Ministry 
of Home Affairs has the final say, but there are a lot of grey areas. There are 
too many players, and people are groping around in the dark. It is not easy to 
deal with. 
 
The system of multiple approvals in the system places employers in subordinate 
position to various authorities. Employers have voiced frustrations about the arbitrary 
nature of the decision-making process, the delays and the lack of transparency in the 
processing of applications. In some cases, approvals are given for only 10-20 percent 
of the total number of foreign workers requested.166 Mr. Lim, an outsourcing agent, 
stated, “Employers get fed up because files get lost. They are told several months later 
that certain documents are missing. They also have to be prepared to wait for a long 
time when submitting their applications. Sometimes it takes a whole day.”167  
 
                                                
166 This statistic was quoted in a dialogue between contractors and developers on the 
banning of the recruitment of Indonesian workers recorded in 2002 (The Edge 
Malaysia 2002). 
167 Mr. Lim (name changed). 2010. Interview by author. 10 February. 
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Employers also struggle to manage their workforce. Mr. Lim, who also employs 
foreign workers for other businesses, cites running away as one of the top problems 
faced by employers. 
The worst is dealing with defiant workers, and the runaway rate is very high. 
The employees abuse the employer! They don’t want to work. If you push 
them, they run. They get jobs through the informal market. If they get arrested, 
they just pay off the police. Their (new) employers also pay off the police – 
RM50 a month. But this is so much cheaper than paying the foreign levy. 
 
According to Mr. Lim, employers take a number of measures to address these 
problems. One is to engage in ‘labour hoarding’. “Employers sometimes ask for more 
workers than are necessary in order to ensure that at least some of them are 
sufficiently productive to meet the deliverables”. Another is to take harsh measures to 
control their workers. 
If employers have had a negative experience in the past, they will take 
measures to protect their interests with the next batch of workers. They will 
hire gangsters, beat them, and so on… The runaways are what cause 
employers to keep their passports, and not allow them a day off… allowing 
them to go out, or to have freedom, is seen as a problem. 
 
He explains, “employers are desperate when they have the letter of credit and the 
materials lie unused. They don’t have the workers to work, and time is ticking. When 
the workers don’t produce, you lose millions because you cannot deliver the goods.” 
Nevertheless, in his opinion, there are relatively few employers who resort to such 
punitive measures. “Up to 90 percent are good employers”, he says. For him, the 
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solution lies in having the police deal more strictly with runaway workers, and in 
addressing corruption amongst the police so that errant workers and employers do not 
easily buy them off.  
 
THE PERSPECTIVES OF AUTHORISED MIGRANT WORKERS 
While employers have clear responsibilities to look after the welfare of foreign 
workers while they are in Malaysia, in practice, the mechanisms for ensuring 
compliance is weak. As a result, many foreign workers live in abject conditions – in 
dirty, dilapidated housing, with overcrowding, poor sanitation, as well as insufficient 
water and electricity.168 Aziz, an Indonesian foreign worker, describes some of the 
challenges faced by the foreign workers in his manufacturing company. 
The boss promised free food and lodging but didn’t give enough food. We got 
some food rations but they ran out. We had to sell the gas [canister] to buy 
food. The boss got very angry. We work 12-15 hours a day… Some workers 
ran away because the work conditions were too difficult…. Sometimes the 
sleeping conditions are very congested… Sometimes, there is not enough 
water; there aren’t enough bathrooms and toilets.... There are gangsters. There 
is no security.169  
 
Those who cannot bear these conditions run away, seeking work in the informal 
labour market. While there are greater risks working illegally, the pay can be much 
better. At one construction site, documented foreign workers earned RM18.50 a day 
                                                
168 While conducting research for this thesis, I visited a number of housing sites for 
construction workers and factory workers and found this to be the case. Poor housing 
conditions have also been reported by Amnesty International (2010) and Tenaganita 
(2007) 
169 Aziz (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 23 February. 
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while an irregular worker doing the same work earned RM30-35 depending on his/her 
area of expertise.170 
 
Foreign workers find it difficult to afford the high fees for medical treatment in 
Malaysia. Duong, a Vietnamese foreign worker in a factory, was taken to hospital 
with severe stomach pains after several years of working in Malaysia. He had to 
undergo an operation, which he had to pay for himself. He ended up paying almost 
RM4,000 for the medical fees, about 5 months of salary. “I had to ask my parents to 
send me some money because I didn’t have enough. I also had to ask my boss for an 
advance and borrowed money from my co-workers.”171 Duong had intended to return 
home at the end of his contract, but now hopes to extend his stay to recuperate the 
cost of his medical fees. 
 
Foreign workers are often unsure about the status of their passes, as renewal 
procedures are handled either by their employers or outsourcing agents. SuSu, a 
Burmese foreign worker brought into Malaysia by an outsourcing company, works 
12-hour days as a cashier at a major department store in Bangsar, Kuala Lumpur. The 
work is exhausting, she says, and she has to stand all the time. When we met, she 
expressed concerns about the way her passport and immigration pass had been 
handled. “A few months ago,” she says, “the agent submitted our passports to the 
Immigration Department to renew our pass. But the Immigration took a long time. 
Then they told us that they had misplaced our passports! We were so worried! But 
after a few weeks, they returned the passports to us”.172   
                                                
170 Maung (name changed). 2008. Interview by author, 18 March. 
171 Duong (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 7 December. 
172 SuSu (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 7 December. 
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Migrant workers also find the system very restrictive. While expatriates can apply for 
a change of jobs after a ‘cooling off’ period, it is practically impossible for foreign 
workers to request for transfers to another employer if they are unhappy with their 
work or living conditions.173 Aside from those employed through the outsourcing 
system, foreign workers are only allowed to work for the employer named on their 
pass and at the exact location of work specified in their pass.174 As stated earlier, 
those who expressed dissatisfaction with their work conditions are in danger of 
having their pass cancelled by their employer, which renders them without legal status 
and vulnerable to arrest and punishment for immigration offences. Some employers 
and agents use this as a way of threatening their workers to keep them compliant. 
 
Foreign workers often pay large amounts of money in advance to recruitment agents 
in order to secure a job in Malaysia – money often obtained through selling assets and 
borrowing against heavy interest.175 It can take a worker between 6 months to 2 years 
of work just to pay off their debts.176 Some foreign workers stay beyond the time 
                                                
173 One notable exception, however, was the case of Rajakannu Boopathy & 39 
Others before the Kuala Lumpur High Court, in which the court ordered the Director 
General of Immigration and the Immigration Department of Malaysia to allow the 
foreign workers involved in the case to live and work in Malaysia with another 
employer (or on their own) in order to pursue their rights under Malaysian labour 
laws. The Respondents conceded and a consent judgment was recorded to allow them 
to work for another company (Hector 2006). However, the court did not provide a 
written judgment, which makes it difficult to use this as a precedent in other cases.  
174 Those who work for the same employer but in a different location as that stated in 
the work permit are guilty of an immigration offence, even if their employer places 
them there. 
175 Recruitment fees paid by foreign workers to agents range from RM8,000-
RM12,000 (USD2,510-3,760) for Bangladeshis, RM4,000-RM6,000 (USD1,250-
1,880) for Nepalis (Sandanasamy, Florida. 2010. Interview by author, 6 February.) 
176 Sandanasamy, Florida. 2010. Interview by author, 6 February. Dannecker (2009) 
noted that it took Bangladeshi migrant workers an average of 2 years to pay back their 
recruitment costs. 
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allowed on their passes in order to remit more money home, as false information from 
agents and brokers had led them to believe that they could remit more before they 
embarked on their journeys (Ishida and Shahid Hassan 2000). Because of this, many 
would rather tolerate their difficult working and living conditions than take legal 
action against their employers, for fear of losing their jobs.  
 
Foreign domestic workers from Indonesia, however, do not pay fees before coming to 
Malaysia. Instead, they sign contracts stating that they owe their agents money and 
pay these debts once they start working in Malaysia. They earn between RM360 to 
RM600 per month; on average, it takes 6-8 months of work for them to repay their 
debt.177 The debt itself averages RM3,300 to RM3,500 per person for each placement 
with an employer. 
 
Foreign workers are more vulnerable in the outsourcing system, as they are required 
to work wherever their outsourcing agent sends them and do not have the power to 
protest. Lydia, a female foreign worker from Burma who did clerical work for an 
outsourcing company, recognized both the difficulties faced by outsourcing 
companies as well as the poor work and living conditions suffered by foreign 
workers, which caused them to run away. 
Outsourcing agents also don’t make much money. The employer [principal] 
pays the agent RM1,050 per worker. The agent deducts RM250 per month per 
person and gives the worker RM800 for 26 days of work. But from this 
amount, they deduct RM100 for ‘agents fees’. So in the end, they only give 
[the workers] RM700…. The workers also cannot extend the visa themselves, 
                                                
177 Ong, Alex. 2010. Interview by author, 7 February. 
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but they need to pay for the extension. The boss cuts the money from their 
salary. Because of this some workers cannot send money back to their 
families… 
The workers run away because of the difficult work conditions. The boss gets 
angry when the workers run away. He signs an agreement with the employer 
[the principal]. If the workers run away, he has to pay the security bond. He 
also has to fulfil the agreement [to the principal], so he gets fined.178 
 
CASE LAW ON AUTHORISED MIGRANT WORKERS 
In spite of the fact that migrant workers have been a part of Malaysian society for 
decades, there are very few written judgments about their position in Malaysian 
society. This is most likely due to the immense difficulties migrant workers face in 
pursuing redress through the legal system (described in Chapter 3). Interviews with 
lawyers and case managers in NGOs suggest that most cases end with migrant 
workers giving up, or employers negotiating a settlement. However, when cases have 
been heard and adjudicated by the courts, the judgments have been favourable to 
migrant workers in terms of protecting their rights, as the following cases 
demonstrate. 
 
Employers are legally responsible for ensuring that they comply with the rules and 
procedures for the recruitment of foreign workers. In Public Prosecutor v. Wong 
Haur Wei [2008] 7 CLJ 200, the High Court Judge found that the lack of knowledge 
of rules and procedures in the employment of foreign workers was a mistake of law, 
not a mistake of fact. In that case, the accused, an employer, claimed that an agent 
                                                
178 Lydia (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 22 February. 
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cheated him into believing that the three foreign workers in his employment had valid 
work passes. He was not allowed to use Section 79 of the Penal Code as a defense, 
which states: “Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by 
law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in 
good faith believes himself to be justified by law in doing it”. The Judge held that the 
magistrate who heard the case before him erred, and sentenced the employer to a fine 
of RM10,000 for each foreign worker employed. 
 
Is an employer liable when the recruitment agent whose services they commission 
dupe foreign workers into coming to Malaysia with false promises about their 
salaries, even if this occurred without the knowledge of the employer? This was the 
matter contemplated by the High Court in Sampath Kumar Vellingiri & 78 ors v. Chin 
Well Fasteners Co. Sdn Bhd [2003] 1 LNS 260. In this case, 52 Indian nationals 
became employees of the defendant on the promise by an agent in India that they 
would receive pay amounting to RM750 a month and that the fees they paid in 
advance to secure their jobs would cover the payment for the foreign levy over three 
years of their contract.179 Upon arrival in Malaysia, they paid either USD950 or 
USD1,000 to a Malaysian recruitment consultant hired by the defendant, ostensibly as 
payment for their foreign levies. However, after working for about a month, the 
plaintiffs found out that they would only be paid RM350 a month, from which foreign 
levies would be deducted. The defendant claimed not to know what the agent in India 
had promised them. After complaining to the Indian High Commission, the workers 
were instructed to sign another contract with a basic salary of RM350. They refused 
to sign and were not allowed back to work. They were then told that they would be 
                                                
179 The civil claim was filed 79 workers on 22 October 2002 but 27 plaintiffs decided 
not to pursue the claim (Chin Well Holdings Berhad 2008:13). 
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deported back to India.  
 
Through the proceedings of the court, it became clear that the Managing Director of 
the defendant had signed a Contract of Employment stating, inter alia, that each 
employee would be paid RM600 a month. This contract was submitted along with 
other documents to the Indian government to obtain their approval for the recruitment 
and placement of the workers. The Managing Director testified that he was not aware 
of the recruitment procedures and was under the impression that the contract he 
signed was only for attestation purposes, to secure visas, and that the amount stated 
would not be the actual monthly salary of the workers. It arose that the defendant had 
clearly stated the actual terms of employment to the Malaysian recruitment consultant 
who then liaised with the agent in India on their behalf. The recruitment consultant 
and the agent in India then communicated different terms to the Indian government 
and to the workers.  
 
The learned judge decided that although the plaintiffs had not signed the Contract of 
Employment lodged with the Indian government, the fact that they came on the 
representation made by the defendant’s agent as well as the fact that the Managing 
Director of the defendant had signed the Contract of Employment submitted to the 
Indian government, were sufficient grounds to hold that a contract existed between 
the plaintiffs and the defendant for the equivalent of the pay of RM750 a month plus 
overtime and all the other benefits stated in the contract. The plaintiffs were also 
entitled to the levies they had paid upon arrival in Malaysia, to airfares to and from 
Malaysia and the costs of the suit. The Court of Appeal upheld these findings (see 
Chin Well Fasteners Co Sdn Bhd v. Sampath Kumar Vellingiri & Anor 
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394), and the Federal Court rejected a further application for appeal. In September 
2008, the plaintiffs agreed to a settlement sum of RM1,360,000 (Chin Well Holdings 
Berhad 2008:13). 
 
Are foreign workers covered under the terms of a collective agreement even when 
they were not members of the trade union at the time that the collective agreement 
was made? This was a matter contemplated by the Industrial Court in Chong Wah 
Plastics Sdn Bhd & Ors vs. Idris Ali & Ors [2001] 1 ILR 598.180 In this case, 127 
foreign workers filed a complaint of non-compliance against three companies for not 
complying with the terms of the collective agreements between these companies and 
the National Union of Petroleum and Chemical Industry Workers given cognizance 
by the court. Specifically, they were not given meal allowances and paid for overtime 
work done on some public holidays, were not granted sufficient days of paid annual 
leave, were not given revised rates for shift allowances, were not paid increments 
upon confirmation, were not paid the full amount of annual increments, and, for some 
complainants, were not paid attendance/transport incentives.  
 
In response, the companies stated that their allegations were not specific enough and 
required interpretation of the collective agreements. The companies also listed the 
facilities provided to the foreign workers that local employees did not enjoy, 
including free water, electricity, transport to the place of work, and free air tickets for 
those who worked a full six years. They argued that if the Court allowed the claims, 
the complainants would be entitled to more benefits than local employees who were 
also members of the union. During the hearing, the companies conceded that they had 
                                                
180 Award No. 140 of 2001 (Case No: 1/1-776/99). 
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not complied with all the provisions of the collective agreements. Their reasons were, 
firstly, that there were no provisions in the collective agreements for foreign workers 
and that the union had only negotiated those terms for local workers; secondly, that 
the foreign workers were not as good as the local workers and had lower education 
and no training; thirdly, that the foreign workers had been given additional benefits 
not given to local workers; fourthly, the complainants and the companies had agreed 
to these inferior terms with the approval of the government through the Immigration 
Department; and also that the companies were forced to use foreign workers because 
of the shortage of local workers.  
 
The Court decided that there were no ‘special circumstances’ that merited an order 
setting aside any term of the collective agreement (in accordance with section 56(2) of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1967). The Court ordered the companies to comply with 
the collective agreements. The learned President stated in his judgment,  
The court considers it contrary to equity and good conscience to pay the 
foreign workers less than the local workers for doing the same jobs. The 
companies’ contention that the foreign workers were not as good as the local 
workers is not supported by any evidence. It is speculative to say that the local 
workers would complain that they are discriminated against if the foreign 
workers are paid the same wages and yet receive other benefits such as free 
accommodation…. If the country has to employ foreign workers both the law 
and equity, and good conscience, demands that they be given their legal rights.  
 
In 2008, the Sessions court adjudicated the high profile case of Nirmala Bonat, an 
Indonesian domestic worker who was burnt with an iron and scalded with hot water 
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by her employer in 2004. The judge sentenced her employer to 18 months of 
imprisonment for three counts of grievous hurt under Section 326 of the Penal Code 
(The Star Online 2008b).181 This case is significant because it is rare for foreign 
domestic workers to get compensation for abuses suffered at the hands of an 
employer. 
 
GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES CONCERNING AUTHORISED MIGRANT WORKERS 
In this section of the chapter, I propose some of the different objectives that the 
Malaysian government has tried to achieve through changes in laws, policies, and 
practices. One of the key reasons that Malaysia’s approach to labour migration has 
been ad hoc and reactionary is that different government ministries have had multiple, 
complex, and conflicting policy objectives. In many cases, the government has had to 
reverse its actions in response to protests from employers, civil society groups, and 
pressure from the governments of the sending countries of migrant workers. The 
sudden changes, and the poor flow of information concerning them, create and sustain 
an environment of ambiguity and uncertainty concerning government policy and 
practice in relation to labour migration. However, viewing these tactical changes over 
a longer period of time allows us to identify longer-term, strategic concerns that 
undergird these short-term changes. 
 
                                                
181 Nirmala Bonat is now pursuing civil action against her employer at the High 
Court, seeking general damages for pain and suffering and medical expenses, as well 
as special damages including the loss of income (Tamarai Chelvi 2010). 
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Ensuring sufficient labour supply for economic growth while protecting the 
rights of citizens to employment 
In its quest to promote economic growth over the past several decades, the 
government has had to help companies overcome labour shortages for skilled, semi-
skilled and ‘unskilled’ workers. It has done so by allowing the temporary import of 
foreign labour, while protecting the rights of citizens to employment.  
 
The government sees expatriates as a temporary workforce that is able to fill 
immediate gaps in skilled positions and is able to train Malaysians to take these 
positions in the future. Over the past decade, the government has undertaken a 
number of initiatives to liberalise the employment of expatriates, in order to “further 
improve Malaysia’s investment environment and promote technology transfer and the 
inflow of foreign skills into Malaysia” (Malaysian Industrial Development Authority 
2010).  
 
In February 2007, the government set up a Special Taskforce to Facilitate Business 
(Pasukan Petugas Khas Pemudahcara Perniagaan, PEMUDAH) comprising private 
and public sector members, in order to improve the delivery of public services. Since 
its inception, PEMUDAH has introduced a number of improvements with regard to 
the employment of expatriates, such as producing a Guidebook on Employment of 
Expatriates182 and working with the Immigration Department to define the term 
‘skilled worker’. It has also influenced the government to extend the length of time of 
passes from two to five years per renewal, to process expatriate applications within 
                                                
182 Available on 
http://www.expat.com.my/The%20Guidebook%20on%20the%20Employment%20of
%20Expatriates.htm, accessed 20 September 2010. 
 197 
seven days183, and to allow spouses of expatriates to work without having to convert 
their Dependent Passes to Employment Passes. These changes have made the 
application process for expatriates easier and also improved the quality of life of 
expatriates and their families while they are in Malaysia.  
 
In 2009, the Malaysian government started to introduce a number of initiatives to 
attract talented workers to Malaysia.184 These included giving permanent resident 
status to foreign applicants who qualified as a ‘high net worth individual’, an ‘expert’, 
or a ‘professional’ (Immigration Department Malaysia 2010b). More recently, in 
April 2011, the government introduced a 10-year Residence Pass for skilled non-
citizens who have worked in Malaysia for at least 3 years on a continuous basis. On 
this Pass, non-citizens are allowed to change employers and their spouses are also 
granted the right to work.185 These two options provide skilled non-citizen workers 
with much greater flexibility; importantly, their residence and right to work in 
Malaysia is not tied to a specific job and they do not need to depend upon an 
employer as a sponsor. However, these options are not open to foreign workers and 
foreign domestic workers.  
 
The temporary nature of foreign worker employment and the priority given to the 
employment of local workers is particularly evident during times of economic 
downturn, such as the Asian Financial Crisis from 1997-1998 and the global recession 
                                                
183 According to PEMUDAH: “With PEMUDAH’s intervention, there has been not 
only reduction in processing time but also improvement in the approval process. In 
2008, 97 per cent of the applications were processed within 7 days. In addition, a total 
of 30,321 passes were issued by the IMI, of which 86 per cent were processed within 
3 days” (PEMUDAH 2010e) 
184 These were introduced in the Prime Minister’s 2010 Budget Speech (see Najib 
(2009)). 
185 See terms and conditions of the programme on TalentCorp Malaysia (2011). 
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of 2008-2009, which had an adverse impact on Malaysia’s economy. During these 
periods, the Malaysian government engaged in the large-scale repatriation of foreign 
workers, signalling its efforts to address unemployment amongst citizens. In 1998, the 
government amended the Employment Act to prohibit employers from terminating 
the contract of a local employee for the purpose of hiring a foreign employee (Article 
60M).186 It required that employers first terminate the services of all foreign 
employees before terminating the employment of local employees in response to 
redundancy (Article 60N). That year, the number of foreign workers dropped from 
1,471,645 in 1997 to 1,127,652 (Azizah, 2001). In April alone, the number of 
authorized foreign workers reduced dramatically from 1,033,497 to 713,821 as a 
result of voluntary departures and repatriation (Scalabrini Migration Center 2009). In 
the 2008-2009 economic downturn, in the wake of an increasing rate of 
retrenchments, the Malaysian government encouraged employers to adopt a ‘Foreign 
Workers First Out’ policy, eventually repatriating around 700,000 workers.187 
 
However, these dramatic displays have had serious consequences for continued 
economic productivity, as foreign workers are not as easily replaced as imagined; 
experienced foreign workers possess skills and knowledge that cannot be substituted 
immediately by a new worker.188 Indeed, the severe cutbacks on foreign labour during 
times of economic recession resulted in serious labour shortages, requiring the 
government to reverse its policies and authorize the recruitment of new foreign 
                                                
 186 Employment (Amendment) Act 1998, Act A1026. 
187 Bardan, Shamsuddin. 2010. Interview by author, 8 March. 
188 In 2010, the Foreign Nationals Management Laboratory recommended that the 
Malaysian government allow foreign workers in all sectors who have worked in 
Malaysia for five years to extend their passes for a further five years, so that their 
skills and experience could be retained (Bernama 2011c). At present, only foreign 
workers in oil palm plantations are allowed to have these ‘5 + 5’ year passes. 
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workers.189 Some government officials and industry leaders are concerned that such 
drastic measures jeopardize foreign direct investment and provoke companies to 
move their labour-intensive operations to other low-cost countries, such as Indonesia, 
Vietnam, and China. As Ms. Chan states, “the manufacturing logic does not make 
sense now. The logic is based on having cheap labour, but now we are importing 
labour that is not cheap. It is not competitive at all. But still, we cannot rely on 
Malaysian workers.”190 The protectionist approach of the Malaysian government to 
foreign labour is unlikely to change. Indeed, one of the main objectives of the 
Department of Labour is to “prioritise and preserve work opportunities for citizens” 
(Department of Labour Malaysia 2008). 
 
Reducing dependence on foreign labour 
From the 1990s, the government has been concerned about the dependence of the 
Malaysian economy on foreign labour.191 Compared to other countries in East Asia 
and Southeast Asia, Malaysia has the highest rate of reliance on foreign labour 
(Athukorala 2006). At the UMNO General Assembly in 2007, (then) Prime Minister 
Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi described the hiring of large numbers of foreign 
workers as an “addiction” amongst employers. The Malaysian government has set a 
target of reducing overall numbers foreign workers to 1.5 million by 2015 (Agence 
France Presse 2008).  
 
                                                
189 More details of policy changes in 1997-1998 can be found in the yearly reports 
published by Scalabrini Migration Center (2010). 
190 Ms. Chan (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 9 February. 
191 The government has also been concerned about an associated problem – the 
outflow of money in the form of remittances. In 2006, for example, Malaysia was the 
10th highest remittance-sending country in the world, with outward remittances of 
more than US$5,560 million (Ratha and Xu 2008). This amount includes unrecorded 
flows through formal and informal channels estimated by the Statistics Department.  
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In 2009, one of the five Key Performance Indicators set for the Ministry of Human 
Resources was for them to “formulate a coherent policy on [the] rationalization of 
foreign workers’ management” with the aim of “reducing dependency on foreign 
workers”.192 The Malaysian government has tried to reduce foreign labour 
dependency in a number of ways – by imposing a levy in order to raise the cost of 
using foreign workers, by setting quotas periodically, by requiring employers to raise 
wages and improve working conditions in order to attract local workers, by 
restructuring the economy so that it is less labour-dependent, and by increasing the 
labour participation of Malaysia citizens.  
 
In November 1991, just a month after the Comprehensive Policy was launched, (then) 
Minister of Finance Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim introduced a foreign levy in his 
1992 Budget Speech at Parliament, in order to “prevent employers from dependency 
on foreign workers”, and to “make employers more cautious in hiring foreign workers 
to ensure that work opportunities for local workers would not be threatened” 
(Minister of Finance 1991). Since then, the Malaysian government has increased the 
amount of levies periodically (see Table 6).193  
 
In March 2009, the government announced, controversially, that it would double the 
amount of foreign levies and require employers to pay the levies rather than passing 
on the cost to foreign workers in order to “reduce the dependence on foreign workers 
                                                
192 Ministry of Human Resources Malaysia (2010) has the Minister’s Key 
Performance Indicators v.2.4. 
193 On 1 August 2005, the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Workers announced an 
increase in levies, with plantation sector increasing from RM360 (USD113) to 
RM540 (USD169) a year and the services sector increasing from RM1,200 (USD376) 
to RM1,800 (USD564) a year.  
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and give priority to hiring local workers”.194 This sparked great concern amongst 
employers and civil society groups alike. Employers resisted the move as they were 
already struggling with economic uncertainties. They warned that the substantial 
increase in costs would cause further loss of jobs, including those of nationals.195 
Civil society groups were worried that these costs still would be passed on to foreign 
workers through deductions from wages – doubling the levy would mean doubling the 
deductions from about 20 percent of their wages to 40 percent.  
 
At the end of March 2009, the Manpower Department issued circulars to employers 
forbidding them to deduct levies from the wages of foreign workers (Kala 2009). 
However, after numerous appeals, the Human Resources Minister quickly conceded 
to allow employers to continue making these deductions until the expiry of the visas 
of the foreign workers under their employment. He maintained that they were barred 
from making these deductions from foreign workers employed after 1 April; however, 
in practice, some employers continued to do so (Bernama 2009b). In May, the 
Cabinet announced that the initiative to double the foreign levy would be deferred 
until the economic climate improved (The Star 2009).  
 
One year later, in May 2010, the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Labour again 
proposed an increase in foreign levies and security bonds in 2011, quadrupling 
foreign levies from RM4 billion to RM16 billion a year (Boo 2010). Again, this was 
met with widespread protest. In the oil palm industry alone, where labour is the 
                                                
194 This was one of the initiatives introduced by Prime Minister Najib on 10 March 
2010 as part of his RM60 billion (USD19 billion) stimulus package aimed at helping 
Malaysia weather the global economic crisis. 
195 Food operators alone estimated the loss of 375,000 jobs, held by foreign workers 
and local workers (The Star 2009). 
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largest component of cost, the Malaysian Employers Federation and the Malayan 
Agricultural Producers’ Association estimated that the proposed increases would raise 
the cost of production tremendously from RM64.01 million to RM1.03 billion; a cost 
which would have to be absorbed by plantation companies as they could not change 
commodity prices (Hamisah 2010). At the time of writing, these plans for the increase 
in the foreign levy have not been implemented, but are still being contemplated.    
 
The Malaysian government sees the availability of foreign workers as an impediment 
to technology transfer. In introducing the 10th Malaysia Plan in June 2010, Prime 
Minister Najib stated, “the continued reliance on unskilled foreign workers will 
hinder our aspiration to shift to high value-added economic activities” (Najib 
2010:39–40). He announced that the government would introduce different levy rates 
based on the ratio of foreign workers to the total number of workers in a company, 
with higher rates for lower-skilled workers. The rates would increase every year. 
These are part of the government’s efforts to move away from low-cost 
manufacturing and to develop higher-technology industries in line with the 2006-2020 
Third Industrial Master Plan. However, industry leaders are worried about how they 
will find Malaysians with the right skills to ensure the success of this economic 
restructuring. Industry leaders have called for the government to provide practical 
assistance to help with technology transfer. One of the recommendations of the 
President of the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers, Datuk Mustafa Mansur, was 
that “levies should be ploughed back into the sectors to help businesses finance 
mechanisation efforts such as investments in automation; in setting up childcare 
centres to attract a higher female labour force participation and in productivity-
improvement measures” (Mustafa 2009).  
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The government has also tried to encourage employers to raise wages and to improve 
conditions of work in order to attract Malaysian workers. Officially, employers are 
not allowed to discriminate between locals and foreign workers in relation to wages 
and terms and conditions of services (Ministry of Human Resources Malaysia 2008). 
However, in spite of the incentives offered to local workers, Malaysians are still 
reluctant to take on some jobs and serious labour shortages remain. According to 
Tuan Haji Shamsuddin of the Malaysian Employers Federation, 
The government says that employers are not paying enough, so Malaysians are 
not interested in the jobs. They urge employers to review the pay, raising basic 
salaries from RM500-RM700 to RM700-RM750. They will not allow 
employers to bring in foreign workers until they raise the wages. But in some 
sectors, such as plantation, they cannot achieve their target for production 
because they don’t have enough workers. Their ability to attract local workers 
is very low. Parents in plantations don’t want their children to work there, so 
employers can’t recruit younger workers. Most workers are getting older. 
They get free housing, with at least 3 rooms a house, free electricity, water, 
and a plot of land. It can cost the employer RM1000-RM1500 a month (per 
worker), but still they cannot attract locals. So they mostly use foreign 
workers.196 
 
Employer groups have called for the government to take measures to boost labour 
participation in a latent Malaysian workforce. Tuan Haji Shamsuddin proposed: 
We have a 46 percent female participation rate currently. If we increased this 
                                                
196 Bardan, Shamsuddin. 2010. Interview by author, 8 March. 
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to 60 percent, we would have 1.2 million more workers. There are 100,000 
older workers who retire every year. If we encourage them to retire at age 65, 
our labour supply would increase by 1 million. There are 540,000 people with 
disabilities, of whom only 3,000-4,000 are working. This is a group with 
potential we can look at. We also have 800,000 students; they can do part-time 
work. We have a latent workforce; we can harness them. 
 
Several months after our interview, the Human Resources Minister Datuk Dr S. 
Subramaniam announced the introduction of the Work Regulations (Part-Time 
Workers) 2010 under the Employment Act 1955, as a measure to encourage a latent 
workforce of 6.5 million people – comprising housewives, the disabled, and students 
– to work (Lai 2010). These Regulations, which came into effect on 1 October 2010, 
outlined the entitlement of part-time workers to overtime pay, holidays, annual leave, 
sick leave, and rest days. However, what Tuan Haji Shamsuddin and Datuk Dr S. 
Subramaniam did not say was that these groups are unlikely to take on the difficult, 
dangerous and geographically isolated work executed by foreign workers in the 
construction, plantation and agriculture sectors. As such, this measure is unlikely to 
reduce foreign labour dependency in these sectors. 
 
Ensuring national security 
There is a fundamental problem that runs like a thread through the government 
migrant policy. It focuses on treating migration as a matter of security where 
the Ministry of Home Affairs takes on the lead role, rather than as a labour 
concern to be managed by the Ministry of Human Resources. 
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Irene Fernandez, migrant rights activist, 
Kuala Lumpur, 26 February 2010 
 
Foreign workers are frequently positioned as a threat to ‘national security’ in public 
discourse. In some cases, the allegations are more specific – for example, seeing them 
as a cause of the overall increase in crime and the spread of communicable diseases. 
In some cases, the allegations signal a more generalized, non-specific fear about 
Malaysia’s loss of ‘territorial integrity’ and the disruption of the ethnic balance upon 
which the Malaysian nation is constructed. In order to address these fears, the 
government has tried to control the absolute number of foreign workers in the 
country, the composition of their nationalities, and their state of health. 
 
Indonesian workers, because of their large numbers, have been a particular source of 
concern. When a series of riots happened in 2002, the Malaysian government 
announced a ban on the recruitment of Indonesian workers, stating that it would 
replace them with workers of other nationalities (Liow 2003). Over the years, there 
have been reports of Indonesian groups such as the People’s Democratic Defense 
(Bendera) calling on Indonesians to ‘kill Malaysians’ and planning to ‘invade’ 
Malaysia to protect the interests of their fellow citizens (Markus Junianto and Nurfika 
2009). They claim to have the support of thousands of Indonesian foreign workers in 
Malaysia.  
 
The government has also tried to make employers more responsible and accountable 
for the behaviour of their workers. Efforts were made in 2007 to legislate this through 
the proposed Foreign Workers Bill mentioned earlier. The Bill would place greater 
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responsibility on employers for monitoring the movements of foreign workers so 
“they do not go astray” (The Star Online 2007). Employers would be expected to 
report those who ran away “so that they would be declared illegal and the ministry 
could hunt them down” (Ritikos 2007). The thumbprints of employers would also be 
taken in order to make them accountable for the behaviour of their workers. At the 
time the Bill was discussed publicly, (then) Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Musa 
Hassan also suggested that foreign workers be confined to their workplace and have 
their movements monitored. (Then) Home Affairs Minister Datuk Seri Radzi Sheikh 
Ahmad supported this strongly, saying, “it is one of the ways to control foreign 
workers’ involvement in criminal activities." Critics of the Bill saw it as a means of 
confining foreign workers. Employers also protested these provisions, stating that it 
was unfair to hold them responsible for the actions of their foreign workers. The Bill 
was eventually dropped. 
 
Preserving the ethnic/racial composition of the Malaysian nation 
Government officials and politicians have also raised concerns about the social 
consequences of ‘mixing’ between foreigners and locals. In February 2001, when the 
government banned the recruitment of Bangladeshi foreign workers, one of the 
reasons put forward was that they were getting romantically involved with Malay 
women and entering into ‘marriages of convenience’ (Netto 2001). In 2007, (then) 
head of the women’s wing of MCA, Ng Yen Yen, urged the government to rethink its 
plans to recruit domestic workers from China, on the basis that they could “seduce 
local married men” – Chinese men in particular (Agence France Presse 2007).  
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The ethnic/ racial identity of foreign workers has indeed been a political issue. In the 
1990s, when large numbers of Indonesians came to Malaysia, Chinese political parties 
raised concerns that this was a method used by the government to boost bumiputra 
numbers (Azizah 1987). These discourses and practices indicate an underlying fear 
that the ‘ethnic balance’ of the Malaysian nation will change as a result of the 
presence of foreigners in Malaysia if measures are not taken to keep these populations 
separate. 
 
Preventing the exploitation of authorised migrant workers 
In public conferences and workshops, Malaysian government officials often state that 
the rights of non-citizens as workers and employees are protected under Malaysian 
law (see for example Khamis 2008; Ministry of Human Resources, Malaysia 2008).197 
Over the years, the Malaysian government has introduced a number of changes to 
laws, policies, and practices aimed at preventing the exploitation of migrant workers. 
These include signing bilateral agreements with governments of sending countries, 
introducing direct recruitment rather than recruitment through agents, stipulating 
conditions of employment for foreign workers and foreign domestic workers, as well 
as blacklisting errant employers and outsourcing companies (described above).  
 
The Ministry of Human Resources has also identified a number of measures that will 
reduce exploitation, such as strengthening statutory inspections in places of 
employment, especially where there are large numbers of foreign workers; 
investigating complaints without prior notice to employers; reminding employers of 
                                                
197 However, these presentations do not discuss the serious challenges that non-
citizens face in obtaining redress for grievances in Malaysia’s legal system (as 
elaborated in Chapter 3). 
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their legal and social responsibilities towards foreign workers; speeding up the 
settlement of claims by foreign workers through the labour court; and prosecuting 
recalcitrant employers for labour law offences (Ministry of Human Resources 
Malaysia 2008).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Malaysia’s approach to foreign labour has been to establish a large temporary 
migration programme. While it envisaged this to be a stop-gap measure in the 1990s, 
until the domestic labour force grew to sufficient strength, Malaysia continued to be 
reliant on foreign labour. Over the past two decades it has not changed the 
fundamental structure of its labour migration programme.  
 
The regulation of migrant workers in Malaysia involves the highest levels of authority 
in Malaysia. The Cabinet Committee on Foreign Workers decides all major changes 
in policies and practices. Some of these changes have been introduced unexpectedly 
and then retracted suddenly, leaving employers, government officials, law 
enforcement officers, migrant workers and other stakeholders in the industry 
confused. The changes have produced powerful results, sometimes unintended, with 
deep implications for migrant workers and the profitability of companies dependent 
on foreign labour.  
 
An ongoing tussle exists between the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of 
Human Resources over the control and regulation of migrant workers. While in 
principle the former has control over immigration matters and the latter over labour 
policies (foreign and domestic), in practice, the immigration control regime has such a 
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strong influence over the deployment of foreign labour that it dictates its structure and 
limits. While the Ministry of Home Affairs periodically raises deep concerns about 
national security, the Ministry of Human Resources prioritises the sufficient supply of 
labour for economic growth. A third Ministry that has vest interests in Malaysia’s 
foreign labour policy is the Ministry of Finance. The foreign levy imposed on 
employers results in billions of ringgit in revenues. The struggles between the 
Ministries contribute to the schizophrenic nature of labour policy in Malaysia.  
 
As demonstrated in this chapter, Malaysia distinguishes clearly between different 
types of migrant workers. It separates them out into different categories and assigns 
them different rights and entitlements. It does so by granting them different types of 
immigration passes. In doing so, the state creates a hierarchy, in which expatriates 
receive the most rights and entitlements while foreign workers and foreign domestic 
workers receive much less. While expatriates may apply for permanent residence, 
foreign workers and foreign domestic workers cannot. This hierarchy remains 
unchanged in spite of changes to Malaysia’s immigration control regime and its 
labour policies and practices. 
 
The government holds employers responsible for the actions and movements of 
foreign workers and foreign domestic workers, giving them a high level of control 
over their legal status. The sponsorship-based immigration system thus configures the 
relationship between employers and migrant workers. Specifically, it establishes 
relations of dependence, with migrant workers depending on their employers 
throughout their time in Malaysia. Foreign workers and foreign domestic workers 
have a higher level of dependence on their employers than expatriates – while 
 210 
expatriates can choose where they live and maintain autonomy over their domestic 
life, foreign workers and foreign domestic workers must live where their employers 
decide and live with what they provide. They have relatively little control over their 
housing conditions. 
 
The most significant way in which employers exercise power over migrant workers is 
their ability to cancel work permits unilaterally, a power enabled through the consent 
of immigration officers. This applies to expatriates as well, but has a greater negative 
impact on foreign workers as a whole. Many foreign workers (in particular those who 
took on debts to come to Malaysia) are afraid of the repercussions of losing their 
income, of losing their right to reside and work in Malaysia, and being forced to 
return home. As a result, some choose to tolerate abuses, difficult work conditions 
and unfair treatment rather than seek redress for wrongs. 
 
As I elaborate in the final chapter of this thesis, the hierarchy of rights, which is also a 
hierarchy of freedoms, has become a fundamental way in which members of 
Malaysian society – citizens and non-citizens alike – understand the place of non-
citizens. By and large, migrant workers are viewed as temporary outsiders, needed for 
their labour but belonging elsewhere. As I argue later, this hierarchy has become so 
internalised and normalised that it operates invisibly. It has also become normative. 
Members of society not only view non-citizens in terms of this hierarchy; they believe 
that this hierarchy is ‘right’. Attempts to disrupt the hierarchy – for example, foreign 
workers or foreign domestic workers demanding more rights that expatriates – are 
considered ‘wrong’. A hierarchy of deservedness has been established, and it through 
this internalised ‘truth’ that governmental power operates.  
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CHAPTER 5: MIGRANTS WITH IRREGULAR STATUS 
TITI: LIVING INVISIBLY 
Titi arrived in Kuala Lumpur just over a year ago to join her husband, who was 
working on a construction site in Cheras.198 She left her first child with her parents in 
Flores, Indonesia, so that he could go to primary school. Her husband, also from 
Flores, had been working in Malaysia for several years, and has been remitting money 
home regularly. But she missed him – so she came to join him in Malaysia. She 
boarded a plane and entered Malaysia on a passport with a valid tourist visa.  
 
When she first arrived, she lived with him in temporary shelters on a construction site 
in Cheras. It was overcrowded and dirty. They stayed there for a few months, until the 
project was completed. Her husband asked around for work and found out about 
another job in Kuchai Lama. He got the job, and they relocated there. This is where 
we met. 
 
They live adjacent to the construction site where he now works, with workers of 
different ethnicities and nationalities – Madurese, Acehnese, Bugis, as well as others 
from Burma and Vietnam. Their small, thriving makeshift village is hidden behind 
high, metal fences that demarcate the site from the busy streets outside. There is 
different rhythm in this space, a surprising vibrancy and informality. Narrow earthen 
lanes separate small houses constructed from wooden planks, plastic and other 
leftover building materials. There is piped water and electricity. It can get very hot 
during the day, Titi tells me, and with the rain, sometimes the lanes become muddy 
pools. But all in all, she says, the facilities are much better than they had in Cheras. 
                                                
198 Titi (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 7 December. 
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There are only three families here; the other residents are all single male workers. 
Some of them hold valid immigration passes, while others are undocumented. 
 
Titi nurses a five-month old baby. She narrates the harrowing account of the birth of 
her child. She was alone in the building site when her water broke and she went into 
labour. There were no women around to help her. She told her husband, who looked 
around frantically for an Indonesian bidan, a midwife, who could assist her with the 
birth. But the bidan took some time to get there, and baby arrived before she did! Titi 
held the baby until the bidan cut the umbilical cord. Thankfully, the birth was smooth, 
both of them were healthy, and they recovered well.  
 
Both Titi and her child are undocumented. Titi was too afraid to obtain a birth 
certificate for her baby, and Titi’s visa expired a while ago. Titi doesn’t dare to go 
outside of the high metal fences, in case she is arrested. She doesn’t dare to go to 
church or to attend mass, even though she is a devout Catholic. She prays at her altar 
at home instead, and spends all of her time in their makeshift village. Her husband is 
happy with his current job; his employers treat the workers well and pay them on 
time. They will stay in Malaysia for now, but Titi looks forward to going home and 
being reunited with her little boy. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In an interview, RELA's director-general, Zaidon Asmuni, dismissed the 
concerns of human rights groups [about RELA’s treatment of migrants with 
irregular status during immigration raids], saying the nation's security was at 
stake and demanded an aggressive defense. “We have no more Communists at 
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the moment, but we are now facing illegal immigrants,” he said. “As you 
know, in Malaysia illegal immigrants are enemy No 2.” Enemy No 1, he said, 
was drugs. (Mydans 2007) 
 
In the 1970s, the Malaysian government tolerated the growing presence of migrants 
with irregular status. However, it began to change its stance in the 1980s, introducing 
stricter controls over the entry and residence of non-citizens. The government started 
to conduct amnesty and regularisation exercises, often followed immediately by 
national crackdowns, in which migrants with irregular status were encouraged to 
register themselves, return home on travel documents (in lieu of passports), and apply 
for immigration passes before re-entering Malaysia. These exercises involved the 
movement of between 180,000 to 500,000 people each time (Fauwaz 2007). As a 
result of the crackdowns, 2.1 million migrants were apprehended between 1992 and 
2000 (Hugo 2002).199  
 
These exercises were opportunities to collect information about these populations. An 
unpublished report by the Department of Immigration in 1993 (cited in Nasution, 
2003) indicated the presence of 372,268 migrants from 28 countries in Southeast 
Asia, South Asia, East Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Of these, the highest 
numbers came from Indonesia (309,905, 83 percent), Thailand (22,518, 6 percent), 
Bangladesh (18,804, 5 percent), and Burma/ Myanmar (9,389, 3 percent). Data on the 
number of migrants who participated in registration exercises from 1992 to 2002 is 
provided in Table 9. As of June 2011, there were an estimated 2 million migrants with 
irregular status in Malaysia (Allard 2011; Palani 2011). 
                                                
199 Drawing upon Immigration Department statistics, Azizah (2003) states that 2.25 




Table 9: Number of Registrations during Amnesty Periods in Malaysia 
 











There are a number of reasons why migrants enter Malaysia through irregular routes 
or become irregular while they are Malaysia. Some enter Malaysia with the aid of 
smugglers because they are unable to afford expensive recruitment fees and/or are 
unable to meet complex bureaucratic requirements for legal entry. Some find it 
impossible to obtain valid passports from state authorities before leaving their 
countries of origin, for reasons of cost, difficulty of access to emigration mechanisms, 
or fear of repression. Some enter Malaysia believing that their journeys – as migrant 
workers or students – were authorized but find themselves victims of fraud by agents 
who provide them with forged or wrong documents (Ahsan Ullah 2009; Jones 
2000).201 Some are victims of trafficking. Some become irregular when their 
immigration passes are cancelled or lapse without renewal.202 Some change jobs 
                                                
200 960,164 individuals registered themselves from July to December 1996, with 
another 5,000 registering themselves in January 1997 in an extended amnesty offer 
allowing them to pay a fine and leave Malaysia without prosecution (Migration News 
1997). 
201 As Ahsan Ullah and Jones note, in the countries of origin of foreign workers, 
sometimes the same agents work for both legal and illegal recruiters. 
202 As stated in Chapter 4, in general, authorised foreign workers and foreign domestic 
workers have very little control over their legal status – in most cases, their employers 
keep their passports. Immigration passes are only valid for one year, and employers 
are fully responsible for getting them renewed. Employers are also able to get the 
passes of migrant workers cancelled; this has happened when migrant workers air 
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without permission and/or stay beyond the period of time stipulated on their 
immigration pass in order to earn enough so that they can send sufficient remittances 
home, thus breaching the conditions of their immigration pass (Ishida and Shahid 
Hassan 2000).203 Yet others, such as the children of migrants, were born and raised in 
Malaysia, but cannot be regularised.  
 
In the next section, I examine some of the government’s mechanisms of control for 
regulating migrants with irregular status. I focus in particular on the use of amnesties 
and public ‘crackdowns’ – large-scale exercises which complement on-going law 
enforcement operations to arrest, detain and deport migrants – as well as 
imprisonment, whipping and humiliation. After analysing the significance of this 
system, I highlight the perspectives of migrants with irregular status and then look at 
the case law related to them. I follow this with a discussion of the main policy 
objective of the Malaysian government with regard to irregular migration, before 
concluding with summary observations. 
 
IMMIGRATION CONTROL OF MIGRANTS WITH IRREGULAR STATUS 
Amnesties and National Crackdowns 
The immigration control regime to regulate migrants with irregular status operates in 
tandem with the government’s regime to regulate authorised migrant workers. Soon 
after the Malaysian government signed the 1984 Medan Agreement with the 
Indonesian government to promote the authorised movements of Indonesian foreign 
                                                                                                                                      
grievances, such as unpaid wages, wrongful deduction of wages, or exploitative work 
conditions. There are also cases of migrant workers who run away.  
203 Ishida and Shahid Hassan argue that Bangladeshi foreign workers hold inflated 
expectations of the amount of remittances that they will be able to send home while 
they are in Malaysia because of the malpractice of agents during the recruitment 
process. 
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workers into Malaysia and to reduce irregular migration, the Home Affairs Minister 
launched a national campaign against irregular immigrants (Azizah 1987). In 1985, 
the government deported 19,644 migrants, of whom 12,582 were Indonesians (Jones 
2000).204  
 
As Jones notes, the 1984 Medan Agreement failed to reduce the irregular migration of 
Indonesians to Malaysia – it failed to convince immigrants to go through the 
expensive and time-consuming official channels. Recognising this failure, the 
governments of Indonesia and Malaysia signed another bilateral agreement in 1988, 
in which Malaysia would regularise Indonesian migrants if they reported to the 
Indonesian embassy, returned to Indonesia on a travel document in lieu of a passport 
(Surat Perjalanan Laksana Paspor), obtained passports and visas to return to 
Malaysia (which they could apply for at certain ports, such as Dumai, Riau and 
Nunukan) and had a Malaysian employer willing to sponsor them. With minor 
modifications in procedures, this model of return, re-documentation and re-entry has 
been used in subsequent amnesty exercises, for example, just before the 2002 and 
2005 national crackdowns.205 
 
At the same time that Cabinet introduced the Foreign Worker Policy in 1991, the 
Royal Malaysian Police announced that it would begin a nationwide operation to 
arrest illegal immigrants, which would be preceded by a regularisation exercise. From 
                                                
204 In contrast, as Jones notes, only 2,910 Indonesians were deported three years 
earlier. 
205 These procedures have caused delays in the return of Indonesian migrants to 
Malaysia, which has led to over-crowding in Indonesian ports (further elaborated 
below). In 2005, 40,000 Indonesians returned to Malaysia on tourist visas rather than 
immigration passes, as the process of obtaining passports and visas from Indonesian 
authorities and obtaining approval for employment by the Malaysian government took 
too long (Ridwan 2005). 
 217 
November 1991 to June 1992, employers registered 442,268 workers with the 
Malaysian government to avoid punishment for immigration offences (Azizah 1992). 
However, as with previous exercises, there were problems with regularization due to 
poor administration and corruption (Jones 2000). In 1992, the government launched 
Ops Nyah I and Ops Nyah II, the former focusing on strengthening border patrols and 
the latter focusing on inland immigration operations. Under Ops Nyah II, the 
Immigration Department arrested 54,155 migrants between July 1992 and December 
1993 (Migration News 1994). National crackdowns were initiated again in 1995, 
1997/8, 2002, and 2005. In February 2010, the government announced that it would 
launch another national crackdown, but immigration operations that year were not of 
the same scale and publicity as those of previous crackdowns. 
 
Immigration raids take place where there are large concentrations of migrants. They 
can occur at any time – during the day in shopping malls, busy streets, and work 
places, for example, and late at night at apartment blocks and housing areas. The 
operations begin with law enforcement personnel arriving in lorries, vans, and cars 
and surrounding a designated area. They stop and search individuals who look like 
migrants for identity documents, chasing down those who try to run away. Those who 
cannot produce valid documents are handcuffed and placed in lorries where they wait 
until they are transported either to an immigration holding facility or an immigration 
detention depot. They are held under remand for 14 days, during which time 
immigration officers verify their identity and decide whether to release, charge, or 
fine them. Those who are charged are brought to the subordinate courts, and if found 
guilty, are transported to prisons to serve their sentence. 
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National crackdowns differ from regular, on-going operations to arrest, detain, punish 
and deport migrants with irregular status. During crackdowns, government officials 
use radio, television and newspapers to warn migrants and employers about the 
punishment meted to those who flout immigration laws. National crackdowns are 
widely publicised events.  
 
During national crackdowns, additional forces are authorized to conduct arrests. In 
1985, the government utilised the Malaysian Task Force on Refugees, known as Task 
Force VII, to patrol landing points of boats in order to prevent illegal landings.206 In 
1992, four battalions of the Police Jungle Squad (Pasukan Polis Hutan), a 
paramilitary arm of the police originally formed in 1948 to combat Communists, were 
deployed to arrest migrants in Peninsular Malaysia (Jones 2000). The marines, the 
army, and officers of the National Registration Department and Municipal Councils 
have also been mobilised to provide manpower for immigration operations at different 
times, their activities ranging from checking documents to conducting arrests to 
demolishing and burning shelters.  
 
In recent years, the most controversial group to be authorised to arrest irregular 
migrants has been RELA. Since 2005, when RELA volunteers when given these 
powers, RELA has been on an active recruitment drive. As of 31 January 2011, it had 
2,593,263 registered members (Ministry of Home Affairs Malaysia 2011a). From 1 
March 2005 to 31 December 2009, RELA personnel arrested 111,852 immigrants, of 
whom 43,052 were in Selangor, 24,361 in Perak, and 24,361 in Kuala Lumpur 
                                                
206 Taskforce VII was originally deployed to prevent Indochinese refugees from 
landing in Malaysia (Robinson 1998). Its mandate was extended to prevent 
Indonesian migrants from doing the same (Jones 2000). 
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(Ministry of Home Affairs Malaysia 2011b). Each district is given a target of 4 
operations a month and encouraged to aim for large numbers of arrests. 
 
There have been many complaints about the way that RELA conduct raids, with 
reports of them destroying valid identity documents (including passports and refugee 
cards issued by UNHCR) and using unnecessary violence. Non-citizens have reported 
getting extorted, having their possessions stolen, and being manhandled during arrests 
(Migrant Rights International and Migrant Forum in Asia 2008). In some cases, these 
raids have led to the deaths of migrants who try to escape (Kent 2006). A number of 
lawsuits have been filed against RELA personnel, including for rape of an Indonesian 
domestic worker (Karunaratne and Abdullah 1978). In December 2007, RELA were 
authorized to assist the Immigration Department in the management of immigration 
detention depots, and incidents of abuse have increased since this change.207 
 
 











2001 33,321 5,513 139,524 
2002 28,316 5,486 70,570 
2003 42,891 8,370 63,710 
2004 23,571 6,808 43,814 
2005 28,079 11,003 31,537 
2006 56,315 17,534 34,186 
 
Source: Ishak (2007) 
 
 
The figures in Table 10 indicate that the full impact of the crackdown is felt in the 
year after it is first initiated. In 2002, the public enforcement phase began in 
                                                
207 Community leader from Burma. 2008. Interview by author, 13 February. 
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September, after an amnesty period from April to August. In 2005, the crackdown 
began on 1st March, after four extensions of the amnesty period, in response to 
requests for a delay by the Indonesian and Philippine governments and as a 
humanitarian gesture in the wake of the Asian Tsunami on 26 December 2004 (Nah 
2007). It is likely that this gave most migrants sufficient time and opportunity to leave 
the country. Indeed, in the first few months of the 2005 crackdown, enforcement 
agents complained that the numbers of those actually arrested during immigration 
raids were comparatively low as most of the migrants they checked had legal 
documents. From 2005-2008, the Immigration Department detained 216,373 persons 
(with the assistance of RELA), of whom it had deported 191,583 by 2009, the largest 
numbers back to Indonesia (104,026), Philippines (32,687), Burma (18,986), 
Bangladesh (14,433), and Thailand (9,481) (W. L. Lee 2009).  
 
Punishment for Immigration Offences: Imprisonment and Whipping 
National crackdowns have been accompanied by changes in legislation that widened 
considerably the powers of law enforcement agents and increase the punishments 
meted out for immigration offences. As outlined in Chapter 3, the Immigration Act 
1959/1963 was amended in 1989, 1997 and 2002.208 The 1989 amendment placed the 
burden of proof on non-citizens to demonstrate that they did not contravene legal 
modes of entry. It allowed for them to be prosecuted in any place in Malaysia without 
their charges specifying the details of their illegal entry and their means of travel. In 
the 1997 amendment, penalties for immigration offences were increased. Employers 
could be fined between RM10,000-RM50,000 for every irregular worker hired. Fines 
                                                
208 These are pursuant to the Immigration (Amendment) Act 1989 (Act A719), the 
Immigration (Amendment) Act 1997 (Act A985) and the Immigration (Amendment) 
Act 2002 (Act A1154). 
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for forging documents were increased, set between RM30,000-100,000. In the 2002 
amendments, whipping of between 1-6 strokes was introduced for illegal entry into 
Malaysia (Section 6(3)) as well for employers who hire more than 5 non-citizens 
without a valid Pass (Section 55B(1,3)). 
 
After whipping was introduced as a form of punishment under the Immigration Act, 
34,923 non-citizens were whipped for immigration offences between 2002-2008, of 
whom 60.2 percent were from Indonesia, 14.1 percent from the Philippines, 13.9 
percent from Burma, 3.6 percent from Bangladesh, 2.8 percent from Thailand, and 5.4 
percent from other countries (Dewan Rakyat 2009a).209 Lawyers advocating for 
migrants and refugees in magistrates courts and sessions courts at immigration 
detention depots have observed an increase in whipping being meted out as a form of 
punishment (Koya 2007). In its 2007 human rights report, the U.S. Department of 
State reported the whipping of 30 recognised refugees (US Department of State 
2008). Amnesty International (2010) describes the practice of judicial whipping as 
follows: 
Across Malaysia, government officials regularly tear into the flesh of prisoners 
with rattan canes (rotan) travelling up to 160 kilometres per hour. The cane 
shreds the victim’s naked skin, turns the fatty tissue into pulp, and leaves 
permanent scars that extend all the way to muscle fibres. Blood and flesh 
splash off the victim’s body, often accompanied by urine and faeces. This 
                                                
209 Whipping is only carried out on men, not women. In some cases, individuals are 
spared from whipping on account of their age or medical condition. Other statistics 
provided by the Ministry of Home Affairs suggest that between 1 August 2002 (when 
the amendment on whipping came into force) and December 2004, 18,607 ‘illegal 
immigrants’ were whipped, comprising 11,473 Indonesians, 2,786 Myanmarese, 
1,956 Filipinos, 708 Bangladeshis, 509 Indians and 1,175 of other nationalities, each 
given 1-6 strokes (Bernama 2004)209. Over that time period, another 16,900 had been 
sentenced and were awaiting execution this sentence (Agence France Presse 2004).  
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gruesome spectacle is kept hidden from public view. 
The pain inflicted by caning is so severe that victims often lose consciousness 
as a result. Afterwards the suffering can last for weeks or even years, both in 
terms of physical disabilities and psychological trauma. As a punishment that 
intentionally inflicts severe pain and trauma, caning violates the absolute 
prohibition against torture and ill treatment under international law (p.5). 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IMMIGRATION CONTROL REGIME 
Crackdowns are specifically designed to be public spectacles. The discourses and 
practices associated with national crackdowns are ideological, creating and sustaining 
a fixed, simplified idea of an ‘illegal immigrant’ as a wilful and disobedient 
transgressor of the law. They are positioned as the ‘second greatest threat’ to national 
security (after drugs), and interpreted as the living, visible evidence of Malaysia’s loss 
of ‘territorial integrity’, the unpredictable ‘enemy from within’. They also mask the 
plurality of their experiences, the complexities of their histories in Malaysia, and the 
multiple reasons for their irregular status.  
 
These discourses do not highlight the vulnerabilities faced by migrants with irregular 
status; instead, they draw attention to how these migrants pose an imminent threat to 
Malaysian citizens. Migrants with irregular status are blamed and held accountable 
for their status with little recognition given of the processes that led to this status and 
the complicity of other actors (e.g. employers, agents, law enforcement agents) in 
causing and contributing to this status. Media reports also tend to cast blame on 
migrants with irregular status without a full and thorough investigation of the facts of 
an event. When riots or disturbances (for example, in immigration detention depots, 
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prisons, factories, or at the gates of the UNHCR) are reported publicly, media 
interpretations all too easily cast ‘illegal immigrants’ as troublemakers without fair 
examination of the discontent that led to their collective protest.210 
 
Crackdowns are public performances of sovereignty. RELA and Immigration officers 
have described their work in arresting migrants with irregular status as exercises of 
their ‘patriotic duty’. The publicity given to law enforcement activities during the 
crackdowns legitimize acts of violence against migrants. These have included the 
demolition of hundreds of squatter homes and burning down of houses built by 
migrants (Kafil Yamin 2002; McDowell 2002). The more migrants are punished, the 
more whipped, the ‘more effective’ the performance of enforcement officers is judged 
to be. Government officials quote statistics of the numbers of migrants whipped as 
evidence of their commitment to reducing numbers of migrants with irregular status 
in Malaysia (see for example, Dewan Rakyat (2009)). 
 
The mass arrests during national crackdowns contribute to severe overcrowding in 
prisons and immigration detention depots. In May 2005, Malaysia’s prisons and 
depots held 45,000 inmates, most of whom were non-documented migrants. These 
facilities were designed to hold only 30,000 people (Agence France Presse 2005d). In 
March 2007, the Prisons department reported holding 38,191 inmates in prison 
facilities built for 28,100, and 48,824 inmates in other facilities that could only 
accommodate 38,100 (Bernama 2007b). 
 
                                                
210 For an example of an analysis highlighting the difference between the portrayal of 
a riot at an immigration detention centre by the mainstream press and the reports of 
migrants involved in the protest, see Human Rights Committee of the Bar Council et 
al. (2008). 
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The national crackdowns trigger large-scale movements of people within a short 
period of time – both ‘voluntary’ (during the amnesty phase) and forced (during group 
deportation exercises). In 2002, for example, an estimated 300,000 workers left 
voluntarily in the 4-month amnesty period (McDowell 2002). Thousands crowd at 
major exit points in Malaysia, waiting for tickets to go home. Riot squads were put on 
standby in case migrants unable to purchase travel tickets panicked (Yeow 2002). A 
Jakarta Post article described this movement as a “massive exodus” that “flooded the 
country’s border areas with thousands of jobless people waiting to return to their 
hometowns” (Unidjaja and Sijabat 2002). The huge outflow even prompted 
Indonesian provincial authorities to ban their entry at popular entry points and at 
transit sites to their hometowns. Indeed, these movements have caused severe 
overcrowding in border zones in Indonesia and the Philippines, leading to 
humanitarian crises and deaths. In 2002, hundreds of thousands of deportees were 
stranded on Nunukan, the Indonesian island near Sabah, because they could not afford 
the cost of transport back to their hometowns (Xinhua News Agency 2004). Lack of 
food, clean water and medicines resulted in the deaths of at least 50, including 
children, at temporary camps over a month (Yates 2002).211 
 
The media attention surrounding crackdowns reveals the poor treatment of detainees 
in immigration detention depots. At Tawi-Tawi in the Philippines where deportees 
disembarked, a health officer observed, “Many of them were obviously suffering from 
first or second degree malnutrition.” (South China Morning Post 2002). Some had 
been detained for three to four months; 32 of the deportees, mostly children, were 
admitted to hospital with severe dehydration and respiratory infection. During this 
                                                
211 See Ford (2006) for an analysis of NGO and government responses to this crisis. 
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time, there was also alleged sexual abuse of young Filipina women by police and 
prison guards while they were held in detention. Another report highlighted the deaths 
of 12 children in detention facilities, due to dehydration and other difficulties (Baker 
2002). Such tragedies were repeated in the 2005 crackdown. A two-year-old Filipino 
girl, deported with around 150 other people from Sandakan, Sabah, died after she 
arrived at Mindanao, Philippines (Fauwaz 2005).  Newspaper reports indicate that 
she, along with 6 others, was severely dehydrated from vomiting and diarrhoea. 
Similar outrage has been expressed in Indonesia, particularly surrounding the 
mistreatment of Indonesian citizens.  
 
Deportation procedures for Indonesians, Filipinos, Thais and Burmese focus on 
expelling them from the geo-body of the Malaysian state, but fail to return them to 
their homes, which can be hundreds of kilometres from deportation sites along the 
borders of Malaysia. Deportees often find themselves stranded without money, having 
to choose between resuming their unfinished lives in Malaysia – from which they 
were suddenly and surprisingly removed when they were arrested – or returning home 
impoverished. Most choose to return to Malaysia, the cheaper and more promising 
option. Group deportations to border zones have also contributed directly to forced 
labour and trafficking, sometimes with the collusion of Immigration officers. 
 
National crackdowns have a negative impact on the smooth running of business 
operations. The absence of workers – due to voluntary return and forced deportation – 
has caused acute labour shortages, which, in 2002 and 2005, resulted in losses of 
millions of ringgit per week. In 2002, the labour shortage sparked a crisis in the 
construction sector – 40 percent of workers in Putrajaya ‘disappeared’, slowing down 
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its progress significantly (S. Jayasankaran 2002). In response, the Malaysian 
government authorised the entry of 500,000 new foreign workers (The Associated 
Press 2002). This problem recurred in 2005. Labour shortages led to losses of 
hundreds of millions of ringgit in different sectors of the economy – the oil palm 
plantation industry alone lost up to 70 million ringgit212 a month (Agence France 
Presse 2005a). The plantation sector was short of about 300,000 workers, and the 
construction sector short by 200,000 workers (Agence France Presse 2005b). The 
government capitulated, allowing Indonesians to return on tourist visas into Malaysia 
in order to apply for immigration passes (Farrah 2005; SBS World News 2005). The 
government also turned to other countries for foreign workers, such as Pakistan, India, 
Myanmar, Nepal and Vietnam; it accepted 100,000 from Pakistan alone (Agence 
France Presse 2005c; J. Singh 2005). When a crackdown was announced in 2009, 
protests by employers who feared labour shortages led to it being postponed.  
 
THE PERSPECTIVES OF MIGRANTS WITH IRREGULAR STATUS 
Contrary to popular belief, migrants with irregular status are desperate to gain and 
maintain legal status; in this sense, their desires match that of the Malaysian state.213 
Indeed, over the course of their time in Malaysia, they attempt to get regularised in a 
number of ways – such as returning to their country of origin during amnesty 
exercises to obtain legal documents, or making arrangements with agents or 
employers to pay for the foreign levies on their own immigration passes. The latter 
involves exiting Malaysia, making an application for the PLKS in conjunction with 
their agent or employer, and waiting for a ‘calling visa’ before returning to Malaysia. 
                                                
212 Around 22 million US Dollars a month. 
213 This comes as a surprise to many Malaysians, particularly those who are persuaded 
by discourses concerning ‘illegal immigrants’ that construct them as wilful and 
uncaring transgressors of the law. 
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However, as the costs involved are high and difficult to sustain over a long period of 
time, their status usually lapses, leaving them undocumented.  
 
The most significant impact of crackdowns on non-citizens is the fear, anxiety and 
uncertainty it generates as to their personal safety and wellbeing. They know that they 
can be arrested at any time of day or night – while travelling, walking, eating, 
working, or sleeping. Migrants are afraid of being caught at roadblocks or having 
their papers checked when they are riding in buses, taxis, cars, or motorcycles. They 
are afraid of officers breaking into their apartments during raids while they are 
sleeping; forcing open locks after demanding swift entry. They are afraid of being 
stopped while they walk through the city, whether by RELA volunteers conducting 
raids or police officers on patrol. Under the Immigration Act 1953/1969, law 
enforcement officers need no warrant to demand identity papers; they can stop any 
person suspected of being an irregular migrant.  
 
Their vulnerability to arrest makes them fear seeking the protection and assistance of 
law enforcement agencies. Those who struggle with problems at work, such as unpaid 
wages, long hours of work, and sexual harassment, are afraid to seek redress, in case 
their employers report them to the police.214 Women who are raped are too afraid to 
lodge police reports, leaving their perpetrators free from punishment. This makes 
them easy targets for crime. The discourses on ‘illegal immigrants’, emphasising their 
                                                
214 Non-citizens with irregular status are particularly vulnerable to exploitation, 
violence, and abuse. They are also subject to discrimination and xenophobia. There 
has been a high level of sexual harassment and abuse reported amongst 
undocumented female migrants and refugees (MSF 2007; Women’s Commission 
2008). Many irregular migrants (amongst them, refugees) have also reported being 
harassed, robbed, extorted, and beaten (Amnesty International 2010b; International 
Federation for Human Rights and SUARAM 2008). There are cases of kidnapping for 
extortion, many of which go unreported.  
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threat to society, reinforces marginalisation and isolation amongst migrant 
communities – migrants with irregular status are afraid of Malaysians, and 
Malaysians are afraid of them. 
 
CASE LAW ON MIGRANTS WITH IRREGULAR STATUS  
Is a migrant worker with irregular status entitled to receive compensation for loss of 
income as a result of negligence in a motor vehicle accident? This was a matter 
considered by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in Lee Seng Kee v. Sukatno 
and Ong Thean Soo [2008] I LNS 226 and Sukatno v. Lee Seng Kee & Anor [2009] 4 
CLJ 171 respectively. The case was first heard at the Sessions Court. The plaintiff, an 
Indonesian foreign worker, was paralysed from the waist down as a result of a car 
accident sustained when he was walking along a road in 1996. The defendant was the 
driver of the vehicle that struck him. The defendant brought an action against a third 
party, claiming that that driver struck the plaintiff, throwing the plaintiff towards the 
direction of the defendant. The third party denied this, stating that the defendant 
knocked into the plaintiff. The Sessions Court judge found that the third party was not 
involved in the accident, and found the defendant 50 percent liable for negligence and 
the pedestrian 50 percent liable for contributory negligence, awarding the plaintiff 
RM150,000 (USD47,000) with interest as general damages as well as special 
damages with interest, including RM153,000 (USD48,000) for loss of future earnings 
(calculated at RM800 (USD250) per month for 16 years). The defendant appealed 
against the whole decision. The defendant also appealed against the award of damages 
for loss of earnings on the grounds that it was gained through illegal earnings. 
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The High Court overturned this ruling, holding that the appellant/defendant’s version 
of events was more probable. The judge also set aside the finding of 50 percent 
liability against the defendant, stating that it could neither be sustained in law nor on 
the facts. The judge set aside the award for loss of future earnings on the basis of the 
doctrine ex turpi causa non orictur actio (‘from a dishonourable cause an action does 
not arise’). At the time of the accident, the plaintiff testified that he held a valid pass 
for work entitling him to work for a company when in fact another employed him. 
Immigration officers testified that the plaintiff’s name was not in the register of the 
Immigration Department, that the pass for work had been forged, and that he was 
working and staying in Malaysia without a valid pass.  
 
The judge stated: “if the plaintiff’s income is found to be from illegal earnings, this 
court cannot convert the illegal earnings to become legal earnings in order to entertain 
or accommodate the plaintiff’s claim for loss of future earnings however serious his 
injuries may be” (p.781). The judge further stated, “If the plaintiff has no legal status 
to remain in this country and is considered to be an illegal immigrant or an illegal 
worker, surely he cannot then claim to be entitled to loss of earnings which was 
derived from illegal earnings or as an illegal worker” (p. 781). The High Court also 
did not grant an award for loss of earnings in Indonesia. The High Court dismissed 
the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant with costs and also awarded costs of the 
appeal to borne by the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed against the whole decision. 
 
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the ruling of the High Court, affirming the 
decision of the Sessions Court judge in finding the defendant 50 percent liable for 
negligence and the plaintiff 50 percent liable for contributory negligence, as well as 
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affirmed the quantum of damages awarded to the plaintiff, including for loss of future 
earnings. The Court of Appeal found inconsistencies in the account of the events by 
the defendant, and on that basis rejected the defendant’s case and allowed the 
plaintiff’s claim in full. In relation to the award for loss of future earnings, the court 
posed the question of whether the plaintiff’s act of working with an employer not 
stated on his pass for work “can… be legitimised…”? (p. 197), and found that it could 
with an application to the Immigration Department. The Court followed a precedent 
set by the High Court in Wakil Diri Bagi Harta Pusaka Atas Rosli Md Nor (Simati) 
and Ors v. TP Saffeer and Anor [1998] 4 CLJ 241(written by the same judge) that if 
earnings could be legitimised in law then the earnings are not illegal.  
 
In terms of the validity of the pass for work, the Court pointed out that the plaintiff 
entered Malaysia through proper channels; there was no evidence that he came in 
illegally. Immigration officers did not stop the plaintiff when he departed Malaysia 
after being discharged from the hospital and the police did not raise any questions 
when checking his passport while he made a police report concerning the accident. In 
relation to working for a different employer, the court ruled that the duty to apply for 
a change of employer for his pass for work was on the employer he worked for, and 
could not be shifted to an employee, in this case, the plaintiff. The court summarised: 
“Taking the evidence in its correct perspective, there is no concrete proof that the 
plaintiff is an illegal worker. Neither is there any evidence that the plaintiff played a 
role in contravening the law of this country” (p.199). The Court ruled that the appeal 
ended there and could not proceed to the Federal Court. 
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GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES CONCERNING MIGRANTS WITH IRREGULAR STATUS 
Reducing the numbers of migrants with irregular status   
The government’s explicit objective concerning migrants with irregular status is to 
reduce their overall numbers. As described above, it has tried to achieve this through 
bilateral agreements with the government of sending countries, amnesty exercises, 
national crackdowns, and increasing the level of punishment for immigration offences 
by migrants and employers. From 2005 onwards, it deployed RELA in order to 
increase the number of arrests of migrants with irregular status. RELA is now a 
volunteer force of over 2 million Malaysian citizens who take part in the national 
effort to arrest migrants with irregular status. 
 
The efforts of the government to reduce overall numbers have not been successful. 
The numbers of migrants with irregular status continue to grow, frustrating 
government officials, who respond by up-scaling punishment and strengthening law 
enforcement. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, these efforts are based on 
the assumption that the key cause for irregular status is the deviant action of migrants, 
who deliberately enter Malaysia illegally. Insufficient attention is paid to the 
institutions, processes, and actors that cause, stimulate and contribute to irregular 
migration. Based on this logic, the primary objects of surveillance and discipline are 
the migrants – comparatively fewer resources are dedicated to dismantling smuggling 
networks, prosecuting recruitment agents who cheat migrants, addressing corruption 
in immigration bureaucracy, and clamping down on the production of fake documents 
which lead to migrants being in an irregular situation.  
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Secondly, the strict and inflexible regime of work passes, based on employer-
sponsorship, is itself a cause of irregularity. Foreign workers and foreign domestic 
workers are forced to stay in their jobs, as there are no legal avenues for them to 
initiate a transfer. Those who decide to leave their jobs have to run away as there are 
no other courses of action, thus ending up with irregular status.  
 
Thirdly, efforts by the government to curtail irregular migration do not address the 
high cost of legal migration and the better wages (albeit with higher risks) in the 
informal market. Legal migration costs multiple times more than irregular migration, 
making it difficult for migrant workers to recuperate their costs in short periods of 
time. This, along with the fact that migrant workers are able to earn more through 
informal work than they do as authorised workers and are able to leave their jobs if 
they are unhappy with their work conditions, creates significant incentives for migrant 
workers to seek employment in the informal market. 
 
Finally, the government maintains very strict terms for the legal status of migrants. It 
has not relied upon alternative methods of reducing the number of migrants with 
irregular status, such as reviewing the criteria for legal status to allow migrants to 
claim status on the basis of the years they have spent in Malaysia or family ties they 
have developed. Malaysia also doesn’t allow them to seek asylum through domestic 
procedures and to remain in Malaysia with legal status as refugees or to apply for 
status on humanitarian grounds.215 Access to legal status is extremely limited. 
 
                                                
215 In France, for example, foreigners with life-threatening pathologies that are unable 
to receive proper treatment at home are given a temporary legal permit for medical 
care (Fassin 2001) 
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CONCLUSION 
Malaysia’s economy is and will continue to be foreign labour dependent in the 
foreseeable future, despite attempts by the Malaysian government to reduce this. It is 
also clear that Malaysia’s approach to migrants with irregular status has failed to 
achieve its main objective – to reduce overall numbers over time. In this sense, the 
use of national crackdowns has been a policy failure.  
 
The presence of large numbers of irregular migrants reduces the cost of labour 
significantly. They form a flexible work force with little bargaining power. In some 
cases, employers respond to complaints by undocumented workers by reporting their 
presence to law enforcement officers, who then conduct operations to arrest them. 
When these same migrants ‘behave’, employers pay bribes so that local law 
enforcement agents turn a blind eye to their presence on work sites. Employers thus 
use the threat of law enforcement as a way of disciplining a work force. 
 
Instead of recognizing the underlying reasons for policy failure, law enforcement 
agents blame migrants as well as their governments for not being able to ‘control’ 
their citizens. These rationalizations reinforce the archetype of the irregular migrant 
as a deviant who flouts Malaysian law and refuse be subject to the rules of Malaysian 
society. Lacking both the structural analysis of the reasons for their irregular status as 
well as the examination of issues from the perspectives of migrants, the response of 
law and policy makers has been to conduct national crackdowns and to increase the 
level of physical punishment meted out to those deemed deviant. 
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National crackdowns, combined with a legal framework that does not provide redress 
for grievances to migrants with irregular status (as elaborated in Chapter 3), result in 
further, unsanctioned exercises of violence by law enforcement agents and Malaysian 
citizens against these populations, thus increasing their vulnerability. Migrants with 
irregular status have been subject to forced labour, unpaid wages, sexual harassment, 
and discrimination in health care services, as well as violence and theft in 
Immigration/RELA raids.216 Upon deportation, they have been subject to trafficking 
at the borders of Malaysia. Against these practices they have little, if any, legal 
protection because of their irregular status.  
 
The process of identifying a person as being ‘illegal’ and the act of punishing him/her 
are concrete expressions of the exercise of sovereign power. What makes Malaysia 
unusual is that it has been increasing the severity of punishment over time. This 
contradicts Foucault’s observation that there has been an overall reduction of penal 
severity over the past 200 years, and a shift from the punishment of the body to that of 
the soul (Foucault 1977). Rather than exercising governmental power, it relies more 
heavily on sovereign and disciplinary power. In the final chapter of this thesis, I 
suggest why this is so. 
                                                
216 The NGO, Health Equity Initiatives, will soon publish a number of studies show 
the high incidence of migrants subjected to forced labour and exploitation. 
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CHAPTER 6: FOREIGN SPOUSES OF MALAYSIAN CITIZENS 
PETER: IN PURSUIT OF LOVE 
Peter, a British national, met his Malaysian wife, Lakshmi, in Penang in the 1980s.217 
Their romance blossomed in London, where she was completing her postgraduate 
studies. They registered their marriage there in 1990. In 1995, when Lakshmi became 
pregnant with their son, they went to the Malaysian embassy to get the forms to 
register his birth. They were shocked to find out that their child had no right to 
citizenship if he was born outside of Malaysia. They “jumped on a plane”, he tells me, 
so she could deliver the baby in Penang. They then returned to London. 
 
In 1997, they decided to relocate to Penang. They faced great difficulties trying to 
settle down, as Peter didn’t have the right to work or reside in Malaysia. He came in 
and out of Malaysia on short tourist visas. However, in 1997, he got rejected at the 
border while trying to enter from Thailand. While Peter remained stranded in 
Haadyai, Lakshmi’s family made appeals to the Ministry of Home Affairs, arguing 
that she was a qualified professional and that he could teach English as the 
government had been explicit about Malaysia needing these skills.  
 
“We didn’t know how it would go”, he says. “We had just moved to Penang and it 
would have been emotionally wrenching to go back to the UK”. Lakshmi’s family 
“pulled out all the stops”, seeking the help of a “well-known person”. After three 
weeks of waiting, Peter had just about given up when the Ministry of Home Affairs 
called him. “I was shaking – like a cat on hot bricks.” They told him he could return 
to Malaysia.  
                                                
217 Peter (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 5 March. 
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Peter reluctantly got a job teaching English in Penang, because it helped him to get a 
yearly employment visa. He could not do what he wanted to do; he held himself back 
from activism in Malaysia, afraid of jeopardizing his status. He became very unhappy 
and frustrated. He said to Lakshmi, “I can’t live like this”. Often, his employer would 
“mess up his work visa”, so he had to leave the country. Each time, he was afraid he 
would not be let in again.  
 
In 2005, he found out about the ‘Spouse Scheme’ and the ‘Malaysia My Second 
Home’ (MM2H) Scheme. He was also offered a job. These were three possible ways 
of residing legally in Malaysia. He first tried the Spouse Scheme. One of the first 
questions on the form was: ‘Have you ever been excluded from Malaysia?’. He 
thought, “forget that!” and proceeded to apply for the MM2H Scheme. To his relief, 
his application was approved. Two weeks later, they changed the rules of the scheme, 
closing it to foreign spouses. “We just got in!”, he tells me.218 He was given a five-
year visa, which is now coming to an end. It has allowed him to reside in Malaysia for 
all these years, but not to work. He now has to decide how he will maintain his 
immigration status in Malaysia. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Problem of ‘Mixed Marriages’ 
On 25th February 2010, Minister of Information, Arts and Heritage, Datuk Seri Dr. 
Rais Yatim, warned young Malaysians to “think ‘thousands of times’ before having a 
                                                
218 From 13 February 2009, pursuant to Immigration Circular No. 6 of 2009, foreign 
spouses were allowed to apply for the MM2H programme (Malaysia My Second 
Home 2010). Tourism Minister Datuk Seri Dr Ng Yen Yen confirmed this on 24 May 
2010, stating that the MM2H programme would be extended to foreign spouses of 
Malaysians and that they were likely to get a 10-year visa like other MM2M 
participants (Malaysiakini.TV 2010). 
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mixed marriage because studies have shown that the success rate is only 3:10” 
(Zulkifli 2010). Citing ‘scientific studies’ by sociologists, he stated that only 3 out of 
10 marriages succeeded, and that failure increased when marriages involved ‘whites’ 
(kalangan warga kulit putih atau mat saleh). “However”, he stated, “intermarriage in 
Malaysia involving the men and women who are non-Muslims who later converted to 
Islam to marry is very successful compared to those who marry foreigners from the 
west”.219 
 
These comments prompted a flurry of indignant responses from couples in ‘mixed 
marriages’, some of which were captured by the editors of a blog called ‘Unscientific 
Malaysia’. Brigitte Leha Bresson wrote, 
 
I am one of these foreigners berkulit putih (with white skin) married to a 
Malay man. Most of my problems actually came from the government, which 
took 19 years to finally give me a red IC [identity card].220 During this time, 
although highly educated (PhD level), I was not [even] allowed to work. This 
led to depression, low self esteem, and would have wrecked my marriage if 
my husband had not been such a nice guy. As for the genetic pool, I have three 
beautiful children. Instead of preventing Malays from marrying foreigners, he 
[Rais] should just help these foreigners to adapt better. Don’t treat us like 
foreign illegal pendatang (immigrants)! (Bresson 2010) 
 
Sharon Bakar, a British woman living in Malaysia concurred, adding,  
 
                                                
219 Translation provided by Lim (2010). 
220 A red identity card is given to permanent residents of Malaysia. 
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In the 20 years we have been married, more stress and unhappiness caused by 
insecurities over PR [permanent resident] status and not being able to work 
than cultural differences. Foreign men married to local women have it much 
harder (Bakar 2010). 
 
Several months later, in August 2010, Datuk Michael Chong of the MCA Public 
Services and Complaints Department made another controversial public comment 
about Malaysians marrying foreigners. He advised Malaysian men not to marry 
foreign women, warning that there have been cases of them taking their Malaysian 
children home and not returning to Malaysia. He was quoted saying: “Don’t take a 
foreign wife. There are many pretty, talented and intelligent Malaysian women to 
choose from” (Hemananthani 2010).  
 
The Malaysian Government’s Approach to Foreign Spouses: 1980s to Present221 
In the 1980s, foreign spouses were allowed to enter Malaysia on Social Visit Passes 
as dependents of their Malaysian spouses. However, the application process was very 
tedious and they had to get their passes renewed every 1-3 months; only after a certain 
period of time, at the discretion of Immigration officers, were they issued passes of 6-
month to 1-year validity. They were not allowed to work. There were also strict 
restrictions on their right to re-enter Malaysia if they went abroad – they needed to 
obtain special permission and a re-entry permit before they left, explaining the 
reasons for their journey.222 Some foreign spouses were told that they could only 
                                                
221 I have not been able to obtain information on policies and practices related to 
foreign spouses before the 1980s, as there has been little published on this topic. 
222 Mrs. Ng (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 26 February. In 1991, when 
Mrs. Ng’s father passed away in Singapore and she wanted to attend his funeral, she 
needed to apply for a re-entry permit in order to return to Malaysia. She had to obtain 
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apply for permanent resident status if they stayed in Malaysia for an uninterrupted 
period of 5 years and that only their time on one-year passes counted; they were not 
allowed to leave the country in the meantime.223 In the mid-1990s, however, foreign 
spouses were told that their residency in Malaysia did not have to be uninterrupted in 
order for it to count towards the requirement for permanent residence.  
 
In February 2008, the Immigration Department was authorized to issue Social Visit 
Passes for a period not exceeding 5 years subject to the validity of the passport of 
foreign spouses.224 Measures are underway to give automatic approvals for the Long 
Term Social Visit Passes for periods of five years (PEMUDAH 2010c). However, at 
the point of writing, many foreign spouses have not yet been issued with these passes. 
 
Foreign spouses were first allowed to work in February 1996, when the Malaysian 
government introduced the ‘Spouse Programme’, which provided Employment Passes 
for foreign spouses (both male and female) married to Malaysian citizens 
(JobSupply.com 2010). However, in practice, it was difficult for foreign spouses to 
obtain work because of the administrative requirements involved in securing an 
Employment Pass – they could only work for employers with a minimum paid up 
capital of RM250,000 (USD78,400), had to have a ‘cooling off period’ of six months 
between jobs, and, in some cases, had to bear the cost of the foreign levy (at the 
                                                                                                                                      
a letter from a doctor in Malaysia as proof of these circumstances, which she 
submitted along with her application to the Immigration Department. 
223 Ramanand, Bina. 2010. Interview by author, 25 January; Ying Chuen’s daughter 
(name changed), 2009. Personal communication, 20 September.  
224 Pursuant to the Immigration (Spouse Programme) (Exemption) Order 2008. 
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behest of their employers).225 The Immigration Department also took a while – 
sometimes several months – to process the applications, which made employers 
reluctant to hire foreign spouses.  
 
In November 2008, the Spouse Programme was discontinued and foreign spouses 
were allowed to work on the Long Term Social Visit Passes (PEMUDAH 2010e).226 
This programme was introduced “(i)n line with the Malaysian Government’s policy to 
attract highly skilled, knowledgeable and talented foreign workers to the country” 
(PEMUDAH 2010b). At the same time, in 2008, the record-keeping system for the 
issuance of Social Visit Passes was changed, to the shock of foreign spouses who 
went to the Immigration Department to reapply for their Social Visit Passes. They 
were treated as if they were making applications for the first-time – they had to pay 
security bonds again, and their previous records of holding Social Visit Passes were 
deemed irrelevant.227 
 
In February 2009, foreign spouses were allowed to apply for the Malaysia My Second 
Home Programme (MM2H)228, a programme managed by the Tourism Ministry of 
Malaysia allowing non-citizens to reside in Malaysia on 10-year renewable Social 
                                                
225 Ramanand, Bina. 2010. Interview by author, 25 January. These are policies 
currently in place for the employment of expatriates on Employment Passes (see 
Chapter 4). 
226 Pursuant to Malaysian Immigration Circular No. 31/2008.  
227 The full implications of this have not yet come to light. Foreign spouses were told 
that the Spouse Programme had been discontinued when they asked for a renewal of 
their visa. The also found that Immigration officers considered their applications for 
visas to be the first one they made – as if all their records over the years had been 
deleted. Those who reapplied for visas after November 2008 were told that this was 
the first time they were issued with a visa and therefore, that they had to a pay a 
security bond. Their first security bond, paid a while ago, was not refunded to them. 
This occurred to Bina Ramanand, an Indian national in October 2009, and also to 
Jordan MacVay, a Canadian national in 2009 (further elaborated below).  
228 Pursuant to Malaysian Immigration Circular No. 6/2009. 
 241 
Visit Passes provided they meet the criteria. In addition, this scheme was amended so 
that participants “aged 50 and above with specialized skills and expertise that are 
required in the critical sectors of the economy, are allowed to work not more than 20 
hours per week” (Malaysia My Second Home 2010).229 This became another way in 
which foreign spouses could get longer terms of residence in Malaysia and permission 
to work on a part-time basis. 
 
The temporary nature of their stay in Malaysia on Social Visit Passes, the limits on 
their right to work, and the restrictions concerning their right to leave and re-enter 
Malaysia have led to foreign spouses to make applications for permanent resident 
status. Most have found this to be a protracted and difficult process, with long delays 
and poor feedback on the status of their application for years on end. However, in July 
2009, the Ministry of Home Affairs was set the task of accelerating the process of 
approving applications for citizenship, permanent residence and birth certificates as 
one of its Key Performance Indicators by the Najib administration (Bernama 
2009a).230 The Ministry stated that it would prioritise some types of applications, 
including those lodged by foreign wives of Malaysian citizens staying continuously in 
Malaysia for five years or more.231 Because of this, many foreign spouses who have 
waited for years have now received decisions on their applications. However, a 
common complaint, particularly by those rejected, is that they are not informed of the 
basis upon which the decision is made (further elaborated below).  
                                                
229 Pursuant to Malaysian Immigration Circular No. 6/2009.  
230 The speedy processing of these applications were one of the key performance 
indicators for the Ministry of Home Affairs set by Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib 
Tun Razak to demonstrate the responsiveness and effectiveness of the government 
under his leadership.  
231 The Ministry of Home Affairs stated that it would also prioritise applications of 
children of Malaysian citizens aged 6 and below and the spouses and children of 
Malaysian professionals abroad who wanted to return to Malaysia. 
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In October 2009, the Prime Minister announced that the government would extend 
permanent resident status to male foreign spouses married to Malaysian women. He 
presented this in his 2010 Budget speech as one of the government’s initiatives aimed 
at “attract(ing) highly talented and skilled individuals from abroad” (Najib 2009:8).232 
However, based on their past experiences, some foreign spouses are very skeptical 
about the implementation of this initiative. 
 
In November 2010, the Immigration Department published statistics showing that it 
had issued 87,830 Long-Term Social Visit Passes to foreign spouses over the course 
of a year – 74,357 in Peninsular Malaysia, 9,615 in Sabah, 3,279 in Sarawak, and 579 
in Labuan (Immigration Department Malaysia 2010d). Between 2001 to July 2008, 
the National Registration Department recorded 61,730 Malaysians married to foreign 
spouses, of whom 16,154 (26 percent) were Malaysian women married to husbands of 
other nationalities and 45,576 were Malaysian men married to women of other 
nationalities (Hariati 2010).233  
 
IMMIGRATION CONTROL OF FOREIGN SPOUSES 
In this section, I outline the official procedures involved in obtaining immigration 
status for foreign spouses. While they appear fairly straightforward when described 
                                                
232 He also announced, “the Government will simplify the granting of Permanent 
Resident (PR) Status to highly talented and skilled individuals to accelerate 
technology transfers and the transformation process. In addition, visas will be 
automatically granted to working and dependent expatriate family members within 14 
days” (Najib 2009:8). 
233 These numbers did not include Malaysians with foreign spouses living overseas, 
and marriages registered before 2001. It is also unlikely to include Muslim marriages, 
as these are registered with State religious offices and not with the National 
Registration Department. 
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below, the system is, in practice, very opaque and a constant source of frustration for 
foreign spouses who live in fear of becoming ‘illegal’. Most foreign spouses complain 
about the lack of clarity regarding the documents required for their applications, the 
length of time for decisions, and the lack of reasons provided for the rejection of their 
applications. As a result, some have had to apply for Special Passes to bridge their 
Social Visit Passes, or to leave and re-enter Malaysia in order to get their visa 
renewed. They have also been subject to discriminatory and racist remarks by 
Immigration officers when lodging their applications.  
 
Permission to Reside and Work as a Foreign Spouse 
Foreign Spouses of Malaysian citizens are able to apply for a Long Term Social Visit 
Pass, which is valid for between 6 months and 2 years. The Long Term Social Visit 
Pass can be extended if the couple meets the conditions set for the Pass. In order to 
qualify, the marriage must be legally recognized under Malaysian law and the 
applicant, the foreign spouse, must be eligible. Applications for these visas can only 
be submitted while they are in Malaysia, and thus, they must first enter Malaysia on a 
(short-term) Social Visit Pass issued to tourists, which can last between 2 weeks and 3 
months depending on their country of nationality. They are then required to apply for 
an extension of this visa while they await the outcome of their application.  
 
The application can be lodged at the Visa, Pass and Permit Division of the 
Immigration Department Headquarters at Putrajaya or at State Immigration Offices. 
However, nationals of China and African countries can only submit their applications 
at the Immigration Department Headquarters. Applicants are required to submit two 
sets of the Imm.55 Form and the Imm.38 Form, 1 set of the Imm.12 form, a statement 
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form from their Malaysian sponsor (typically the Malaysian spouse), the husband's 
and wife's particulars form, an ‘additional information’ form, a security bond with 
RM10 (USD3) stamp duty, a statutory declaration that the marriage is still subsisting, 
2 passport-sized photographs of husband and wife, a photocopy of husband's/wife's 
birth certificate, a photocopy of husband's/wife's Identification Card, a photocopy of 
marriage certificate (for a marriage conducted abroad), a photocopy of their 
Malaysian marriage certificate, a photocopy of a Divorce/Death Certificate (if 
applicable), wedding photographs, a photocopy of children's birth certificate, a 
Trading License/ROC form/Form J (for a Proprietor), a supporting letter from 
employer (for an Employee), an income statement (Form J/bank book/3 months salary 
slip), a residential address and a photocopy of husband's/wife's passport (Immigration 
Department Malaysia 2011b). 
 
In this application, the Malaysian spouse acts as the ‘sponsor’ who undertakes to 
provide financially for the foreign spouse; however, if he/she does not qualify, an 
alternative sponsor can be found. Both the applicant and their Malaysian spouse (or 
the alternative sponsor) must present themselves before the Immigration Officer. The 
decision on the application is at the discretion of the Immigration Officer, who also 
decides on the length of validity of the Long Term Social Visit Pass issued. 
Successful applicants pay RM90 (USD28) for a one-year Long Term Social Visit 
Pass, and depending on their eligibility, RM15 (USD5) for an Exit Visa or RM40 




In order to obtain an extension on the Long Term Social Visit Pass, they need to 
provide the following documents: the Imm.55 form, the Imm.38 form, a statutory 
declaration that the marriage is still subsisting, a photocopy of their children's birth 
certificate, a photocopy of their husband's/wife's identification card, a photocopy of 
their marriage certificate (Malaysia/abroad) and a photocopy of their husband's/wife's 
birth certificate. 
 
An ‘abused foreign wife’ of a Malaysian citizen is also able to apply for a Long Term 
Social Visit Pass. She is required to provide the same documents as above, 
substituting the statutory declaration that the marriage is still subsisting with one that 
states that the husband has left. In addition, she needs to provide a letter from the 
local sponsor, the sponsor’s identification card, the sponsor’s proof of financial 
support (with a monthly income equivalent to or more than RM2,000 (USD630)) and 
supporting documents to prove the abuse, such as police reports or hospital records.  
 
Similarly, a ‘divorced foreign wife’ of a Malaysian citizen can make the same 
application with the same documents, submitting a statutory declaration that she is 
still divorced and providing details of her sponsor. Also, a ‘foreign widow’ of a 
Malaysian citizen can make the same application, submitting the same documents 
along with her husband’s death certificate, a statutory declaration that she is still a 
widow and details of her sponsor. 
 
As stated earlier, the Malaysian Immigration Circular No.31/2008 came into effect in 
November 2008, allowing foreign spouses to work on Long Term Social Visit Passes. 
The terms and conditions of their employment are that the marriage must be legal in 
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Malaysian law, the applicant is eligible for a Long Term Social Visit Pass or has 
already been issued one, the employment, business or professional occupation they 
engage in doesn’t contravene any Malaysian law or regulation, and permission to be 
engaged in employment must be endorsed on their passport by the Immigration 
Department. Approval to engage in employment must be obtained in advance from 
the Immigration Department (at the Visa, Pass and Permit Division at the Immigration 
Headquarters in Putrajaya or at State Immigration Offices). Applications can be 
submitted along with the application for a Social Visit Pass or after the Social Visit 
Pass is issued, and required supporting documents including the marriage certificate 
and a letter of offer from the company/government agency.234 
 
Seeking Permanent Residence Status 
Foreign spouses of Malaysian citizens are one of five categories of applicants eligible 
to apply for an Entry Permit (Permit Masuk), which confers permanent resident status 
in Malaysia (Immigration Department Malaysia 2010b).235 In order to qualify, they 
must have been married to a Malaysian for at least 5 years, been issued with Long 
Term Social Visit Passes236, stayed continuously in Malaysia for 5 years, and have a 
Malaysian sponsor. The application must be submitted at the State Immigration 
Office. After the application is submitted, the applicant and his/her sponsor are 
required to attend an interview with the Immigration Department. 
                                                
234 The latest information on the Immigration website, as at 17 February 2011, does 
not state that a letter from a Malaysian spouse is required  
235 The other categories are: ‘High Nett Worth Individuals’ (individual investors with 
USD2 million fixed deposit in Malaysia), experts, professionals, and applicants 
through a point-based system. 
236 Information on the Entry Permit appeal process indicates that female foreign 
spouses who have lived with their husband in Malaysia on social visit passes, 
temporary work passes and employment passes are eligible for permanent residence 
(Ministry of Home Affairs Malaysia 2010d). It does not state if the same applies to 
male foreign spouses, and estranged or widowed foreign spouses. 
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The Entry Permit entitles the holder to stay and remain in Malaysia without time 
limits, to work and conduct business in Malaysia, to acquire property in Malaysia, and 
to be exempted from visa and immigration requirements to enter and exit Malaysia. It 
lists the nationality of the holder. The Immigration Department website states the 
obligations of permanent residents: they are to observe the laws of Malaysia, they are 
not allowed to get involved in political parties and associations, and their permanent 
resident status can be revoked by the government “at any time if deem[ed] 
necessary.”237 
 
Rejected applicants can submit an appeal within 30 days. Female foreign spouses and 
children of Malaysian citizens are to submit their appeal to the Director General of 
Immigration while all other applicants (presumably including male foreign spouses) 
are to submit their appeal to the Ministry of Home Affairs (Ministry of Home Affairs 
Malaysia 2010d). 
 
Holders of an Entry Permit must apply for a red identity card at the National 
Registration Department (NRD) called the MyPR (National Registration Department 
Malaysia 2010).238 The MyPR identity card is a requirement under Regulation 3 of 
the National Registration Regulations 1990 (Amendment 2001). Applicants must 
come in person to the NRD Headquarters in Putrajaya or to NRD State Headquarters 
to submit their applications. They must do so within 30 days of the date stamped on 
their Entry Permit; otherwise, they are charged a compound and processing fee. They 
                                                
237 See ‘Obligation as Permanent Resident in Malaysia’ on Immigration Department 
Malaysia (2010a).  
238 This application process is described on National Registration Department 
Malaysia (2010). 
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need to submit the original and copies of the JPN.KP01 Application form, their Entry 
Permit and their valid international passport and pay the processing fee of RM40 
(USD13). In practice, it takes up to one year to obtain a red identity card at the 
National Registration Department.239 Applicants can check the progress of their 
application on the NRD website240 if they are issued an application number in the 
same format as a Malaysian identity card; those who are not cannot do so.241 Foreign 
spouses have their permanent resident status revoked if they are divorced from their 
Malaysian spouses. 
 
In 2008, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced that in a period of 20 years until 
May 2008, there were 371,281 permanent residents in Malaysia (K. S. Lim 2010). In 
July 2009, the Ministry reported that it had received 34,523 applications for 
permanent residence between 2001 and 2008, of which it had approved 19,728 (57.1 
percent), rejected 9,496 (27.5 percent) and were processing 5,299 applications (15.3 
percent) (Bernama 2009a).242 Of the 9,468 appeal cases referred to the Home 
Minister, 2,333 (24.6 percent) were approved, 3,370 rejected (35.6 percent), and 
3,765 (39.8 percent) were being processed. In total, therefore, of the PR applications 
received between 2001 and 2008, 63.9 percent were accepted at first instance and 
upon appeal while 37.3 percent were rejected and 26.3 percent remained outstanding.  
 
                                                
239 Lim, Asha. 2010. Personal communication, 4 October. 
240 This can be done on http://www.jpn.gov.my/semakic/ accessed 2 November 2010. 
241 Foreign spouse. 2010. Personal communication, 5 November. 
242 These figures are higher than those reported by the Deputy Home Minister Datuk 
Wira Abu Seman Yusop to the House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat) at 
Parliament stating that between 2001 and 2009 a total of 24,883 applications for PR 
were received and solved (Malaysiakini 2010).  
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Prospects for Citizenship 
Applications for citizenship operate differently for male and female foreign spouses. 
Female foreign spouses are entitled to citizenship by registration and have shorter 
residency requirements for citizenship than non-citizens applying for citizenship by 
naturalisation. Specifically, Article 15 of the Federal Constitution states, 
(1) Subject to Article 18, any married woman whose husband is a citizen is 
entitled, upon making application to the Federal Government, to be registered 
as a citizen if the marriage was subsisting and the husband a citizen at the 
beginning of October 1962, or if she satisfies the Federal 
Government - (a) that she has resided in the Federation throughout the two 
years preceding the date of the application and intends to do so permanently; 
and (b) that she is of good character. 
 
Article 15(5) clarifies that the marriage must be registered in accordance with written 
laws enforced in the Federation. 
 
Male foreign spouses, however, do not have the same entitlement to citizenship by 
registration and can only apply for citizenship by naturalization in the same way as 
other non-citizens. That is, they gain no benefit through their marriage to a Malaysian 
citizen. Article 19 of the Federal Constitution states that an applicant for 
naturalization must be a non-citizen of or over the age of 21 years; have resided in the 
Federation for “periods which amount in the aggregate to not less than ten years in the 
twelve years immediately preceding the date of the application for the certificate, and 
which include the twelve months immediately preceding that date” (Article 19(3)); 
has plans to reside in Malaysia permanently if granted citizenship; is of “good 
 250 
character”; and has an “adequate knowledge of the Malay language” (Article 19(1)). 
Applications for naturalization are granted at the discretion of the Malaysian 
government. 
 
The main legal issue for both male and female foreign spouses in relation to 
applications for citizenship concerns the definition of residence. Article 15(5), which 
comes within Part III of the Federal Constitution related to citizenship, is to be 
interpreted according to Part III of the Second Schedule (see Article 31, Part III, 
Federal Constitution).243 Item 20(2c) of Part III of the Second Schedule states that in 
calculating  
any residence in the Federation… (c) a period during which a person is 
allowed to remain temporarily in the Federation under the authority of any 
pass issued or exemption order made under the provisions of any written law 
of the Federation relating to immigration, shall not, except in the case of any 
period referred to in paragraph (c), with the consent of the Minister, be treated 
as residence in the Federation. (my emphasis) 
 
As such, any time that any foreign spouse spends in Malaysia on passes that allow 
him/her to enter and remain temporarily within Malaysia – including the Long Term 
Social Visit Pass, an Employment Pass, or a Visit Pass for Temporary Employment 
(Pas Lawatan Kerja Sementara, PLKS) – does not count towards his/her residency 
requirement for citizenship244; only his/her time in Malaysia as a permanent resident 
                                                
243 I am guided in this analysis by Haji Sulaiman Abdullah, Constitutional Lawyer, 
member of the Constitutional Law Committee of the Malaysian Bar, personal 
communication by email, 1 October 2010. 
244 Rule 8 of the Immigration Regulations 1963 makes it clear that an Employment 
Pass (or Work Pass in the case of Sabah), a Dependent Pass, a Visit Pass, a Transit 
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on an Entry Permit counts towards his/her application for citizenship.245 Thus, 
although female foreign spouses have an entitlement to citizenship that male foreign 
spouses do not, in practice, few have been able to meet the residency requirements for 
citizenship because their permanent residence applications have been stalled 
indefinitely, often for years on end. Nevertheless, item 20(2c) does allow for the 
Minister to make an exception to this rule. 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IMMIGRATION CONTROL REGIME 
The immigration system for foreign spouses fosters continuing dependence on a 
Malaysian citizen. The basic premise of the Long Term Social Visit Pass is that 
foreign spouses live in a dependent relationship to their Malaysian spouses, and 
continue to do so for the duration of their time in Malaysia, even if this lasts for more 
than two decades. Even if they are financially independent, they need the support of 
their spouse for their Long Term Social Visit Pass applications.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
Pass, a Student Pass, a Special Pass and a Landing Pass are issued “for the purpose of 
entitling a person to enter and remain temporarily within the Federation or within 
Sabah or Sarawak” (my emphasis). Note however, that definitions of residence for the 
purposes of adoption are different. In Neil Duncan Gillies and Megan Sarah-Rose 
Gillies v. Liew Mei Ling and 2 Ors [2010] 1 LNS 294 the High Court in Malaya ruled 
that two foreign citizens, one on an Employment Pass and another on a Social Visit 
Pass, were ‘ordinarily resident’ in West Malaysia within the meaning of Section 4(3) 
of the Adoption Act 1952 as they were “regularly, normally, customarily and usually 
residing in or located at Malaysia”. The judge noted a distinction made by Parliament 
between ‘ordinarily resident’ and ‘permanently resident’, and departed from the 
judgment in Re Benjamin Taine and Anor [2010] 4 CLJ 126 wherein the High Court 
of Sabah and Sarawak ruled that an infant of a legal female migrant worker born in 
Malaysia was not considered to be a person residing in Sabah under the Adoption 
Ordinance 1960 as the terms of her work pass did not confer any permanency of 
residential status for herself or her child.  
245 The requirement for female foreign spouses to hold Permanent Residence status 
for two years in order to qualify for citizenship was stated by the Home Affairs 
Minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein in an interview with the Star newspaper 
(Gabriel 2009). 
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Although a Long Term Social Visit Pass can be issued for up to five years, in 
practice, it is usually issued for periods of between 6 months to 2 years. Thus, foreign 
spouses have to make repeated applications in short periods of time together with 
their Malaysian spouse in which they have to prove, time and again, their continuing 
relationship. Applications that do not have the support of the Malaysian spouse are 
rejected, even if the foreign spouse has a continuous, long-term attachment to 
Malaysia, such as Malaysian children and property in Malaysia. In such cases, foreign 
spouses have to secure the ‘sponsorship’ of another Malaysian citizen in order to 
remain, putting him/her in another dependent relationship.  
 
Secondly, the immigration system is gender-biased. It is primarily designed to 
accommodate female foreign spouses rather than male foreign spouses, putting female 
Malaysian citizens and their male spouses at a disadvantage. This is most obvious in 
relation to immigration procedures to accommodate foreign spouses in distress 
(abused, divorced or widowed), which only apply to female foreign spouses. Again 
these procedures require that they live in Malaysia in a dependent relationship to a 
Malaysian ‘sponsor’. These procedures do not apply to male foreign spouses, who, 
presumably, are expected to leave Malaysia upon the dissolution of their marriages. 
The gender bias is also obvious in relation to applications for citizenship, in which 
female foreign spouses have the right to citizenship by registration while male foreign 
spouses can only apply for citizenship by naturalization, the latter granted at the 
discretion of the Malaysian government. Thirdly, it is a system that only recognizes 
registered heterosexual marriages as a basis for residence of a dependent in Malaysia; 
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it does not recognize marriages through customary rites246, cohabitation, or same-sex 
relationships as a basis for residence in Malaysia. 
 
Fourth, it is an opaque system that fosters a sense of continuous impermanence for 
foreign spouses whose right to reside, work as well as to enter and leave Malaysia are 
always time-limited and subject to the approval of the next Visit Pass. They also 
experience long delays in obtaining outcomes on the applications for permanent 
residence – some applications remain undecided for years and years (further 
elaborated below). The application processes for both Long Term Social Visit Passes 
and permanent resident status do not state the expected length of time required for a 
decision.  
 
Fifth, it is a system that makes it almost impossible for foreign spouses to be 
naturalized as citizens. As stated earlier, time in Malaysia on time-limited, temporary 
passes does not count towards their residency requirements for citizenship. The long 
delays in permanent residence applications have, very likely, been a way in which the 
government has prevented valid applications for citizenship by registration from 
female foreign spouses and application for citizenship by naturalization from male 
foreign spouses. 
 
Finally, it is a system biased towards the notion of a citizen as a person who lives for 
most of his/her time in the territory of the state rather than one who travels frequently 
or has multiple residencies in number of countries. This is most evident in the 
                                                
246 However, Muslim marriages conducted through traditional rites and registered by 
the State religious offices are recognized as legal marriages under the laws of 
Malaysia.  
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stringent residency requirements for citizenship by naturalization. As stated earlier, in 
order to qualify, non-citizens must have stayed in Malaysia for at least 10 years of the 
past 12 years, including the immediate 12 months prior to their application. This 
allows them to travel outside of Malaysia for only an average of 2 months a year for 
ten years, with no travel at all in their final year. This requirement penalizes those 
who have a high level of travel for work purposes, or who have lived abroad for 
substantial periods of time, whether for work purposes, further education, or for 
extended holidays.247 
 
THE PERSPECTIVES OF FOREIGN SPOUSES 
The most significant preoccupation of foreign spouses while living in Malaysia is 
their immigration status. Many live in fear of becoming ‘illegal’ and subject to arrest, 
detention and deportation. Some foreign spouses prefer not to apply for the Long 
Term Social Visit Pass because of the difficulties involved in the application process, 
as well as the restrictions on their time of residence and their ability to work. Instead, 
some apply for an Employment Pass as an expatriate migrant worker, while others 
obtain a visa as a Business Investor, and others reside in Malaysia on a long-term 
tourist visa through the Malaysia My Second Home (MM2H) Programme. Some 
switch between different immigration statuses in the years they spend in Malaysia. 
 
The second major problem that foreign spouses face is the ambiguity involved in 
making applications for both the Long Term Social Visit Passes and permanent 
                                                
247 The Reid Commission proposed this length of time in light of concerns over 
national security and the loyalty of citizens to the Federation of Malaya. Recognizing 
that ten years was long, they opined “conditions in the Federation are such that it 
appears to us difficult in many cases to infer loyalty to Malaya and an intention to 
reside there permanently from any shorter period of residence” (J. S. C. Reid et al. 
1957:16). 
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residence. They are unsure of the precise documents required for each application, the 
length of time needed for a decision on their application, as well as the outcome of the 
decision. As Bina Ramanand, a Indian national with a Malaysian husband, stated, “the 
Immigration rules, regulations and policy change on a month to month basis; it is not 
consistent between [offices in] Putrajaya and Kuala Lumpur. As such, foreign spouses 
never know what to expect; how much the visa charges or the levy [that] will be 
charged, each time they go to Immigration.”248 Delays in decisions on applications 
mean that some have to apply for Special Passes while they await the outcome of their 
applications, or do ‘border runs’ to Singapore and Thailand, either obtaining Social 
Visit Passes to re-enter Malaysia as a tourist or wait (sometimes for weeks) until their 
Visa with Reference is prepared. 
 
In relation to applying for the Long Term Social Visit Pass, Jordan MacVay, a 
Canadian with a Malay Muslim wife, describes the arduous process on his blog. His 
entry dated 14 August 2009 highlight the confusing nature of the process, the unclear 
jurisdiction between state and federal authorities, the delays in processing times, and 
the lack of clarity about the exact documents required (MacVay 2010a). Applying for 
his 17th visa in 7 years in 2009, he was required to resubmit documents he had already 
filed numerous times, including wedding photos, family photos, and copies of 
marriage and birth certificates. His visa application was delayed. After some 
investigation, they were told that the Immigration Department was checking the 
veracity of their marriage with the National Registration Department. When they 
contacted the NRD, the NRD officer said that the Immigration Department was in 
error in contacting them as the NRD did not register Muslim marriages. The officer 
                                                
248 Ramanand, Bina. 2009. Personal communication, 21 January. 
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further clarified that the Malaysian High Commission in Ottawa had also been in error 
in issuing them with a marriage certificate as they could only do so for non-Muslim 
marriages.  
 
When Jordan finally received his visa, he was told to his great surprise, “this is your 
first visa”, and that he therefore needed to pay a RM2,000 (USD630) security bond. 
He was informed that the government had just discontinued the Spouse Programme. 
As such, he could only apply for permanent residence after another six years, as his 
previous years of residence did not count under the new programme. However, 
several months later, to his great relief, another Immigration officer told him that 
previous years of residence did count.249 In a later blog post, dated 1 February 2010, 
he clarifies that his subsequent application for a Long Term Social Visit Pass was 
much easier (MacVay 2010b). 
 
In relation to her permanent residence application, Bina Ramanand explains, 
In 1992, I was told that I could only apply for PR if I resided in the country 
uninterrupted for 5 years. In 1997, I was told that I could not even apply for 
PR status as I was on an employment pass and not a dependent pass. Then I 
was told to go to [the State Immigration office in] Shah Alam [to submit my 
application]. When I was there, I was told that my husband’s residence is in 
Perak. Then I was further pushed away and told to go to [the State 
Immigration office in] Damansara, who told me to go to the state 
[Immigration office in Perak]. Until today, no one seems to know the rule as 
                                                
249 Jordan MacVay blog entry entitled ‘Malaysian PR: The Catch’, dated 2 December 
2009, available on http://macvaysia.com/2009/12/02/malaysian-pr-the-catch/, 
accessed 8 November 2010. 
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to where the submission for application of PR could be made. Finally, I was 
able to submit my application in Pusat Damansara in August 2007. Now I 
have been told that the rules have changed and [only] spouses who have 
children who are below 6 years can apply – after being given a run around for 
15 years. I cannot reduce the ages of my children who are 14 and 9 years of 
age. In conclusion, policies are not in black and white; [they] change 
constantly at [the] whims and fancies of the immigration staff, from officer to 
officer, from month to month; there seems to be no fixed policy for [foreign] 
spouses.250 
 
The ambiguities in the application process have caused suffering amongst foreign 
spouses. The most poignant was the case of Ying Chuen, a mother of three adult 
children, who did not go back home to Taiwan for years because she was told that she 
could only obtain permanent resident status if she demonstrated uninterrupted stay in 
Malaysia for five years. She was unable to go home to tend to her sick parents, both 
of whom died while she was in Malaysia. Until now, she has not forgiven herself for 
not returning when her parents needed her; her bitter experience has had a 
psychological impact on her children.251 
 
In some cases, Immigration officers themselves are unsure of how to implement 
policies. When Robert Lim, a Canadian national married to a Malaysian citizen, 
applied for permanent resident status in 2009, he was called for an interview in 
October. He tells me, 
                                                
250 Ramanand, Bina. 2009. Personal communication, 21 January. 
251 Ying Chuen’s daughter (name changed), 2009. Personal communication, 20 
September. 
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During the interview, the Immigration officer said it was the first time he was 
doing this sort of interview and he didn’t know what he was supposed to ask. 
So, he just made up his own questions. He asked general questions like: Do 
you know the laws of Malaysia? Do you know the laws relating to drugs? Do 
you know the national anthem? Do you know the Rukunegara [National 
Principles]? Do you speak Bahasa?252 
 
A third major problem, as stated earlier, is that permanent resident applications have 
remained undecided for years on end, leaving couples in limbo. In response to a blog 
entry by opposition leader Lim Kit Siang entitled ‘Agony of foreign spouses for PR – 
the worst cases’, dated 27 June 2008, a male Malaysian citizen married to a wife of 
Indonesian nationality described how he has been renewing the visa for his wife on an 
annual basis since they got married in 1993. They submitted their application for 
permanent residence after five years (as was required at that time), and had been 
waiting for a response ever since. Every time they renewed their visa, they enquired 
as to the status of their PR application and were told that it is ‘under consideration’. 
He opines,  
I am worried about my wife if I die. She cannot renew [her] visa without me in 
person. She has to leave Malaysia or else she [will] be [an] illegal person to 
stay here [sic]. I am more worried for my daughter. What will happen to her 
without both the parents? I have no blood to look after her. I am the only son 
for my late Malaysian parents.253 
 
                                                
252 Lim, Robert. 2010. Interview by author, 2 February. 
253 Comment No. 4 by MGR1940, dated 28 June 2008 on K. S. Lim (2008). 
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Some foreign spouses think that they find difficulties obtaining permanent residence 
because they and/or their Malaysian husbands or wives aren’t Malay and Muslim. 
However, Malay Muslim citizens, both male and female, also face the same 
challenges of obtaining permanent resident status for their spouses. A female Malay 
Muslim citizen who also responded to the blog entry by Lim Kit Siang opined,  
I am sorry to read that some replies talk about the link of race and religion as 
well as country of origin to getting your PR status. I think that is really 
uncalled for since I am a Malay and married to an Indonesian and yet we do 
not get any special treatment as what some of you think…254 
 
However, another commentator retorted, 
Uncalled for?? Try this! My father was a Christian, lived in Malaysia for some 
20 years and was asked at the interview by an immigration officer if he would 
like to be a Muslim and change his name? 10 years later, there is still no 
news.255 
 
Roseli Abdullah, a Swiss national woman married to a Malay Muslim citizen who 
moved to Malaysia in 1982, agrees that having a Malay Muslim husband is not 
enough. She opines, “A lot of people say ‘your husband is a Malay; you have no 
problem’. But this is not true. My husband is Malay, but he is opposition-aligned. 
You can’t just be a Malay [to have it easy]; you must be a ‘government party 
Malay’”.256 
 
                                                
254 Comment No. 11 by shaxx, dated 27 June 2008 on K. S. Lim (2008). 
255 Comment No. 14 by undergrad2 dated 27 June 2008 on K. S. Lim (2008). 
256 Roseli Abdullah (name changed), foreign spouse, 12 February 2010. 
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Fourthly, foreign spouses have experienced unpleasant encounters with immigration 
officers, who make racist, sexist, discriminatory and even perverse comments when 
foreign spouses lodge applications. A male Malaysian citizen with a wife of Chinese 
nationality stated, “Sometimes, you even meet some very arrogant immigration 
officer[s]. They even ask whether the child you carry is your own child, or just 
borrow[ed] from others?”.257 A female Malaysian citizen married to a European 
husband, expressed her dismay at the treatment they experienced with an Immigration 
officer: 
…my husband has a professional degree in engineering… and they ask[ed] 
him... why you follow your wife to Malaysia...??!! Your wife should follow 
you to your country!! – this was asked by the immigration department 
(Putrajaya) officer!! (only one sentence of English and very rudely spoken) .. 
can you imagine this!!...258 
 
Another male Malaysian citizen stated, 
Nothing is worse than being asked by a perverted immigration officer during 
an interview for the application of a PR status on the following questions 
orally. How many times you have sex with your wife in a week, why do you 
have to marry a foreign wife, why can’t you marry a local woman. Did you 
have sex before you married your wife. You are lucky that your wife is not 
from China or Taiwan or we would have send [sic] her back straight. These 
were the exact shocking words that still rings loudly in my ears.259 
 
                                                
257 Comment No. 3 by chanwk28, dated 28 June 2008 on K. S. Lim (2008). 
258 Comment No. 19 by kiren, dated 22 July 2008 on K. S. Lim (2008). 
259 Comment No. 44 by toyolbuster, dated 28 June 2008 on K. S. Lim (2008). 
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Indrani Loh, a Singaporean national married to a male Malaysian citizen, found it 
insulting when she was ignored by Immigration and Police officers. They only spoke 
to her Malaysian husband, even when she spoke to them in Malay. This, she says, 
makes her feel invisible in Malaysia. However, she concedes that things have become 
better over time. “Over the years, their treatment has changed from ‘who are you, 
what are you doing here?’ to ‘we will treat you slightly better – we don’t like you but 
we will be polite’”.260 
 
Roseli Abdullah tells me about the importance of being sabar (having patience): 
“Every time I got my one year pass, I was told my permanent residence was not ready 
yet. I had to wait. If you push too hard, you piss them off. Some women actually 
brought kuih (desserts) to get the Immigration officers in a good mood”.261 It took 
Roseli 13 years to get PR status. 
 
A fifth problem is that the support of their Malaysian spouse is required for 
applications for the Long Term Social Visit Pass, permanent residence and to obtain 
permission to work. As mentioned earlier, this puts foreign spouses in a subordinate 
relationship to their Malaysian spouse. Indrani, who has been living in Malaysia for 
more than 27 years, tells me, “When my visa is up for renewal, I am afraid to quarrel 
with my husband. I need him to come with me to the Immigration Department to get 
my visa renewed. Several years ago, when our marriage was on the rocks, I was really 
afraid that I would be kicked out of the country”.262 At one point, she overstayed her 
visa by a few days because her husband was out of the country. Pushpa, an Indian 
                                                
260 Loh, Indrani (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 25 January. 
261 Abdullah, Roseli (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 12 February. 
262 Loh, Indrani (name changed). 2010. Interview by author, 25 January. 
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national whose marriage could not be saved, was not so fortunate. After 13 years of 
marriage and two children, she lost her legal status when she got divorced, becoming 
‘undocumented’. Fortunately, she managed to get another Malaysian citizen to be her 
‘sponsor’, and re-applied for a Long Term Social Visit Pass.263 
 
A sixth problem is the difficulty foreign spouses face in obtaining permission to work. 
Although they have officially been able to apply for the right to work since November 
2008, in practice many have found in difficult to obtain work for various reasons. 
Firstly, some companies are unfamiliar with immigration procedures and are reluctant 
to employ foreign spouses in case they breach immigration laws. Some employers 
also give preferential treatment to Malaysian citizens. Secondly, foreign spouses 
require the permission of their Malaysian spouse to work; if there are estranged, this 
becomes difficult to negotiate. Thirdly, some professional qualifications obtained by 
foreign spouses in other countries, such as dentistry and architecture, are not 
recognized in Malaysia and there are no equivalency tests that will grant them this 
recognition.264 Thus, they are not allowed to practise their profession. Fourth, because 
of extremely strict restrictions on employment before November 2008, some foreign 
spouses living for years in Malaysia have been out of the workforce for so long that 
they feel that they have lost their skills and find it hard to get back into their former 
careers.  
 
                                                
263 Pushpa (name changed). 2010. Personal communication, 21 January. 
264 This was a problem raised by a foreign spouse qualified as a dentist in an opinion 
piece (see The Star Online 2010). The inability of a foreign spouse to practise as an 
architect because she did not qualify to sit for examinations run by the Malaysian 
Institute of Architects (Pertubuhan Akitek Malaysia) on the basis that she was neither 
a citizen nor a permanent resident was highlighted in the case of Koay Cheng Eng v. 
Linda Herawati Santoso [2008] 4 CLJ 105. 
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Asha Lim highlights some of the struggles that have arisen from the restrictions that 
foreign spouses have faced in terms of working. She says, 
Firstly, they are dependent (on their husband) and vulnerable to abuse and 
exploitation. Secondly, their Malaysian spouses and children may have to live 
within a lower income level, which creates additional stress on the marriage 
and restricts access to a better upbringing for the(ir) children. Thirdly, they are 
unable to plan and provide for long-term financial resources for education of 
their Malaysian children, for family medical needs and for their old age. 
Fourthly, the delay in processing may result in (them) having ‘lost years’ of 
high earning capacity and job advancement, in their prime 
working/employable years, which can never be compensated for.265 
 
The worst aspect of the restrictions to work imposed on foreign spouses before 
November 2008 was the fear of being arrested for working illegally. Roseli Abdullah 
described the anxieties of working without official permission in the 1980s. 
There were some problems in my workplace, including the misuse of funds by 
my boss. But I couldn’t say anything. My boss threatened to report me to the 
authorities as a way of controlling me. I was the primary breadwinner at that 
time. I tried hard to get another job but I could not. My position was 
eventually cancelled, so in the end, I lost my job….  
The inability to work was a very significant experience; it was paralyzing…. It 
was a culture shock, [adjusting from] being an active member of society to 
being an ‘appendix’ [with no function]. I was totally incapacitated from the 
outside…. To have to work illegally – it is a big thing, a terrible thing. You 
                                                
265 Asha Lim, personal communication, 25 April 2008. 
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have no feeling of security; you don’t have a right to anything; that feeling is 
paralyzing.266 
 
A seventh problem that foreign spouses face is the difficulties involved in maintaining 
separate finances and independent ownership of property in Malaysia. Those who do 
not hold employment passes or entry permits are not permitted to open independent 
bank accounts; they can only open joint bank accounts with their Malaysian spouse. 
Their bank accounts accrue lower interest rates, and there are limits on the amount of 
money they can pay through bank cheques. They are also subject to restrictions on the 
purchase of property in Malaysia. In order to get property co-registered, they need 
approval from Bank Negara, which takes a long time. The Foreign Investment 
Commission requires that foreigners get approval for buying land. Property sellers do 
not want to wait this long, and interest charges also build up.  
 
Last but not least, foreign spouses are charged higher rates for public and private 
services such as for medical treatment in government hospitals and entrance fees to 
tourist attractions. They were also not eligible for a rebate on petrol offered to 
Malaysian citizens. In addition to the increased financial burden, this contributes to 
their feelings of alienation in Malaysia. As a foreign spouse opined, “We raise 
Malaysian children for years and years and we are still treated like strangers”. 
 
CASE LAW ON FOREIGN SPOUSES 
The judiciary has decided on number of cases concerning Malaysian citizens and their 
foreign spouses, most of which concern family law matters. Firstly, the judiciary has 
                                                
266 Roseli Abdullah (name changed), foreign spouse, 12 February 2010. 
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taken into account the sacrifices made by foreign spouses in moving to Malaysia and 
living with their Malaysian spouses in divorce proceedings. In Koay Cheng Eng v. 
Linda Herawati Santoso [2005] 1 CLJ 247 before the High Court, a Malaysian citizen 
and his wife, an Indonesian national of Chinese descent, had been married for a total 
of 17 years. They got married in the United Kingdom, where they lived together 
before moving to Malaysia where they registered their marriage and lived together for 
a further 11 years. The judge, Raus Sharif J, ordered that the husband pay 
maintenance to his wife commensurate with their lifestyle and standing as a couple on 
the basis that she had sacrificed her professional career as an architect in order to be 
with her husband and to set up home in Malaysia. She was unable to practise as an 
architect in Malaysia as she could not meeting the prerequisites for professionals 
examinations by the Lembaga Akitek Malaysia, being neither a citizen not a 
permanent resident in Malaysia. This decision was upheld in the Court of Appeal 
(Koay Cheng Eng v. Linda Herawati Santoso [2008] 4 CLJ 105). 
 
Secondly, the judiciary has also considered the question of jurisdiction in relation to 
the custody of children of foreign nationals married to Malaysian citizens. In 
Neduncheliyan Balasubramaniam v. Kohila Shanmugam [1997] 4 CLJ 676, the 
husband and father, ‘B’, a Canadian citizen appealed against a High Court decision 
granting his wife, ‘K’, a Malaysian citizen with permanent residence in Canada 
custody of two children, both Canadian citizens. Both ‘B’ and ‘K’ were resident in 
Canada and came to Malaysia for a holiday. While in Malaysia, ‘K’ petitioned for 
divorce and the judge ordered that interim custody be given to ‘K’ pending the 
outcome of the Divorce Petition.  
 
 266 
The petition was struck out, with the judging ruling that ‘K’ had Canadian domicile, 
and therefore, could not apply for divorce under Section 49(1) of the Law Reform 
(Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, which only applied to wives resident in Malaysia 
and ordinarily resident in Malaysia for two years before the commencement of the 
proceedings. ‘B’ then filed a summons to the same judge for the children to be 
returned to him as the interim order was conditional on the disposal of the Divorce 
Petition, which had been struck out. However, the court granted custody and control 
of the two children to the mother, with ‘reasonable access’ to the father. In the Court 
of Appeal, the judges set aside the order of the High Court, and did not make any 
conclusion as to which parent should have permanent and exclusive custody of the 
children. Instead, they left this to the decision of Canadian courts. The judges ordered 
that the children be delivered into the care and custody of their father, who was at 
liberty to bring them back to Canada. 
 
Thirdly, the judiciary has considered whether they have jurisdiction to grant custody 
orders in cases when a marriage was contracted and solemnized abroad but not 
registered in Malaysia and when both parties are Muslim, or whether such decisions 
should be left to the Syariah Court. In the case of Norlela Mohamad Habibullah v. 
Yusuf Maldoner [2004] 2 CLJ 541, a female Malaysian Muslim citizen entered into an 
Islamic marriage with an Austrian citizen in Austria, registering their marriage 
through the civil registry. They subsequently obtained divorce through civil and 
Syariah proceedings and Norlela left for Malaysia. Norlela was pregnant at the time 
of their divorce, and gave birth to a daughter in Malaysia. Later on, her ex-husband, 
Yusuf, and his new wife visited the daughter in Malaysia on a short holiday. Two 
months afterward, he returned to Malaysia, took the child without Norlela’s 
 267 
knowledge, and left the country using forged documents. Norlela obtained an order 
from the Malaysian Civil High Court granting her legal guardianship, custody, care 
and control of their daughter, and managed to get the child returned to Malaysia six 
months later with the help of the Austrian government.  
 
Yusuf Maldoner applied for the order to be set aside, questioning if the High Court 
had jurisdiction to hear an application for guardianship of the child as both of them 
were Muslim. The judged held that the order was valid, stating: “Civil Courts are 
courts of general jurisdiction and can hear cases commenced by Muslims as well as 
by Non-Muslims, and can try offences against Muslims and Non-Muslims that are 
created by the laws of the land”. The Judge reasoned that there was no remedy for 
Norlela with the Syariah Court, as her marriage and divorce were not registered with 
the Syariah system in Malaysia, and that the Syariah Courts did not have inherent 
jurisdiction, unlike Civil Courts.  
 
Last but not least, the judiciary has also examined whether a non-citizen has the 
entitlement to remain in Malaysia on the basis of being a spouse of a Malaysian 
citizen and whether refusal by immigration authorities to allow her to remain in 
Malaysia is perverse and illegal. In Meenal w/o Muniyandi [1979] 1 LNS 89 before 
the High Court of Kuala Lumpur, the judge ruled that Meenal “was not entitled as of 
right to an entry permit to enter or to remain in Malaysia by reason solely of the fact 
that her husband is a citizen”. The unfortunate circumstance of the case was that 
Meenal had overstayed her Visit Pass and Special Pass, and had been arrested and 
placed in prison for the purpose of deportation. The judge also ruled that the Order of 
Removal and the Order of Detention in her case was not illegal and that her detention 
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was not unlawful. This occurred even though she had been married to her husband for 
19 years, had Malaysian children, and had lived in Malaysia for ten years with 
permanent resident status before giving this status up in order to return to India with 
her husband’s mother, who was mentally ill. 
 
In these cases, it is clear that the judiciary has considered the individual circumstances 
of foreign spouses and their personal sacrifices in coming to live in Malaysia, but has 
also recognized that their right to enter and reside in Malaysia is conditional upon 
their immigration status in Malaysia. The judiciary has had to consider carefully the 
limits to their jurisdiction – in particular, where their powers lie in relation to both the 
Syariah system in Malaysia when deciding on cases involving Muslims and in 
relation to the jurisdiction of courts in other countries where one or both of the 
spouses are citizens and/or are domiciled at the time their case is examined.  
 
GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES CONCERNING FOREIGN SPOUSES 
Identifying the objectives that undergird government policies and practices 
concerning foreign spouses is a difficult task because government officials rarely give 
a straight answer on the reasons for their policies and practices. Unlike its approach to 
foreign workers, the approach of the government to foreign spouses has been marked 
more by the absence of strategy, rationale and discussion. In most cases, foreign 
spouses have been left in the dark about the government’s overall position with regard 
to foreign spouses as well as on decisions related to their own individual applications. 
All the foreign spouses I interviewed had theories as to why their own applications for 
permanent residence took a long time or were rejected. In this section, I suggest a 
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number of (implicit) objectives that the Malaysian government has concerning foreign 
spouses based on the limited information available. 
 
Limiting access to citizenship because of ‘national security’ 
The long delays in approving applications for permanent residence is likely tied to the 
government’s reluctance to encourage citizenship by registration for female foreign 
spouses and citizenship by naturalization for male foreign spouses, as indefinite leave 
to remain in Malaysia in a necessary pre-requisite for these applications. As stated 
earlier, the length of residency in Malaysia on an Entry Permit for female foreign 
spouses is far shorter than that required for male foreign spouses – 2 years in 
comparison to 12 years. The Federal Constitution also states that this residence 
period, spent in a legally registered marriage with their husband in Malaysia, entitles 
them to citizenship.267  
 
Government officials have not publicly admitted that they are reluctant to recognise 
foreign spouses as Malaysian citizens. Instead, they have stated that the process for 
permanent residence applications takes a long time because of the deliberate process 
of vetting required on the basis of ‘national security concerns’. This was evident in 
the written response of (then) Home Affairs Minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar to 
a parliamentary question posed by opposition Member of Parliament Lim Kit Siang in 
                                                
267 It is ironic that many foreign spouses have expressed a lack of desire to apply for 
citizenship, content with holding permanent resident status. They prefer not to gain 
Malaysian citizenship because Malaysia does not allow dual citizenship and thus 
requires them to renounce the citizenship of their country of origin. 
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July 2008 concerning the steps taken to speed the issuance of permanent resident and 
citizenship status to foreign spouses, in which he stated268:  
Granting of Permanent Resident status is a gift and not a right (satu anugerah 
dan bukan hak) that can be claimed by foreigners. In considering an 
application for Permanent Resident status (Pemastautin Tetap, PT), the 
Government gives priority to the national security aspects of decision-making. 
Based on these factors, the government is very careful in making judgments 
and decisions. Therefore, all applications must go through a security vetting 
process by the Royal Malaysian Police (PDRM). In addition to the 
investigation conducted by the Police, the applicant and the sponsor will also 
be interviewed to ensure that the information provided is accurate, and also to 
avoid any fraud that may occur. It is also to ensure that applicants are genuine. 
All these steps are vital in order to ensure that the applicant is a person who is 
free from negative characteristics that might threaten national security. The 
government's intention is to ensure that only foreign nationals who really want 
to reside in the country are given the status of Permanent Resident. In 
addition, all the conditions and procedures put in place are intended to 
minimize the likelihood of misuse of facilities such as “marriage of 
convenience” [sic]. 
 
                                                
268 He continued, “Priority to safety is one of the reasons why there are delays in 
processing of applications for Permanent Residence. In addition, there are also other 
factors such as failure by the applicant to make a 'follow-up, the applicant changed 
address and could not be contacted, the information is incomplete, the sponsor can not 
be contacted and so forth. In considering an application for permanent resident status, 
the government always gives priority to foreign spouses of Malaysians. The increase 
in Malaysians getting married to foreign nationals has increased the application for 
permanent resident status by foreigners” (K. S. Lim 2010). 
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Government officials have, however, clearly stated that, “citizenship by naturalization 
is not encouraged” (United States Office of Personnel Management 2001:126). While 
no explicit reason is given for this restrictive approach to citizenship, authors have 
pointed out that the Malaysian government has perceived that having the right ‘ethnic 
balance’ is a core element of national security. This was particularly evident in the 
way the government has responded to several political and social crises wherein 
ethnic balance and corresponding political power shifted as a result of the inclusion 
and exclusion of populations – when Singapore joined the Federation of Malaysia in 
1963, thus increasing substantially the numbers of the Chinese population; when the 
Vietnamese ‘boat people’ arrived on the shores on Malaysia, only to be pushed back 
out to sea because the government was concerned that the ‘ethnic balance’ would shift 
in favour of the Chinese (H. Singh 2004); and when the large numbers of Indonesian 
migrants became visible and perceived as potential agents of the Indonesian state, and 
therefore potential threats to national security (Arifianto 2009; Liow 2003) rather than 
potential Malays through assimilation.  
 
Many non-Malay-Muslim foreign spouses as well as their Malaysian spouses suspect 
that they are not given permanent resident status on the basis that they are neither 
Malay nor Muslim. Their suspicions are fuelled by questions and comments by 
Immigration officers suggesting that conversion to Islam facilitates the acceptance of 
applications, by rumours concerning the issuance of permanent resident status to large 
numbers of Muslim immigrants (also known as ‘Project M’), and by witnessing a 
number of people at Immigration offices who look like Indonesians receiving letters 
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confirming the approval of their Entry Permit.269 As there are no official statistics in 
public circulation that provide detailed information as to the ethnicity, religion and 
country of nationality of foreign spouses given permanent resident status, it is not 
possible to verify if there is indeed an ethnic/religious bias in decisions concerning 
permanent resident applications. Furthermore, both female and male Muslim foreign 
spouses have stated that they too, have been subject to delays in their applications 
despite being married to Malay Muslim citizens.  
 
Finally, there is concern over potential fraudsters entering into ‘marriages of 
convenience’ in order to gain permanent residence and citizenship. Aside from the 
statement by (then) Home Affairs Minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar elaborated 
upon earlier, this has also been raised by the High Court in Meenal w/o Muniyandi 
[1979] 1 LNS 89. Observing that Article 15 of the Federal Constitution relating to the 
registration of foreign wives was amended in 1962 to be more stringent, the judge 
stated, “This new amendment was introduced largely to eliminate the possibility of 
acquisition of citizenship by a formal marriage of convenience entered into purely to 
enable acquisition of federal citizenship by a woman”. These concerns suggest that 
the administrative obstacles related to permanent residence applications may be a 
deliberate strategy to ‘weed out’ false applications so that only the ‘true’ and 
‘genuine’ applications are approved. 
 
It must be noted, of course, that the Ministry of Home Affairs has been speeding up 
the processing of applications for citizenship, permanent residence and birth 
                                                
269 Foreign spouse. 2010. Personal communication, 13 July. When she went to the 
Immigration Office, she observed that the Immigration officers were calling out those 
whose letters of approval were ready for collection and that the recipients looked like 
Indonesian workers. 
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certificates since 2009. The reasons behind this are unclear, although it is likely to 
relate to escalating feelings of discontentment amongst non-citizens and Malaysian 
citizens alike and the desire of the Najib administration to demonstrate its capacity for 
efficient and effective performance. Because of this, large numbers of foreign spouses 
have now received decisions on their applications after years of waiting, even if they 
may not know the basis upon which their applications were accepted or rejected. 
 
Attracting ‘talented’ and ‘skilled’ individuals 
As stated earlier, in 2008 and 2009, a number of changes were introduced to lengthen 
residency periods for foreign spouses on Long Term Social Visit Passes as well as to 
give them permission to work without having to convert their Passes into 
Employment Passes. This is a significant relaxation of rules concerning work; it 
means that foreign spouses no longer have to adhere to the strict rules and regulations 
related to Employment Passes and have the capacity to change employers without fear 
of losing their permission to work. 
 
The reasons for these changes are clear. They are aimed specifically at filling the 
shortage of skilled workers in Malaysia. Foreign spouses are not the only ones to 
benefit – the Malaysian government has also relaxed the rules concerning permission 
to work for dependent spouses of expatriates as well as participants of the Malaysia 
My Second Home Programme. Again, it is the exigencies of the economy that prompt 
a change in the Malaysian government’s policies.  
 
CONCLUSION 
For decades, foreign spouses have lived with great uncertainty with regard to their 
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lives and their futures in Malaysia. They have struggled with opaque administrative 
procedures, given up careers, suffered from loss of income, had their mobility 
restricted and feared becoming ‘illegal’ in Malaysia. Some have had to work illegally 
at great risk to themselves. As their right to remain in Malaysia has been dependent 
on the goodwill of their spouse, they have been vulnerable to abuse.  
 
This research indicates that, until recently, Malaysia has not valued the contribution 
of foreign spouses to Malaysian society. For decades the Ministry of Home Affairs 
instituted a (de facto) policy of delaying decisions on permanent resident applications, 
which effectively prevented foreign spouses from becoming citizens. Since 2008 and 
2009, however, a number of laws, policies, and practices have been amended to allow 
foreign spouses to stay for longer periods in Malaysia, to work legally, and to have 
long-term prospects as permanent residents. These changes have the potential to bring 
great relief to many foreign spouses, allowing them to enjoy greater freedom in 
relation to work.270 These changes were introduced not because Malaysia recognised 
the contribution of foreign spouses as wives/ husbands, mothers/ fathers, and 
members of society, but because it viewed them as untapped sources of foreign talent. 
Economic rationality prevailed in this recalculation of their position in society. 
                                                
270 However, some foreign spouses are unaware of how to take advantage of these 
policy changes; at the time of writing, many have yet to received these benefits. 
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CHAPTER 7: ASYLUM SEEKERS, REFUGEES, AND STATELESS PERSONS 
AINI: SEEKING ASYLUM 
Aini’s fourth child, Nurul, was born in prison. Aini fled to Malaysia to avoid military 
operations in the province of Aceh in 1991.271 They were detained for more than four 
years, spending the first two years in a prison in Kedah and then a further two years in 
an immigration detention depot in Langkap, Selangor. “It was painful raising a child 
in detention”, Aini tells me. “Nurul didn't know what a ‘bird’ was – she saw one for 
the first time only after we were released”. Aini and Nurul were released in 1996 
along with other Acehnese refugees. They were given temporary work permits 
(IMM13) that permitted them to reside and work in Malaysia legally. That year, her 
son, Rijal, who had fled to Jakarta, came to Malaysia to join her.  
 
Several months later, Rijal was arrested while waiting at a bus stop. He was sent to a 
police lock-up in Gombak and then to an immigration detention depot in Semenyih. 
His parents were worried for him, but there was little they could do. “There were 
many Acehnese in Semenyih at this time. Many of us were afraid of what would 
happen to us if we got deported to Aceh. There were stories of people who never 
reached home”, Rijal told me. In March 1998, in what is now known amongst the 
Acehnese as Tragedi Semenyih (the Semenyih Tragedy), Acehnese rioted in a number 
of detention depots after hearing rumours that they would be subject to forced 
deportation, and thus potentially refouled.272 The police used firearms to quell dissent 
and a number were shot, wounded and killed. Rijal was among the 540 Acehnese 
placed on an Indonesian warship and deported.  
                                                
271 Aini (named changed). 2005. Interview by author, 14 September. Rijal (name 
changed). 2005. Interview by author, 14 September. 
272 Amnesty International (1998) reports about this incident. 
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Aini has never forgotten the deep anxiety she felt during this time. She shudders as 
she speaks. “It is terrible to wonder if your child will survive; whether he will be 
arrested and tortured by the Indonesian military”. Thankfully, Rijal lived. He returned 
to Malaysia and sought asylum with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in Kuala Lumpur. However, he was arrested soon afterwards. 
After more time in prison, he eventually got resettled to the United States where he 
sponsored his family to join him. “My mother finds it very hard to talk about her time 
in Malaysia”, he tells me, as we sit over a cup of coffee in Harrisburg, Philadelphia. 
“She prefers to forget about happened in the past, and to focus on the future”.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
There are more than 100,000 asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons residing 
in Malaysia. At the end of May 2011, there were around 94,400 asylum seekers and 
refugees registered with UNHCR273, of whom 91.6 percent originated from Burma 
(UNHCR Malaysia 2011). In Peninsular Malaysia, most live in urban areas, with the 
highest concentrations in Kuala Lumpur and the Klang Valley as well as Penang. 
Refugees live in two broad ‘types’ of places – what Malaysian NGOs and UNHCR 
term ‘urban sites’ or ‘urban areas’ – typically run-down, low-cost flats and houses in 
inner-city neighbourhoods – and ‘jungle sites’ – typically plantation or jungle areas 
                                                
273 UNHCR is an international organisation established by and accountable to the 
United Nations General Assembly. It derives its mandate from the Statute of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, adopted by the 
General Assembly on 14 December 1950 as Annex to Resolution 428(V) which calls 
on governments to cooperate with the High Commissioner in the performance of 
his/her functions. The Statute states: “The work of the High Commissioner shall be of 
an entirely non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social…”  (paragraph 
2). UNHCR’s mandate towards stateless populations evolved later on, through a 
series of General Assemblies resolutions from 1994 onwards.  
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adjacent to construction projects (Nah 2010a). The former tend to be spaces of urban 
decay while the latter tend to be frontiers of urban expansion. These are places where 
they can live relatively cheaply as well as find informal work. There are no refugee 
camps in Malaysia.  
 
Numerous populations have sought refuge in Malaysia in the past, most notably from 
territories in present-day Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam. 
Those who arrived in the Peninsula before the independence of Malaya in 1957 were 
integrated as Malaysian citizens – such as the Acehnese from Sumatra.274 In the 
1970s, Malaysia gained prominence through its role as one of the key transit centres 
in Southeast Asia for Indochinese refugees (Robinson 1998; Suhrke 1983). Between 
1975-1995, close to two million people left Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam overland 
and on boats, seeking refuge in Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines (Frost 1980). 
 
Malaysia’s approach to Indochinese refugees changed over time. Initially, groups 
were placed in refugee camps and given assistance. However, from 1977 onwards, 
fearing the arrival of overwhelming numbers, the government began to classify them 
as ‘illegal immigrants’, pushing boats back out to sea unless UNHCR intervened in 
time (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 1996). (Then) Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohammad attracted negative press when he announced that the government would 
adopt a ‘shoot on sight’ policy (Time Magazine 1979), which was subsequently 
                                                
274 Acehnese have sought asylum in the Malay Peninsula during periods of conflict 
since the late 19th century (A. Reid 2005). Some established permanent settlements in 
Perak, Penang, Langkawi and Kedah. Abdul Majid (1980) provides an ethnographic 
description of Malaysians of Acehnese descent in Kampung Yan, Kedah. 
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retracted and repositioned as a ‘shoo’ on sight policy (Cheah 2002). However, 
through negotiations with other states and through its participation in the 
intergovernmental Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), Malaysia eventually hosted 
around 258,500 Vietnamese refugees in temporary closed camps. By 1998, 249,132 
had been resettled to third countries and 9,365 returned to Vietnam (UNHCR 
Malaysia 1998). The last Vietnamese refugee from this period in history departed 
Malaysia in August 2005 (Steenhuisen 2005).  
 
Malaysia has also sporadically offered asylum to different groups of Muslim refugees. 
From 1975 onwards, Malaysia gave refuge to Khmer Muslims from Cambodia, some 
of whom arrived on its shores and some of whom were resettled from Thailand 
(Robinson 1998; UN High Commissioner for Refugees 1996). By 1993, 12,627 of 
them had been registered with the help of UNHCR and over 50 percent had been 
given citizenship (UNHCR Malaysia 1998). In 1994, in a public demonstration of 
Islamic solidarity and rising Asian economic strength during a global crisis, Malaysia 
offered asylum to 350 Bosnian Muslims fleeing the collapse of Yugoslavia (Farley 
1994). In the 1970s, Malaysia was also a place of refuge for around 120,000 Muslim 
refugees from the southern Philippines who settled in Sabah (Strauch 1980). 
However, only some of them were officially registered and given temporary, 
renewable IMM13 passes for work; an estimated 61,000 remain in Sabah on these 
permits today (Bernama 2006). In December 2004, Malaysia issued around 32,000 to 
35,000 temporary time-limited passes for work (known as the IMM13) to Acehnese 
Muslim refugees after the devastating Asian Tsunami.275 In October 2004, the 
                                                
275 The conditions of the IMM13 passes are more generous than the Visit Pass for 
Temporary Employment (Pas Lawatan Kerja Sementara, PLKS) issued to 
documented migrant workers – they allow the holder to change jobs and to work 
 279 
Malaysian government announced that it would give IMM13 passes to Rohingyas, a 
Muslim ethnic minority from Burma, but the implementation of this failed, with 
accusations of corruption made against Rohingya community leaders engaged in 
facilitating these procedures (Nah 2007). 
 
During the same period, there were other smaller and less visible flows of asylum 
seekers and refugees into the Peninsula, such as the Acehnese from Sumatra and Thai 
Muslims from Southern Thailand (Mantāphō̜n and Muntarbhorn 1992). In the 1990s, 
UNHCR registered around 200-250 new arrivals a year who originated from different 
countries in Asia, the Middle East and Africa (UNHCR Malaysia 1998). The relative 
invisibility of these ‘urban refugees’ perpetuated a lack of proactive response from 
UNHCR and from Malaysian civil society groups. Aside from the Indochinese 
refugees (then sequestered in camps), the dominant myth until 2003 was that very 
few, if any, refugees existed in Malaysia.276  
 
In terms of its legal framework, Malaysia is a state party neither to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention nor to its 1967 Protocol. Neither is it a state party to the 1954 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons nor the 1961 Convention on the Reduction 
of Statelessness. However, Malaysia is a signatory to the 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and is therefore obligated to ensure that asylum-seeking and 
                                                                                                                                      
without the employer having to pay foreign levies. The IMM13 has also been issued 
to women and children, allowing them to reside in Malaysia legally and, for children, 
to go to school.  
276 Large numbers of Acehnese arrived from 2003 onwards to escape intensive 
military operations, joining the existing population of Acehnese permanent residents, 
migrant workers and refugees in Peninsular Malaysia. Hostilities in the Province of 
Aceh ended with the signing of the Helsinki Peace Agreement in August 2005. In 
2008, these IMM13 passes were no longer renewed, and the estimated 29,000 
remaining in Malaysia were given until January 2009 to return to Aceh or face arrest 
as ‘illegal immigrants’. 
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refugee children received protection and humanitarian assistance (Article 22). 
Malaysia’s domestic laws do not give legal status to asylum seekers and refugees. As 
many come into Malaysia through irregular channels, use fake passports, or overstay 
their visas, they are often liable to prosecution for immigration offences. Indeed, the 
greatest difficulties that asylum-seeking populations face in Malaysia stem from their 
treatment as irregular migrants. 
 
Asylum-seeking populations are attracted to Malaysia for several reasons. Firstly, it is 
relatively easy to gain access into its territories. Robust networks of smugglers have 
constructed numerous routes over land and sea from Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines (Ananta and Arifin 2004; Battistella and Asis 2003; Hugo 1988; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2001; Spaan et al. 
2002).277 Malaysia is also a hub for international air travel, with flights coming in 
from all over the world; it is relatively easy to get a visa to Malaysia.278 Asylum-
seeking populations are able to enter Malaysia through legal means as migrant 
workers, tourists and students, staying on to mount asylum claims with UNHCR.  
 
Secondly, it is possible to get informal work, particularly in the construction, 
agriculture and service sectors – albeit with associated vulnerabilities to exploitation 
and cheating. The availability of work is crucial for the avoidance of poverty, as 
asylum-seeking populations usually live in Malaysia for years waiting for status 
determination and resettlement. Thirdly, as numbers grow, refugees have been better 
able to receive social and material support from members of their own communities in 
                                                
277 Some of these smuggling routes are constructed with the participation of corrupt 
immigration officials who ‘look the other way’ for a bribe. 
278 However, Malaysia has tightened visa requirements periodically, thus reducing the 
ability of refugees to enter Malaysia legally (The Associated Press 2010).  
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Malaysia. Fourthly, for refugees from Burma specifically, they are not deported 
directly to Burma but to Thailand. This gives them a sense – false or not – that they 
would be better protected in Malaysia.279  
 
The Malaysian government has permitted UNHCR to maintain an office in Kuala 
Lumpur since 1975, when it assisted the government in responding to Indochinese 
refugees. The UNHCR office is located in an exclusive residential area of Bukit 
Petaling. There is only one UNHCR office in Malaysia. All who seek asylum and 
international protection come to this office eventually – it is where they return if 
released from detention centres, it is where they make appeals for help, where they 
mount collective protest to express grievances, and from where they depart for 
resettlement countries. As a result, Kuala Lumpur has become a unique node for 
populations seeking refuge in Malaysia; it is where they mingle, find work, pool 
resources, and gain community support.  
 
The first phase of UNHCR’s existence focused primarily on Indochinese refugees 
until the official end of the CPA in 1996. The scope of its work has changed over 
time, in response to the needs and circumstances of populations seeking its assistance. 
It maintained a fairly quiet operation from 1996 to 2001, receiving an average of 820 
new applications for asylum each year.280 From 2002 onwards however, UNHCR 
received significantly larger numbers of new claims for asylum, primarily from 
nationals from Indonesia (mostly Acehnese) and Burma. As elaborated in Chapter 5, 
2002 was also the year in which whipping was introduced in the Immigration Act 
                                                
279 Alexander, Amy. 2010. Personal communication, 19 May. 
280 More specifically, it received 208 new applications in 1996, 231 in 1997, 1,207 in 
1998, 1,853 in 1999, 453 in 2000, and 964 in 2001 (UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees 2004:380). 
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1959/1963 as possible punishment for irregular entry and when a ‘crackdown’ on 
irregular immigrants was launched. This prompted many to seek asylum as a means 
for forestalling arrest, punishment and forced deportation. In 2003, UNHCR in 
Malaysia registered the highest increase in new asylum claims in the world, from 
2,100 applications in the previous year to 18,600 (UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees 2004), thus becoming the tenth largest recipient of asylum seekers 
worldwide. Since then, UNHCR in Malaysia has maintained one of the busiest 
refugee status determination (RSD) operations in the world. Table 11 provides total 
numbers of persons of concern registered with the Office from 2002-2009.  
 
 
Table 11: Persons of Concern to UNHCR Malaysia 
 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
2009 








Concern 0 62,053 62,311 61,552 61,314 101,730 101,318 
 
NA 




Source: Data for 2002-2005 obtained from UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(2007a); for 2006-2008 obtained from UN High Commissioner for Refugees (2007b, 
2008b, 2009) and for 2009 from UNHCR Malaysia (2009).  
Note: In 2003, UNHCR reclassified Filipino Muslims and some refugees from 
Myanmar (Burma) from the ‘refugees’ category to ‘others of concern’ (UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees 2004). For the 2007 and 2008 figures, ‘Others of 
Concern’ comprises three categories: ‘people in refugee-like situations’, ‘stateless 
persons’ and ‘various’. 
 
 
The inability of refugees to integrate locally or to return home makes resettlement to a 
third country the only viable ‘durable solution’. UNHCR has been able to negotiate a 
large number of resettlement places for refugees in Malaysia. From facilitating the 
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resettlement of less than 100 people in 2002, it facilitated over 7,000 in 2009 (UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees 2002; UNHCR Malaysia 2009).281  
 
At present, UNHCR plays a significant role in identifying, protecting, and providing 
assistance to asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons. It registers these 
‘persons of concern’ (POCs), conducts RSD, provides services and material relief 
through implementing partner agreements with Malaysian civil society groups282, and 
provides legal intervention when POCs are arrested and detained in immigration 
detention centres and prisons. It also advocates with the government for the protection 
of these groups within Malaysia, and facilitates resettlement to other countries with 
the assistance of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). 
 
                                                
281 Specifically, as of 30 November 2009, UNHCR Malaysia submitted 3,399 cases 
(comprising 9,307 people) to resettlement countries, of which 3,099 cases (7,573 
people) were accepted. By that date, 3,000 cases (7,053 people) had actually departed, 
90.0 percent of them to the United States of America, 5.5 percent to Australia, and the 
rest to Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, New Zealand, and 
Sweden (UNHCR Malaysia 2009). 
282 UNHCR works with Malaysian civil society groups (primarily NGOs and faith-
based groups) to provide health, education and legal aid services to refugee and 
stateless communities. UNHCR funds some of these programmes through 
implementing partner agreements; however, many groups also raise their own funds 
in order to run independent programmes for communities. These services are usually 
provided free to refugee and stateless populations. Medical services include the 
provision of primary health care at mobile and static clinics, sexual and reproductive 
health services and counselling, mental health programmes, and specialised treatment 
for tuberculosis and HIV patients. Education programmes mainly focused on 
providing primary and secondary education to younger children. There are also 
classes organised for adult groups, focused on language development, computer skills 
and livelihood skills. In terms of legal aid, UNHCR partners with the Legal Aid 
Centre (LAC) to run a clinic staffed by pupils. Over a six-month period from January 
to June 2010, the UNHCR-LAC clinic attended to 2,696 clients (Bar Council Legal 
Aid Centre Kuala Lumpur 2010). 
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IMMIGRATION CONTROL AND ASYLUM SEEKERS, REFUGEES, AND STATELESS 
PERSONS 
The government itself does not have systems and processes aimed at regularising and 
regulating asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons. However, since 2002, 
UNHCR’s efforts at identifying, protecting and assisting asylum-seeking populations 
have resulted in the emergence of a regime of regulation aimed at separating asylum-
seeking populations from other migrants with irregular status and minimizing the 
negative impacts of Malaysia’s immigration control mechanisms on them. 
 
Before reviewing the specific practices of UNHCR in regulating asylum-seeking 
populations, it is useful to consider its global role and mandate. The international 
refugee protection regime is based on the understanding that states need to work 
together to address forced displacement and that an individual state cannot do this 
alone. One of the main responsibilities of UNHCR is the supervision of state practice 
in relation to its international obligations towards asylum seekers, refugees, and 
stateless persons. However, as Volker Turk, the current Director of International 
Protection (and incidentally, the previous Representative of the High Commissioner 
to Malaysia from 2004-2008) observes, UNHCR plays an unusual role for a UN 
agency, “interceding directly on behalf of distinct individuals and groups of people” 
(Turk 2010:3). As Turk points out, there are contexts in which UNHCR plays a “de 
facto state substitution role” (p. 11), with “strong operational involvement” (p.15). In 
such contexts, UNHCR gets involved in the case management of individuals and 




Practices of Identification: UNHCR Registration and Refugee Status 
Determination 
In order to protect asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons, it is necessary to 
identify them as such. As the Malaysian government has been reluctant to undertake 
status determination activities, UNHCR performs this function by conducting 
registration and RSD procedures. UNHCR registers asylum seekers in one of two 
ways. It registers non-Burmese asylum seekers in their office in Kuala Lumpur, and 
register asylum-seeking populations from Burma through mobile registration 
exercises (further elaborated below).283 Non-Burmese asylum seekers are required to 
present themselves at the UNHCR office for registration early in the morning. 
Sometimes, they are able to get registered on the first day they arrive; however, if the 
daily quota for registration is exceeded, they are instructed to return home and to 
come again another day284.  
 
Asylum seekers registered with UNHCR obtain a paper document with their photo 
and thumbprint on it. They are then given dates for RSD interviews, which can be 
scheduled for several weeks or months ahead of time depending on current case loads. 
Some asylum seekers are given a decision after the first interview, while others have 
to attend several interviews before a decision is given. In some cases, the process of 
                                                
283 Asylum-seekers from Burma who are in need of emergency registration (such as 
those in need of urgent medical care) are also able to get registered at the gates of 
UNHCR. 
284 In their desperation to avoid arrest, detention and deportation, some migrants with 
irregular status lodge asylum claims with UNHCR. Some have valid claims that meet 
the legal definition of a refugee or stateless person in international law, while others 
don’t. There are also non-citizens with legal status (whether as tourists, students, 
migrant workers or permanent residents) who approach UNHCR with asylum claims. 
In international law, the legal status of an applicant in Malaysia is irrelevant to 
whether they are a refugee or stateless person – however, in practice, UNHCR has 
rejected applicants from registration procedures on the basis that they have passports 
and valid visas as migrant workers. 
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status determination is protracted, lasting for more than two years, much to their 
frustration. Those who are rejected are allowed two appeals on the basis of being able 
to provide new information to support their claim. Those who are recognised as 
refugees through the RSD process are issued a plastic, tamper-proof identity card with 
their photo and thumbprint on it. The asylum seeker letters and the refugee identity 
cards are time-specific documents with expiry dates that need to be renewed 
periodically. Renewals of these identity documents allow UNHCR to maintain 
updated records of the populations under its purview.  
 
Asylum-seeking populations from Burma are registered and have their status as 
refugees determined through an expedited process through UNHCR-organised mobile 
registration exercises. This is done with the assistance and participation of refugee 
community-based organisations and is a system that has evolved over time, as a result 
of refugees forming self-help collectives and developing partnerships with UNHCR 
(see Nah, forthcoming). The first step in this process is for asylum seekers to seek out 
one of the community-based organisations of their ethnicity – such as the Chin 
Refugee Committee (CRC) or Alliance of Chin Refugees (ACR) if they are Chin, the 
Kachin Refugee Committee (KRC) if they are Kachin, the Mon Refugee Organisation 
(MRO) if they are Mon, and so on. They then register as members of the community-
based organisation, paying a membership fee of between RM10-60 (USD3-19) per 
person on a monthly, biannual or annual basis. The community-based organisations 
issue them with community registration cards that identify them as asylum seekers 
from their country of origin awaiting official registration with UNHCR. Such 
membership with the community-based organisation constitutes their ‘pre-
registration’ with UNHCR.  
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UNHCR periodically instructs the community-based organisations to submit 
membership lists, perhaps once or twice a year. Using the biographical and 
geographical information provided in these lists, UNHCR plans and executes mobile 
registration exercises, registering up to several hundred people at a time. Those who 
do not meet the criteria for expedited status determination are scheduled for RSD 
interviews and processed in the same way as non-Burmese asylum seekers.  
 
Between 2004-2008, UNHCR maintained an unofficial cap of around 47,000 of 
registered persons. This cap was lifted in 2009, and within a one-year period, the 
numbers of registered Burmese asylum seekers and refugees increased significantly as 
UNHCR conducted more mobile registration exercises (Table 11). Nevertheless, there 
are still many protection gaps with this approach (further elaborated below). 
Interviews with refugee community leaders of ethnic minorities from Burma in March 
2011 indicate that only around 30 percent of their communities are registered with 
UNHCR, with the others desperate for registration.285 
 
Practices of Intervention: UNHCR Outreach Protection Intervention 
Another very significant way in which UNHCR protects those registered with it is 
through its ‘outreach protection and intervention’ activities, which involve responding 
to cases where they are arrested, detained, and charged in court. Since the 2005 
crackdown on irregular immigrants, UNHCR has maintained a ‘hotline’ through 
which it receives emergency calls for assistance. When responding to an arrest, 
UNHCR records as many details as possible, including the name of the arrested 
                                                
285 Community leader from Burma. 2011. Interview by author, March 29. 
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person, their location, the UNHCR reference number (as recorded on their UNHCR 
documents or cards), and, when they are detained in immigration detention depots, 
their ‘body number’. UNHCR then contacts the relevant authority to request for their 
release and/or makes an appointment to see the person in detention.  
 
Those who are arrested by the Police are typically kept in police lock-ups and 
transferred to immigration detention depots within several days, while those arrested 
by Immigration and/or RELA are either kept in immigration holding facilities or 
taken directly to immigration detention depots. As stated in Chapter 3, all non-citizens 
who are arrested can be legally subject to 14 days of remand before they must be 
presented before a magistrate. Often, those under remand are not allowed to make any 
outside contact, which makes it very difficult for them to seek assistance. During this 
period also, UNHCR is usually barred from visiting them. 
 
If a refugee is charged with immigration offences and brought to court, UNHCR 
makes an application to the Attorney General’s Office for these charges to be dropped 
and arranges for a Malaysian lawyer to provide legal aid.286 UNHCR also writes to 
the Immigration Department to request for the release of individuals from 
immigration detention depots. As a result, some vulnerable refugees in detention – in 
particular, children, as well as the mentally or physically ill – have been released after 
a period of detention.  
 
Since 2002, as a result of the advocacy of UNHCR and civil society groups, there 
have been a number of policy changes in different arms of the government that 
                                                
286 However, UNHCR does not intervene if the individual is charged with criminal 
offences.  
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indicate their recognition of the special needs of persons of concern to UNHCR. Now, 
the Police usually release those who hold refugee identity cards after verifying their 
documents with UNHCR, if they were detained solely on the basis of committing an 
immigration offence. However, if the refugee is sent to an immigration detention 
depot before UNHCR is contacted, the process of identity verification and release is 
often delayed. As a result, some registered refugees have been detained for several 
months before being released. In 2005, the AG’s Chambers agreed to waive 
prosecution for immigration offences for recognized refugees registered with 
UNHCR. 
 
However, not all asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons are able to obtain 
comprehensive assistance from UNHCR, and as such, have faced the full brunt of 
arrest, punishment for immigration offences (sometimes including a sentence of 
whipping), indefinite detention and forced deportation (sometimes leading to 
refoulement). This occurs for a number of reasons. As stated, some are unable to call 
UNHCR when they are arrested or to keep UNHCR updated as to their whereabouts 
when they are transferred to another detention facility. Secondly, law enforcement 
officers sometimes give UNHCR misleading information, stating that the person they 
enquire after is not present in their detention facility. This makes it difficult for 
UNHCR to establish contact with persons in detention. Thirdly, immigration officers 
exercise great discretion in relation to the release of detainees. An officer can reject or 
delay decisions on applications by UNHCR for the release of individuals depending 
on his/her mood and foibles. Fourthly, it is more difficult for UNHCR to intervene on 
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behalf of asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons who were not registered with 
them at the time of their arrest.287  
 
In 2005, UNHCR Malaysia managed to secure the release of 1,734 asylum seekers 
and refugees from police lock-ups, prisons and immigration detention centres (UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees 2006). In 2008, when UNHCR capped the number 
of registered POCs, its caseloads in detention centres also dropped – not because 
fewer people were arrested, but because UNHCR didn’t intervene for those who were 
not registered with them at the point of arrest. UNHCR Malaysia plans for 2010 
include timely registration and fair and efficient RSD procedures, as well as legal 
counsel for 500 asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons charged with 
immigration offences (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 2010c) – a modest 
number considering its overall caseload. 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IMMIGRATION CONTROL REGIME 
In establishing practices to identify and intervene on behalf of asylum seekers, 
refugees, and stateless persons, UNHCR has created the means through which these 
groups can be protected from the brunt of Malaysia’s harsh treatment towards 
irregular immigrants (as detailed in Chapter 5). Unfortunately, there are no other ways 
though which non-citizens with irregular status can gain legal status without first 
returning home. This has particularly dire consequences for people in need of 
international protection.288 This is why asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons 
                                                
287 UNHCR has also been criticized for their perceived reluctant to intervene in such 
cases. 
288 Those who wish to apply for passes for work, tourist visas or student visas in order 
to stay in Malaysia are required to return home and to lodge their applications from 
there. Since 2009, some immigrants with irregular have also been permitted to leave 
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place great importance on UNHCR registration and recognition of status; it is their 
only hope of avoiding arrest and refoulement as well as of getting resettled.289  
 
However, one of the most frequent complaints voiced by asylum seekers, refugees, 
and stateless persons over the years has been the difficulty they face in gaining access 
to registration and RSD procedures. Since 2002 (and possibly before), there has been 
significant pressure on registration, with many people competing for limited places. 
UNHCR has restricted registration for several reasons. One is a concern that high 
registration numbers will invite criticisms by the Malaysian government that UNHCR 
is not sufficiently rigorous in differentiating between irregular migrants and refugees. 
Another is that they do not have the resources to conduct mobile registration exercises 
due to funding shortages. However, these restrictions have also resulted in negative 
outcomes, such as the failure of UNHCR to accurately identify and protect 
particularly vulnerable refugees such as unaccompanied minors and survivors of 
sexual and gender-based violence.290 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Malaysia without being charged for immigration offences, if they pay a fine. 
However, this does not give them any right to return and reside in Malaysia. 
289 However, in reality, only a small proportion of recognised refugees will ever be 
resettled, due to annual quotas. Most will live in Malaysia indefinitely. 
290 According to James Meisenheimer, who volunteered with an Arakan community-
based organisation for almost a year from 2009-2010: “Such a policy had widespread 
affects among the ethnic Arakan community from western Burma. In 2009, UNHCR 
stopped registering the Arakan Community, claiming that they received information 
from the Malaysian Immigration Department that the majority of Arakans in Malaysia 
came with valid passports and passes for work and that the entire community had no 
cause to claim asylum. Registration ceased among the approximate 15,000 ethnic 
Arakans living throughout Malaysia, and among the Arakan population in Malaysian 
Immigration Detention Centers. At present there are an estimated 300 Arakans in 
Immigration Detention Centers that have not been given access to UNHCR. Included 
in this population are vulnerable individuals.” Meisenheimer, J.  2010. Personal 
communication, 26 May. 
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As stated, the possession of UNHCR identity papers and cards can result in the 
release of asylum-seeking populations – however, this is not guaranteed and law 
enforcement officers exercise great discretion in deciding whether or not to accept the 
validity of UNHCR documents. In some cases, asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless 
persons have been told point blank by RELA officers upon showing their refugee 
identity documents, “you are exactly the kind of people we are looking for”; the 
officers then proceeded to arrest them. Once the arrest of an individual is officially 
recorded, the direct intervention of UNHCR is necessary. This places great pressure 
on UNHCR – the greater the number of people registered with this UN Agency, the 
more work they accrue in outreach protection and intervention activities. If no 
intervention is made, these groups, including those registered with UNHCR, are 
treated and punished as ‘illegal immigrants’. 
 
UNHCR’s partnerships with refugee community-based organisations have a direct 
impact on the power-relations between the leaders of these community-based 
organisations and their communities. As registration and resettlement are prized 
outcomes for asylum-seeking populations, any organisation or individual that is 
perceived to have influence with UNHCR over these activities is seen as an agent of 
power. This paves the way for corruption. Over the years, there have been many 
accusations that refugee leaders and refugee interpreters (in particular, those who 
translate RSD interviews) have accepted sums of money to speed up or increase the 
chances of someone being registered, recognised as a refugee or even resettled. 
UNHCR has an official policy against corruption and takes some measures to reduce 
the possibility of corruption. In mobile registration exercises, for example, UNHCR 
has been very strict about limiting those who are registered to those whose 
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biographical information is already captured on community registration lists.291 
However, there have also been cases where reports of corruption have not led to direct 
disciplinary action.  
 
A strategic question that confronts every UNHCR operation at the country level – and 
from which UNHCR in Malaysia is not exempt – is how far they are able to act for 
the protection of asylum-seeking populations before they ‘cross the line’. UNHCR is 
concerned about pushing too much, and as result reducing their ‘protection space’ – 
the space they are given to intercede for and provide services to populations in need. 
In the worst-case scenario, UNHCR officials are afraid of being declared persona non 
grata and being kicked out of the country and having UNHCR country operations 
shut down. As UNHCR often operates with ambiguity, especially when they respond 
to unfolding crises and if they try out new initiatives, this fear leads them to be 
conservative in their interpretation of their mandate and cautious in their advocacy 
and in their actions.292 
 
THE PERSPECTIVES OF ASYLUM SEEKERS, REFUGEES, AND STATELESS PERSONS 
Those who come to seek asylum in Malaysia have some pre-conceptions of what to 
expect when they arrive, formed on the basis of the stories told by their friends and 
family, and sometimes, the smugglers who try to attract their business. However, 
much more intense ‘learning’ occurs as they deal with the practicalities of living and 
                                                
291 This is also a crowd-control measure taken to reduce the likelihood of new arrivals 
accumulating in large numbers at registration sites who were not pre-identified as 
applicants for registration. 
292 The other two beliefs that shape the nature, quality and boldness of their advocacy 
and actions are (a) the idea that what they are doing operationally is not ‘really their 
job’ but the job of the host government, and therefore, (b) whatever they do is better 
than nothing being done at all. 
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surviving in Malaysia. Many of the opinions they hold are shaped through formal 
interactions with refugee community-based organisations, Malaysian NGOs, and 
UNHCR, as well as through informal interactions with other refugees. 
 
New arrivals often find it difficult to trust authority figures. Some feel afraid of 
UNHCR personnel, seeing the UN system as a form of bureaucratic control that 
liaises uncomfortably closely with the government of Malaysia and their own 
governments. They are afraid that their biographical information and their narratives 
of resistance to state repression collected by UNHCR during RSD interviews will be 
shared with their own governments without their knowledge. They distrust 
bureaucracy. Some refugees, especially those who have been arrested in their 
countries of origin, are instinctively afraid of UNHCR security guards – their 
uniforms and strict manner remind them of the military and police at home who 
mistreated them and/or their families and friends. The reassurance of NGOs and 
fellow community members as well as the witnessing of practical assistance and 
outcomes of asylum claims helps to counter this distrust, but in some cases, it is never 
fully overcome. Some refugees remain ambivalent about UNHCR, seeing it as a 
quasi-government entity that may or may not be trustworthy, that may or may not be 
truly committed to their personal protection, and which wields significant power over 
their lives. 
 
Life in Malaysia is uncertain and filled with anxiety for asylum-seeking populations. 
Police and RELA personnel threatened them with arrest, demanding payment for their 
release. The quantum of payment varies – from what they have on them (typically 
RM20-50 (USD6-16 with valuables and mobile phones), up to RM1,000 (USD314, 
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an equivalent of around 1-2 months of salary) or even more. On some occasions, 
corrupt police have forced refugees into their patrol cars and driven around for hours 
or detained them in lock-ups until the payments were made with the help of friends or 
family who were given instructions on how to make the payments. The extortion of 
asylum-seeking communities has been widely documented (e.g. see Christian 
Solidarity Worldwide 2006; Chin Human Rights Organisation 2005; Human Rights 
Watch 2004; International Federation for Human Rights and SUARAM 2008). Local 
Malaysians, too, are potential sources of threat. Refugees have reported gangsters 
breaking into the houses of refugees to rob them, and taxi drivers driving them to 
different locations and demanding money to release them.293 Refugee leaders have 
worked with the MACC to catch corrupt police, and also reported that the local police 
have been willing to help when they face problems with gangsters. However, there are 
potential negative outcomes – in one case, when refugee leaders reported the matter to 
the police, the gangsters severely beat the refugees whom they were holding to 
ransom.294 
 
As stated earlier, UNHCR documents do not guarantee freedom from arrest. 
“Sometimes if they are very angry with us, they tear up our documents”, said Din, an 
Acehnese refugee in his mid-30s. When we spoke in 2008, Din had been residing in 
Malaysia for six years, and had been arrested and deported three times. The last time 
he was arrested was at a roadblock, as he walked home from visiting a friend. “When 
the police stopped me, I showed my UNHCR letter. He tore it up and said, “‘this is 
                                                
293 In one case, a taxi driver demanded RM3,000 (USD941) but settled upon RM500 
(USD157). Mon refugee. 2010. Interview by author, 22 February. 
294 Mon refugee. 2010. Interview by author, 22 February. 
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not effective here’ (tak laku disini). I wanted to phone UNHCR but he took away my 
handphone and told me to get into the lorry”.295 
 
Those who have been arrested and have had their deportation halted by UNHCR have 
spent indefinite periods in detention. Sometimes, they have done so after serving 
prisons sentences and being whipped for immigration offences. Detention conditions 
vary, but in many immigration detention depots, detainees suffer from overcrowding, 
poor sanitation, insufficient food, water, clothing and bedding, as well as poor access 
to health services and exposure to violence from fellow detainees and guards. Afraid 
of deportation, many have opted to live for long periods in these stark circumstances, 
sometimes for years. Some, unable to bear the uncertainty of indefinite detention, 
have opted for ‘voluntary deportation’. In order to mitigate the risks involved, some 
detainees from Burma have paid bribes in order to get deported to the Thai-Malaysia 
border at specific times and into the hands of specific smugglers. They preferred to 
risk the dangers faced at border zones with the possibility of freedom afterward, than 
face the bleakness of continued detention. 
 
However, opting for deportation has been risky, particularly for refugees and stateless 
persons from Burma. For several years until 2009, many were handed over to 
traffickers at the Thai-Malaysia border, who held them to ransom and extorted them 
for exorbitant payments. The price of these transactions increased over the years, up 
to RM2,500 (USD784) per person depending on the location of deportation and 
smuggler involved. Those who failed to pay were sold – men to fishing boats as 
forced labourers, and women to brothels and other private businesses (United States 
                                                
295 Din (name changed). 2008. Interview by author, 25 January. 
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Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2009). In 2009, the practice of mass 
deportation to the Thai-Malaysia border ceased in response to international pressure.  
 
As a result of gaps in protection in Malaysia, asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless 
persons develop a number of strategies – even alternate systems – to reduce their own 
vulnerability.296 Firstly, they have developed localized, contingent, negotiated 
arrangements with law enforcement officers. Refugees have been able to plead with 
Police officers for the release of their friends or family members – often facilitated 
with the payment of a bribe. Refugees have been able to visit friends and family in 
some detention centres, and to arrange for food and goods to be given to, or bought 
for, detainees. Secondly, refugees also pay money to law enforcement officers in 
order to ward off arrest. These payments are made both directly and indirectly (e.g. 
through brokers such as employers), on an individual as well as group basis.  
 
Thirdly, they have formed self-help groups which range from small, informal, 
geographically-restricted self-help networks usually based on kinship, friendship and 
the proximity of households in the country of asylum to large, formalised, 
geographically dispersed refugee community-based organisations, usually created on 
the basis of ethnic and/or territorial identity in their country of origin. Through these 
organisations, refugees organise social services, running programmes that help their 
members’ access healthcare, education, and emergency donations (such as food and 
clothing). These self-help groups have also organised collective action – expressing 
political discontent outside of the embassies of their own countries and protesting 
against unequal treatment outside of the gates of UNHCR (Nah 2010). 
                                                
296 For more comprehensive analysis on the array of strategies taken by asylum 
seekers and refugees, see Nah, forthcoming).  
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Fourthly, as mentioned earlier, refugee community-based organisations have 
developed community registration systems. The community cards have been given 
some recognition by the police, who sometimes accept them as a basis for identifying 
an individual as an asylum seeker. Community registration has also been accepted by 
UNHCR as a way of ‘pre-screening’ individuals as being genuine asylum seekers. 
Community registration has also been given recognition by the judiciary. In Tun 
Naing Oo vv PP [2009] 6 CLJ 490 (further elaborated below), the High Court judge 
advised asylum seekers and refugees to show their registration with their community 
as proof of their status in order to avoid a sentence of whipping. 
 
CASE LAW ON ASYLUM SEEKERS, REFUGEES, AND STATELESS PERSONS  
What is the status of asylum seekers and refugees in the Malaysian legal system and 
should they be differentiated from ‘illegal immigrants’ in relation to punishment for 
immigration offences? Over the past decade, the judiciary has considered these 
questions in cases where asylum seekers and refugees who have sought asylum with 
UNHCR have been arrested for immigration offences.  
 
The judiciary has ruled that asylum seekers and refugees are subject to Malaysia’s 
domestic laws, including the Immigration Act 1959/63. In Subramaniyam Subakaran 
v. PP [2007] 1 CLJ 470, the High Court reviewed a judgment by a magistrate who 
sentenced a Sri Lankan national, an adult, charged for entry into Malaysia without a 
valid Pass under section 6(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1959/63. The applicant 
pleaded guilty and the magistrate sentenced him to 4 months imprisonment and 1 
stroke of the rattan. At that time, the applicant had not stated that he was an asylum 
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seeker registered with UNHCR and thus, the magistrate did not consider it. The Bar 
Council Legal Aid Centre wrote to the High Court for a revision under section 323(1) 
of the Criminal Procedure Code stating that he was registered with UNHCR as an 
asylum seeker under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol as well as Article 22 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child297 and as such was not liable for any 
offence committed under immigration laws.  
 
In his consideration of the case, the judge upheld the judgment of the magistrate, 
stating that the applicant “did not present himself without delay to the authorities and 
did not show good cause for his illegal entry” (p.471) as provided for in Article 31 of 
the 1951 Convention. He also noted that the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and 
Article 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child were not legally binding on 
the Malaysian courts.298 He further stated that the Immigration Act 1959/63 in general 
and section 6(1)(c) and section 6(3) – which outlines the punishments associated with 
offences under section 6(1) – were applicable to the applicant as an asylum seeker and 
refugee.  
 
Is the punishment of whipping overly harsh, and would it impose “undeserved 
hardship” upon offenders in the case of asylum seekers and refugees? Would it be an 
“inappropriate sentence” given their circumstances? In Kya Hliang and Ors v 
Pendakwa Raya [2009] MLJU 0018, the High Court reviewed a judgment by a 
                                                
297 This was an odd argument as the applicant was an adult. 
298 The judge made a number of errors in his written judgement. Firstly, he stated 
inaccurately that Malaysia was a signatory to the 1951 Convention and to the 1967 
Protocol (paragraph 15, p. 478); it is not. Secondly, he failed to distinguish between 
the status of a Declaration and a Convention in international law. He also failed to 
distinguish between Malaysia’s obligations as a signatory and as a state party to 
international treaties. 
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magistrate who sentenced 11 offenders for entering Malaysia without a valid Pass 
under section 6(1) of the Immigration Act 1959/63 to imprisonment of 1 month from 
the date of their arrest and whipping of 1 stroke each. The applicants pleaded guilty, 
and in mitigation, counsel submitted that they were refugees who had suffered much 
hardship in their own country and had been forced to leave for fear of their lives.  
 
The judge set out his deliberations as follows, 
Whipping is a form of corporal punishment. It is usually imposed for its 
deterrent and retributive effect. For example, in offences like rape and 
robbery, the punishment imposed must not only reflect the revulsion felt by 
the majority of society, but also serve to deter the individual offender and 
others from committing similar offences. As a general rule the punishment of 
whipping should be reserved for crimes involving violence and brutality, 
involving actual physical violence resulting in injury that has led to substantial 
pain and suffering. Whipping may be justified even though no actual violence 
or brutality may have been used. However, in such cases the Court should 
consider long and anxiously before it exercises its discretion in imposing a 
sentence of whipping. Each case is dependent on its own facts and upon the 
character and antecedents of the offender. 
 
Noting that the punishment of whipping under section 6(3) was not mandatory, and 
recognising that the offenders in this case were first offenders, that they were refugees 
who escaped from their own country, and that there was no violence or brutality in 
their actions, the High Court set aside the sentence of whipping. However, as the 
offenders entered Malaysia without a valid entry permit, they committed an offence 
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under Malaysian laws and the judge affirmed the sentence of imprisonment of 1 
month. 
 
In Tun Naing Oo vv PP [2009] 6 CLJ 490, the High Court followed this precedent. In 
this case, the High Court reviewed a judgement by a sessions court judge of an 
asylum seeker from Burma charged and convicted under section 6(1)(c) of the 
Immigration Act 1959/63 and sentenced to 100 days of imprisonment and 2 strokes of 
whipping. In this case, the judge considered whether whipping was a sentence that 
was “manifestly excessive” and whether the applicant should be spared “on 
humanitarian grounds” (p. 490). The judge stated,  
…it is inhumane and serves no purpose to impose the sentence of whipping 
upon an asylum-seeker or refugee. If asylum seekers or refugees: (a) have not 
committed acts of violence or brutality; (b) are not habitual offenders; or (c) 
have not threatened public order, they should not be punished with whipping 
(p. 491).  
 
The judge also advised, 
In order to avert future cases of whipping being imposed as a sentence for 
similar offences, asylum seekers or refugees ought to give documentary proof 
of their registration with their own community in Malaysia or with the 
UNHCR in Kuala Lumpur to satisfy the subordinate courts that they are 
genuine asylum-seekers or refugees waiting to be resettled (p. 491). 
 
In the cases reviewed above, the judiciary has clearly stated that asylum seekers and 
refugees are subject to domestic laws including the Immigration Act 1959/63 and are 
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therefore liable for immigration offences. However, sentencing must be ‘appropriate’ 
to their circumstances rather than excessive, and, if they have not engaged in acts of 
violence or brutality and are not habitual offenders, then asylum seekers and refugees 
should be exempt from whipping. The judiciary has also recognised that the 
Malaysian courts are neither legally bound by the 1951 Convention nor its 1967 
Protocol. However, it has been inaccurate in stating that Malaysian courts are not 
legally bound to adhere to Article 22 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child as 
was expressed in Subramaniyam Subakaran v. PP.  
 
Finally, in the case of refugee minors, the Malaysian courts have recognised that an 
officer of UNHCR can be classified as a person “directly concerned” within the 
meaning of section of the Child Act 2001 and of a “responsible person” under 
sections 12(3)c), 90(7) and 90(11) and of the Act (Iskandar Abdul Hamid v. PP 
[2005] 6 CLJ 505). As such, a UNHCR officer may be present at any sitting of the 
Court For Children (section 12(3)(b)), be allowed to assist the child in conducting 
his/her defence if he/she is not legally represent (section 90(7)), and, in circumstances 
where the Court For Children finds the child guilty or is satisfied that the offence is 
proved, “be asked if they desire to say anything in extenuation or mitigation of the 
penalty or otherwise” (90(11)). 
 
GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES CONCERNING ASYLUM SEEKERS, REFUGEES, AND 
STATELESS PERSONS 
Protecting Malaysia’s international image  
Concern over Malaysia’s image in the international community has prompted the 
government to adopt a less ‘hard line’ position over the status of asylum seekers, 
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refugees, and stateless persons. This has not always been so. At certain times in the 
history of Malaysia, in particular when questioned about the arrest of asylum seekers, 
refugees, and stateless persons, high level government officials such as the Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Home Affairs have stated publicly that these individuals 
were merely ‘illegal immigrants’ and not people in need of asylum (Nah 2007). The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, conscious of Malaysia’s standing in the 
international community, has taken a more diplomatic approach. 
 
In February 2009, Malaysia was reviewed through the Universal Review Process of 
the Human Rights Council for the first time. Malaysians civil society groups 
highlighted the numerous human rights abuses faced by non-citizens, including the 
mistreatment of asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons.299 During the review 
process, several states enquired as to the status of these groups in Malaysia and about 
their treatment under the Immigration Act. They urged the Malaysian government to 
introduce domestic legislation to give asylum-seeking populations legal status and 
protection. Their recommendations reinforced those of the CEDAW and CRC 
Committees in their Concluding Comments of May 2006 and June 2007.300 In 
response, Malaysia stated, 
                                                
299 See ‘A joint submission by members of the Migration Working Group (MWG) and 
the Northern Network for Migrants and Refugees (Jaringan Utara Migrasi dan 
Pelarian, JUMP) for the 4th Session of the Universal Periodic Review, February 
2009’ available on 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMYStakeholdersInfoS4.aspx 
accessed 8 March 2011. 
300 See ‘Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination of Discrimination Against Women: Malaysia’, dated 31 May 2006, 
available on http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/6371861.10019684.html accessed 8 
March 2011 as well as the ‘Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding 
Observations: Malaysia’, dated 25 June 2007, available on 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/284f251ba9a22866c125730d004f
0b16?Opendocument accessed 8 March 2011. 
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Despite not being party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Malaysia 
has complied with international obligations to persons who have entered 
Malaysia claiming to be refugees and asylum seekers through special 
arrangements with the UNHCR on humanitarian grounds, ever since it agreed 
to the establishment of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees some thirty years ago, with which it has cooperation and 
constructive engagement… Malaysia is of the view that the onus and 
responsibility lie with the UNHCR to look into the welfare of refugees/asylum 
seekers particularly in finding suitable third countries to receive them since 
Malaysia is only a transit point.301  
 
This response indicates that the Malaysian government views cooperation with 
UNHCR as a fulfilment of its obligation.302 However, it is also clear that it does not 
hold responsibility for asylum-seeking populations but sees this as the role of 
UNHCR. Furthermore, it demonstrates Malaysia’s position that the presence of 
asylum seekers and refugees in Malaysia is temporary, and that the government 
expects them to be resettled rather than integrated into Malaysia. This position, and 
more specifically, this relationship it expresses towards UNHCR, is reminiscent of the 
terms of agreement of the CPA for Indochinese refugees wherein UNHCR is the 
primary agency responsibility for their welfare and resettlement (UN High 
                                                
301 Copies of the documents related to the assessment of Malaysia under the UPR 
process are available on 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/MYSession4.aspx accessed 30 May 
2011. 
302 On a number of other occasions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has formally 
expressed its cooperation with UNHCR over asylum-seeking populations ‘on 
humanitarian grounds’ (Bernama 2010b; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia 2008).  
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Commissioner for Refugees 1996). These populations have no official prospects of 
long-term residence and integration into Malaysian society. 
 
Demonstrating international solidarity and humanitarian support for Muslim 
refugees in need 
In the past, Malaysia has been particularly generous to certain populations of asylum 
seekers and refugees. As stated earlier, in the 1990s, it granted permanent resident 
status and even citizenships to Muslims resettled from Bosnia and Cambodia. In the 
1980s, it gave temporary passes for work (IMM13) to Muslims from the Philippines, 
many of which are renewed until today. Similarly, in the 1990s, it gave IMM13 
passes for work to Acehnese fleeing violence in Aceh and again, did so for several 
years after the Tsunami devastated the coastlines of Aceh, killing hundreds of 
thousands of Acehnese. The government has also allowed Thai Muslims fleeing state 
repression temporary refuge in Malaysia, sometimes for months or years in special 
sections of immigration detention depots upon their request not to be deported. It has 
done the same for Acehnese. The clear similarity between these groups is that all of 
them were Muslims. 
 
These ad hoc decisions, made by individuals with significant executive power, reflect 
Malaysia’s desire to show leadership in the Muslim world. However, this does not 
mean that Malaysia has a universal policy of granting legal status to all Muslims. 
Indeed, there are now many Muslims amongst the asylum-seeking population who are 
in danger of arrest, detention and deportation, most notably the large population of 
Rohingyas from Burma as well as Palestinians, Afghans, Iraqis, Sudanese and others 
from Africa and the Middle East. In other words, the decisions to extend protection to 
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these different populations are more reflective of the thoughts and political 
calculations of powerful individuals in government rather than of the execution of 
state policy towards Muslim refugees in general. 
 
Maintaining maximum discretion in decision-making concerning asylum-seeking 
populations 
In spite of having had to grapple with different asylum-seeking groups over the years, 
Malaysia has not established a domestic legal framework that recognises their status. 
Malaysia is also amongst the minority of states that has not acceded to the 1951 
Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.303 In public statements (as seen earlier in 
its response to the UPR process), Malaysia repeats the fact that it has not acceded to 
these instruments as justification for its approach towards asylum seekers and 
refugees. Implicit in its message is the idea that it has no (or limited) obligations 
precisely because it is not a state party. No shame or remorse is attached to such 
statements. In the context of the Asia Pacific region, this behaviour is not unusual. As 
stated in Chapter 1, only 2 of the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) – Cambodia and the Philippines – are state parties.304 
 
Rather than treating all asylum-seeking populations in a systematic, impartial and 
apolitical manner, Malaysia has sometimes provided temporary asylum and 
                                                
303 As of 1 October 2008, 147 of 192 member states of the United Nations are state 
parties to one of these international legal instruments (UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees 2008a). 
304 Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam are state parties neither to the 1951 
Convention nor its 1967 Protocol. Nearby, in South Asia, only 1 of the 8 members of 
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is a state party – 
Afghanistan. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are 
not. 
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sometimes ignored calls for humanitarian assistance. There are negative consequences 
to this approach. By handling each asylum-seeking population on an ad hoc basis, 
these states also open themselves to charges of assisting the ‘enemies’ of 
neighbouring countries. When Malaysia allowed Filipino refugees to reside in Sabah, 
the Philippines government accused Malaysia of harbouring criminals and assisting 
the separatists in the south. Malaysia faced a similar charge by the Indonesian 
government in relation to Acehnese refugees in 2003. 
 
CONCLUSION 
On the whole, life is difficult for asylum-seeking populations in Malaysia. A large 
proportion suffers from extraordinarily high levels of stress, anxiety and depression. 
Some refugees struggle with traumas from the past, particularly if they were raped 
and/or tortured. Many live in, or very close to, poverty. Nevertheless, exile in 
Malaysia is also a time of re-constituting meaning, involvement, and achievement. 
Community leaders and workers have felt a deep sense of fulfilment when providing 
assistance to their ‘own people’. Refugees have become more connected to their own 
extended kin and ethnic groups as they try to lead ‘normal’ lives in Malaysia, 
speaking familiar dialects, getting married, raising children, celebrating cultural 
identity, and enjoying their own food. They have also formed unexpected friendships 
with members of other ethnic groups from their country of origin. However, they are 
also vulnerable to high levels of violence and exploitation.  
 
Unlike other non-citizen populations in Malaysia, asylum seekers, refugees and 
stateless persons have a supranational body that looks after their interests, UNHCR. 
Since 2002, UNHCR’s operations in Malaysia have grown significantly. UNHCR has 
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been able to gain some recognition from state authorities as to its role in intervening 
on behalf of persons of its concern. UNHCR’s work has involved creating some 
‘protection space’ so that asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons are not 
subject to the punishment meted out to migrants with irregular status. Over time, 
UNHCR has been able to secure the release of individuals from detention, to get 
immigration charges dropped, and to halt deportation.  
 
However, these interventions require the attentiveness of UNHCR staff; it places 
pressure on them to respond to each and every case reported to them. There have been 
cases where they did not intervene on time, or at all. There are cases where their 
interventions have been unsuccessful. This state of affairs is unlikely to change unless 
Malaysia introduces a formal legal and administrative framework for the protection of 
asylum-seeking populations. To date, there are no signs that it intends to do so, 
despite repeated calls for this to happen from Malaysian civil society groups, 
UNHCR, and the international diplomatic community. 
 
In order to perform its role of protection, UNHCR mimics the approach of state 
authorities in regulating individuals – it documents individual identity and issues 
identity cards and letters. It performs a regulation of sorts; it requires individuals to 
report themselves to the office periodically in order get their time-limited identity 
cards renewed. However, its reach is not comprehensive. There are asylum seekers, 
refugees and stateless persons who are not registered by this UN body. While 
UNHCR maintains that these numbers are small, refugee leaders suggest that more 
than half their communities are unregistered, and that numbers continue to grow. 
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UNHCR’s interventions demonstrate the interest of the international community in 
protecting a certain type of vulnerable non-citizen. It invokes a global governance 
regime for the their protection, using what resources it can to compel Malaysia to 
recognise the special circumstances of asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons. 
Cautious of its international image, Malaysia has tempered its exercise of sovereign 
power, allowing UNHCR to influence the behaviour of its law enforcement 
authorities. In documenting individual identity, UNHCR provides state authorities 
with a system for their individual regulation. UNHCR in Malaysia acts as a ‘surrogate 
state’ (Kagan 2011; Slaughter and Crisp 2009), a role that is Janus-faced.  
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CHAPTER 8: ANALYSING STATE POWER 
INTRODUCTION 
This research project has examined the exercise of state power over non-citizens in 
Malaysia, providing a case study of how a developing state dependent on foreign 
labour positions non-citizens in society as it responds to political and economic 
globalisation.  
 
Broadly speaking, Malaysia has approached the conceptualisation and regulation of 
non-citizens in two ways – a deliberate approach that has been proactive, and an 
accommodative approach that has been reactionary. The former is evident in relation 
to migrant workers, both authorized and with irregular status, where state authorities 
have been more explicit in articulating how these groups fit in Malaysian society. 
State authorities have been proactive in instituting and amending laws, policies, and 
practices related to their regulation. Although these changes have often been 
inconsistent and confusing at a tactical level, the overall objectives of government 
have remained the same over the past two decades. 
 
The latter approach is evident in relation to foreign spouses as well as to asylum 
seekers, refugees, and stateless persons. State authorities have had a more convoluted, 
opaque, and inconsistent conception of how these groups fit in Malaysian society. 
State authorities have been reactionary in developing laws, policies, and practices 
related to their regulation. Changes have been instituted in response to internal and 




This chapter is divided into four parts. Drawing on the material presented in earlier 
chapters, I first look at how the case of Malaysia contributes to theorizing concerning 
the limits of state power. I argue that the ‘art of government’ involves achieving 
balance and alignment in exercising power over three ‘targets’: population, territory 
and economy; responding to global governance regimes; managing citizens’ 
expectations and opinions; and curtailing the subversive capacity of bureaucracy.  
 
Second, I highlight some themes in Malaysia’s mentalities of government, examining 
the knowledge, beliefs and opinions that have shaped the way state authorities 
calculate and respond to non-citizens. I suggest that the state draws a clear distinction 
between citizens and non-citizens, conceiving of the latter as being outsiders, 
subordinate to the former and having only temporary status in Malaysia. I suggest 
that this has direct implication for how it wields power over non-citizens – Malaysia 
relies on sovereign and disciplinary power rather than governmental power; it exerts 
power over non-citizens rather than attempting to persuade them to regulate 
themselves as members of society. 
 
Malaysia also calculates the value of migrant workers in terms of their labour, 
viewing them as a commodity that can be increased and decreased depending on the 
needs of the economy. Finally, Malaysia is also concerned about the impact of non-
citizens on national security, interpreting the presence of irregular migrants in its 
landscape as the loss of territorial integrity and a sign of weak sovereignty. I argue 
that state authorities do not aim to ‘govern best’ as governmentality scholars would 




In the third section, I analyse the different techniques that state authorities have used 
in regulating non-citizens. In relation to sovereign power, I examine the significance 
of juridical status (in particular, the act of separating the ‘legal’ from the ‘illegal’ 
person) and law enforcement on the lives of non-citizens, including in relation to their 
protection by the law. In relation to disciplinary power I focus on state practices of 
surveillance, inspection and the use of the sponsorship-based immigration system, 
which foster relations of dependence on citizens. Citizens exercise delegated 
disciplinary power over non-citizens. Finally, in relation to governmental power, I put 
forward the concept of the hierarchy of deservedness to explain how truth discourses 
about non-citizens operate to ‘keep them in place’. 
 
THE LIMITS OF STATE POWER 
In his exposition about the nature of a state, Foucault sought to identify the ways in 
which a state was ‘self-limited’. He identified the emergence of a governmental 
reason, which he termed raison d’Etat (reason of state). This governmental reason 
“gave rise to a certain way of thinking, reasoning and calculating” (Foucault 
2007:286), which delineated the state as a semi-autonomous entity and which sought 
its permanence and stability. As Foucault states: “To govern according to raison 
d’Etat is to arrange things so that the state becomes sturdy and permanent, so that it 
becomes wealthy, and so that it becomes strong in the face of everything that may 
destroy it” (Foucault 2008:4). In other words, state authorities must ensure that the 
state is strong, prosperous and able to compete with other states. 
 
 313 
This way of reasoning required a state to set limits on itself. Governing according to 
raison d’Etat meant that a state would not seek unlimited expansion; it would not 
seek to be the one and only global empire. Instead, states limited their objectives, 
seeking independence while avoiding both a position of inferiority and dominance 
vis-à-vis other states. An important aspect of raison d’Etat is the balance of power 
between states. As Foucault observes, states develop military-diplomatic apparatuses 
for their engagement with other states and the police for their internal regulation. 
However, with mercantilism, police regulation is no longer sufficient. Instead, states 
have to rely on a more liberal form of governmentality, which comprises economic 
practice, population management and the rule of law based on freedoms, in addition 
to the police (Dean 2010). In this section, I suggest that there are still other ways in 
which state power is self-limited. 
 
Balancing and Aligning Population, Economy and Territory 
In explicating his ideas about governmentality, Foucault identified population as the 
object or target of the sovereignty-discipline-government triangle of power. However, 
in the course of his theoretical explorations, he also identified two other targets of 
state power – territory and the economy. There are certain characteristics of these 
three targets that are important to note in relation to a state’s exercise of power and 
which have bearing on the ways in which it approaches non-citizen populations. 
 
Firstly, these three targets of power are dynamic – they can increase and reduce in 
size, vitality and productivity. They are amenable to a certain level of intervention – 
they can be shaped, regulated and managed, albeit within limits. Not only must each 
of these targets be robust, they must be able to produce in ways that strengthen the 
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overall position of the state. As Foucault pointed out, state authorities monitor the 
status of these targets through statistics, measuring, for example, the fertility and size 
of arable land, the economic yield of land, economic growth, employment creation, 
income inequality, the size and composition of the labour force, labour participation 
rates, unemployment, mortality, and morbidity. These statistical indicators provide the 
knowledge that state authorities need to act upon these targets of state power.  
 
Secondly, these targets of power are interdependent. In order for a population to 
thrive, a robust economy and safe territory in which to live are needed. For a territory 
to be productive, the right investments of capital, technology and manpower are 
required. For an economy to be robust, fecund territory and the right balance of 
human resources are necessary. Of the three, the main characteristics of territory and 
population are established when a state comes into being – this is when territorial 
boundaries are negotiated and groups of people identified as citizens. Characteristics 
of the economy are relatively more amenable to change over time. Disagreements 
about the main features of these three targets can lead to internal conflict, civil war 
and calls for secession. 
 
I propose that the nature of the relationship between these three targets is just as 
important in the art of government as the productivity of each of these targets alone. 
These targets must grow in balance and alignment in proportion and function in 
relation to each other. Balance and alignment refer to the size and the growth of each 
of these as well as the specific demands they impose, and the way their features 
complement each other. If one of these targets grows too large or fast, it poses a strain 
on the others. A population that expands too rapidly, for example, places significant 
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demands on the economy and territory, while a population that does not grow fast 
enough will not supply sufficient human resources to keep the economy healthy and 
the territory sufficiently productive. Similarly, an economy that grows too quickly 
will need a population able to meet its demands, while an economy that is too 
sluggish will impoverish a population. The art of government involves ensuring that 
the specific features of each target are interconnected in ways that increase the vitality 
of each other and that they are productive for the overall wellbeing of the state and its 
people. 
 
Although the overall objective of government is the welfare of the population 
(Foucault 1994:217), demands are made of the population. The population must not 
only be healthy, of the right number, and live at peace; they must possess the right 
mix of knowledge, skills, abilities, and motivations in order to allow the optimal 
functioning of the economy and the use of the territory. Of the three targets of power 
– in particular with the rise of economic globalization, the interdependencies fostered 
by global markets, and the fear of unemployment and poverty amongst citizens – the 
economy has become the most important to govern well. It is the key domain through 
which citizens judge the performance and legitimacy of their governments. 
 
State authorities achieve balance and alignment through introducing, amending, and 
changing laws, policies, and practices. In relation to governing populations, state 
authorities have resorted to migration as a technique for redistributing people in order 
to ensure that they have sufficient manpower in key locations to keep their economies 
going. Having either a shortfall or a surplus of citizen labour is undesirable. Policies 
concerning emigration and immigration have become part of state mechanisms for 
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adjusting populations quickly in order to suit the needs of the economy and 
territory.305 Some governments with weak economies have actively promoted 
emigration in order to alleviate unemployment and to strengthen their financial 
standing, hoping to reap the benefit of remittances. Mexico, Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Philippines are some examples of countries with explicit 
emigration policies for the purpose of strengthening their own economies.  
 
Some governments that have robust economies but insufficient manpower promote 
immigration either on a temporary or long-term basis to supplement their domestic 
supply of workers. Canada and Australia, for example, introduced immigration 
policies aimed at attracting migrant workers with the desired combination of 
characteristics and skills with a view to integrating them as citizens over the long-
term. In these two countries, the “quest for demographic expansion was underpinned 
primarily by economic motives” (Walsh 2008:794). Canada introduced a points-based 
system in 1967, and Australia did the same in 1979, in order to select carefully 
citizens-to-be based on their potential contribution and risk to their society. Some 
countries such as Germany and the United States, however, preferred to invite 
migrant workers on a temporary basis using ‘guest worker’ programmes. However, 
these programmes failed when migrant workers refused to return home. 
 
This is the position in which Malaysia finds itself – it has had robust economic 
growth, but insufficient manpower for its economy. Concerned about the domestic 
political ramifications of changing the ethnic, religious and demographic profile of its 
                                                
305 There are other ways of making adjustments to the population in relation to the 
economy, such as limiting/ promoting births, increasing the health and well-being of 
the population, as well as improving/ reducing labour force participation rates. 
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citizens too quickly, state authorities have instituted a policy of using temporary 
labour migration rather than promoting permanent immigration. The unintended 
consequences of this approach, however, are that the economy has become foreign-
labour dependent and the population of non-citizens resident in Malaysia has 
increased over time, most of which have no prospects for integration. Faced with 
public concern over non-citizens as potential threats to the well-being and security of 
the Malay(sian) ‘nation’, state authorities have had to negotiate a difficult path 
between meeting citizen demands for robust economic growth with foreign direct 
investment while allaying their fears about their security. In summary, the necessity to 
achieve balance and alignment in a state’s population, economy and territory shapes 
the objectives of a state in its exercise of power. 
 
The ‘Globalisation of Political Life’: Global Governance and Diplomacy 
There has been increasing attention paid to the effects of ‘globalisation’ on the 
sovereignty of states. International relations theorists observe that there are new forms 
of political interconnectedness that are “transforming state power and world politics” 
(Held et al. 1999:10). Some theorists – particularly those concerned with economic 
globalization – argue that these processes ‘weaken’ the sovereignty of states (Sassen 
1996). Others – more concerned with legal and political processes – posit that states 
remain relevant players in defining and mediating the effects of globalization 
(Sørensen 2002). Globalisation includes “(t)he growing significance of democracy 
and human rights as near-universal norms of governance in the international 
community” and “(t)he emergence a global commitment to a common set of values 
and standards of the Good…” (Castles and Davidson 2000:4). In order to understand 
globalisation, it is necessary to shift beyond state-centric approaches to consider the 
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roles played by supra-, sub- and non-state actors in the “globalisation of political life” 
(Higgott and Ougaard 2002, 1).  
 
As Foucault observes, states develop military-diplomatic apparatuses to interact with 
other states. However, international relations theorists recognize that a ‘balance of 
powers’ approach to understanding the behaviour of states is no longer sufficient. 
Instead, there are now a number of global governance regimes that shape the 
behaviour of states towards each other and towards populations over which they wield 
power. Global governance, loosely defined, refers to the existence of regulation over 
and above the level of the nation-state, over which there is no centralizing, rule-
making, enforcement authority (Betts 2008; Rosenau 1992). In relation to non-
citizens, in particular, there are emerging (and intersecting) global governance 
regimes related to human rights, asylum, statelessness, human trafficking, and 
migration for work.306 
 
The history and nature of these global governance regimes differ. Global governance 
concerning human rights includes the establishment of international human rights 
treaties, treaty bodies, special procedures, and more recently, in March 2006, the 
Human Rights Council. Global governance concerning asylum has the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol as the central component of its legal framework, as 
well as UNHCR as the supervisory body for the international protection of refugees. 
UNHCR also coordinates protection for stateless populations, promoting the 1954 
                                                
306 The ways that these global governance mechanisms intersect can have a negative 
impact on non-citizens. Dialogues on anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling, for 
example, have had adverse impacts on refugee protection, by associating refugees 
with transnational crime (Kneebone 2010). 
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Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness. Global governance concerning human trafficking 
takes an approach based more on criminal justice, anchored on the 2000 UN Protocol 
on the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of Trafficking in Humans, 
supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Global 
governance concerning migration for work evolves around the poorly supported 1990 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families, the ILO conventions (related to the labour rights of all and 
of migrants specifically), and the Global Forum on Migration and Development. At 
the regional level, Australia and Indonesia have been convening the Bali Process as 
an inter-governmental forum to discuss collaborations to address human smuggling 
and trafficking. Australia, in particular, has been leading discussions on a Regional 
Cooperation Framework to combat smuggling, which is very likely to have direct 
implications for refugee protection.  
 
Malaysia’s behaviour towards non-citizens has already been evaluated according to 
some of these global governance regimes. In particular, human rights abuses against 
migrant workers, asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons were highlighted 
formally through the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review Process, 
which focused on Malaysia in February 2009, and to the treaty bodies supervising 
CEDAW and CRC. Malaysia’s response in the UPR process, through which it 
formally agreed to cooperate with UNHCR ‘on humanitarian grounds’ and to provide 
education to the children of migrants through partnerships with NGOs, shows its 
growing recognition of its obligations towards non-citizens. However, these formal 
utterances reflect more the diplomatic position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs than 
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the contradictory actions of the different agencies and departments of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, which persist in carrying out actions criticized by the international 
community. 
 
Malaysia’s poor record in relation to the protection of refugees came under public 
scrutiny again during discussions over the controversial refugee transfer agreement 
with Australia aimed at stopping people-smuggling and trafficking. Malaysia has 
agreed to accept 800 asylum seekers from Australia in exchange for 4,000 UNHCR-
recognised refugees. Civil society groups in Australia and Malaysia are concerned 
that the 800 asylum seekers transported from Australia to Malaysia will be subject to 
arrest, punishment and deportation along with other irregular migrants. Under 
pressure, Malaysian state authorities have agreed that all of them will be treated with 
dignity, and that those recognised as refugees will have legal status in Malaysia as 
well as the right to pursue economic ‘self-reliance’ and to gain access to community-
based education.  
 
Global governance also operates through the establishment of global norms. As such, 
there is a possibility that similar practices in countries nearby legitimise the actions of 
a particular state. One example is Singapore’s treatment of foreign workers, which is 
very similar to that of Malaysia’s. It too, has a large temporary labour migration 
programme and subjects foreign workers to close surveillance and periodic medical 
screening. Foreign workers are also not allowed to marry in Singapore, and if found 
to have communicable diseases or to be pregnant, are subject to deportation. 
Singapore too, takes a very punitive approach to irregular migration – even harsher 
than Malaysia’s – subjecting those who have attempted irregular entry and those who 
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have overstayed their visas by 90 days to mandatory judicial caning of not less than 3 
strokes (Section 6(3a), 15(3b), Immigration Act, Chapter 133) (Migration News 
1998). Singapore’s treatment of foreign workers normalises Malaysia’s punitive 
policies and practices. 
 
Another example in relation to refugee protection is the behaviour of other states in 
South and Southeast Asia, many of whom are non-signatories to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Like Malaysia, they have adopted an ad hoc 
approach rather than granting asylum to all refugees in a systematic, impartial and 
apolitical manner. India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Thailand and Malaysia, for example, 
have preferred to negotiate with UNHCR and the international community over the 
treatment of specific groups of refugees and stateless persons. This has resulted in 
uneven protection, with some groups receiving better protection than others (Nah 
2010). By not making any commitment to domestic or international legal frameworks 
concerning asylum, these states minimize their formal obligations, thus giving 
maximum discretion to their Executive to decide on what to do with refugees and 
stateless persons.  
 
In summary, Malaysia’s management of diplomatic relations and its standing in the 
international community has had a minor influence on the way it exercises state 
power over non-citizens. At the very least, global norms concerning the treatment of 
non-citizens have served as normative frameworks in external evaluations of 
Malaysia’s actions. However, the behaviour of states in close proximity to Malaysia 
also has a mediating effect, normalising discourses and practices that differ from 
global norms. In short, the extent to which the actions of a state conform to or deviate 
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from global norms and the behaviour of proximate states both help to determine the 
global legitimacy of its exercise of power. 
 
Managing Citizens’ Expectations and Opinions 
Democratically elected governments need to secure the votes of citizens, and as such, 
are required to respond to their plural perspectives and concerns. They must also 
ensure that the actions they take – often, in the name of citizens – are considered 
legitimate by their constituencies. In contrast, non-citizens in most countries do not 
have the right to vote307 and do not have same level of influence over the government 
of a state. This in-built political inequality causes government officials and politicians 
to prioritise the concerns of citizens over those of non-citizens. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the actions of state authorities that impact on the composition, wealth, 
or wellbeing of populations often prompt strong reactions from citizens. In the case of 
Malaysia, the ‘ethnic balance’ of the Malaysian nation has been a politically sensitive 
issue. This is evident in how the Barisan Nasional government and opposition 
politicians have reacted to the presence and growth of large groups of non-citizens at 
certain times in Malaysian history, such as the Indochinese refugees during the 1970s 
and ‘80s (Robinson 1998) and Indonesian immigrants in Peninsular Malaysia in the 
1980s (Azizah 1987). There is still great concern over the impact of Indonesian and 
Filipino communities in Sabah today (Sadiq 2005, 2009). Politicians have expressed 
concerns that these groups threaten the livelihood and wellbeing of citizens. 
Politicians have also been concerned that giving permanent resident status to non-
citizens will result in changes to existing ethnic-based voting patterns, triggering the 
                                                
307 There are exceptions, such as the United Kingdom, where citizens of 
Commonwealth countries are allowed to vote in national and local council elections. 
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redistribution of political power to the detriment of minority citizens. In summary, the 
extent to which a state addresses the desires, perceptions, and concerns of citizens 
determines the local legitimacy of its exercise of power. 
 
The Power of Bureaucracy 
In his work on bureaucracy, Max Weber recognised that the power of bureaucrats 
rests on the technical knowledge they obtain through specialized training and the 
official information they possess (Weber 1978). He observed that although the 
purpose of such knowledge is to serve those who hold political responsibility, 
bureaucrats guard the spread of knowledge, which becomes a source of power. 
 
The greater the level of discretion given to bureaucrats and the weaker the 
mechanisms for reducing corruption, the greater their capacity to exercise power. In 
the case of Malaysia, law enforcement officers have discretion in decisions of great 
consequence for non-citizens – such as whether a person will be granted an 
immigration pass/ permit, whether a person can enter Malaysia, whether a person will 
be arrested, and whether a person will be charged in court. These decisions are made 
with limited guarantees for procedural fairness. The Immigration Act prevents the 
judicial review of immigration decisions and excludes a person’s right to be heard 
when an order is made against him/her.  
 
While the removal of the capacity of courts and individuals to challenge immigration 
decisions gives state authorities great power over non-citizens, the lack of 
transparency and accountability in decision-making also creates conditions for 
corruption which can lead to the circumvention of state objectives. For example, by 
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taking bribes, immigration officers have allowed irregular migrants to enter Malaysia 
and allowed agents to manipulate the system of approvals for foreign workers.308 In 
summary, the structure and function of government bureaucracy shapes the efficacy 
of the exercise of state power. 
 
MALAYSIA’S MENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT TOWARD NON-CITIZENS 
Non-liberal Governmentality and the Place of Non-Citizens in Malaysian Society 
Much of the literature theorising governmentality has focused on the exercise of 
power in liberal democracies (Dean 2010; Foucault 2003, 2007; Lemke 2000; P. 
Miller and Rose 1990; Rabinow and Rose 2006; Rose 1996, 2007). How then do we 
understand the operation of governmentality in non-liberal democracies? Mitchel 
Dean distinguishes between states that operate through explicit authoritarian rule and 
those that function as liberal democracies with elements of illiberal rule. In the 
former, authoritarian governmentality operates “through obedient rather than free 
subjects, or, at a minimum, endeavour(s) to neutralize any opposition to authority” 
(Dean 2010:155). Illiberal rule in liberal democracies occurs through dividing 
practices, which refer both to the practices of defining and excluding categories of 
people from the broader population, and practices of creating an internal division 
within an individual such that he/she represses or dominates one part of him/herself in 
his/her exercise of freedom. As Foucault states: “The subject is either divided inside 
himself or divided from others. This process objectivises him. Examples are the mad 
and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys’” (Foucault 
                                                
308 As Mr. Lim, an employer of foreign workers stated, “Corruption is the biggest 
determinant [of the immigration system]. The same people who police the rules come 
up with the ways to counter them”. Mr. Lim (name changed). 2010. Interview by 
author. 10 February. 
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1982:208). Through dividing practices the state distinguishes between those it deems 
able to hold the full set of responsibilities and rights expected of a juridical and 
political subject, and those who it deems not. 
 
Malaysia has the political and legal infrastructure of a liberal democracy. However, 
the exercise of executive power has served to limit the capacities of citizens to 
exercise their full range of rights. Under the rule of Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), 
the Malaysian government was described as a repressive-responsive regime, ruling 
“through a mixture of repression, manipulation, and responsiveness” (Crouch 
1996:236). Malaysia has also been referred to as a semi-democracy, in which 
opposition parties and civil society groups are allowed to express discontent without 
the ability to escalate these into political claims (Case 1993), as well as a syncretic 
state that “combines a variety of ideological orientations and political practices” in 
managing society, “mixing coercive elements with electoral and democratic 
procedures” (Jesudason 1996:130–131).  
 
A number of scholars have applied the notion of governmentality to Malaysia. Aihwa 
Ong uses Malaysia as one of her examples when she suggests that states respond to 
global market forces by exercising ‘graduated sovereignty’ over different segments of 
the population, treating them differently according to the needs of the market, thus 
intensifying already-existing fragmentation according to race, ethnicity, gender, and 
other forms of difference (A. Ong 2000). Tim Bunnell and Neil Coe agree with this 
analysis, pointing out that the state does not exercise governmentality evenly across 
its territory, but uses a different mix of governmental rationalities and technologies to 
manage populations in zones that are situated differently in relation to global capital 
 326 
(Bunnell and Coe 2005). In the case of Malaysia, they draw attention to how state 
authorities invest in producing a cheap and flexible workforce in Export Processing 
Zones while fostering creative and ‘intelligent’ subjects in Cyberjaya, the centrepiece 
of the Multimedia Super Corridor. These practices ‘re-fragment’ social and spatial 
differences that already exist in society. Eva-Lotta Hedman has applied the concept of 
governmentality more directly to the politics of immigration practices, suggesting that 
involving Malaysian volunteers (RELA) in apprehending ‘illegal migrants’ serves as 
a “performative or discursive (re)enactment of the making of Malays – and 
Malaysians” (Hedman 2008:383). 
 
It was under Mahathir’s leadership that the fundamentals of immigration policies and 
practices concerning non-citizens were established. After Mahathir stepped down, a 
number of distinct changes occurred. Firstly, the ‘protection space’ for asylum 
seekers, refugees, and stateless persons expanded from 2004 onwards under the 
Badawi administration. In particular, the Police, AG’s Chambers and Ministry of 
Health responded to the requests of UNHCR to release refugees from detention, 
waive charges for immigration offences, and provide government health services at a 
discounted rate. Secondly, the Najib administration accelerated decision-making on 
applications for birth certificates, permanent resident and citizenship applications 
from 2009 onwards, clearing a backlog built up over decades. The Najib 
administration also liberalised permanent residence and allowed longer periods of 




This research shows that Malaysian state authorities draw a clear distinction between 
citizens and non-citizens as well as between different categories of non-citizens. At 
the heart of Malaysia’s dividing practices is the system of immigration passes, which 
sets out the different categories of non-citizens, specifying their different rights and 
entitlements and setting the boundaries for appropriate behaviour. The state uses a 
number of different methods of coercion to ensure compliance, such as blacklisting, 
fines, imprisonment, whipping, and deportation (further elaborated below).  
 
The discourses and practices of state authorities indicate that the state does not 
conceive of itself as bearing the same duties and responsibilities towards non-citizens 
as towards citizens. State authorities adopt a protectionist approach to the 
employment of citizens, taking a number of measures to ensure that non-citizens do 
not gain employment at the expense of citizens. The state provides education for 
Malaysian children but does not grant access to primary and secondary education as 
of right to non-citizen children. It provides citizens with subsidized health services at 
government facilities, but charges ‘foreigner rates’ to all non-citizens. It also exercises 
strict controls over the health of authorized foreign workers and foreign domestic 
workers, requiring them to undergo medical screening upon arrival and at periodic 
intervals afterwards, deporting those found to bear communicable diseases or be 
pregnant. 
 
Malaysian state authorities also view most non-citizen groups as having temporary 
status in Malaysia. Aside from the few who obtain permanent resident status under 
the new rules introduced in 2009 to welcome skilled workers to Malaysia, it assumes 
that most non-citizens will serve their short- and medium-term purpose in Malaysia 
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and leave. There has been little room for the incorporation of non-citizens who 
develop loyalties, affective ties and attachments to Malaysia. As such, state 
authorities view with suspicion non-citizens who enter and reside in Malaysia 
indefinitely, such as foreign spouses, migrants with irregular status, and asylum-
seeking populations.  
 
Modern State Capitalism and the Commodification of Labour 
Malaysia’s present policies concerning migrant workers stem from its desire to 
position itself favourably in relation to global capital. Its strategy of using temporary 
labour migration is an attempt to reconcile two competing demands: the need for 
cheap labour, and the political need to assuage the concerns of citizens about their 
position in Malaysia. Malaysia’s policies and practices concerning labour migration 
indicate a modernist, capitalist approach to labour, assuming that people can be 
rationalized, categorized, ordered, and regulated as a factor of production. Through 
such calculation, migrant workers are homogenized, valued and expressed as units of 
labour – in short, they are commodified.  
 
This is evident in the way that Malaysia deals with foreign workers in times of 
economic growth and recession. When jobs are scarce, state authorities reduce the 
quota of foreign workers and deport large numbers of those already in Malaysia. 
When there is labour shortage, it increases the quota. Its policies and practices 
presume that foreign workers are replaceable units of labour, to be recruited when 
they are necessary and disposed of when they are not. Taking decisive action to 
reduce the total number of foreign workers is also how the government demonstrates 
its commitment to handling unemployment amongst citizens. However, there are 
 329 
negative consequences to such drastic measures. The swift reduction of foreign 
workers creates immediate labour shortages, which Malaysians are reluctant to fill. As 
a result, the government is forced to authorise the recruitment of new batches of 
foreign workers. However, this takes time, and businesses dependent on foreign 
labour suffer from economic losses. 
 
The Securitization of Non-citizens: Enfolding Territorial Integrity within 
Sovereignty 
The construction of non-citizens as a national security concern features strongly in 
state discourses and practices. This is most evident in relation to migrants with 
irregular status. State authorities have referred to them as the second greatest threat to 
Malaysia (after drugs), launching ‘national crackdowns’ to arrest, punish, and deport 
irregular migrants. State authorities have used emergency laws to authorise hundreds 
of thousands of citizen volunteers (through RELA) to participate in law enforcement 
activities, thus scripting them as bearers of state authority. Through immigration 
raids, state authorities place these citizen volunteers into direct, face-to-face 
engagement with non-citizens, bringing to life the phantasm of the ‘illegal 
immigrant’.  
 
The discourses and practices of state authorities indicate the centrality of the notion of 
territorial integrity in the exercise of state sovereignty. Territorial integrity is 
achieved when a state is able to control the entry and exit of people through its 
borders. The failure of the state to do so – in spite of repeated attempts and the heavy 
investment of resources – is interpreted as the expression of its weakness. However, 
territorial integrity is a chimera of the modern state. There has never been a state with 
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the power to exert complete control over all of the movements of all people through 
its borders. Nevertheless, state authorities embrace this notion, and in such logic, 
irregular migrants – as foreigners visibly out of place – become the visual 
representation of the loss of sovereignty and the figure to be punished in the anxious 
attempt to regain it. 
 
MALAYSIA’S TECHNIQUES OF GOVERNMENT OVER NON-CITIZENS  
Foucault distinguishes between sovereign power, disciplinary power and 
governmental power, recognising that they utilise different techniques. The exercise 
of these different forms of power can dovetail; however, they can also be incomplete 
and fail to achieve the objectives of the state. In this section, I suggest that sovereign 
power delimit a field of acceptable behaviour for individuals (or a field of legal 
freedoms); disciplinary power regulate behaviour, keeping populations ‘in check’ so 
that they don’t breach the limits of these freedoms; while governmental power is used 
to produce self-regulation and willing compliance. Governmental power cannot 
operate alone; it depends on the operation of disciplinary and sovereign power rather 
than replaces it. 
 
The Exercise of Sovereign Power: Separating the ‘Legal’ from the ‘Illegal’ and 
Punishing Transgressors 
Malaysia has enacted a framework of laws, decrees and regulations related to the 
status and rights of non-citizens. As elaborated earlier, these apply to non-citizens in a 
number of different ways – more generally as a person, a non-citizen, and an alien 
before the law; and more specifically, depending on their circumstances, as a worker, 
employee, stateless person, smuggled migrant, or trafficked person. However, some 
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important legal statuses that confer rights are not included in Malaysia’s domestic 
legal framework, in particular that of an asylum seeker and refugee.  
 
Through its immigration laws, the Malaysian state draws a rigid distinction between 
those who are ‘legal’ and those who are ‘illegal’ in its territory. The state provides 
law enforcement officers with extensive powers to stop, search, arrest, detain, punish, 
and deport those who cannot prove that they have the legal right to remain in 
Malaysia. Over the years, the punishment meted out to transgressors has increased in 
severity, the most torturous being the practice of whipping.  
 
The delineation between those who are ‘legal’ and those who are ‘illegal’ has a direct 
impact on whether an individual is protected by the law. Non-citizens with irregular 
status who suffer violations of human and labour rights face great difficulty in gaining 
access to justice. As such, their perpetrators enjoy impunity, which further increases 
their vulnerability. In Agamben’s words, they are effectively abandoned – “exposed 
and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become 
indistinguishable” (Agamben 1998:28). Effectively, they no longer bear rights while 
they remain in Malaysia even as the law ‘captures’ them. 
 
Nevertheless, on the few occasions where non-citizens have been able to arrange for 
legal defence, the judiciary has upheld their rights as codified in the laws of Malaysia. 
However, the Malaysian judiciary stays within the limits of the powers granted to it 
by Parliament and observes ouster clauses. In so doing, it limits itself in the extent to 




The Exercise of Disciplinary Power: Surveillance, Inspection, the Sponsorship-
based Immigration System and Relations of Dependence on Citizens 
The system of immigration passes is the central component of the state’s exercise of 
disciplinary power. It is through this system that the state defines and regulates the 
conduct of individuals. Inside spaces of detention, the state is able to conduct close 
surveillance over detainees, paying attention to what they wear, what they possess, 
and how they behave. However, the state does not have the resources to conduct 
continuous surveillance over all non-citizens outside spaces of detention. Instead, the 
state regulates non-citizens through inspections, conducted both systematically, 
during the issuance and renewal of immigration passes, and randomly, through 
immigration operations. Foreign workers and foreign domestic workers are subject to 
stricter, more frequent and more invasive inspection than expatriates.  
 
Migrant workers and foreign spouses are issued with immigration passes on the basis 
of sponsorship – migrant workers sponsored by their Malaysian employers and 
foreign spouses by their Malaysian husbands/wives. In order to obtain renewals on 
passes, sponsors must indicate their continuing support of the non-citizen’s residence 
in Malaysia. This introduces another regime of regulation for non-citizens, placing 
them in relations of dependence on citizens. Non-citizens who do not conduct 
themselves appropriately in relation to their sponsor risk jeopardizing their support for 
the renewals of passes. The frequency of the renewals required – every year for 
foreign workers and foreign domestic workers, and in the past, every 3-12 months for 
foreign spouses – has had an impact on their level of docility. The sponsorship system 
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is a way in which the state delegates disciplinary power to citizens, involving them in 
the individualised regulation of non-citizens. 
 
The Exercise of Governmental Power: The Hierarchy of Deservedness 
The notion of non-citizens as separate, subordinate and temporary in Malaysian 
society has been internalised by citizens and non-citizens alike. In this section, I argue 
that these ‘truths’ produce a social order through which individuals view, compare 
and place groups in society. Through a socially constructed hierarchy of 
deservedness, members of society view some groups as deserving of more rights and 
entitlements than others. Members of society judge the legitimacy of state action in 
granting, promoting, and protecting rights according to this hierarchy. A disruption 
occurs when a group at the lower end of the hierarchy enjoys more rights and/or 
entitlements than those at the higher end. Such disruptions trigger feelings of 
dissatisfaction amongst those at the higher end; they feel that they have been treated 
unfairly. 
 
The hierarchy of deservedness is constructed through two levels of interconnected 
frameworks, which operate as ‘dividing practices’. The first level divides and orders 
populations into three primary categories – citizens, regularized non-citizens, and 
non-citizens with irregular status. This first framework is more universal and 
dominant; it is used by every state and has become fundamental to the exercise of 
sovereignty over populations. Members of society expect that citizens have the most 
rights and entitlements, followed by regularized non-citizens, and non-citizens with 
irregular status.  
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The second level comprises a number of frameworks that further divide the three 
primary categories into sub-categories. Examples of second-level frameworks are 
ethnicity, religion, gender, types of immigration status, perceptions of value, or 
intersections of these dimensions of difference. Unlike the first level framework, 
which has become universal, second level frameworks are context-specific, contested 
and negotiated. There is greater flexibility in the definition and use of second level 
frameworks. There may be multiple – even competing – frameworks, and these 
frameworks can also change over time. 
 
Secondary frameworks conform to the primary framework. That is, within the 
category of citizens, second level frameworks create sub-categories of citizens, which 
are also ordered in a hierarchy, as well as sub-categories of regularized non-citizens 
and non-citizens with irregular status which are also ordered in hierarchies. Secondary 
frameworks that construct non-citizen sub-categories operate differently from those 
that construct citizen sub-categories. Citizens as a whole are a more firmly ‘bounded’ 
group; the state has a vested interest in keeping the criteria by which a person 
becomes a citizen relatively stable, and thus, in erecting barriers to entry. Citizen sub-
categories are more interdependent. Non-citizens, on the other hand, are a 
comparatively open-ended population; the state has a vested interest in maintaining a 
high level of discretion in deciding the absolute numbers of non-citizens in its 
territory. Their lives are not as interdependent as the lives of citizens. 
 
How does the hierarchy of deservedness apply in the context of Malaysia? Citizens 
occupy the highest level of the primary framework. However, citizens in Malaysia do 
not enjoy equal rights and entitlements; they are fragmented by social distinctions 
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such as ethnic-religious identity, indigeneity, gender and class. While the construction 
of ethno-religious identity is the most powerful means of establishing difference in 
Malaysia, both socially and politically, it is the construction of indigeneity that is used 
to legitimize the hierarchy of deservedness.309 The sub-categories formed on the basis 
of indigeneity and ethno-religious identity are: bumiputra – comprising Malays, 
Orang Asli, and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak – followed by non-Bumiputra – 
comprising Indians, Chinese, and other minorities. However, neither all bumiputra 
nor all non-bumiputra are treated the same. Some refer to Malays as the ‘first class 
bumiputra’ who are given better treatment than the Orang Asli and the natives of 
Sabah and Sarawak. On the basis of indigeneity, some continue to argue that 
bumiputra groups deserve special rights and entitlements, while others call for equal 
rights for all. At the moment, the secondary frameworks of ethno-religious identity, 
indigeneity, and class remain salient in perceptions and arguments about rights and 
entitlements amongst citizens in Malaysia. 
 
Aihwa Ong has observed the fragmentation of citizen groups and the differentiated 
exercise of sovereignty over them. Linking this to global capitalism, she states, 
Graduated sovereignty… refers to the differential treatment of populations – 
through schemes of biopolitical disciplining and pastoral care – that 
differently insert them into the processes of global capitalism. These 
gradations of governing may be in a continuum, but they overlap with pre-
formed racial, religious and gender hierarchies, and further fragment 
                                                
309 The construction of indigeneity is fundamentally based on the idea of migration; it 
is premised on the idea that some groups have greater claim to special privileges 
because they have longer histories in the land than citizens of ‘immigrant stock’, 
regardless of their actual genealogies in the land.  
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citizenships for people who are all, nominally-speaking, citizens of the same 
country (A. Ong 2000:62) 
 
 In relation to Malaysia, she states: “The pastoral power that has been employed on 
behalf of the Malays has unevenly favored the middle and upper classes, and the 
Malays as a community enjoy more rights, benefits and claims than non-Malays”  
 
Regularized non-citizens are the second primary category, occupying the place below 
citizens in the hierarchy of deservedness. Regularised non-citizens are further divided 
into sub-categories, with some given more rights and entitlements than others. In the 
context of Malaysia, I suggest that the Malaysian state fragments them according to a 
calculation of their potential contribution to the Malaysian ‘nation’. Potential 
contribution is measured in two ways: in relation to the economy, that is, assessing 
their immediate financial contribution as well as their capacity to fill shortages of 
required skills; and on the basis of ethnicity, in terms of their capacity to strengthen 
the numbers of the political dominant ethnic group. The latter is politically 
controversial. 
 
Permanent residents lie at the top of the sub-categories of regularised non-citizens. 
They have the right to work, reside, marry and have families, as well as to leave and 
re-enter Malaysia freely. They can acquire property in any part of Malaysia. They do 
not need a sponsor for their immigration permit. After ten years of residence, they are 
able to qualify for citizenship by naturalisation. In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Malaysian state made it very easy for Indonesian migrants to obtain permanent 
resident status. Historically, Indonesians have been seen as being ‘of the same nation’ 
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(serumpun bangsa) as Malay Muslims. The current official policy on permanent 
residence is to grant it to ‘high net worth individuals’ (those able to deposit two 
million US Dollars into a Malaysian bank for five years), ‘experts’, ‘professionals’, 
spouses of Malaysian citizens, and applicants approved through the point-based 
system. However, some Malaysians are still suspicious that Indonesian migrants who 
do not fulfil these criteria also obtain permanent resident status easily. 
 
Expatriates lie below permanent residents in the hierarchy. They too have the right to 
work, reside, marry and have families, as well as to leave and re-enter Malaysia freely 
on their immigration passes. However, they are only allowed to acquire certain types 
of property with special permission. They need an employer as a sponsor for their 
immigration pass. They cannot change jobs without the permission of the 
Immigration Department; if they do so, they must observe a six-month ‘cooling off’ 
period during which they cannot work. They do not qualify for citizenship, but they 
can apply for permanent residence after five years and citizenship after ten years of 
residence as a permanent resident. Beginning in 2011, highly qualified expatriates 
who have lived and worked in Malaysia for at least three years on a continuous basis 
qualify to apply for a Residence Pass, which allows them a longer (ten-year) 
residence period in Malaysia and the right to work with the freedom to change 
employers. On a Residence Pass, they do not need to have an employer as a sponsor. 
 
Foreign workers and foreign domestic workers lie at the next level, contributing low 
and semi-skilled labour. They have the right to work and reside in Malaysia, but not 
to marry and have families. They cannot acquire property in Malaysia. They are also 
not permitted to leave and re-enter Malaysia freely on their immigration pass. They 
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need an employer as a sponsor and cannot change jobs without the permission of the 
Immigration Department. They do not qualify for citizenship and cannot apply for 
permanent resident status. 
 
Foreign spouses are an anomaly in the state’s calculation of the value of non-citizens. 
Unlike migrant workers, foreign spouses do not enter Malaysia for an explicit 
economic purpose. They also marry citizens of different ethnic groups, and more 
often than not come from different ethnic, religious and/or cultural groups themselves, 
and as such, do not necessarily strengthen the numbers of the politically dominant 
Malay-Muslims. Until 2008, foreign spouses had the right to reside in Malaysia only 
on short-term passes of 3-12 months duration. They were only allowed to acquire 
certain types of property with special permission. They neither had the right to work 
nor to leave and re-enter Malaysia freely. They needed a sponsor for their 
immigration status. They could apply for permanent resident status after five years, 
but experienced long delays in getting their applications approved. While waiting, 
their time in Malaysia did not qualify as ‘residence’ for citizenship applications. They 
were effectively prevented from gaining citizenship by registration. 
 
Foreign spouses have contested the state’s approach to their position in society, 
arguing for a wider interpretation of their contribution to the Malaysian nation. 
Instead of just being calculated on the basis of their economic contribution as 
workers, they have sought recognition for their affective and nurturing roles as 
spouses and parents of citizens. However, state authorities have been suspicious of 
their ‘true motives’. As a result, foreign spouses have been forced to live precarious, 
contingent lives, unclear of their long-term future in Malaysia. Only when the state 
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identified them as a latent pool of talented workers for the economy did it extend 
them the right to longer residency periods and the right to work with the freedom to 
change employers. As such, foreign spouses have slightly better entitlements than 
expatriates, but do not have the right to unlimited residence or the right to buy 
property enjoyed by permanent residents. Many foreign spouses are pleased with the 
loosening of these restrictions on residence and work, but do not feel secure until they 
are granted permanent resident status. 
 
At the bottom of the primary framework – below all the sub-categories of citizens and 
regularised non-citizens – lie non-citizens with irregular status. They are considered 
the least deserving of rights and entitlements. They too, are fragmented by a state-
imposed secondary framework based the legitimacy of their reasons for illegality. 
Asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons lie at the highest level of this series of 
sub-categories. While still officially ‘illegal’, state authorities have started to 
recognise that they are in Malaysia because they flee persecution, reasons 
championed by UNHCR and considered legitimate by the international community. 
As stated earlier, UNHCR has been able to advocate for some to be spared from 
arrest, punishment for immigration offences, detention, and deportation. 310 
Malaysia’s practice of granting some groups of Muslim refugees temporary work 
passes suggest that state authorities have responded more sensitively to the protection 
needs of those who share the religious features of the dominant citizen population. 
 
                                                
310 As noted in Chapter 7, the judiciary recognises that asylum seekers and refugees 
should be differentiated from irregular migrants in relation to punishment for 
immigration offences; specifically, they should not be whipped. 
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At the next level, below them, are migrant workers who have lost their status because 
they have been cheated or abused. The Immigration Department allows some of them 
to be transferred to other employers (albeit rarely), and also allows some of them to 
remain in Malaysia on Special Passes (albeit temporarily). Below this sub-category 
are ‘over-stayers’, non-citizens who stay in Malaysia after the expiry of their 
immigration passes. This offence is punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment. The 
lowest of all in the whole hierarchy of deservedness are non-citizens who enter 
Malaysia illegally. This offence is punishable not just by a fine and/or imprisonment, 
but also by whipping.311 
 
What is the significance of this hierarchy of deservedness? Why does it matter where 
and how each sub-category is placed? Firstly, restrictions in the rights and 
entitlements of those placed in the higher sub-categories legitimize the restrictions 
placed on those in the lower sub-categories, making the latter difficult to challenge. 
One example is the state-imposed requirement for all individuals to carry identity 
documents. Citizens are required to carry a national identity card at all times, which 
states their name, address, gender and date of birth along with a photo and 
thumbprint. The national identity card was introduced as a mechanism to monitor and 
control population movements during the war against Communism. At present, all 
non-citizens are also required to carry identity documents with them wherever they go 
and are in danger of getting arrested if they fail to produce these upon demand. This 
                                                
311 Although there are slightly different approaches to these sub-categories of non-
citizens in law, policy and practice, the discourse concerning ‘illegal immigrants’ is 
so powerful that these subtle differences are often masked; many members of the 
public and law enforcement officers do not recognise the fine differences between the 
different sub-categories. Thus, while the hierarchy exists at the sub-level, the social 
effects are less salient than the sub-categories for citizens and regularised non-
citizens.  
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imposition ‘makes sense’ to Malaysian citizens, because they too, are required to 
carry identity documents wherever they go. It is difficult for human rights advocates 
to call for this requirement to be abolished for non-citizens if citizens themselves are 
subject to this requirement. Another example is the lack of minimum wage. 
Malaysian citizens do not have minimum wage guarantees, despite years of lobbying 
by trade unions and worker organizations. As such, it would upset the ‘natural order 
of things’ for foreign workers to be given minimum wage guarantees and citizens not; 
it would be ‘unfair’.  
 
Comparisons are made not just in relation to citizens, but also between non-citizen 
groups. For example, UNHCR and civil society actors have called for refugees to be 
given temporary legal status and for them to have the right to work and to reside in 
Malaysia with their families until they can return safely to their countries of origin. 
However, UNHCR and civil society actors have refrained from calling for refugees to 
be given permanent resident status and placed on a pathway to citizenship, even 
though local integration is the most fitting and appropriate option of the three 
universal ‘durable solutions’ for refugee populations in Malaysia. UNHCR and civil 
society actors have also refrained from calling for Malaysia to give stateless children 
(such as Rohingyas) citizenship, even though this is provided for in the Federal 
Constitution. These calls would upset the ‘natural order of things’, as most regularised 
non-citizens do not enjoy these rights and entitlements; it would be ‘unfair’ for 
asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons to enjoy these when migrant workers 
and foreign spouses who have ‘played by the rules’ do not. Such requests also jar the 
secondary framework of the state in extending rights and entitlements to non-citizens 
according to their potential contribution to the nation, as the economic value of 
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asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons is unclear and their ethno-religious 
identity varied. 
 
In short, the restrictions and controls placed on those higher in the hierarchy have a 
legitimizing effect on those placed lower in the hierarchy. The removal of restrictions 
and controls for those in the lower sub-categories are only deemed fair if they are also 
removed for those in the higher sub-categories. Similarly, the rights and entitlements 
extended to those in the lower sub-categories cannot exceed those enjoyed by those in 
higher sub-categories; this would also be perceived to be unfair. Thus, the hierarchy 
of deservedness has the capacity to shape rights advocacy by members of society, by 
shaping their perceptions of ‘fairness’ concerning the allocation of rights and 
entitlements. 
 
Non-citizens have been able to gain greater rights and entitlements by getting state 
authorities to recognise them as belonging to a higher sub-category. Some non-
citizens who are foreign spouses, for example, have gained the right to work and to 
longer periods of residence as expatriates rather than as foreign spouses. Some non-
citizens who are irregular migrant workers have sought status as recognised refugees. 
In short, individuals exercise agency in relation to the hierarchy, negotiating better 
terms for themselves by getting re-categorised. This is an easier approach than 
lobbying for the social, political, legal and administrative change needed to reshape 
the hierarchy. 
 
Recognised refugees are also an anomaly in this hierarchy, in two ways. Firstly, 
unlike the other sub-categories of non-citizens, it is not the state that determines their 
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status but UNHCR. UNHCR RSD procedures do not require the provision of 
documents, the payment of fees, or the sponsorship of individuals (which are required 
for Malaysian regularisation procedures) – it is based on UNHCR officers assessing 
the narratives of asylum seekers and evaluating if they meet the criteria for refugee 
status under the 1951 Refugee Convention. As such, technically, anyone can be an 
asylum seeker if they can get themselves registered with UNHCR – there are 
comparatively fewer barriers to access than for other legal statuses for non-citizens. 
Secondly, recognised refugees have access to resources provided by the international 
community, of which the most prized is resettlement – the free, facilitated transfer to 
a developed country with unlimited rights to reside and work and a pathway to 
citizenship. This benefit is not provided to anyone else in the hierarchy. Indeed, there 
have been cases where permanent residents and authorised migrant workers have 
disguised their legal status and sought asylum with UNHCR, hoping to get resettled. 
 
The intervention of UNHCR with regards to asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless 
persons is an example of how a hierarchy of deservedness constructed at the national 
level through laws, policies, and practices can be challenged and permeated by global 
governance regimes that utilise different frameworks for determining the rights and 
entitlements of individuals. The hierarchy of deservedness is socially constructed; it 
evolves and changes over time. There are pressures – both internal and international – 
to change the structure of the hierarchy of deservedness, both in terms of the 
secondary framework used sub-divide populations and the types of rights and 




In this research, I have sought to understand the exercise of state power over non-
citizens. From the perspectives of non-citizens ‘captured’ by its immigration control 
regimes, Malaysia has tremendous power over their lives. Malaysia guides and 
regulates their behaviour through different techniques, shaping how they are viewed 
in society and influencing how they should view themselves. The state has the 
capacity to exercise legitimate violence in punishing non-citizens who fail to conduct 
themselves appropriately. However, there are limits to the exercise of state power, 
most notably the necessity for the state to be prudent in how it balances and aligns its 
population, territory and economy; how it responds to global governance regimes 
concerning non-citizens; how it manages the expectations of citizens; and how it 
addresses the subversive capacity of its bureaucracy.  
 
I have argued that Malaysia conceives of non-citizens as being separate, subordinate 
and temporary in Malaysian society, and that this conceptualisation undergirds the 
techniques of government it employs towards different categories of non-citizens. The 
state has recruited citizens to be its agents in the exercise of power – getting RELA 
volunteers to arrest irregular migrants; employers to manage and discipline migrant 
workers; and Malaysian husbands and wives to vouch for the good behaviour of their 
foreign spouses. By ‘delegating’ disciplinary power, the state expands its reach.  
 
The state has also contributed to the creation of a particular social order, which I call 
the hierarchy of deservedness, which both reflects and shapes the sentiments of 
members of society. This hierarchy has become a way in which citizens and non-
citizens view themselves and judge the legitimacy of state action in allocating rights 
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and entitlements. However, this hierarchy is socially constructed and dynamic, and 
there are contests to the way in which it operates, from within and without. This 
hierarchy, which operates most powerfully at the national level, is a way in which 
state authorities exercise governmental power. This is only possible with the 
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